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*Culture, Institutions, and Neoliberalism in France,
1974-1981—Prasad*

Is Power Sexy?—Martin

Collaboration and Creativity—Uzzi and Spiro

*The Role of Political Parties in Women's National Political
Representation—Kunovich and Paxton*

*Black-White Wage Inequality, Employment Rates, and
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*Law and Law Enforcement in Germany and the United
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CONTRIBUTORS

MONICA PRASAD is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and a faculty fellow of the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. Her book, *The Politics of Free Markets*, is forthcoming from the University of Chicago Press.

JOHN LEVI MARTIN received a PhD in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley and is now associate professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison and Rutgers University, New Brunswick. His work concentrates on the formal properties of belief systems and social structures; other recent publications deal with field theory, the numerical analysis of qualitative data, the use of race as a conceptual category in American sociology, and the gendering of power dynamics. His current projects include the development of local social structures, the rationalization of infantry war, and pseudospacial models for response data.

BRIAN UZZI is professor of management and professor of sociology at Northwestern University. His research has focused on social embeddedness and the network analysis of ego and global-level networks. He is currently studying network dynamics, with an emphasis on threshold models of consumption behavior and the emergence of self-organizing networks in diverse types of creative enterprises (see *Science* April 28, 2005).

JARRETT SPIRO is a PhD candidate in business administration (specializing in organizational behavior) at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. His research interests include network emergence, network dynamics, organization form emergence, and complexity theory.

SHERI KUNOVICH is assistant professor of sociology at Southern Methodist University. Her main areas of interest are women's political participation, the sociology of wealth and consumption, and intergenerational exchanges.

PAMELA PAXTON is associate professor of sociology at the Ohio State University. She has intersecting interests in political sociology, prosocial behavior, and methodology. Some of her previous research on women in politics appears in *Social Science Research* and *Social Forces*. Her current research focuses on women's political participation over time and multilevel models of trust in individuals.

BRUCE WESTERN is professor of sociology at Princeton University. He is currently finishing a book on the causes, scope, and social impact of growth in the American penal system. He also has research interests in the sociology of labor markets, comparative patterns of economic inequality, and statistical methods for comparative research.

BECKY PETTIT is assistant professor of sociology at the University of

Washington Her research focuses on demographic processes and social inequality In addition to her work examining the role of the prison system in racial and class inequality in employment and earnings in the United States, she is working on a project studying structural and institutional explanations for cross-country variation in women's labor force participation and gender inequality in earnings

JOACHIM J SAVELSBERG is professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota Recent publications are on religious roots of penal regimes (*Law and Social Inquiry* 2004) and on institutional conditions of criminological knowledge (*Social Forces* 2004, *Criminology* 2004, *Social Problems* 2002) They build on earlier work on the institutional conditions of penal knowledge and practices (*American Journal of Sociology* 1992, 1994, *Punishment and Society* 1999)

RYAN D KING is assistant professor of sociology at the University at Albany, SUNY His present research investigates jurisdictional variation in the implementation of hate crime policies in the United States, the precursors of punitive attitudes, and contemporary American anti-Semitism Related work on the politics of crime control and European anti-Semitism has recently appeared in *Social Forces*, *Social Problems*, and the *International Political Science Review*

Why Is France So French? Culture, Institutions, and Neoliberalism, 1974–1981¹

Monica Prasad
Northwestern University

French capitalism has changed in many ways in the last two decades, but France has not seen the extreme neoliberalism of Britain and the United States. The author first provides evidence that the French pattern is not caused by adherence to cultural traditions of egalitarianism. The author then uses historical and interview data to compare the French case with the American counterexample. The argument is that France has adopted a “pragmatic neoliberalism” because in the postwar period it had adopted a “pragmatic state interventionism” designed not to further goals of social justice, but to turn an agricultural country into an industrial one. Moreover, neoliberalism in the United States required a remarkable degree of extreme political innovation which has not been possible in France.

Whatever criteria we use to measure the size of the state, France has a larger state than Britain, Germany, or the United States. French tax revenues are among the highest in the world, the proportion of the total workforce working for the state is higher than in the other three countries, and the amount the state pays for goods and services is greater as a percentage of GDP. In addition, the size of the welfare state is slightly larger than in Britain and Germany and much larger than in the United

¹ This article has been in the works for a long time, and I am grateful to the many people at several campuses and at the American Sociological Association annual meeting who made time in their busy schedules to comment on previous versions, particularly Andrew Abbott, George Steinmetz, William Parish, Pierre Rosanvallon, Steve Rosenberg, Jeremy Straughn, and the *AJS* reviewers. I thank Laurent Berthet for research assistance. I am also grateful for funding from the University of Chicago’s exchange program with the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and from the University of Michigan’s Rackham Graduate School. Direct correspondence to Monica Prasad, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1810 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, Illinois 60208. E-mail: m-prasad@northwestern.edu

States (and was much larger than Germany's until the costs of reunification pushed up Germany's social expenditures) And an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) index of state control summarizing public ownership and the state's involvement in industry places France higher than the other three countries (table 1)

At the same time, the French state is no longer as interventionist as it was during most of the postwar period price controls have been abolished, many industries have been privatized, labor and financial markets have been deregulated, and increasing integration with Europe has forced adherence to a more liberal monetary and exchange rate policy (Schmidt 1996, Gordon and Meunier 2001, Levy 1999b) In some cases, such as in privatization, the reason for the higher French levels is that the starting point was higher in France when the "neoliberal revolution" hit However, in other cases (e g , taxation and total state consumption), the French state has *grown* in the last few decades, to a much greater extent than in the other countries (figs 1–2)

Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002) summarize the contradictory indicators by calling the French changes a "pragmatic" neoliberalism, in contrast to the more radical and ideological changes that have taken place elsewhere (see also Amable and Hancké 2001) The particular nature of this pragmatic neoliberalism is puzzling If an observer in the 1970s had been told that France was about to undergo several neoliberal changes, she would have predicted that the main change would be reduction in the taxation and the "social costs" that make France one of the most expensive places to run a business As for the nationalized industries, she would have expected them to remain under state control, because, unlike the nationalized industries in Britain, they had support from across the political spectrum But 30 years on, it is privatization that has been the most noticeable feature of French neoliberalism, while taxation and social costs remain undiminished In this article I investigate three policy domains—tax policy, industrial policy, and welfare state policy—to ask why French neoliberalism took the particular shape that it did These three domains cover the most frequent sites of neoliberal assault on the size of the state and allow a broad analysis of changes in French economic policy over the last three decades They also include one domain where there has been great change in France (industrial policy), one where there has been almost no change (tax policy), and one where there have been several attempts at change with varying degrees of success (welfare state policy)

France is not the only OECD country to post high measures of state size along many dimensions Sweden, Finland, and the Benelux countries still have large states, as do less developed countries like Portugal But because of its economic and geopolitical weight, France has managed to become a symbol of resistance to Anglo-American-style neoliberalism in

TABLE 1
MEASURES OF STATE SIZE

Country	Total Tax Revenue as % GDP (2001)	Public Sector Labor Force as % Total Workforce (1999)	Compensation Costs for the Public Sector as % GDP (1997)	General Government Consumption as % GDP (1998)	Social Expenditure as % GDP (1998)	Index of State Control in Industry
France	45.0	18.3	11.03	23.54	29.52	2.63
Germany	36.9	11.0	8.38	19.01	29.24	1.76
United Kingdom	37.3		7.84	18.17	25.59	55
United States	28.9	13.9		14.47	14.96	85

SOURCES — Total Tax Revenue, OECD Revenue Statistics, Public Sector Labor Force, OECD 2002—note that this measure includes defense sector employees, otherwise the US figure would be much lower, Compensation Costs, OECD 2001, Government Consumption, World Bank 1960–99 World Development Indicators, Social Expenditure, OECD Social Expenditure Database, Index of State Control (including public ownership and state involvement in business operations, see also the similar rankings in indices of product market regulation and employment protection legislation), Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (2000)




FIG 1—Total tax revenue as % GDP (OECD 1965–2002)

popular opinion (see, e.g., Friedman 2000). Moreover, France has always been something of a distinctive case in comparative political economy when corporatism was the ruling paradigm, France did not fit the corporatist model because of the weakness of its labor unions, now that the “varieties of capitalism” paradigm has taken over the field, France continues to resist incorporation, since it is clearly not anything like the “liberal” economies of the United States or Britain, but also not like the “coordinated” German economy (Hall and Soskice 2001).² This characteristic of French political economy, combined with its visible role on the world stage, make France a compelling case in the evolution of contemporary capitalism.

To understand the French changes, two concepts need to be clarified. First, a larger state does not necessarily mean a political economy that is oriented toward issues of social justice. In tax, welfare, and industrial policy, the French state in the immediate postwar period was oriented not toward social goals, but toward economic growth. France’s postwar regime might best be characterized as a strong state put at the service of capital, all in the service of nationalism. The French state turned an agricultural and artisanal economy into an economy based on heavy industry like its European neighbors. It was able to do this through a tax structure that is less progressive than in the United States, a welfare state aimed toward social insurance for the middle classes (to cushion the transition to an industrial economy) rather than redistribution, and an in-

² But see the discussion of the work of Bob Hancké below.




FIG 2 —General government consumption as % GDP (World Bank 1960–99)

dustrial policy oriented toward economic growth rather than full employment. In other words, the French postwar policy was a “pragmatic state interventionism” quite unlike that of the United States, with its progressive tax structure and antibusiness regulations (cf. Steinmo 1993, Kato 2003, Lindert 2004, Vogel 1986). France remained one of the most inegalitarian countries of the advanced capitalist world for most of the postwar period (see table 2, cf. Cameron 1991, Levy 1999a, 1999b).³

Second, a conceptual distinction is necessary between the state as the site of policy innovation and the state as the means of policy implementation. These have been confused in the recent literature, which takes the wave of French privatizations and other reorganizations as evidence against a “state-centered” argument. “The statist view appears to neglect what characterized French economic and industrial policy most during the 1980s and 1990s, namely the attempts by the state to retreat from direct economic and industrial policy-making” (Hancké 2002, p. 24). But the process of this retreat has been state led, and it is precisely this fact, I will argue in this article, that explains the particular shape of the retreat. That is, although the means of policy implementation have changed such that the state’s degree of direct intervention in the economy is much lower, the particular shape of those changes is explained by the effects of previous policies on politics and the effect of the structure of the state on policy innovation—classic “state-centered” variables.

These two conceptual distinctions create a framework for understanding what has happened in France. The orientation toward economic

³ During the early years this may have been a consequence of the large role of agriculture in the French economy, but by 1975 farmers and agricultural laborers made up only 7.5% of the population (Smith 2004, p. 75).

TABLE 2
INCOME INEQUALITY COMPARED AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

RANK*	GINI COEFFICIENT		THEIL STATISTIC	
	1970	1992	1970	1992
1	United Kingdom	Spain	Norway	Norway
2	Sweden	Finland	Finland	Denmark
3	Belgium	Belgium	Denmark	Finland
4	Netherlands	Netherlands	Germany	Netherlands
5	Finland	Italy	Netherlands	Sweden
6	Germany	Germany	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
7	Denmark	United Kingdom	Belgium	Germany
8	Greece	Sweden	Sweden	Belgium
9	Spain	Denmark	Greece	Austria
10	Norway	Norway	France	Greece
11	Portugal	France	Austria	Portugal
12	Italy	Greece	Italy	France
13	France	Portugal		Spain
14				Italy

SOURCE — Conceição, Ferreira, and Galbraith (1999, p. 18)

* Rank 1 is least unequal, 14 most unequal

growth (rather than social justice) has remained stable throughout the entire postwar period even as the means to attain growth have changed, and the incentives and resources of state actors (rather than cultural discourses or class interests) have remained the main source of policy innovation

With these distinctions in mind, this article suggests that France did not witness the same kinds of change as the United States and Britain did for two reasons. First, at the end of the Second World War, France had a much more heavily agricultural economy than the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Therefore, the intensification in state interventionism that followed the war everywhere was implemented in a peculiar manner in France: the difficulties of the development of reliable income tax collection in an agricultural economy, plus the ideological leanings of the postwar governments of the Right, made France miss the great wave of rapidly rising income taxes that swept other countries (where income taxes went up to finance the war, but did not come all the way back down after the war), and so France has remained reliant on indirect sales taxes, which are “invisible” and do not provoke resistance (Wilensky 2002, Cameron 1978, Hibbs and Madsen 1981, Flora and Heidenheimer 1981). And the welfare state in France was developed by the Right and has been based on the principle of social insurance for the middle classes, rather than on redistribution of wealth between classes; this has generated loyalty to the welfare state across classes (Esping-

Andersen 1990, 1996, 1999, Scharpf and Schmidt 2000) and has mitigated the negative effects of social spending on economic growth (Lindert 2004). Tax policy and welfare state policy have thus been resilient because of the way in which they are rooted in electoral interests. Industrial policy, however, has not been similarly rooted in electoral interest and has therefore been more subject to the incentives of politicians, but throughout the postwar period it has been guided by the same goal to make France competitive with its more industrialized neighbors (Schonfield 1965, Hall 1986, Schmidt 1996). All of these features add up to a resilient political-economic structure.

Second, several elements of the French political structure made it less innovative than others. Until 1981, no president had ever lost an election in Fifth Republic France, and so the intense political competition that led to major innovation in, for example, Margaret Thatcher's Britain was not seen in France. In France, parties still finance political campaigns, so the entrepreneurship seen in the American case—where, for example, a junior congressman, hoping to broaden his national reputation, brought the issue of tax cuts to political attention—is not as extreme. Power is centralized in the French government, so the number of points at which new innovations can enter the agenda is smaller, making tax cuts—like those that entered the agenda in West Germany because of losses in provincial elections—unlikely. Bureaucracies are staffed by cautious and careful technocrats rather than by political appointees, so the haphazard budget making of the Reagan era in the United States, which allowed the large deficits of the 1980s, is not seen in France. Finally, interest groups are excluded from routine decision making, so innovations cannot enter the political agenda as easily as they did with deregulation in the United States (for more on the British, German, and American cases, see Prasad [in press]). Innovation in France, instead, came from three sources: backlash to the policies of previous governments, imitation of other countries, and the technocracy, and all three of these sources produced moderate innovations.⁴

In sum, the argument of this article is that the legacies of state-led industrialization in the postwar period created a resilient political-economic structure that benefits business and the middle classes and increases loyalty to the status quo in France, and the exclusion of interest

⁴ I should note at the outset that “innovative” does not necessarily mean “better.” Innovative governments come up with and implement bad policies as well as good ones. The radical innovations of the American case have resulted in rising inequality and high relative poverty, but also higher GDP per capita and lower unemployment than in France, and in some cases, the opposite of the “innovative state” is “the responsible state.” Innovation is a mixed blessing.

groups and the continued strength of parties and other political structures dampen political innovation in France

I use the French case to critique and modify theories of “path dependence.” Path dependence has become a quite popular explanatory tool in the social sciences. The basic idea is that certain identifiable features of complex systems can make reversal of a system decision much more difficult and unlikely than the original choice of the decision had been. For these reasons, practices that may have once been efficient, or that were simply chosen accidentally, can persist long after their inefficiency has become evident. Economists have used this insight to explain, for example, why some countries remain poor. Arthur (1994) notes four particular features that make causation one-way: startup costs, learning costs, coordination costs, and adaptive expectations. Once a particular path is chosen, investments must be made in this path, and if the path is later altered those investments, the startup costs, would be lost; similarly, once a path is chosen individuals begin to learn how to navigate it, and their efforts at learning would be lost and would have to be begun again if the choice were altered. For these reasons, chosen paths tend to persist. Coordination costs occur when the benefits of a technology multiply the more users use it, to switch to a different technology would mean sacrificing those additional benefits. And adaptive expectations are the self-fulfilling predictions individuals make when, aware of coordination costs, they attempt to choose the technology that will attract the most users. Coordination costs and adaptive expectations mean that the first technology out of the gate may gain a lasting advantage, even if it is demonstrably inferior to later competitors. Pierson (2000b) builds on Arthur’s work and adds the insight that path dependence is much more likely in the social world, because certain features that “correct” path dependence in economics—competitive pressures and learning processes, both of which reduce the persistence of inefficiency—are attenuated outside of the economic sphere (see also Mahoney 2000, 2001, Collier and Collier 1991).

There are two problems with applying this model of path dependence to policy making. First, the basic fact of representative democracy is that those making the decisions on whether or not to adopt policy changes are not the ones bearing the costs of those changes: politicians externalize the costs of change, in that the startup costs, learning costs, and coordination costs are borne by those who must implement the policy and those who are the subjects of the policy, rather than by those who are deciding upon the policy. Politicians’ own cost-benefit calculations are based on criteria that are partially independent of the question of the costs of adopting the new policy. Thus, the path-dependence framework needs to be reformulated if it is to be useful to the study of policy making in representative democracies. Second, the model of the social world that underlies the

theory is one in which innovations arise randomly, but are blocked from implementation because of the costs of change. However, another way in which decisions made at prior moments can alter what happens at later moments far removed in time is that prior decisions can change the likelihood that other paths will be discovered or developed. That is, there can be systematic difference in policy innovation. Prior decisions can influence the rate of innovation itself or the kind of innovations produced. We know from the sociology of organizations that several factors can increase the rate of innovative activity within organizations, including decentralized authority structures, specialization and functional differentiation of units, slack resources, and internal and external communication (Damanpour 1991). If at a certain point one rather than another of these organizational factors is adopted, it can set the organization on different paths with respect to the degree of innovation generated and therefore with respect to the potential alternative paths available for cost comparisons with the path chosen. In this conceptualization, causation is also one-way, because innovations, once invented, cannot be uninvented. This is a conception of path dependence that is much more broadly applicable to explanations of social phenomena.

I suggest in this article that there are political analogues to the factors that increase innovation in economic organizations. In particular, weak parties, tight informal linkages with interest groups, a tradition of amateurs in politics, and decentralized state structures combined to increase political innovation in the United States, conversely, less intense political competition, strong parties, weak interest groups, professional bureaucracies, and a centralized state combined to dampen political innovation in France in the postwar period. In the United States, increased innovation led to a dynamic in which politicians rapidly discovered a set of neoliberal policies that would appeal to the increasingly prosperous majority. Political innovation in France during this period came from the bureaucracy, from imitation of other countries, and from backlash to previous policies, and thus remained moderate, neoliberal politicians found themselves unable to discover a neoliberalism that would appeal to the majority.

Thus, I argue that a better framework for understanding how political paths persist (and when they change) is found by looking at what policies do for and to the incentives of state actors, and how previous policies structure innovation. I suggest that adversarial policies do several things to influence the consequent path of policy development: they define categories of opposed combatants, structure information flows to reinforce these categories, and strengthen the coalitions that struggled to get them passed. In addition, prior conditions can determine the way in which policy innovation occurs.

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

The history of neoliberalism in post-oil-crisis France is a history of stops and starts. Since 1973 the question of the proper limits of state intervention in the market has moved increasingly, but very slowly, to the center of the French political stage. Between 1976 and 1981, a government that might be called "proto-neoliberal" ruled France. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Raymond Barre had indicated preferences for reducing state intervention, and they accomplished important free-market objectives like the end of price control, in 1979 members of Margaret Thatcher's administration were said to admire Barre's economic policies (*The Guardian* 1979b). But in comparison to the neoliberalism of Reagan and Thatcher, the aims were modest, and the results even more so—tax revenues and government spending increased during this period, and privatization was briefly mentioned, but never attempted. The second neoliberal moment came in 1986–88. After devastating electoral defeats in 1981, the Right roared back to win the 1986 legislative elections decisively, so that Mitterrand became the first Fifth Republic president to have a prime minister not of his own party. Seeing both the failure of Mitterrand's attempt at "socialism in one country," and also the successes of Reagan and Thatcher, the Gaullists had adopted a neoliberal platform when he took office in 1986, Prime Minister Chirac announced that he wanted to reduce taxes from the 45% of GDP at which they currently stood, to 35%, to reduce spending 1% every year, and to privatize a total of 61 companies (Levy 1999a, p. 63). The tax cuts the government passed did not come anywhere close to this goal, but they did halt the path of rising tax revenue France had been on since the oil crisis. Corporate taxes and individual taxes were cut, and the tax structure was made more regressive, displaced "from business toward households, from the richest households toward those more poor, from already flourishing enterprises toward those not profitable, and from passive revenue (from capital) toward active revenue (from labor)" (Théret 1991, p. 345). In spending cuts, Chirac never went as far as Reagan (who proposed spending cuts to Congress before backing down in the face of opposition), or even West Germany's Kohl (who started out on an overhaul of the health system intended to reduce costs, but saw the plan picked apart by his own party). Spending cuts were taken off the agenda, probably because of fear of their unpopularity, and never again mentioned. Although privatizations did not go as far as the prime minister had announced before the stock market crash of 1987 called a halt to them, 13 state-owned companies were privatized.⁵

⁵ Later, Mitterrand was unable to finance and was forced to sell parts of four more major companies.

After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, a new dynamic is evident both parties have decided that at least some neoliberal reforms are necessary, both to try to meet the budgetary criteria of the EU's Growth and Stability Pact and to try to bring unemployment down (although Levy argues that the Left attempts to twist these reforms to the advantage of its traditional constituencies [2001])⁶ The main question has been whether or not the government can outmaneuver the trade unions in 1993–95, Prime Minister Balladur (under President Mitterrand) managed to make the tax structure more regressive, introduce health care and private sector pension reforms, and start a second wave of privatization Ironically, Chirac won the 1995 election partly by appealing to popular unhappiness with this neoliberal program—and then turned around and continued and even intensified it, his prime minister Alain Juppé attempted (unsuccessfully) to reform private sector pensions and health care, unleashing the greatest wave of general strikes in France since 1968 Juppé did manage to make the tax structure more regressive and continue with privatizations, at the end of these several rounds of privatization, 80% of the banking sector and 50% of the insurance sector had been privatized, and 12.6% of the total workforce had been moved from the public sector to the private sector Between 1997 and 2002, Gaullist president Chirac “cohabited” with Socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin Jospin represents the Left's acquiescence in the 1990s to privatization, which continued and even intensified under his term, with the privatization, most noticeably, of France Telecom, Credit Lyonnais, the insurance company CNP, and shares in Air France which attracted millions of investors, but Jospin did manage to shift the tax burden upward slightly and to extend health insurance Since 2002, Chirac has again had a Gaullist prime minister, Raffarin, who in 2003 implemented an important pension reform—which may have been responsible for the clear defeat the Right suffered at both the regional and European elections in 2004 (Vail 1999, 2004, Michel 2002, Levy 2001, Natali and Rhodes 2004, Schludi 2003)

This slow, three-decade-long process of liberalization is in sharp contrast to the American pattern In the United States, the administration of president Ronald Reagan passed a quick burst of legislation in the early 1980s—broad tax cuts, deregulation of industry, and cuts in government programs These policies seemed so significant at the time and were passed in such quick succession that many observers called the episode the “Reagan revolution” In tax policy in particular, 1981 was the year of the “Big Budget Bang” “Fiscal policy in all the years since was dominated by efforts to deal with the consequences of” the 1981 tax cut and the

⁶ The constraint of the EU's Growth and Stability Pact may be decreasingly important given both France and Germany's inability to meet it

deficits it produced (Stein 1996, p. 266). Although Reagan's successors raised taxes, even bringing the budget into surplus, the debt produced in the aftermath of the 1981 tax cut was never substantially reduced, and the George W. Bush administration has again increased it, approximately 12% of the American budget currently goes toward interest on debt.

The contrasting French and American patterns present an interesting theoretical anomaly, given the absence of checks and balances in the French case and the proliferation of them in the American federal states. They are thought to be less able to steer through great changes, because a multiplicity of veto points—sites in the decision-making process where actors can block change—makes it difficult to pass legislation that hurts anyone. Centralized states, on the other hand, are thought to be able to oversee great change, because those who would resist such change do not have access to any institutional means of blocking it (see Tsebelis [1995, 1999, 2002] for a recent restatement of the veto points thesis, see also Hall [1983] for a discussion of why the French state should be expected in general to be innovative). But in these cases, the fragmented US state saw rapid and extensive change, while the centralized French state has seen slow and moderate change. Obviously one counterinstance does not disprove the veto points theory. But, as Paige (1999) writes, the historical investigation of theoretical anomalies—cases that do not fit the pattern predicted by a theory—can be a fruitful method of conducting historical research that is informed by the attempt to learn from history and that in turn sharpens our theoretical understanding. Anomalies show us that there is something else going on which we need to understand. Accumulation of anomalous findings may lead to modification of the theory or to development of a broader theory that incorporates the earlier findings.

To ask why the neoliberal reforms were so slow requires us to examine the instances of failure as well as those of success—the moments when neoliberalism did not take root and did not speed up as it did in other cases. In the periodization given above, in the current neoliberal moment, the main sources of resistance have been the public sector trade unions, who in late 1995 brought the Juppé plan to a halt through general strikes, and the electorate, who have consistently voted against politicians promoting free-market reform. Neither of these has been enough to halt the movement toward reform, but they have been enough to slow it down. In the second period, 1986–88, the stock market crash brought the privatization period to a halt. In both of these periods, analysts have also suggested that neoliberalism has been weak because it has been implemented by the Gaullists, and, like Christian Democratic parties in southern Europe, the Gaullists have not (until very recently) been enamored of the free market. Rather, starting with de Gaulle himself, Gaullist eco-

nomic policy was turned to the aim of establishing French preeminence, with the state taking an active role in nurturing the economy “For loyal Gaullists, *dirigisme* [the preference for state coordination of market outcomes] was not simply an economic program—it constituted a core component of their identity, the translation into the economic arena of General de Gaulle’s belief that only a strong, activist, modernizing state could restore France to greatness. Chirac and Balladur had both been forged in this ethos” (Levy 1999a, p. 66). Levy suggests that this explains both the moderate degree of reforms and the strangely statist *way* in which some of them have been conducted—for example, in the fact that in French privatizations, the state chose who could purchase controlling shares in the newly privatized companies and dictated the price, rewarding its political allies, and, in an attempt to keep out foreign investors, rigged the sales so that these favored investors were sheltered from attempts at takeover by others.

But there is a way to “control for” the effect of party ideology, because there is a period in recent French history when a party much more receptive to an American-style neoliberalism was at the helm: that first proto-neoliberal moment of Giscard, from 1974 to 1981, when, for the first and only time in recent history, France elected as its president a politician receptive to free-market ideas.⁷ Chirac’s neoliberalism might be expected to be limited, given his roots in *dirigisme*, but Giscard had made his name, and a political niche for his party, by advocating a reduced role for the state. His party represented a new “centrist” and less *dirigiste* right-wing alternative to the Gaullist party. In *Démocratie Française* Giscard wrote

If we want the individual to become master of his own destiny and free to take an increasing number of decisions, here is what should *not* be done: increase the powers or the dimensions of an already multi-tentacled administration, nationalize enterprises which do not perform a public service—to do so would be either to deliver them to the technocracy, or to “étatize” them and have them be directed by a small number of bureaucrats of the central administration not responsible to anyone, planify the economy, which would be the same as to give a few men the power to decide for several millions, suppress initiative and competition [What should be done is] deepen liberties: not only the fundamental political liberties, but also the new liberties of everyday life, such as educational freedom, free medical choice, freedom of information, conserve the market economy, the only manner of assuring the responsibility of directors and managers, and the

⁷ Giscard’s own term for it was “advanced liberalism”—in the European sense of the word liberal, i.e., what American scholars call neoliberal with a focus on social reforms such as legalization of abortion.

efficacy of the enterprise, decentralize boldly in enterprise, and towards local life ([1976] 1979, pp 16–17)

Prime Minister Barre was even more firmly committed to this direction. In 1977 he described the liberalism he wanted to implement this way: “Not *laisser-faire*, *laisser-passer*, of course. But leaving behind this neo-mercantilism in which we find ourselves, with the goal of establishing in this country relations between the state, citizens, groups which are not fixed by the regulation of the state but by a sense of responsibility” (*La Vie Française* 1977). In 1980 he was defining his goals as “to assure firms the freedom to make their own decisions of production, employment, and investment, of salaries and of prices in the framework of a politics of strict control of the monetary mass, of a politics of progressive reduction of aid from the state and an active politics of competition” (*Le Figaro* 1980a). This list of Giscard’s and Barre’s concerns—concentration of power, the market as the preserver of individual freedoms, individual responsibility—would not be out of place coming from the pen of an American or British politician of the period. It is similar to the writings coming from the Right in both the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1970s—a sort of proto-neoliberalism making general arguments against state intervention (see Fourgnaud 2001, Frears 1981, Giroud 1979, Giscard d’Estaing [1976] 1979, 1984, 1988).

As Théret notes, “Neoliberalism is not a coherent doctrine furnishing a formal system of rules of action . . . but rather a ‘global referent’ which should be seen as an ensemble of practical receipts and of common representations of a certain number of concrete political actors” (1991, p 343). He summarizes this “global referent” as consisting of three main principles: “that market exchange is the most optimal method of production, that a structural distribution of revenues favorable to entrepreneurs is necessary for economic growth, and the strengthening of the state passes through its disengagement from the economy” (p 359). This is a set of general principles against state intervention, rather than specific policies of *what kinds of* state intervention to attack. These general principles drove both Reagan and Thatcher, but were only turned into specific policies through the vagaries of the processes of policy formation. For example, Reagan was a late convert to the idea of broad middle-class tax cuts, and when she was education minister, Thatcher presided over an expansion of the education budget. However, their *rhetoric* was antistate and in much the same general terms as the elements quoted here from Giscard. It is teleological to assume from the outcomes of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations their preferences in the 1970s: the historical record shows that in the 1970s the Republicans were still the party of fiscal responsibility (it was the Keynesian Democrat Kennedy who had

lowered taxes and created a deficit), and there was only weak support for Thatcherism in the Conservative Party when Thatcher took office. The most radical elements of the Reagan and Thatcher agendas developed *after* both actors took office and snowballed as a result of subsequent events (for a more detailed defense of this interpretation of the Reagan and Thatcher episodes see Prasad [in press]).

The Giscard period, then, presents us with a moment when a politician receptive to free-market aims presided over a centralized state apparatus. Moreover, because of France's unique dual executive system, Giscard's government held power longer than any other government of the Right in the post-oil-crisis period, and he had five full years with a prime minister of his own party—a record unequalled by the Gaullists even today.⁸ Although he never had a majority in the Parliament, the French Constitution gives the president several ways to outmaneuver Parliament, and, at the limit, to bypass Parliament altogether.⁹ Giscard and Barre made use of these powers an unprecedented number of times—but never to implement sharp tax cuts, like Reagan, or major privatizations, like Thatcher, or cuts in social spending. Giscard reigned on the eve of Reaganism and Thatcherism, but oversaw very different outcomes.¹⁰ Given this, it is remarkable that the Giscard period has received so little scholarly attention, as it seems to present an important counterexample to the Reagan and Thatcher episodes. This article aims to remedy that gap by providing a comparative historical study of neoliberalism under Giscard, to ask both how neoliberalism arose in his administration, and why it did not become more extensive. Because the Giscard period has been so little studied, part of the goal is to illuminate the main elements of the episode for future researchers, as well as to make a case that closer examination of this historical period is worthwhile. The claim is not that this period is more crucial than later periods, but that examining what happened during the one moment when a non-Gaullist party of the Right was in power can give insights into the variables *other than* party ideology that are at work in contemporary French political economy. The case study that follows is built from a range of primary and secondary sources, including economic dissertations written at the Sorbonne during 1974–81, interviews

⁸ A constitutional amendment synchronizing presidential and legislative elections ensures that starting in 2002, five-year governments with cohesive executives will be the rule rather than the exception.

⁹ For example, by drawing on constitutional article 49.3, the “guillotine,” which cuts off debate on a bill and considers the bill passed unless a motion of no confidence is introduced within a specific period of time (Huber 1992).

¹⁰ And at a moment when the global economic context was broadly similar to that which Reagan and Thatcher faced—in the inflationary environment caused by the oil crisis, but before the explosion in levels of foreign direct investment and “capital flight.”

with 19 of Giscard's ministers (including the prime minister, Raymond Barre, see app table A1), and the newspaper collections of the Institut d'Études Politiques

CLASS, CULTURE, AND THE STATE

In recent years, class and cultural explanations of policy making have seen a resurgence. These are the theories that come immediately to mind when searching for explanations of French political economy, but neither is convincing when the case is considered in international perspective. First, the French unions in the postwar period have been fragmented and excluded from routine decision-making authority. As figures 3 and 4 show, a lower proportion of the workforce is unionized in France than in Britain, Germany, or even the United States, and France had fewer working days lost per 1,000 employees in this period than Britain and the United States. Moreover, the French labor movement has been characterized by lack of ties between left parties and the trade union movement, meaning that the ability of the unions to affect policy is limited to extreme instances when they can mobilize thousands of demonstrators (Howell 1992). Although in recent years the public sector unions have been able to resist or amend reform by striking, leading some analysts to argue that "labor still matters" (Béland 2001, Palier 2000*a*, Levy 1999*a*, 1999*b*), the much larger private sector, where unionization rates are as low as 5%, has been unable to resist reform. Related to this is the question of how and whether the strength of labor translates into policy: in postwar France the Left was split between the Communists and Socialists, a split which kept both parties excluded from power.

If the working class is weak, a new trend in the scholarship associated with the "varieties of capitalism" perspective argues that business interests are at the heart of policy making. A look at the work of Bob Hancké (2001, 2002), who has been instrumental in applying this approach to the French case, shows both the insights it yields and its limits. Hancké studies the response of the French political economy to the profitability crisis of the early 1980s. He argues that all of the attempts of the state—through the reform of labor relations, through the Auroux laws on workplace decentralization, and through financial reform—failed. He then shows how large firms turned varying aspects of each of these state-implemented reforms to their own ends, but could only do so by keeping the state at arm's length. Hancké's work is an elegant and entirely convincing explanation of industrial adjustment in the 1980s, but it falters when it tries to generalize from this case to the French political economy as a whole. Other features of French neoliberalism—e.g., privatizations, abolition of




FIG 3—Net union density (Golden, Lange, and Wallerstein 2002)

price control, and financial deregulation—were all initiated by the state privatization began as a tactical political response to Mitterrand's nationalizations, abolition of price controls was undertaken by Prime Minister Barre in the face of business opposition (both discussed further below), and financial deregulation was (in Hancké's own term) the "brain-child" of a senior minister. If the "firm-centered" explanation cannot be generalized to other aspects of industrial policy, much less can it be generalized to other policy domains. French firms are not unified on the question of whether to oppose expensive social policy and the high taxation that it requires (see Mares [2001, 2003] for discussions of why firms have historically supported social policy and high taxes). And as we will see below, Giscard's neoliberalism, although it did not move in an Anglo-American direction, was more hurtful to industry than helpful to it—rather than creating an environment that would nurture firms, Giscard withdrew state support from them. Thus the situation is rather that French firms have tried to make the best of the policies given them by the state. In particular, when faced with high social costs, firms have responded by investing more heavily in technology, leading to a rise in productivity. This was not a coherent program of the state, but an example of French firms turning state policies to their own advantage. In French political economy, the state imposes, and the firm disposes.

In recent years we have also witnessed a resurgence of cultural arguments in the social sciences, and the cultural explanation for the French pattern is common in both popular as well as scholarly accounts. Defining the independent variable to include "world views, cultures, societal scripts,




FIG. 4—Working days lost per 1,000 workers (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1997, from data proved in International Labour Organization 2002)

norms, models, and causal beliefs" (Bleich 2002, p. 1063), proponents of the cultural turn make the reasonable claim that actors' cognitive processes influence their actions. This is intended as a corrective to structural theories in which human agents seem to follow blindly the dictates of material incentives. Talking about national culture in particular, Frank Dobbin argues that "national traditions influence policy-making by contributing to collective understandings of social order and instrumental rationality. History has produced distinct ideas about order and rationality in different nations, and modern industrial policies are organized around those ideas" (1994, p. 2). In the French case, a cultural tradition such as "the Jacobin obsession with equality, universalism, and national unity negates particularism based on locality, corporate membership, and birth, thereby weakening the probability of people drawing boundaries on the basis of ascribed characteristics" (Lamont 1992, p. 137). The "Jacobin" tradition identifies the state as the defender of the general interest, in opposition to the particular interests advanced by interest groups (Schmidt 1999); this tradition is said to underpin policies of state intervention in industry that aim for "equality, universalism, and national unity," and makes the competitive, individualistic, and antistate rhetoric of neoliberalism unpalatable, particularly in the domain of welfare state policy, because "the welfare state constitutes a kind of common meeting ground or lowest common denominator that symbolizes republican unity and a collective commitment to providing a strong safety net, values to which the Left has historically assigned priority, state responsibility for promoting the common good, a value that the Left and Gaullism championed, and Christian solidarity" (Kesselman 2002, p. 181).

There are many advantages to cultural explanations, not least the way

in which they demand a detailed engagement with historical context, challenge the dominant social scientific trend of assuming a universal human nature, and attempt to produce explanations “from the inside,” beginning with actors’ understandings of their situations. To some degree, cultural explanations have been accepted as one tool in the arsenal of social scientific explanations. But there is considerable evidence against the proposition that a “national culture” sustained the French pattern of a weak adoption of neoliberal measures in the Giscard period.

First, neoliberalism was an important minority position in 1970s France. Although a statist ideology was clearly dominant in the 1970s, neoliberal economics had made considerable headway in France, as elsewhere in the world. Kesler (1985) writes that the *École Nationale d’Administration* (ENA), which feeds the *Grands Corps* of the French state, had already been “conquered” by neoliberal thought in the 1970s, even if this teaching was not hegemonic. Instruction was overseen by the “brilliant leader of fundamentalist neo-liberalism” Professor Jean-Jacques Rosa [who] considered western economies sick because of their bulimic states, and considered the Welfare State to have failed” (Kesler 1985, p. 374). “The high bureaucrats issued from the ENA or from the *École Polytechnique* believe that there is a limit to the state’s intervention and to the tax burden. The state can’t do everything, it has already done too much, it should stop. They believe that France has lived for twenty years a social democratic experience and that it should from now on bend to the constraints of international competition” (Kesler 1985, p. 395). Indeed, Kesler writes that after the Socialist victory of 1981, it was the ENA that was the “protector” in France of neoliberal ideas.

A similar situation was occurring at the *Institut d’Études Politiques* (Sciences Po), from which almost the whole of France’s leadership class emerges. There, economics was taught under the auspices of Jacques Rueff, one of the most ardent postwar defenders of the market. Rueff is known as one of the few leading economists to resist the increasingly interventionist direction of the postwar French state; he was the architect of a liberalization effort under de Gaulle, and he is responsible for analyses such as the following: “If you aid the unemployed, you make durable a condition which would have been only temporary had you not intervened.

You have falsified the mechanisms . . . and you have done more bad than good” (Rueff quoted in Hatzfeld 1971, p. 55). Along with economists and social scientists Jean Fourastié, Jean-Marie Benoist, Lionel Stoleru, Jean-Pierre Fourcade, Jean-Jacques Rosa, André Fourcans, and several others, Rueff constituted a group, dubbed the “new economists,” who carried the neoliberal flame in France in the postwar period (see, e.g., Fourastié 1978, Fourcade 1979, Fourcans 1978, Rosa and Aftalion 1977, Stoleru 1974, Madelin 1997).

In the 1970s antistatist arguments had also received a renewed boost from an unexpected quarter following the publication in French of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* a new strain of anti-Marxist argument emerged among the French intelligentsia "At some point between 1973 and 1978 marxism, and the study of its theoretical implications and resonances, lost its stranglehold upon the intellectual imagination in France, a grip it had exercised unbroken for a generation In the space of less than a decade it became fashionable to be not just non-marxist, but anti-marxist The French discovered Popper, Hayek, and, with embarrassment at the oversight, their own Raymond Aron" (Judt 1986, p 170) This was reflected in public opinion, which came to view the Soviet system increasingly negatively over the course of the 1970s (*Le Figaro* 1980b) Thus in the mid- to late 1970s, at just the time that France had elected into office a politician favorable to reducing state intervention, French political culture was rediscovering for its own reasons a rejection of collectivism

I do not argue here that neoliberalism was dominant, but that it was an important minority position, with exponents in the highest reaches of the French state To develop an objective measure of how popular neoliberal ideas were among academics in the 1970s under the government of Giscard, particularly when he had chosen as his prime minister the economist Raymond Barre, I examined and coded all doctoral theses ("Doctorats d'État") defended between 1976 and 1981 in economics at the Sorbonne (Paris 1), following the methodology of Babb's (2001) work on Mexico The total population consists of 152 theses, ranging across all subdisciplines in economics Paris 1 was chosen because it is reputed to be *less* neoliberal than the other leading producers of academic work on economic subjects, ENA, Sciences Po, and the École Polytechnique (Kesler 1985), and thus provides a tough test of the thesis that neoliberal ideas were already "thinkable" by the late 1970s (Although the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales was also a possible candidate for the analysis, too few dissertations were produced there during this period to make such an analysis meaningful)

I read the introduction and conclusion of all of the dissertations, as well as any pages that, according to the table of contents, dealt with the issue of neoliberalism The specific issue was defined as the question of whether state intervention in the form of high taxes, high welfare spending, nationalization of firms, or tariff barriers prevents economic growth, and of whether monetarist policies are preferable to Keynesian policies This is a slightly broader selection of issues than the specific policies considered in this article (tax policy, welfare state policy, and industrial policy), but, as argued above, the early stages of neoliberalism should be measured in

general terms, because a general adherence to the “global referent” of neoliberalism precedes their translation into specific policies

I coded the dissertations first as to whether they mentioned any of these issues at all. This provides a first glimpse into whether the issue of state interventionism was on the agenda, which, indeed, it was (fig. 5). 35.5% of the dissertations mentioned one of these issues, either in the introduction or conclusion, or in a section important enough to be labeled in the table of contents (I did not include in this count several dissertations that simply mentioned the *word* “neolibérale” or “neoclassique”, the specific theme of less state intervention had to be mentioned). The most heated debate during this period was around the question of free trade: a substantial number of dissertations praised the virtues of low tariff barriers, while an equally large number condemned free trade for leading to the “underdevelopment” of the periphery.

Second, I coded the evaluation of neoliberal tenets that the theses gave. Of the group that mentioned neoliberal tenets, 24.1% did not attempt to give a normative evaluation of them at all: this group largely consisted of dissertations that in the United States would be written in departments of history rather than departments of economics, in that their intent was historical and descriptive rather than evaluative—e.g., a dissertation on the history of antipoverty policy in the United States between 1964 and 1974 which refrained from evaluating the *effect* of these policies on the economy. Because the intent of this project is to examine how neoliberal tenets were evaluated, I exclude this group from the calculations below.

Of the group that mentioned and evaluated neoliberal tenets, a large number (17.1%) gave mixed evaluations, as might be expected in academic work at this level. The largest group—though not quite the majority—of the theses that mentioned and evaluated neoliberal tenets evaluated them negatively: 46.3%. The largest subgroup of these examined the question of underdevelopment, particularly in the countries formerly colonized by France, and among these theses, world-systems theory was by far the strongest intellectual influence in the late 1970s. And, of dissertations that mentioned and evaluated neoliberal tenets, 36.6% evaluated them positively (fig. 6).

What these numbers show is that in the late 1970s in Paris, at an institution not reputed to be particularly favorable to neoliberal ideas, such ideas were mentioned regularly, and they were evaluated favorably quite often. The tendency is clearly antineoliberal: almost one-half of the dissertations that mentioned such ideas evaluated them negatively. But over one-third of the dissertations that mentioned such ideas evaluated them positively, suggesting that even at the educational institution *least* in favor of the free market, neoliberalism was a significant minority presence among economists in the late 1970s.




FIG 5—Neoliberalism mentioned in doctoral theses, Sorbonne, 1976–81 (source as explained in text)

Finally, opinion polls suggest that the French embrace of the state and of egalitarianism during this period was ambivalent, as seen in responses to questions on taxation, nationalization, egalitarianism, and trust in government. On taxes, the vast majority of respondents favored a tax on “great fortunes.” Gallup found 86% in favor of a tax on fortunes greater than two million francs, and 69% in favor of a tax on fortunes greater than one million francs in 1977. On the other hand, 68% of French respondents in 1970, and 55% in 1974, found taxes “excessive or unbearable” (Gallup 1976). On nationalization, views were mixed: 30% of respondents thought nationalized enterprises were rather less efficient than private enterprises in 1977, with 26% responding the reverse, but 36% believed the nationalization of banks and large enterprises would play a positive role in the resolution of the economic crisis, with only 20% anticipating a negative role (Gallup 1976).

Although support for the welfare state has always remained high (Schmidt 1999, 2001, 2002, *La Croix* 1979), this does not extend to support for egalitarianism. Although repeated surveys on this measure are not available for this period, in 1978 SOFRES posed a set of questions on egalitarianism to those who identified themselves as on the left of the political spectrum. One question asked respondents to place themselves on a scale from one to six, with one representing the position “It is necessary to conserve a large measure of inequality of revenues, to foster imitation” (presumably imitation of the supposed work habits of the wealthy), and six, the position “It is necessary to give the same revenue to everyone, whatever their context or aptitudes.” Those identifying themselves as on the “extreme left” were the most egalitarian (83% placed themselves at levels 4 to 6, the egalitarian half of the spectrum), but those who identified with the Communists, Socialists, Left Radicals, and ecologists showed considerably more mixed responses: respectively, 54%, 45%,




FIG 6 —Evaluations of neoliberal claims as percentage of theses that mentioned issue (source as explained in text)

43%, and 40% at levels 4 to 6 (SOFRES 1978, p. 60). In other words, the majority of Socialists, Left Radicals, and ecologists fall in the more *inegalitarian* half of the scale.

Trust in government is actually *lower* in France than in other countries for the time period examined here. Scholars of France have often noted this distrust. Crozier wrote of it as long ago as 1964. Ambler (1975) reports the results of a survey conducted in the mid- to late 1970s which showed that the French give trustful responses less often than respondents in other countries when asked "Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as a Frenchman?" only 29% spontaneously reported pride in the political system, this compares with 85% in the United States, 46% in the United Kingdom, and 7% in Germany (the latter three taken from Almond and Verba [1963]). Ambler concludes that these findings show "the significance of political alienation in France, as well as the instrumental nature of loyalties to the Fifth Republic" (1975, p. 40). Levels of trust in authorities are similar in the United States and France (53% vs. 47%) but belief in the efficacy of elections varies to the question "How much do you feel that having elections makes the people who govern (the government) pay attention to what the people think?" 24% of French respondents but only 8% of American respondents said "not at all" or "not very much," while 66% of French respondents but 90% of American respondents said "some" or "a good deal."

I conclude from these various sources of evidence first that collectivist or statist culture may have been dominant, but was certainly not hegemonic in France in the 1970s: a minority culture of questioning state intervention was developing among the elite as well as among professional

economists, and the public was ambivalent about high taxes, nationalization, egalitarianism, and the efficacy of the state—often evidencing what psychologists call attitudinal inconsistency (Plous 1993), the tendency to express contradictory responses about preferences depending on which aspect of a phenomenon is salient in a question (e.g., preference for a large welfare state, but discomfort with the taxes that finance that welfare state), making it difficult to predict behavior from expressed attitudes. Perhaps more important, even if a culture of egalitarianism existed, it did not prevent France from being, for most of the postwar period, one of the most inegalitarian countries of the developed world, or from taxing capital more lightly than its peers, as will be discussed in more detail below.

Although this section has only presented empirical evidence from one time period, there are several theoretical reasons why the “national culture” explanation is unsatisfactory. As is clear from the evidence above, the national culture argument ignores the presence of contradictory cultural trends, conflict and struggle, and often vital subcultures. The national culture argument also ignores the presence of cultural diffusion across national boundaries, an increasingly important phenomenon (Simmons, Garrett, and Dobbin 2003). Third, it ignores the fact that cultural concepts are malleable and can usually be interpreted in multiple ways, because of this multiplicity of interpretation it is not possible to read policy off culture. And finally, the national culture arguments run against the grain of recent research in cognitive psychology. Summarizing this psychological research, DiMaggio (1997) asks whether culture is best conceived of as a “latent variable”—that is, a “tight network of a few abstract central themes and their more concrete entailments, all instantiated to various degrees in a range of symbols, rituals, and practices”—or a cultural toolkit, “a pastiche of mediated representations, a repertoire of techniques, or a toolkit of strategies” and concludes

Research in cognitive psychology strongly supports the toolkit over the latent-variable view and suggests that the typical toolkit is very large indeed. This work has several important implications for students of culture. First, it refutes the notion that people acquire a culture by imbibing it (and no other) through socialization. Third, the research explains the capacity of individuals to participate in multiple cultural traditions, even when those traditions contain inconsistent elements. Fourth, it establishes the capacity of people to maintain distinctive and inconsistent action frames, which can be invoked in response to particular contextual cues.

Recent cognitive research—at the very least, places the burden of proof on those who depict culture as strongly constraining behavior or who would argue that people experience culture as highly integrated, that cultural meanings are strongly thematized, that culture is binding, and that

cultural information acquired through experience is more powerful than that acquired through other means (DiMaggio 1997, pp 267–68)

The “national culture” explanations, with their talk of “distinct ideas about order and rationality” pervading entire territorial units, are at odds with this research. There are indeed aggregate differences in the way populations respond to specific questions, but both attitudinal inconsistency and the ability of actors to participate in and invoke multiple cultures depending on contextual cues means we cannot extrapolate from this fact to policy making.

If class and culture do not explain the Giscard case, the next sections argue that two institutional variables do: (1) the structure of previous policies, and (2) whether politicians’ route to power generates or dampens innovation.

PRAGMATIC VERSUS IDEOLOGICAL STATE INTERVENTION

In contrast to the popular picture of France as having “never really been won over to capitalism” (Fernand Braudel quoted in Jefferys 2003, p 356), France in the postwar period had tax and industrial policies that were in many respects more procapitalist than those of the United States. Moreover, although spending on the welfare state was much higher in France, the French welfare state redistributes within rather than among classes, and there are elements of it that are actually reverse redistributive. These add up to a “pragmatic state intervention,” in contrast to the American pattern of weaker but more ideologically motivated and adversarial state intervention.

Tax Policy

The 1981 tax cut in the United States was rooted in the anti-property-tax social movement in California, which brought the general issue of taxation to public attention, and catalyzed by Reagan’s wish to ward off the political rivalry of Jack Kemp, who had been making political capital out of the issue of income tax cuts (Aldrich and Niemi 1996, Himmelstein 1990, Rudder 1983, Strahan 1990, Weaver 1988, Prasad, *in press*)¹¹

Such a movement was unlikely in France because French tax policies

¹¹ In addition, recent changes in US government had led to a greater number and variety of political innovations reaching the political agenda because of “policy entrepreneurs” attempting to seek out and mobilize issues that would be potentially popular with the public, and the federal “multiactor” structure of the US government inflated the size of the tax cut because every politician needed to be individually convinced to vote for it with an attachment of tax cuts for her own district.

taxed income, capital, and property much less than did American tax policies (figs 7, 8, 9, 10) As many scholars have pointed out, France, like the other large welfare states of Europe, has a regressive tax structure (taking proportionately more taxes from the lower portions of the income distribution, see Steinmo 1993, Kato 2003, Lindert 2004) based on payroll and sales taxes While property taxes hit those with property, and income taxes are structured so that those with higher incomes pay higher percentages, sales taxes are regressive because the same absolute amount is paid on an item regardless of income or wealth (which means lower-income workers pay a higher percentage of their income on the tax), and payroll taxes are regressive because

first, only wages are taxed, whereas earnings from capital or real estate, which accrue overwhelmingly to the wealthy, escape imposition Second, social security contributions are deductible, and since tax rates are progressive, the size of the deduction increases with income For example, those in the top income bracket, with a marginal tax rate of 56 percent, pay only 44 percent of their social security charges Third, many social security programs do not tax earnings above a certain ceiling (\$2,300 per month in 1997) Not surprisingly, in the early 1990s, it was estimated that a minimum-wage worker contributed 13.6 percent of his or her salary to the social security system, whereas a manager earning \$60,000 per year paid only 7.5 percent (Levy 1999b, p. 250)

Throughout the course of the Fifth Republic, France has had a regressive tax structure Since de Gaulle, the tax regime has attempted continuously to lower taxes on corporations When international competition—inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome, the globalization of exchange, and the end of empire—hit France, de Gaulle's response was to attempt to create a hospitable environment for industry "All taxes, without exception—taxes on business volume [*chiffre d'affaires*], indirect taxes, registration taxes, direct taxes—were concerned to reduce the fiscal burden weighing on enterprise, or indeed to suppress it altogether" (Nizet 1991, p. 267, see also Bertoni 1995) Table 3 shows that while the American tax structure taxes capital, the French tax structure taxes labor and consumption

The key political implication of progressive versus regressive taxation is that progressive and regressive taxes structure the flow of information quite differently (Wilensky 2002) progressive taxes give to the taxpayer very precise information about how much she is paying, and no information at all on what is being purchased with the tax revenues Sales and payroll taxes, on the other hand, work the other way sales taxes are collected invisibly, and payroll taxes are targeted to spending In both




FIG 7—Distribution of revenue sources income, profits, and capital gains taxes as % total tax revenue (OECD 1965–2002)




FIG 8—Property tax as % total tax revenue (OECD 1965–2002)

cases, the manner of tax collection structures the flow of information to French and American taxpayers in opposite ways

In France in the postwar period indirect taxes such as sales taxes (particularly the value-added tax) consistently generated approximately 60% of total tax receipts. Indirect taxes are “invisible” because taxpayers do not have a very precise sense of how much of the price of a product is




FIG 9—Social security contributions as % total tax revenue (OECD 1965–2002)




FIG 10—Taxes on goods and services as % total tax revenue (OECD 1965–2002)

going toward taxes, particularly value-added tax. The tax is collected in small amounts over many exchanges over a long period of time, and consumers often assimilate it into the cost of living (Wilensky 2002). Moreover, welfare spending in France is paid for by targeted payroll taxes; these structure information in such a way that the welfare services that workers receive are made visible and linked precisely to the taxes that

TABLE 3
AVERAGE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON CAPITAL, LABOR, AND CONSUMPTION

COUNTRY	CAPITAL			LABOR			CONSUMPTION		
	1965-75	1975-85	1985-94	1965-75	1975-85	1985-94	1965-75	1975-85	1985-94
France	17	25	25	29	37	43	19	18	17
Germany	21	29	26	29	35	37	14	13	15
United Kingdom	50	60	52	24	25	21	12	13	14
United States	42	42	40	17	21	23	06	05	05

SOURCE — Genschel 2002, p. 250

they pay (see fig. 11) “People think that they have ‘bought’ their own social benefits through the social contribution they have paid. In France, each *branche* (health, old age, unemployment insurance, family benefits) has its own contribution which appears on every French employee’s pay slip. The link between payment and entitlement is very visible. When you pay health insurance contribution, for instance, you ‘buy’ your right to health care, social contribution is perceived as a ‘deferred wage’ which will come back when the insured person will be sick, unemployed or aged” (Palier 2000a, p. 121). This is, of course, the reason analysts often give for why Social Security is so popular in the United States; it extends to other domains of social policy in France.

Thus Wilensky (2002, p. 391) notes: “It is not the level of taxes that creates tax-welfare backlash but the type of taxes—property taxes and income taxes with their visibility and perceived pain. Conversely, consumption taxes and social-security payroll taxes keep things cool.” While in the United States highly visible property and income taxes take money from taxpayers at infrequent intervals, such that they know precisely how much they are paying but do not know precisely what they are getting for it, France’s reliance on invisible consumption taxes and targeted payroll taxes dampens antitax sentiment (see also Kato 2003, Lindert 2004). In short, French tax structures were less conducive to reform because of the kinds of taxes that make up the French tax regime and the ways in which they are collected; consequently there was no “sales tax revolt” to parallel the property tax revolt of the United States, and because cutting payroll taxes would have required cutting welfare spending in an extremely transparent manner, politicians did not sense any political capital to be made as American politicians did with income tax cuts.

Industrial Policy

In industrial policy in the United States, neoliberalism involved deregulation of industry, particularly reductions in health and environmental protections. “Regulation” in the United States is two distinct things: “economic regulation” is the regulation of one particular industry in the interest of preventing any one company from gaining a monopoly in that industry; “social regulation,” on the other hand, is regulation that extends to *all* industries, such as environmental and worker safety legislation, in the interest of preventing others from the “externalities” of market production in general. The cause of “deregulation” was brought onto the policy agenda by social movements, particularly the consumers’ movement led by Ralph Nader, which pushed for economic deregulation in the interest of lower prices for consumers. But the deregulation idea was taken over by the Ford and Reagan administrations, who turned it into a direction the

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FIG 11—Pay stub of a French worker, showing taxes targeted to specific government programs

original proponents did not favor, "social" deregulation, although there is no evidence of quid pro quo, it is undeniable that business lobbies had by this point been complaining of social regulations for a decade, and there is some evidence that in the Ford administration the popularity of economic deregulation was cynically used as a cover for the policy of social deregulation (see Prasad, in press)

Like French tax policy—and unlike American social regulation—French industrial policy throughout the postwar period has been favorable to business. France has been the European state most associated with state-led industrial growth, and this is responsible for its socialist image. Directly after the Second World War key industries were nationalized and the Planning Commission was founded with the intention of directing economic growth. But many observers have pointed out that the nature of this state intervention was to turn France into a world-class *capitalist* economy (Hall 1986, Schmidt 1996, Zysman 1983). Neither the nationalized industries nor the Planning Commission were focused on social justice, rather, intervention was aimed at reducing the role of agriculture in the French economy and increasing the role of industry, with the goal of improving aggregate economic growth compared to its much more heavily industrialized neighbors.

The plans were largely oriented toward economic growth. Of the nine postwar plans, only two—the seventh and ninth, introduced long past the heyday of planning—concentrated on attaining full employment. The first four plans, which laid the foundations for the postwar period, concentrated on ways to stimulate economic growth. Social goals were a minor component of the fifth plan of 1965, but that was overshadowed by a new attention to international competitiveness, which the sixth and eighth plans also took as their main theme (Hall 1986). Thus, the plans only began to address social goals when the era of planning was coming to an end, and seven of the nine postwar plans were "market" oriented, that is, explicitly advocated the generation of a favorable climate for industry. Planning was abandoned not because the state became less socialist—the plans were never very socialist to begin with—but because the increasing integration of the French economy into the world made economic prediction nearly impossible, and the attempt to control the direction of the French economy through domestic policies unfeasible.

Nationalization, too, was not used in the interest of full employment or egalitarian redistribution of incomes. An early observer noted that with a few exceptions, "nationalization has replaced a fluctuating and uncertain income [for the former owners of the nationalized enterprises] by a guaranteed and constant income in a reasonably fair way. Nationalization, therefore, has failed to make a substantial contribution to the socialist objective of achieving a more equalitarian distribution of income" (Sturm-

thal 1953, p. 48) Nationalization at once provided direct access to key state sectors and prevented “capital flight”, during the postwar period the French state controlled about half of the capital being invested in French industry and could provide a continuous stream of capital even during economic downturns. But this prevention of capital flight was not used as a means of leverage with which to institute worker friendly policies or income redistribution, rather, it was used to transform the French economic structure from one dominated by rural and artisanal production into one dominated by heavy industry and big business. “Nationalized industries—the banks, the transport industry, the energy industry—would serve as the spearheads in the postwar economic battle. They would help to ‘relaunch’ France as a great economic power” (Smith 2004, p. 71). President de Gaulle’s strategy was to create firms large enough to compete on a European, and worldwide, scale—“national champions.” Although measuring productivity in the nationalized industries across countries is difficult, it seems that French nationalized industries were more productive than British nationalized industries throughout the postwar period, except for the decade of 1958 to 1968 (see Pryke 1971, 1981). Estrin and Pérotin (1987, 1991) suggest that this is because productivity depends not on ownership so much as on how the firm is managed, and discuss various mechanisms that ensured that French nationalized firms were consistently managed with the goal of productivity, unlike British nationalized firms. Kuisel (1981) writes

The [French] nationalized companies [in the 1950s] were expansionist in their own operations and in their effect on the French economy. Electricité de France (EDF) and the state railways led the way in applying econometric techniques. The uniform purchasing procedures of state firms fostered the standardization of equipment supply. In a few instances, a public enterprise, such as Renault, served as a model for private firms and sharpened competition. The directors of the nationalized companies successfully pressed for higher productivity, new technology, and more investment. The result was a large expansion of capacity (e.g., EDF) and rising productivity (e.g., coal mines and railways). The example of public enterprise contributed to leading private industry toward a pattern of high investment and a decisive break with prewar behavior. An economist surveying the machine tool industry of Renault, the Caravelle jet, and EDF’s high-voltage power grid, concluded that “much of the stimulus for technological change came from nationalized industry” (Kuisel 1981, p. 266, see Prasad [in press] for a more detailed comparison of nationalization in France vs. nationalization in Britain, see also Adams 1989, on comparative productivity figures in specific industries, see O’Mahony and Vecchi [2001] for evidence that the nationalized French electricity industry was more productive than the nationalized British electricity industry, see US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment [1980] for evidence that nationalized French iron and steel in-

dustries were more productive than British ones, Frost [1991] presents an excellent case study of the failure of workplace democracy at EDF)

Thus, unlike the social regulations found in the United States, which generated hostility from capital, French industrial policy has in general aimed to help large capitalist firms in the interest of nationalism. These policies both reflected the Right's role as part of the coalition that implemented nationalization and ensured that the Right would be committed to nationalization throughout the postwar years—until, as will be discussed below, Mitterrand upset this political equilibrium with further nationalization.

Welfare State Policy

In the domain of social policy in the United States, the Reagan administration originally intended to cut all manner of spending. The main focus was middle-class entitlements, particularly Social Security, the largest social spending expenditure. However, Congress would not hear of touching Social Security because of the political costs of cutting a popular universal program. Meanwhile, although there was not much financial savings to be gotten out of antipoverty policies, there was a tremendous amount of political capital to be made from attacking them. Because the beneficiaries of antipoverty policies were disproportionately black, an attack on antipoverty policies could mobilize racial resentment particularly from working-class whites, in this sense, cutting antipoverty policies was an extension of the Republicans' "Southern strategy" that could be generalized all over the country (Prasad, in press).

These dynamics were not possible in France as many scholars of the welfare state have pointed out (see, e.g., Korpi and Palme 1998), welfare state policy in France does not separate and stigmatize, thus, it is not a source of political capital. This is not because of lack of racism in France, plenty of racism exists, and politicians do not hesitate to make political capital out of it, as is evident from recent immigration policy. Rather, the same political mobilization against welfare state policies has been difficult because, as Esping-Andersen (1990) notes, the French welfare state is a middle-class welfare state, redistributing risk within classes rather than between them.

Moreover, much of the French welfare state is actually *reverse redistributive*, benefiting the upper portion of the income distribution proportionately more. The largest portions of the high social spending for which France is known goes to old-age pensions and health and education spending, all of which benefit middle classes to a greater extent than the poor. The wealthiest 15% of retirees receive 1/3 of all pension disburse-

ments, the next wealthiest 25% receive another 1/3, and the bottom 60% receive 1/3 (Smith 2004, p. 165). This is because pensions are linked to earned income, as are unemployment benefits and sickness pay (Ambler 1991, p. 12). Moreover, because the wealthy tend to live longer, they take greater advantage of universal health care, and the middle and upper classes are also more likely to take advantage of spending on higher education. Together, the top of the income distribution actually received more than the bottom over the period 1950–75, making the welfare system reverse redistributive (tables 4 and 5). As Cameron explains, “High levels of social spending, if distributed in a proportional manner throughout the society rather than concentrated among the poorest households, and if unaccompanied by significantly higher levels of [progressive] income taxation, will do little to mitigate the inequalities endemic in any capitalist economy” (Cameron 1991, p. 90, see also Levy 1999a, 1999b, Smith 2004).

Because the welfare state benefits the majority and particularly benefits the powerful, there is little room for neoliberal ideologists to appeal to the majority middle classes for a scaling back of hugely popular welfare services. This is also true in terms of *costs*. As discussed above, the French welfare state is financed through the *cotisations sociales*, payroll taxes pegged to welfare spending, because these taxes are precisely identified with the programs they pay for, they are difficult to cut. But these taxes are at least partly coming at the expense of the creation of new jobs, particularly for the less skilled.¹² This means that French welfare state

¹² That is, for any individual firm payroll taxes must by definition come from a combination of employer profits, wages, firm growth, and higher prices, since wages in France are as high or higher than in other comparable countries, the taxes may at least partly be coming at the expense of the growth of the firm and thus at the expense of potential employees. In particular, French firms can avoid hiring expensive unskilled labor by investing in capital-intensive technology, so the French unemployment rate among the unskilled is much higher than among skilled workers who are less easily replaced by technology. Henry Sneessens (1994) has made this argument most forcefully, investigating the causes for the much higher rate of unemployment among the unskilled; he writes, “Given the composition of the active population, one finds that a substantial reduction (20% or more) of the relative cost of unskilled labor would be necessary to eliminate the gap between the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers and to create the conditions for a return to full employment” (p. 29). That is, the *cotisations sociales* add to the cost of work and thus make it less likely that employers will hire new workers, particularly when such workers do not possess skills that are absolutely necessary (on this much-discussed issue see also Sneessens [1993], Cohen and Michel [1987], Fourçans [1980], Malinvaud [1998], Hamermesh [1996], Dormont and Pauchet [1997], Dormont [1997], Drèze [1997], and *Economie et Prévision* [1994]), leading to the French state’s “dual” character—highly beneficial for those in the system, but very difficult to break into for those not in it, notably immigrants, the young, and unskilled workers. As Edmond Malinvaud sums up the mainstream—though far from consensus—position: “We are not so far from reality when we claim that all modes of financing . . . make employment pay the cost of social protection”

TABLE 4
AFTER-TAX HOUSEHOLD INCOME AS PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL WEALTH, BY DECILE

Country	First Decile (Poorest 10%)	Second Decile (Second- Poorest 10%)	Ninth Decile (Second- Richest 10%)	Tenth Decile (Richest 10%)
France (1970)	1 4	2 8	16 6	30 5
West Germany (1973)	2 8	3 7	15 7	30 6
United Kingdom (1973)	2 4	3 7	15 4	23 9
United States (1972)	1 7	3 2	16 0	26 1

SOURCE —Smith 2004, p. 135

policies benefit a sheltered core of the population, at the expense of an excluded minority (see Smith [2004] for more on this argument). The political implication of a welfare state system that redistributes within rather than between classes, and that is even reverse redistributive, is that “welfare” is not identified with weak populations. As Walter Korpi (1980, Korpi and Palme 1998) and others have spent several decades demonstrating, this makes the French welfare state highly resilient.

In sum, the dominant tendency in tax policy, industrial policy, and welfare state policy was neither egalitarianism nor anticapitalist state intervention. The book explaining when and why France acquired such a durable reputation as an anticapitalist state, despite the evidence, remains to be written.

INNOVATION IN FRANCE

The preceding section explained the ways in which previous policies made the French postwar economic structure resilient and prevented a neoliberal reform of the kind seen in the United States. But although he did not institute a neoliberalism of the kind and intensity seen elsewhere, Giscard did introduce several measures in this direction—neoliberalism “à la française” (Michel Poniowski, interview, June 1, 2001). These included an attempt to end subsidies to lame-duck industries, the end of price control, the beginning of the process that would result in the Euro, and efforts to control health care costs (interviews, Fernand Icart, June 10, 2001, Pierre Lelong, June 8, 2001, René Monory, July 18, 2001, Poni-

(1998, p. 70). In recent years the French state has taken steps to address both unemployment and the linkage of welfare with employment, most notably, the cotisations sociales have been reduced for unskilled workers and their employers in the hopes that the reduction of the cost of unskilled work will lead to the creation of new unskilled jobs, and the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, employment benefits inaugurated under Mitterrand, help to dismantle the dual character of the French welfare state.

TABLE 5
TRANSFER PAYMENTS RECEIVED, 1950–75

Percentage	Britain	France
Received by top 20% of income distribution	7.2%	24%
Received by bottom 20% of income distribution	47.3%	18%

SOURCE —Smith 2004, p. 128

atowski, June 1, 2001, Jean Sérisé, June 20, 2001, Simone Veil, June 26, 2001) In particular, even if the comparison of the policy structures explains why French neoliberalism did not take the shape that American neoliberalism did, we still have to explain a curious element of French neoliberalism under Giscard: its *punitive* character.

Neoliberalism for Giscard meant above all three things (Wright 1984): making French industry more competitive by opening it to external competition, ending subsidies to lame-duck industries, and encouraging firms to make their own decisions. “Nationalised industries were forced to adopt a more ‘realistic’ economic pricing policy, price controls in the private sector were dramatically abolished or considerably eased, certain restrictions on capital investment abroad were lifted, and private shareholders were given (albeit limited) access to state industries, banks and insurance companies” (Wright 1984, p. 18). These measures had the intended effects—they “rationalized” industry, driving unprofitable firms off the market—but because the world economic climate had turned difficult in the late 1970s, the workers who lost their jobs when these unprofitable firms closed down did not find new jobs, driving unemployment to record heights. The political unpopularity of this position (see, e.g., *Le Figaro* 1978, *Le Matin* 1979) soon led to pressure to continue the tradition of subsidizing key industries, especially steel, shipbuilding, and textiles, to which Giscard bowed. Many Gaullists criticized the policy to such an extent that by 1979 rumors were circulating that the prime minister would resign; he did not do so, but the punitive policies could not withstand the criticism (*The Guardian* 1979a). Moreover, for reasons of defense as well as international symbolism Giscard invested heavily in high-tech industries such as aerospace and nuclear power. These two policies—politically generated continuation of subsidies plus symbolically important investment in certain industries—combined to increase the size of the state. “By the end of Giscard d’Estaing’s presidency one worker in four was employed by the state administration, in local authorities, the public service industries (for example, electricity industry), or the public enterprises (such as Air France, Renault and Seita)” (Wright 1984, pp. 18–19).

Where Giscard was successful was in making the environment "more competitive" for French companies that could not exert pressure for subsidies. "One of the most direct and far-reaching consequences of Giscardian industrial policies is the radical rationalisation which took place. A number of well-known companies disappeared in mergers (often as an alternative to liquidation) (for instance, Boussac and Kléber-Colombes) and many of the big industrial groups moved out of some of their traditional (and often loss-making) activities into new ones. The costs of this belated and accelerated rationalisation were high. The number of bankruptcies rose dramatically, increasing 70 per cent over the seven years of the Giscardian presidency" (Green 1984, pp. 147–48). These changes were furthered by the forced confrontation of French industry with international firms and resulted in the ending of uncompetitive firms. But as Green notes, these changes were not popular with the French. The immediate result of this rapid rationalization was increasing unemployment. "It could be argued that rather than constituting a failure, the attempt to encourage industrial adjustment was too successful. More specifically, the consequences of Giscardian industrial policy (in the shape of the disappearance, at too rapid a rate, of sectors, firms and jobs), proved to be electorally unacceptable. In other words, what mattered to the French electorate was not so much inflation (which they had learned to live with) as unemployment. This suggests that Giscard d'Estaing's main error was in giving the control of inflation priority over all other policy objectives" (Green 1984, p. 152). When confronted with external competition, French firms that had been used to counting on state aid, but could not exert pressure on the state for aid to continue, folded. Note the curious role that "globalization" plays in this story: the usual argument is that globalization hinders state actors who want to pass leftist, redistributive policies by forcing states to attract capital with low taxes, harsh antilabor laws, and minimal welfare payments. But under Giscard, globalization forced the abandonment of neoliberal policies because external competition led to increased folding of firms (as Rodrik [1997] and Garrett [1998] predict). By contrast, American neoliberalism in industrial policy included attempts to *make* firms more competitive across the board by lowering the costs of regulatory compliance—a populist neoliberalism. By 1980, 56% of French business leaders were calling Raymond Barre's policies a failure (*Quotidien de Paris* 1980).

This punitive neoliberalism was also a new innovation in France—but where did it come from? To explain the particular shape of French neoliberalism, this section develops the second point of my critique of theories of path dependence: the path dependence model assumes that innovations arise randomly, and that the key moment to analyze is the moment of implementation, at which point these innovations will be blocked because

of the costs of reversal. But one key difference in analyzing change across societies is that innovation itself is systematically structured: social structures may determine the rate of innovations and the kind of innovations that are brought onto the agenda. This is clear from a comparison of the sources of innovation in the two countries.

In the US case, the weakening of party structures in the 1960s increasingly forced candidates to turn away from dependence on parties and to oversee their own campaigns. For most of the century, the mass party was the medium through which politicians acquired and used power, starting in the 1970s parties no longer were financially strong enough to continue in this role, and so politicians increasingly began turning to social sources of support to be able to build their own personal campaign machines and conduct their campaigns themselves. In this system, candidates are “in business for themselves” (Davidson 1981, p. 131, see also Aldrich and Niemi 1996). Many politicians became “policy entrepreneurs” because one technique for ensuring visibility in voters’ eyes is immediate engagement with substantive issues. For example, politicians elected to Congress in the mid-1970s were significantly more likely to become immediately involved in substantive issues than their predecessors. Thus, the weakening of party structures created a generation of legislators who actively sought out issues on which to make their name, such as junior congressman Jack Kemp, whose championing of the issue of income tax cuts brought the issue to national prominence. The quest for political office became a stable source of political innovation (Prasad, *in press*).

Another source of innovations was the decentralized nature of the polity. It has become scholarly orthodoxy that decentralization of power hinders policy change. Immergut (1992) introduced the idea that veto points—sites in the policy-making process where minorities can block change—can lead to policy stability, and Tsebelis (1995, 1999, 2002) has attempted to turn the idea into a basis for the reorganization of comparative politics. But in the study of organizations, it is orthodoxy that decentralized systems lead to rapid innovation. Stark (1999) writes “In relentlessly changing organizations where, in extreme cases, there is uncertainty even about what product the firm will be producing in the near future, the strategy horizon of the firm is unpredictable and its fitness landscape is rugged. To cope with these uncertainties, instead of concentrating its resources for strategic planning among a narrow set of senior executives or delegating that function to a specialized department, firms may undergo a radical decentralization in which virtually every unit becomes engaged in innovation” (p. 159). Decentralized organizations have several advantages that lead to greater innovation: for example, greater numbers of workers are involved in innovative activities, including those closest to

and most knowledgeable of the production process Damanpour (1991) examined studies conducted between 1960 and 1988 on organizational innovation and reports a routine finding of a negative correlation between centralization and innovation Decentralization brings a larger range of actors into contact with the production or policy-making process, increasing the rate of innovations, although the decentralized nature of the organization may make implementing those innovations difficult (for a similar theory of the effect of veto points on policy innovation, see Martin 2005)

With its entrepreneurial politicians and its decentralized innovation, the American case fits the model of politics described by William Riker "New alternatives, new issues, are like new products Each one is sponsored as a test of the voting market, in the hope that the new alternative will render new issues salient, old issue irrelevant, and, above all, will be preferred by a majority to what went before This is the art of politics to find some alternative that beats the current winner" (Riker 1982, p 209)

But, just as economic markets are socially constructed, so are political markets Riker's description does not fit French politics in the postwar period very well There, politics are reminiscent not of a market, but of a bureaucracy, with many of the classical features of bureaucracies identified by Weber Most important among these are entry based on competitive exams (instead of on loyalty, popularity, or ideological similarity as in the American system) and a centralized hierarchy (strong parties [see Wilson 1987] and with the legislature firmly subordinate to the executive in this period) Instead of becoming "entrepreneurial politicians," the path to success for a French politician is through the formalized system of schools of administration (Sciences Po, ENA) followed by civil service, parties still finance political campaigns, so there is no need for individual politicians to seek new issues on which to make their name, and centralization of power means fewer points at which innovations can enter the political agenda This combination of characteristics leads to a distinctive pattern of policy innovation reliance on experts leads to policy innovations that are tightly coupled to innovations in the academic world, as well as to a methodical process of search for the most successful practices, and hierarchy leads to political innovations at the level of the national party rather than at the level of the local individual politician Although there is innovation at the level of the party, no president had ever lost an election in Fifth Republic France before Giscard, so the parties of the Right had not set up an apparatus for policy rethinking of the kind seen in, for example, British parties when they are out of power

Technocracy—The most prominent source of innovations in France, cited by the majority of my interviewees, is innovations that arise from

the academy, or, more narrowly, the technocracy that funnels students through particular elite schools and into government office. The French executive is staffed to a great degree by graduates of the *École Nationale d'Administration*, entrance to which, and exit from which, are governed by competitive exams. Dogan (1979) found that this path of “mandarin ascent” was the predominant means into ministerial office for the Giscard ministers. A characteristic of innovations that arise from the academy is that they are constrained by the evolution of academic expertise, this explains both the punitive nature of some of the innovations—they were born autonomously of what would be politically popular—as well as their moderate degree—they were constrained by the rationalist ethos of the technocracy (see Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb [2002] for a similar argument about the influence of the French technocracy). Note that it would be misleading to argue that because French state actors are more enamored of academic expertise than American state actors, there must be a national cultural difference at work, the United States has plenty of academically trained professionals, but the difference is that they do not control the state.

Imitation—A second result of staffing the state with trained professionals, rather than through mechanisms of loyalty or ideology, is that policy innovation is fed to a greater degree by a search for the most successful practices among neighboring states. For example, in discussing the origins of her attempt to control health costs, Simone Veil, Giscard’s minister of health, social security, and the family, said ¹³

It was in 1974 that, when I arrived at the ministry . . . I began to say that medicine has a cost, “health is priceless but medicine has a cost” [“la santé n’a pas de prix mais . . . la médecine a un coût”] and that one could not avoid being interested in costs. [In response to the question, “What were the influences on the development of your thinking in this domain?”] At the very beginning of my ministry, I made a very interesting voyage to Canada. They did very interesting things, very experimental. . . . Then, I kept up with the evolutions in the other European countries, those that had the same standard of living, for example Germany, the English system.

We were all agreed on the fact that the population didn’t realize, that our other colleagues . . . said that we managed badly, “You spend too much.” (Interview, June 26, 2001)

Raymond Barre invoked similar experiences during his tenure as vice president of the Commission of the European Communities in Brussels, and a secretary of state recounted an episode where he disguised himself as part of a team of OECD experts to inspect Germany’s vocational

¹³ Interviews were conducted in French. The translation is my own.

training system (Barre, interview, June 28, 2001, Jacques Legendre, interview, June 20, 2001)

Backlash—A third source of innovation becomes evident when we examine why Giscard did *not* move to privatize, although Chirac, only a few years later, did. The postwar nationalizations had been undertaken by a very wide political spectrum, including de Gaulle himself, and the Gaullist party remained within this understanding of nationalization in the interest of modernization. But when Mitterrand nationalized further, he broke this implicit coalition, in reaction, the Gaullists rethought their views on nationalized industry. Thus privatizations were initiated for tactical reasons, “intended for the short-term political benefit of those backing the policy” (Feigenbaum and Henig 1994, p. 196, Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1999). Feigenbaum and Henig point out that profit and loss statements show that state-run enterprises were increasingly profitable in France, casting doubt on the economic arguments for privatization. The Gaullists seized on privatization as a political response to the socialists’ nationalizations. “Since 1983 the socialists had slowly deregulated the economy, reduced taxes, and liberalized capital markets. While they had deregulated for pragmatic reasons, largely because they had no other ideas after the failure of the 1981 economic program, this left the conservatives with little to call their own. Thus they blamed France’s problems on the public sector, especially on the nationalizations of the socialists” (p. 197). Because the Socialists had already made a significant political U-turn and moved toward the center, they forced the Gaullists even further to the right. Therefore the privatizations did not stop with returning the industries that Mitterrand had nationalized to the private sector, once privatization was on the agenda, the Gaullists went on to an extremely broad privatization program, because Mitterrand’s economic difficulties had caused a rethinking within the Gaullist party of the idea of nationalized industry as a whole. One wonders if large tax cuts and cuts in social spending would also have arrived on the agenda in 1986 if Mitterrand had significantly raised taxes or social spending in 1981.

In sum, we see a very different picture of policy innovation in France, in the United States innovation was generated by candidates engaged in intense political competition and intensified because parties cannot fund candidates, in addition, tight informal linkages, a tradition of amateurs in politics, and decentralized state structures combined to bring new ideas into the American polity. In France, the process of policy innovation during this period was more moderate, constrained by the bureaucratic features of the French state, particularly entrance based on competitive exams and hierarchy.

CONCLUSION INNOVATION AND THE AUTONOMOUS STATE

Putting these observations together, we can explain why the Giscard period—when all of the signs seemed to be in favor of a neoliberal direction—did not see promarket reform of the Anglo-American kind. French resistance to the free market cannot be explained by an appeal to French national culture. French cultural traditions, like the cultural traditions of all complex societies, are flexible enough to include the possibility of free-market measures. But despite this, and despite the autonomy of the state, the weakness of labor, the economic crisis which had opened a space for new solutions to be tried, and the president's stated intentions to reduce state intervention, France did not see the kinds of changes in the late 1970s that the United Kingdom and United States would see just a few years later.

Rather, the source of the different fates of the United States and France is found in the ways in which the postwar political economy mobilized support or opposition, and in the structures that lead to innovation in each country. First, the legacies of state-led industrialization in the postwar period—turning an agricultural country into an industrial power—created a political-economic structure that generates popularity from both business and the public, a “pragmatic state interventionism.” The state has been concerned in the postwar period to keep direct taxes on business low, and French planning was largely used in the interests of industry. The one exception to the probusiness nature of the state is in the welfare state taxes, the *cotisations sociales*, but because of the universal nature of the welfare state, as well as the specific manner of tax collection—with taxes visibly targeted to benefits—the welfare state generates loyalty from the majority of citizens. And the largest portion of state revenue comes from “invisible” indirect taxes, which do not generate political protest.

The neoliberal innovations that did arrive on the agenda arose mainly from the technocracy and from imitation of other countries—which meant they were autonomous from popular will and explains the punitive nature of Giscard's industrial policy—and, later, from backlash to the policies of Mitterrand. Because nationalization was a main element of Mitterrand's policies, privatization became the leitmotif of the Gaullists afterward. These innovations were constrained by the evolution of economic expertise.

What is not visible is the kind of intensely innovative, populist, and entrepreneurial process—not at all constrained by economic expertise—seen in the American case. Evident in the histories of neoliberalism under both Thatcher and Reagan is a remarkable degree of improvisation, with events moving in unpredictable fashion, and earlier events opening horizons of possibility that had not been envisioned, so that the neoliberal

impulse becomes more clearly defined and exaggerated as time passes. In the United States, this dynamism was catalyzed by a set of structures—weak parties, decentralized state structures, permeable bureaucracies—that made politics more like a competitive market by bringing in a wider range of actors into the policy-making process. This allowed politicians to discover a way to make free-market policies appeal to the majority. The absence of similar dynamism made it difficult for French policy makers to find a way to entrench neoliberal policies in public opinion, and the punitive neoliberalism they came up with through their technocratic means of innovation withered at the next election.

This observation allows us to resolve the anomaly of rapid change occurring in the fragmented American state, rather than the centralized French state. While fragmentation and decentralization of power is an obstacle to rapid implementation of policy, it aids policy innovation. Centralized states see less innovation and different kinds of innovation: innovation comes from close familiarity with the evolution of academic expertise and from imitation of other states. In addition, in strong party systems, political innovation happens at the level of the party rather than the level of the individual politician.

This investigation of neoliberalism in France also gives us some tools with which to understand the current round of attempts at neoliberal reform. The “national culture” interpretation of French policy making would predict that change is impossible in France, the “class” interpretations, for example, the varieties of capitalism argument, would predict that change will happen if the large exporting firms want it. In contrast, I suggest here that change will happen in France if and when it allows either party to present itself as a contrast to the unsuccessful policies of the other, can be modeled on successful changes in other countries, or generates consensus among experts. These are the conditions under which the autonomous state has historically been moved to action.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A1
INTERVIEWS

Name of Interviewee	Position under Giscard
Raymond Barre	Prime minister
Michel Durafour	Minister of labor
Jean François-Poncet	Minister of foreign affairs
Robert Galley	Minister of voluntary services (“ministre de la coopération”)
Fernand Icart	Minister of public works and town and country planning

TABLE A1 (Continued)

Name of Interviewee	Position under Giscard
Jacques Legendre	Secretary of state for the minister of labor
Pierre Lelong	Secretary of state in posts and telecommunications
Maurice Ligot	Secretary of state for the prime minister, public services
Pierre Mehaignerie	Minister of agriculture
René Monory	Minister of industry, commerce, and the artisanat, and minister of the economy
Jacques Pelletier	Secretary of state for the minister of education
Monique Pelletier	Secretary of state for the guardian of the seals, and minister delegate of the prime minister in charge of the condition of women
Maurice Plantier	Secretary of state for veterans
Michel Poniatoski	Minister of state, minister of the interior
Christiane Scrivener	Secretary of state for minister of economy and finance (consumption)
Jean Sérisé	Secretary to Giscard
Olivier Stirn	Secretary of state of departments and territories
Pierre-Christian Taittinger	Secretary of state for minister of foreign affairs
Simone Veil	Minister of health, social security, and the family

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Is Power Sexy?¹

John Levi Martin
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Using a set of network data from a large number of naturally occurring groups, this study seeks to determine whether powerful people are more likely to be seen as sexy by others than are persons without power. In particular, this study disentangles two aspects of power that are often confused, namely power as a dyadic *relationship* and power as an individual *characteristic* or *position* (which the author calls “status”). Most sociological theories that predict a relationship between power and sexiness argue that the connection will involve men of high status being sexier—or at least more attractive as partners—to women than will men of low status. While this study finds that there is indeed a connection between sexiness and power, it is instead women whose high status increases their sexiness (to men), while it is the interpersonal power of men that makes them sexy, both to men and to women.

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ATTRACTION

Rational Actors and Hardwired Programs

Few subjects raise more interest and provoke hastier pronouncements than the nature of sexual attraction. Sociologists reasonably tend to avoid getting embroiled in the popular debates over the subject because there is so little in the way of systematic data, analysts rightly fear stigmatization

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(see Zetterberg 1966), as any generalizations offered may be interpreted as a confession of personal predilection. While a number of pioneering studies have demonstrated the importance of attractiveness for interpersonal relations (e.g., Elder 1969, Mulford et al. 1998), most theoretical arguments have made recourse to what we "all know to be the case," as opposed to attempting a careful examination of empirical data.

Of course, much of the inattention to the nature of sexual attraction comes because of common assumptions that it must be treated as exogenous to any sociological investigation. Because interrater reliabilities of judgments of attractiveness appear quite high (see Feingold 1988, p. 228) and because of the corporeal fundament of attractiveness, it is easy for sociologists to assume that any apparent social organization to patterns of sexual attractiveness is an artifact of accidents of birth outside the scope of sociological analysis.

This does not mean that social phenomena pertaining to sexual attraction have been assumed to be detached from other sociological processes; on the contrary, many discussions of heterosexual attractiveness assume that it is bound up with issues of power. Most commonly, it seems to be assumed that while men tend to find youth and certain stereotyped secondary sexual characteristics attractive, women tend to find the interpersonal position or power of men attractive. The most influential sociological explanations for this propose that sexual pairing involves an exchange between men and women, whereby men bring some exogenous status such as wealth or power, while women bring youthful beauty—what Talcott Parsons ([1942] 1949, p. 225) saw as the "female glamor pattern." ("It is perhaps significant that there is a common stereotype of the association of physically beautiful, expensively and elaborately dressed women with physically unattractive but rich and powerful men.") In sociology this idea was formulated theoretically by Kingsley Davis (1966, p. 324), who argued that sexual attractiveness is a value that can be traded for economic and social advantage, and unattractiveness a handicap that can be overcome by control of nonsexual means. (For a more recent derivation, see England and Farkas [1986, esp. p. 32].) Since men have greater economic resources than women, the pairing system tends to involve an exchange of female attractiveness for male money.

We should note that this approach does not require that women see men with resources as more sexually attractive than those without, but simply that they prefer to pair with such men. (While the word "attractive" is often used to describe those with whom some ego wishes to pair sexually, ignoring any other utilities that may or may not be associated with the act of pairing, this seems inexact, we may perhaps use the word "sexy" to describe the evaluation of another person as one who elicits this will or wish to pair sexually.) This derivation also assumes that women are

in general lacking in the wealth or power that men have. Like most other sociologists interested in this question, Davis was primarily interested in wealth and reasonably assumed that men tended to have it while women did not. This would imply that an equalization of wealth would decrease the differential preference women would have toward men with resources (see Collins 1971, Hrdy 1997, p. 32).²

In contrast, strong claims have recently come from a descendant of sociobiology generally called "evolutionary psychology," most notably by Buss (1994), that contradict the context dependency of this relation between male attractiveness and status, since they claim that this relation is literally bred into *Homo sapiens* (Buss 1994, p. 114). In most cases, this line of theorizing agrees with other approaches as to men's interest in youthful female attractiveness and women's interest in male resources,³ but argues that this is evidence of genetic predispositions that do not "require conscious calculation or awareness" (Buss 1994, p. 56).⁴

Because desire is simply our name for an evolved innate "psychological mechanism" coordinating mating behavior, evolutionary psychologists argue that we know two things about women's desire for men with resources. The first is that, since it is a residue from Darwinian selection from the "environment of evolutionary adaptedness" (EEA), often loosely taken to be the Pleistocene (e.g., Miller 2000, pp. 179–80),⁵ the desire for high-status men is context dependent only in that women will always, all other things being equal, find men of high status sexier. As Buss (1994, pp. 26, 46) says, "Women desire men who command a high position in society because social status is a universal cue to the control of resources." Miller (2000, p. 319) agrees and emphasizes that by status, we mean not position in some specific social structure, but the more general esteem in

² England and Farkas (1986, pp. 56–57) and Collins and Coltrane (1995, p. 271) suggest that an increase in women's resources should decrease the relative weight of their attractiveness for men, this is plausible but does not necessarily follow (a point first made by Adam Smith [(1776) 1937], namely that the value to the buyer is the difficulty of getting it elsewhere, not the difficulty incurred in producing it on the part of the seller).

³ Men are assumed to want women who are likely to be able to produce many children, and general standards of attractiveness such as hip-to-waist ratio are assumed to be "cues" to such reproductive value (Buss 1994, pp. 51–53), although this assumption has not actually been supported (see Caporael 2001, p. 609).

⁴ For this reason, evolutionary psychologists tend to restate sexual decisions in terms of "cues," the significance of which escapes actors. Thus Buss writes of "men's value in supplying resources, indicated by cues such as income and social status" (1994, p. 196, emphasis added).

⁵ While more rigorous evolutionary scientists stress that the EEA is neither a time nor a place, but an explanatory construct summarizing environmental pressures, the works discussed below tend to assume that the EEA can be treated as equivalent to the Pleistocene.

which some are held (also see Campbell 2002, p. 177). This preference of women for men with high status is asserted to be independent of the power of women (the case of the Bakweri is cited by Buss as a counter-instance). The second conclusion we can draw from the premises of evolutionary psychology is that women will subjectively experience men with resources as more sexually desirable, since desire is simply our name for the psychological mechanism governing mating.

Power and Status

Both of these theories, the rational choice and the evolutionary psychological, assume that there is some connection between sexual attractiveness and power because women will want to pair with high-status men (though the rational choice theory does not necessarily imply that they feel sexual desire for these men). That is, the power of men enters here not in terms of their particular *relationship* with a woman (a dyadic characteristic), but in terms of their general *position* (an individual characteristic). However, other theorists have proposed that women may be attracted to men who have a power *relationship* with them. To illustrate the difference, standard Freudian-Lacanian feminist psychoanalytic theories argue that, at least as an indirect result of patriarchy in which desire is always a residue of some lack (either the man's lack of the mother or the woman's lack of the phallus), men are attractive to women insofar as they promise a vicarious possession of a ("the") phallus (see Mitchell 1974, pp. 396–98, Connell 1987, p. 215). This possession is a quality of an individual man or the collection of men with dominance, and not a characteristic of a relationship.

In contrast, MacKinnon (1988, p. 110) has argued that the relation between power and sexual desire for women comes not because they desire some resources controlled by the man, but because in patriarchy, sexual desire "is socially constructed as that by which we [women] come to want our own self-annihilation, that is, our subordination is eroticized in and as female." This argument implies that women are more likely to find men who dominate them sexy. Thus we can, at least in principle, imagine a separation between power as position and power as relationship.

Similar arguments have been made regarding which women men will find sexy. Some researchers have argued that conventional understandings of the meaning of gender difference lead men to find women's signs of submission as sexy (see Chancer 1992), thus focusing on the character of the relationship, while other researchers focus on characteristics of individuals, proposing that men will be attracted to women of lesser status, as men will find women who are too powerful to be threatening and

unattractive⁶ Thus Holland et al (1996, pp 255–56) argue that in the sexual culture of British youths, “it is not possible to be female, powerful and feminine” because “a powerful woman unmans a man, depriving him of his position of binary opposition ” At the same time, some analysts of dating systems (Waller 1937, Holland and Eisenhart 1990, pp 96, 99, 105, 212) have argued that to some extent, men’s prestige is a function of the prestige of the women they date—indeed, Rubin (1985) argues that the use of women as an index for intermale valuation is at the heart of patriarchy (also see Chancer 1998, p 115, Lerner 1986, p 84) Hence there may be aspects of women’s status that are attractive to men

Thus it is not the case that all sociological approaches to the connection between power and sexual attraction are post hoc explanations of a single pattern This suggests that an empirical examination of detailed data may be able to shed light on these issues This study attempts to begin a serious and systematic examination of the connection between power and sexual attractiveness, using data on perceived sexiness in naturally occurring communities (the data are introduced in the next section) This study is in the unusual position of having information both on perceptions of sexual attractiveness and on interpersonal power relations that allows one to distinguish between power as position and power as relationship

To illustrate, consider the set of persons displayed in figure 1 Men are denoted as triangles, and women as circles The higher the placement of any person on the page, the higher this person’s position of individual status (It is worth emphasizing that here I use “status” in the sense of a generalized position of power, as opposed to some other position distinct from power, such as nobility of birth, occupational prestige, or cultural capital) A dotted line indicates an attribution of sexiness (going from the nominating to the nominated), while a solid line indicates a relation of power (going from the more powerful to the less powerful) Male X finds female A sexually attractive, she is of high status, although she does not have power over him, which is compatible with the idea that it is positions of status that are most attractive But female A does not find male X attractive Female B does, however, and inspection demonstrates that there is no case in which a female reports a male as being sexy where

⁶ One recent experimental study (Kenrick et al 1994, though see Sadalla, Kenrick, and Vershure 1987) found suggestive evidence along these lines men were most likely to lower the ratings of their current partners when exposed to possible other partners of “high attractiveness” and “low dominance” (these being typical experimental treatment groups) The researchers interpreted this behavior as a result of the men’s adjusting their appraisal of their current relationship to the new “information” that there were more “high attractiveness–low dominance” potential partners than they had originally estimated The result may then be understood to imply that this is the most favored category of potential partners




FIG 1 —Example of positions of overall status, relations of power, and attributions of sexiness

the male does not have power over her. This is compatible with the very different idea that it is relationships of power (and not status per se) that are sexy. With data such as that diagrammed here, then, we may examine to what extent relationships of attributions of sexiness are embedded in a structure of positions of status and relationships of power.

HIERARCHY AND RECIPROCITY

We began with the frequently expressed belief that there should be a specific linkage between power and sexiness (that powerful men are more attractive to women), but found that it is not at all clear that any linkages between power and sexiness must be of such a form. There may be other patterns or perhaps a more diffuse relation between power and sexiness (cf. Echols 1992, pp. 58, 66, Hartsock 1983, p. 166). Let us therefore begin with the most general consideration of the possible relations between sexual attraction, on the one hand, and asymmetry and inequality, on the other. One might then suggest that an investigation of the relation between power and sexiness cannot only examine forms of status such as resources or general powerfulness that are *exogenous* to the set of relations of attraction, but also the *endogenous* status—what Zetterberg (1966) called the “erotic ranking”—that is generated by differences in the sexiness of group members. If nothing else, such attention to endogenous stratification could help us avoid confusing effects that may be ascribed to a general position in some group’s status hierarchy with effects caused by position in some group’s hierarchy of sexual desirability.

Following the recent work of Gould (2002), we may say that sets of relationships—networks—tend to be characterized by two very different structural tendencies, reciprocity and hierarchy. The former refers to the disinclination of people to attempt to establish relationships with those who do not reciprocate. For the case at hand, it might mean that we expect a tendency for persons to find sexually attractive those who find them sexually attractive (see esp. Collins 1982, p. 130), a process that, if unchecked, could lead to the fragmenting of a social structure into exclusive dyads (see Slater 1964) or larger cliques (mutual admiration societies).

Yet we also frequently find the contrary dynamic. Several authors have argued that sexual choice involves a positive feedback effect whereby simply being attractive to other people increases one’s attractiveness. Most famously, Willard Waller (1937) argued that at least in the dating system on college campuses in the 1920s and 1930s, there was such a feedback effect, though it was stronger when it came to women being judged than when it was men who were judged. This is because in such a system of

“competitive dating,” desirability is itself a desirable quality in women, like gold, desirable women are precious to men because not all men can possess them. There is consequently a nonindependence of attributions of attractiveness in such a system—men are more likely to believe that the same women are attractive than would be predicted under a chance model.

Of course, such nonindependence would also arise if it were the case that some people simply *are* more attractive, if only because of their physical constitution. It is also often asserted that such physical attractiveness is more narrowly defined for women than for men, which would also lead to greater endogenous hierarchy for women than for men. Indeed, this has been confirmed in a number of studies (recently, see Townsend and Wasserman 1997). However, other analysts, noting the importance of physical attractiveness in gay male sexual choice (see Gagnon and Simon 1973, p. 149), have argued that the importance of attractiveness has to do primarily with male standards of evaluation (whatever sex the target), not with females *per se*. Thus if one were to consider the production of endogenous hierarchies of sexual valuation, one would be interested in examining not only women’s attributions of sexiness to men and men’s attributions to women, but also women’s attributions to other women and men’s attributions to other men.

More specifically, a serious investigation of the questions discussed above would entail a close examination of the relation between such attributions of sexiness to a concrete social order in which one is able to examine not only the endogenous hierarchy of attraction, but also an exogenous hierarchy of status, and to differentiate between power as a dyadic relationship and power as a position in this status hierarchy. There are existing data from a number of groups allowing for such a close examination—indeed, the data used in figure 1 are from one of the smaller of these groups. I go on to describe the data set in more detail.

DATA AND METHODS

The Data Set

I propose to examine the relation between power and attributions of sexual attractiveness using a remarkable set of data on interpersonal relationships in a national sample of 60 naturally occurring communities. These are the intentional communities of Benjamin Zablocki’s Urban Communes Data Set, surveyed in 1974 (see Martin, Yeung, and Zablocki 2001, Zablocki 1980). As far as I know, this is the only study of relatively closed naturally occurring communities that collected social network data both on interpersonal power and on attributions of sexiness. This data set has

two important advantages over a random sampling frame that make up for its nonrepresentativeness. First of all, there are reports from both members of each dyad, in contrast to studies that force one to compare, say, men's and women's reports only in the aggregate. Second, because there are multiple reports on how the same persons are seen, this study is able to examine the degree of hierarchy in sexual desirability, and so to distinguish between positions in exogenous hierarchies from positions in endogenous hierarchies. This allows one to make some headway in distinguishing two theoretically different scenarios. According to the first, person A sees person B as sexy because person B is of high status, and high-status people are sexy, while according to the second, person A sees person B as sexy because person B simply *is* sexy (say this is an unproblematic physical attribute), and people who are seen as sexy tend to have high status. A measure of overall sexual hierarchy allows us to "instrument" (as economists say) this difference by using position in this hierarchy as a measure of overall sexiness independent of any ego's choice. Data from such complete networks are therefore of the highest importance, but as Laumann and Gagnon (1995, pp. 197–98) have emphasized, no such analyses from small groups have yet been done.

In addition, these data have two notable (and closely related) advantages over a conventional experimental sample (usually, though not necessarily, undergraduate students). The first is that because these data come from naturally occurring groups, the resulting measures have unusually high ecological validity. Experimental studies generally involve manipulating status or power by relying on photographs or brief vignettes about occupational standing. It is far from clear that these manipulations successfully create the same conditions present in social life, and, indeed, there is evidence that patterns of attractiveness uncovered in such studies deviate from those in natural settings (e.g., Cavior, Miller, and Cohen 1975, p. 140). Further, it is entirely possible that people may believe that, say, they find power sexy when confronted with it in the relatively abstract setting of a hypothetical choice between fictitious persons, while finding actual persons with power quite unappealing.

Part of this increased validity of the data at hand comes because these groups arise through self-selection as opposed to random assignment, and sexual choice is an example of self-selection par excellence. But this self-selection can introduce complications. Most important, it is quite plausible to expect that self-selection processes lead to different, and truncated, ranges of sexual attractiveness in different groups. That is, sexiness is one of the many attributes that can serve as the basis for homophilous patterns of association, "like liking like." If, as David Hume ([1777] 1985) thought, attractiveness is inherently a relative matter, and roughly the same proportion of the most appealing persons in each group were considered sexy,

we would find people who would not be considered sexy were they in one group being so considered because they are in another group with fewer sexually attractive members. If, further, there was a large “just noticeable difference” required to determine who was sexy and who was not, we might expect increasing error in the response process, and hence decreased hierarchy in resulting choices.⁷ But the evidence here does not favor the Humean scenario—the proportion of the possible dyads in which an attribution of sexiness was made varied from .00 to .35, with the central 50% of cases between .05 and over three times that value, .17.

The second advantage is that while these groups differed in the degree of intensity of their common life and in the amount of commitment required from members, in general, members cared a great deal about their positions and relationships in these groups and were less likely to be heavily invested in other social arenas that might have orthogonal principles of social valuation. These groups were not only where the members lived, they were also where they often loved, worked, played, worshipped, and learned. Thus relationships and position in these groups can be expected to be more than a trivial concern to the members.

We are thus relatively poorly equipped to determine the degree to which people will make sacrifices along some dimension on which they may rate prospective partners (e.g., attractiveness) in order to increase their stock of other goods that provide utility (e.g., connection to an illustrious family or wealth in the form of a dowry or income, Laumann et al. [1994]), a question that was of pivotal interest to theorists describing sexual pairing in an era in which this pairing was still predominantly understood through the lens of marriage. But we are in an excellent position to understand what we may consider the phenomenology of sexual attraction—how positions in social networks affect the ways in which people perceive and interact with others. In addition to providing a strategic site for the investigation of the relation between power and sexiness, an examination of these data may have direct implications for the sexual choice that takes place in relatively closed communities such as schools, colleges, social movement organizations, or religious groups—arenas in which the dynamics of sexual partnering have been the focus of both political and, in some cases, epidemiological concern (see, e.g., Coleman 1961, Bearman, Moody, and Stovel 2004, Echols 1989, Jacobs 1984).

As said above, this data set is not a representative sample of the U.S. population in 1974, and there have been changes in gender roles in the United States since that time. One may insist that the logic of sexual attraction is so fundamentally variable that this constitutes a grave limitation to the use of such data. Of course, that means that data from any

⁷ I thank a reviewer for drawing my attention to this process.

time period are equally suspect—we are no better off with a false sense that the interpretation of some set of data can correctly predict future states based on current data than a false sense based on earlier data. However, it is far from clear that we should expect fundamental changes. The assumption of a watershed change in gender social psychology in the 1970s has not been demonstrated (see, e.g., Nyquist and Spence's [1986] replication of Megargee's [1969] classic experiments).

In sum, there is no reason to think that the possible differences between the members of these groups and Americans today means that we cannot use these data to shed light on the questions pertaining to the relation between power and sexiness. Further, there are other advantages of the data set that outweigh the disadvantages. First of all, the data are such as to avoid confusing processes in which status affects persons' *choices* of sexual partner without affecting their *preferences* (e.g., a sacrifice of love for money) with those in which status affects preferences or vice versa. This is because, on the one hand, we have explicit measures of attributions of sexiness as opposed to simply observed outcomes such as marriage, and, on the other, because status is relatively divorced from issues of lineage or want satisfaction.

Thus the data can help us understand the specific issue of how social factors affect perceived sexual attraction, and the results are likely to be relevant to theoretical traditions that make arguments along these lines, including, but not limited to, those derived from evolutionary psychology. The strength (in the technical sense) of the evolutionary psychological approach is its indifference to context, and so if indeed women's sexual preferences were hardwired in the Pleistocene, we should see strong evidence of that in these data. More generally, these data can shed light on what may be termed the phenomenology of social interaction—how participants perceive and evaluate social positions and social relationships. I go on to describe the sampling frame and those data gathered.

The Sampling Frame

Ten communes (defined as having five or more adult members, either not all of the same sex or with at least one child, and with a collective identity known to others) were selected from the largest metropolitan area in each of six of the census bureau's eight major areas in 1974 (for more information, see Zablocki [1980]). Fifty-six of these groups had valid data for these analyses. The groups were not picked randomly, but rather to fill certain distributions for key variables such as number of members, ideological type, and age. Thus the sample is multistage and weighted (Zablocki 1980, pp. 14, 69–74, 373), but as the true population distributions are unknown, I treat the sample as if it were a random one. Communes

ranged from 5 to around 40 members, with an average of 10⁸ The groups varied in ideology, sexual norms, and social structure

Data Gathered The Dependent Variable

All the data used here come from a relationship questionnaire that each member was asked to fill out (For purposes of consistency, I will always consider the person whose reports are being discussed as “ego,” and I shall refer to any other group member as “alter”) In the first section, respondents were asked to come up with names of fellow commune members whom they considered to be any of a number of adjectives, one of which was “sexy” Ego indicating that alter is sexy is the chief dependent variable

It is important to emphasize that reporting that someone is “sexy” is not the same thing as saying that this person is “attractive,” nor the same thing as saying, “I am attracted to this person ” Regarding the first distinction, “sexy” may actually be a more accurate transcription of what is implied by questions about sexual choice and power than the more common “attractive,” since it is more likely to imply a desire for sexual contact (and not, say, general appreciation of physique and grooming) The second distinction is more fundamental It might be the case that ego could identify some alter as being “sexy” in that ego believes that third parties would nominate alter as sexy, though ego him- or herself is not attracted to alter This might occur, for example, if ego was not attracted to persons of the same (or the other) sex, but knew that members of the other sex considered this alter sexy

This particular scenario could be dealt with if, as many might expect should be possible, one were to characterize respondents as predominantly heterosexual, predominantly homosexual, or bisexual in orientation, and then to study each category separately In fact, there were a great deal of other data that could have been used to construct such a triage (including reports on whom respondents had slept with, and whether they indicated having had “homosexual experience” in the past) But close attention to these data suggested that such a partition was both unnecessary and impossible, for both men and women made both same-sex and cross-sex attributions of sexiness, and this could not be simply explained on the basis of other variables related to sexual orientation

Further, respondents could easily refrain from naming any same-sex alters as “sexy” In other words, the question did not require that heterosexual respondents, for example, mentally go through all other group

⁸ I note that these data have recently been made public, see <http://sociology.rutgers.edu/UCDS/UCDS.htm> for more information

members of the same sex to determine who might be sexy, they merely needed to list those individuals of either sex who came to mind as sexy. Consequently, there is no reason to imagine a qualitatively different response process leading to same-sex as opposed to cross-sex nominations, further, other evidence presented below is consistent with a fundamental parallelism between same-sex and cross-sex responses.

Of course, it might be that both cross-sex and same-sex attributions really involve the respondents acting as informants were "sexiness" a group status that could be observed by the members, regardless of their personal feelings. If this were the case, one would be mistaken to take this variable as an indicator for the presence of sexual attraction. This alternative explanation for the generation of the data implies a hierarchy of choices that is open to empirical exploration, I conduct such exploration in the next section, but as it requires some preliminary exposition, I first introduce the rest of the data.

Data Gathered: The Independent Variables and Measure of Status

Respondents were asked whether they "slept with" each alter (they could respond "yes," "no," or "sometimes"). Each respondent (ego) was also asked, for each alter, who held the balance of power, or whether they were equal. These data are used both to measure the power relation within any dyad, and also, as explained below, to construct scores for each person's overall "status" position in a group's power structure. In other portions of the interview, respondents were asked to give their date of birth, from which age is computed. Finally, observers coded what they called the "gender ideology" of the group on a five-point scale running from deliberately traditional to deliberately antitraditional gender roles, with indifference in the middle.

Groups differed in the general propensity of members to make attributions of sexiness. Two groups had no attributions, and seven groups had only one. If all the groups were identical in their dynamics, we could still pool all the dyads, assuming that these differences in propensity to make attributions were because of differences in power structures or to random factors. But it might well be that some groups with very few reports of sexiness ("unsexy" groups) did in fact have some persons who found others sexy, but also strong ideological proscriptions on the expression of such sentiments, alternatively, the unsexy group's ideology may actually have been sufficiently powerful to suppress members' inclinations to view others as sexy. (Note that I do not claim that either of these is necessarily the case, merely that both are reasonable possibilities.) In either case, we might expect that including such unsexy groups in the denominator of any measure of the effect of power on sexiness would

probably lead to bias. I therefore eliminate groups with fewer than two attributions from further analysis. The total data set used here then includes 47 groups and 3,334 dyads.

I noted that each ego reported for each alter who had more power in the relationship, or whether they were equal. From these reports, one can retrieve an estimate of each person's overall "status" in the group from the model applied to the data on interpersonal power relations by Martin (1998). This model begins by assuming that every person possesses an unobserved (latent) status which can be placed on an interval-level scale. It then assumes that the observed responses to the question "Who has more power, you or alter?" come from a stochastic process whereby ego compares his or her status to that of alter and tends to report having more power if his or her status is greater than that of alter, or less power if his or her status is less than that of alter.⁹ Each person is then assigned that value for his or her unobserved status that best explains all the observations, thus, each person's status comes not from self-reports only, but also from the pooled reports of all persons in the group.

Thus in figure 1 (which, for purposes of clarity, only graphs as "power" the relation "ego says that alter is more powerful" and not "ego says that ego is more powerful") the vertical position of each person corresponds to his or her latent status as retrieved by this model. We see that person A is of higher overall status (in general, has more power) than person B, even though there is no direct power relationship between the two. Further, we see that the status difference between B and C (the second- and third-ranking women) is much greater than the difference between C and D (the third and fourth).

It is worth emphasizing that this measure is not a conventional sociometric measure derived from a set of data on *choices*. While most social network data on positions of "power" actually come from dyadic data of a quite different nature (e.g., data on exchanges or on nominations of whom one "likes"), here the participants were reporting specifically on the

⁹ This model can be expressed as log linear for two sets of odds for an observation x_{ijk} , giving any person i 's report regarding his or her relation with j in group k as follows: first, the odds that x_{ijk} is in state A (i claims to be more powerful than j) as opposed to state B (i reports equality with j), and second, the odds that x_{ijk} is in state C (i claims that j is more powerful) as opposed to state B .

$$\ln(\text{prob}[x_{ijk} = A]/\text{prob}[x_{ijk} = B]) = m_k(a_{ik} - a_{jk}) - b_k,$$

$$\ln(\text{prob}[x_{ijk} = C]/\text{prob}[x_{ijk} = B]) = m_k(a_{jk} - a_{ik}) - b_k,$$

where a_{ik} is the latent status of person i , a_{jk} is the latent status of person j , b_k is a parameter that measures group k 's propensity to claim equality, and m_k is the group's overall degree of status differentiation.

relationship of power. Second, this measure is not derived from any one person's reports about her- or himself, but from the complete set of reports of all participants upon all others. These parameters have been shown to have internal validity as tapping status in other research (Yeung and Martin 2003). Since such latent parameters for network data may increase without bound in certain circumstances, to facilitate comparison across groups, these parameters were normalized so that in any group, they sum to zero, and their squares sum to one. This status parameter then indicates the overall relative powerfulness of each person in the group. Descriptives for all variables at the dyadic and individual level are found in appendix A, tables A1–A2.

Hierarchy in Attributions of Sexiness: Further Explorations

I noted above that while I hope to consider attributions of sexiness as tapping ego's sexual attraction to alter, there is an alternative model of the response process according to which ego simply reports that alter is generally recognized to be sexy in this group, whether or not ego is personally attracted to alter. There is, however, considerable evidence that this scenario does not explain the generation of these data. First of all, it is not the case that "sexiness" is some socially objective status that members observe and report on. This can be seen in the relatively low degree of hierarchy of choices. Figure 2 portrays the percentage of men and women who received zero, one, or more than one nomination of being sexy; large (10 or more members) groups are displayed separately from small (five to nine members) groups.¹⁰ There are more men and women receiving only one nomination than there are receiving more than one choice. This is not because of a complete paucity of attributions—in small groups, at any rate, most people make at least one nomination. But they evidently do not nominate the same few people.

A less intuitively accessible, but more formally rigorous, test of the presence of hierarchy can be conducted, such a test is warranted because, as we have seen, the presence or absence of hierarchy is relevant to the theoretical debates over the nature of attraction. One may measure the degree of hierarchy in attributions by taking an approach quite similar to that suggested for the study of attraction by Coleman (1961, pp. 99, 297, 1964, pp. 442–44), who saw the connection between entropy statistics and sociometric hierarchy. Because, in sociometric terms, a person who

¹⁰ One might expect larger groups to have a larger number of attributions made and received, on average, by each member. That this is not the case is likely because of the fact that many large groups were religious ones that had relational environments that were, to the best of the leadership's ability, greatly (but not wholly) desexualized.




FIG 2 —Attributions of sexiness received

is “higher up” receives more choices, in such a case hierarchy can be equated with the *concentration* of choices whereby some people are disproportionately chosen. Hence entropy can be considered an absence of hierarchy, entropy is often difficult to interpret, and Coleman suggested what was conventional at the time, a division by the maximum possible. But, as I argue elsewhere (1999a), this makes little sense, and when using discrete, small- N , data, it makes more sense to use the standardized combinatorial probability.

For example, consider a group in which there are four attributions of sexy coming from men and going to women (as it happens, these are real data from one of the groups), two women received two attributions each,

TABLE 1
EXAMPLE OF COMBINATORIC HIERARCHY MEASURE

Pattern	<i>W</i>	No of Combinations	Total Microstates
4-0-0-0-0	1	5	5
3-1-0-0-0	4	20	80
2-2-0-0-0	6	10	60
2-1-1-0-0	12	30	360
1-1-1-1-0	24	5	120
Total			625 = 5 ⁴

and the three remaining women, none. Given four choices and five women, there are only five different patterns or "macrostates" that could be observed, these are listed in table 1. If the number of women is labeled as M , and the number of choices as N , with the number going to the i th woman as N_i , the combinatorial probability of any state (W) can be defined as follows:

$$\text{combinatorial probability} = W = \frac{N!}{N_1!N_2!N_3! \dots N_M!} \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) gives the number of indistinguishable "microstates" that have this same observable macrostate; this data is given in the second column of table 1 (see Feller 1957). Most of these macrostates can be observed in different ways: for example, women 1 and 2 may have received the two choices each, or it may have been women 3 and 5, or 1 and 4. The number of equivalent macrostates can be determined with a formula from combinatorics and is given in column 3 of table 1. If we multiply the W by this number of combinations, we have the total number of microstates associated with this distribution (table 1, col. 4). The total, adding up over column 4, equals M^N .

Now let us go through all the macrostates and see whether they have a W larger than the observed (which indicates less concentration), smaller than the observed (which indicates more concentration), or the same. For the data in question, 13.6% of the possible microstates are more concentrated than the observed W of six, 76.8% are less so, and 9.6% are the same, thus this pattern of choices is relatively concentrated, though not outstandingly so. While we can choose either of the first two numbers as an overall measure of the degree of hierarchy, they are highly correlated in these data ($R = -.685$), and, to be compatible with other usage, I choose the proportion greater. This measure of hierarchy was computed for all groups, for all combinations of ego's and alter's sex that had more than one attribution.

TABLE 2
MEAN HIERARCHY OF ATTRIBUTIONS OF SEXINESS

EGO'S SEX	ALTER'S SEX		TOTAL
	Male	Female	
Male	264 ($N = 13$)	360 ($N = 36$)	334
Female	232 ($N = 26$)	318 ($N = 22$)	271
Total	242	344	303

NOTE.— N is the no. of groups with more than one valid choice for this combination of ego's and alter's sex

Table 2 presents the mean hierarchy for the four combinations of ego's and alter's sex. Indeed, we see that it is in fact the case that men's choices have more hierarchy, no matter what alter's sex. But more variance is explained by alter's sex—there is more hierarchy when women are judged, no matter who does the judging. While this difference is not statistically significant using an F -test, it is more significant than an equivalent test of difference between male and female egos ($F = 2.096$, $P = .151$, as opposed to $F = .837$, $P = .363$, for both, $df = 1$).

We have thus found somewhat more hierarchy in the judgment of women's sexiness than in the judgment of men's sexiness. But more striking is the relative absence of hierarchy. In most groups, the degree of dispersion of choices is roughly in the middle of the range of what would be expected if the choices were completely independent, that is, if there were *no* hierarchy whatsoever. There is, then, little evidence that responses to the question on sexiness provoke our respondents to act as *informants* and report the social consensus as to who is desirable. If we find that their responses as to who is sexy vary on the dyadic level according to an interpretable pattern, there will be strong internal evidence that the response process is one that taps whether or not ego personally finds alter sexy.

Methods

To examine whether characteristics of the dyadic relationship between some ego and alter predict ego's attributing sexiness to this alter, I will use conventional multivariate methods. The question is whether power is sexy, while this need not be interpreted in a strictly causal sense (and since the data are cross-sectional, there would be no real advantage to doing so), treating power as a potential "cause" of sexiness helps formulate models that take into account alternative explanations for sexiness. I thus treat attributions of sexiness as the dependent variable in dyadic-level

models, although we must bear in mind that in some cases (but not all), sexiness might boost someone's power or status¹¹

My method will be to regress ego's attributions of sexiness to alter on characteristics of alter, characteristics of ego, and characteristics of ego's relationship with alter, and to test interaction coefficients with group-level variables. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regressions. But because dyadic data are likely to have correlations of errors across cases, conventional significance tests are inapplicable. Accordingly, the significance level of the logistic regression coefficient is judged via a permutation quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) test (Krackhardt 1987, 1988), adapted for nonlinear models and multiple groups (Martin 1999b). This compares the observed coefficient to a constructed distribution in which persons are randomly permuted to different network positions (though always in their original group), and hence leads to a test of the null hypothesis that there are no dyadic effects not reducible to individual-level effects. It is worth pointing out that in contrast to OLS regressions, with logistic regressions, the estimates are not necessarily unbiased given the correlation of errors. Thus the tests are not tests of whether the coefficient is different from zero, but of whether a coefficient this large or larger in the direction predicted would be observed were there no dyadic effects. As said above, I look at all four combinations of ego's and alter's sex¹²

RESULTS

Power and Status

Is power sexy? We can begin to answer this question by separating the effect of alter's position of *status* from the effect that alter's relational

¹¹ While I here assume that power influences sexiness and not vice versa, and then examine to what degree the data are consistent with several important unidirectional hypotheses, I did conduct tests for reverse causation as described below.

¹² This technique thus may loosely be seen as akin to a random-effects model for dealing with the dependence across dyads, in contrast to an attempt to specify this dependence through parameters. The latter approach leads to the p^* models discussed by Wasserman and Pattison (1996) and Pattison and Wasserman (1999). The p^* model is preferable when a complex but known set of dependencies describe the data, but becomes quite unwieldy when a large number of covariates need to be taken into account, as in the current case. With the QAP approach, one is still able to examine the theoretically important structural aspects of reciprocity and attractiveness in this modeling framework without having too many parameters to be reasonably identified. (It is also possible to examine the "expansiveness" of each ego—the effect that ego's tendency to make choices in general affects ego's readiness to make any additional choices. Doing so did not change the results at all.)

power has on ego's attribution¹³ Models 3 1–3 4 of table 3 regress ego's attribution of sexiness to alter on alter's status and the reported balance of power for men reporting on men, men reporting on women, women reporting on men, and women reporting on women, respectively The balance of power is parameterized as two dummy variables indicating ego's claim to have power over alter and ego's claim that alter has power over ego (equality being the omitted category) Quite in contrast to the expectation that women should prefer high-status men, the results indicate that it is men who prefer high-status women—that is, those who are in general more powerful than others But a male respondent seems not to find it sexy if the woman has power over *him* Such a pattern was suggested by Cronin (1980, p 305), who argued that “the ideal for a male is to find a female who is high ranking and yet submissive to him”¹⁴

It might be asserted that at least in this case, causality goes the other way, and that this finding is really explained by a process whereby women who are seen as sexy by men acquire high status Thus other men would recognize that attractive women will be of high status because their attractiveness allows them to command resources from high-status men But other women do not seem to recognize this, for the coefficient linking alter's status to sexiness is insignificant in model 3 4 Since 75 of the possible 577 of the female-female dyads included an attribution of sexiness (see the bottom rows of table 3), a higher prevalence (13%) than that seen when women judge men (11%), we cannot dismiss this by saying that women simply do not recognize any women as sexy They do, but they do not see sexiness as related to status

While men thus find the status, but not the power, of women sexy, women find the interpersonal power, but not the status, of men sexy¹⁵ Further, it is interesting that men join women in seeing men who have power over them sexier than men who do not, indeed, for men, it even appears that ego's having more power in the relationship *decreases* the sexiness of a male alter This pattern is incompatible with the idea entertained above that men's reports as to which men are sexy result from

¹³ While one might expect equals in status to be more attracted to each other (a point consonant with Maslow's [(1942) 1969, p 100] argument that those of equal “dominance” would tend to pair up), there was no evidence that this was the case in these data

¹⁴ Randall Collins (in a personal communication) had also predicted such a pattern for these data While in general he proposed a similarity in the dynamics for women and men, he predicted that men will be attracted to high-status women, and that the attractive process will not be upset if the man has more power than the woman, though women will be unlikely to be attracted to men over whom they have power

¹⁵ The difference between the coefficient for *alter has power* when women judge men (model 3 3) and when men judge women (model 3 2), or when women judge women (model 3 4), is statistically significant ($P < .05$)

TABLE 3
EFFECTS OF STATUS AND INTERPERSONAL POWER ON ATTRIBUTIONS OF SEXINESS

Variable	Model 3 1	Model 3 2	Model 3 3	Model 3 4
Ego's sex	Male	Male	Female	Female
Alter's sex	Male	Female	Male	Female
Alter's status	425 (<i>P</i> = 276)	1 086* (<i>P</i> = 017)	395 (<i>P</i> = 336)	093 (<i>P</i> = 292)
Ego has power	- 748** (<i>P</i> = 003)	427 (<i>P</i> = 175)	- 070 (<i>P</i> = 820)	- 197 (<i>P</i> = 141)
Alter has power	803** (<i>P</i> = 008)	484 (<i>P</i> = 252)	1 046** (<i>P</i> = 001)	464 (<i>P</i> = 301)
Constant	-3 388	-1 756	-2 484	-1 973
<i>N</i>	1077	811	869	577
<i>N</i> _{pos}	41	138	95	75
<i>N</i> _{neg}	1036	673	774	502
-2LL	335 085	725 098	572 520	441 434

[†] *P* < 1, one-tailed tests

* *P* < .05

** *P* < .01

*** *P* < .001

a simple process whereby they act as informants and tell us which men are seen as sexy by women. Were that the case, there would be no *dyadic* effects, whereby one man's relationship with another affects the likelihood of his attributing sexiness to this other man.

Put somewhat differently, there are two reasonable explanations for the pattern of results in model 3 1, both of which may, to some extent, be operating. According to the first, men respond to other men as do women—they find men who have power over them more sexy. According to the second, men do not themselves find other men as sexy, so they begin their process of responding to the question by thinking “What men do women find sexy?” But they do not seem to have this information at hand, as can be seen by examining the degree to which men's attributions of sexiness to men overlap with women's attributions.

Cross-Sex and Same-Sex Attributions

To conduct such an examination, we can give each person two scores in terms of general sexiness, one from choices by members of the same sex, and one from choices by members of the other sex. I use the number of such choices, divided by the total number of such choices given in the group. (This measure is conservative and deals with differences in reporting conventions across groups, for a more complete discussion, see Yeung and Martin 2003.) That is, if $x_{ijg} = 1$ denotes person i seeing person j as sexy in group g ($x_{ijg} = 0$ otherwise), and if the set of all members in

some group of the sex of any person j is denoted $S(j)$, while all those of the other sex are denoted $O(j)$, the same-sex attractiveness of person j in group g may be written as

$$Q_{jg}^s = \left[\frac{\sum_{i \in S(j)} x_{ijg}}{\sum_{i, k \in S(j)} x_{ikg}} \right], \quad (2)$$

and j 's attractiveness to members of the other sex as

$$Q_{jg}^o = \left[\frac{\sum_{i \in O(j)} x_{ijg}}{\sum_{i \in O(j), k \in S(j)} x_{ikg}} \right] \quad (3)$$

The correlation between same-sex attractiveness and opposite-sex attractiveness turns out to be positive and significant when women are being judged ($r = .495$, $P < .001$, $N = 130$) but only weakly and insignificantly positive when men are being judged ($r = .181$, $P = .097$, $N = 85$). Thus men and women do not generally name the same men as sexy, which makes it implausible that men's nominations come from a process whereby they simply report the men they know to be seen as sexy by women.¹⁶ Thus even if men were to attempt to report which men are seen as sexy by women, they would probably need to ask a slightly different question "What men would I find sexy were I the kind of human who found men sexy?" They seem to answer this by disproportionately choosing men who have power over them. Hence even in this case, both men and women understand that a sexy man is one who has interpersonal power.

Thus men and women are in substantial agreement not about the particular men who are sexy, but about what sorts of relationships with men are sexy. Like the findings in table 3, this does not accord with the view of evolutionary psychology, which would imply that if men and women found anything sexy about men's power, it would be their position of status. If we failed to find an effect of status on which men are seen as sexy simply because the measure of status was a poor one, men and women would still agree as to which men are sexy (because they would be able to tell who had high status in their group even if we could not). But instead we can see that they agree not on the particular *persons*, but on the kinds of *relationships* that are sexy. If it is argued that men and women use the interpersonal relationship as a "cue" to the man's status, this is as much to admit that thousands of millennia of natural selection have

¹⁶ I note that the higher correlation between men's and women's reports as to which women are sexy suggests that it is possible that women's same-sex reports are, to some extent, a report as to which women are seen as sexy by men.

produced psychological mechanisms that are so poor that they can be quickly trumped by going over survey data

Male Dominance and the Effects of Status

There was no evidence in the findings that women were disproportionately attracted to men of high status, despite the common assumption that something along these lines should occur. But it might be that this is because the relation between men's status and women's attributions of sexiness to these men is a context-dependent one. Reasoning analogously to the psychoanalytic theories discussed above, one might expect that women only desire status in men when women are systematically excluded from that status themselves. Such context dependency in mate preferences was found by Eagly and Wood (1999) in their reanalysis of Buss's (1990) data: the preferences that Buss took to be universal were weaker the more women were empowered relative to men. To test this, I compute the average status difference between men and women for each group (see Fuller and Martin 2003), since in most (but not all) groups this difference is positive (men are of higher status than women), I call it male dominance.¹⁷ The models in table 4 add this term and an interaction term between male dominance and alter's status to see whether men's status becomes more attractive to women as women's status deprivation increases. (These models also add other terms that are discussed below, the conclusions are exactly the same if these other variables are omitted. While the coefficient for alter's status in model 4.2—which now refers to alter's status only in groups where men and women are of equal average status—is now insignificant, this is only because of the presence of the interaction coefficient.)

It is not, however, the case that women in more male-dominated groups value status in men more than women in less male-dominated (or female-dominated) groups. The crucial interaction coefficient in model 4.3 is positive, but nowhere near statistical significance. Instead, it is significantly positive when men judge women (and the difference between these coefficients is statistically significant, $P < .05$). In other words, the more male dominated a group, the more men find higher-status women sexy. This is compatible with the idea that high-status women are used to order intramale status relations in patriarchal settings.

¹⁷ As a reviewer pointed out, an exchange logic would imply that it is not the collective disadvantage of women that is at issue here, but the individual disadvantage, suggesting a different parameterization. However, such specifications (available upon request) produce coefficients in the wrong direction for the hypothesis, and thus the parameterization used here is preferable for a sympathetic examination of this argument.

TABLE 4
MALE DOMINANCE, HIERARCHY, AND RECIPROCITY AND ATTRIBUTIONS OF SEXINESS

Variable	Model 4 1	Model 4 2	Model 4 3	Model 4 4
Ego's sex	Male	Male	Female	Female
Alter's sex	Male	Female	Male	Female
Alter's status	942 [†] (<i>P</i> = .054)	779 (<i>P</i> = .296)	- 252 (<i>P</i> = .577)	- 891 [†] (<i>P</i> = .092)
Ego has power	- 374* (<i>P</i> = .034)	433 (<i>P</i> = .164)	207 (<i>P</i> = .616)	- 406 [†] (<i>P</i> = .055)
Alter has power	686* (<i>P</i> = .015)	383 (<i>P</i> = .355)	1 067** (<i>P</i> = .001)	388 (<i>P</i> = .252)
Male dominance	-1 218** (<i>P</i> = .001)	1 393 (<i>P</i> = .177)	1 829 [†] (<i>P</i> = .099)	-1 110** (<i>P</i> = .004)
Status/maledom	-1 218 (<i>P</i> = .174)	3 180* (<i>P</i> = .020)	429 (<i>P</i> = .614)	1 652 [†] (<i>P</i> = .087)
Reciprocity	-207 071** (<i>P</i> = .001)	253* (<i>P</i> = .012)	470** (<i>P</i> = .012)	048 (<i>P</i> = .323)
Same-sex attractiveness	- 107 (<i>P</i> = .223)	080 (<i>P</i> = .552)	- 287* (<i>P</i> = .041)	638 (<i>P</i> = .390)
Other-sex attractiveness	1 378 [†] (<i>P</i> = .065)	1 820** (<i>P</i> = .006)	660 (<i>P</i> = .408)	1 511** (<i>P</i> = .006)
Age	017 (<i>P</i> = .798)	- 038** (<i>P</i> = .008)	062 (<i>P</i> = .119)	- 001 (<i>P</i> = .171)
Constant	-3 847	-1 351	-4 642	-2 134
<i>N</i>	871	707	696	490
<i>N</i> _{pos}	33	129	82	68
<i>N</i> _{neg}	838	578	614	422
-2LL	259 471	602 233	454 498	372 837

[†] *P* < .1, one-tailed tests

* *P* < .05

** *P* < .01

*** *P* < .001

Furthermore, it is of the greatest importance that male dominance leads to a net decrease in the likelihood of a same-sex attraction (see models 4 1 and 4 4, these coefficients are different from those for cross-sex attraction, *P* < .05). This provides further internal evidence that same-sex attributions are not simply reports as to which alters ego imagines are considered sexy by third parties, since it seems that male-dominated groups inhibit the development or expression of attributions of sexiness to those of the same sex.

Status as Compensatory

The results indicated that the attractiveness of status in men did not seem to increase where women tended to be more deprived of status. It might simply be that the phenomenology of attraction does not respond to the

structure of rational incentives, or that status is here not treated as a transferable resource. Alternatively, it might be the case that the logic of partnering is akin to an exchange, but rather than status being something that women *perceive* as attractive in men, it is something that *compensates for* a lack of attractiveness in a calculus of pairing. Thus women are, say, as likely to pair up with a man of high status but medium attractiveness as they are with a man of medium status but high attractiveness. To some extent, this hypothesis can be tested by examining responses to the item "sleep with" as characterizing the relationship. Respondents could answer yes, no, or sometimes, here I combine yes and sometimes as yes.

Unfortunately, there is some ambiguity with the item "sleep with": it is quite possible that in some cases respondents meant this literally, in that they shared a bed or perhaps a room, as opposed to using it as a euphemism for sexual relations. This seems especially likely when it comes to relations in same-sex dyads. The justification for this is that there is no relation between ego reporting that he or she slept with alter and reporting that he or she finds alter as sexy in same-sex dyads ($\chi^2 = 3.13$, $df = 2$, $N = 965$, $P = .855$ for male-male dyads, $\chi^2 = 3.114$, $df = 2$, $N = 559$, $P = .211$ for female-female dyads). But there is a strong, though imperfect association for cross-sex dyads. Thus while some of those answering yes are wrongly being considered to be in a sexual relationship even in the cross-sex dyads, it is a reasonable measure, and there is no reason to believe that it will introduce bias. I can therefore replicate the previous tests (for cross-sex dyads only), but using this dichotomized sleep with variable as the dependent variable (table 5, models 5.1, 5.2).¹⁸

The crucial question is whether the interaction between status and male dominance is significant in the positive direction for women judging men. It is not: indeed, it is in the wrong direction for the hypothesized dynamics. Of course, it may be that to pick up the effect of status in this calculus, attractiveness must be held constant, since status's effects are seen in its compensating for attractiveness. If status and attractiveness are correlated in the sample, we might expect a misleading result. Accordingly, models 5.3 and 5.4 replicate models 5.1 and 5.2 but add a term for ego perceiving alter as sexy. Not surprisingly, ego perceiving alter as sexy is strongly related to ego reporting that she or he sleeps with alter, but including this term does not change the conclusion. Women are indeed more likely to report sleeping with high-status men. But this effect does not increase with the status deprivation of women in these groups; further, men differ from women not in their responsiveness to status but in the connection

¹⁸ While sleep with should be a symmetric variable, I treat it here as asymmetric, given that there are well-known reporting differences between men and women regarding sexual relationships (see Laumann et al. 1994).

TABLE 5
EFFECTS OF MALE-DOMINATED ENVIRONMENT ON SLEEP WITH VARIABLE

Variable	Model 5 1	Model 5 2	Model 5 3	Model 5 4
Ego's sex	Male	Female	Male	Female
Alter's sex	Female	Male	Female	Male
Alter's status	1 132* (<i>P</i> = 046)	1 129*** (<i>P</i> < 001)	965 (<i>P</i> = 124)	1 184*** (<i>P</i> < 001)
Ego has power	964*** (<i>P</i> < 001)	− 066 (<i>P</i> = 372)	933*** (<i>P</i> < 001)	− 054 (<i>P</i> = 384)
Alter has power	381 (<i>P</i> = 369)	082 (<i>P</i> = 431)	281 (<i>P</i> = 422)	− 138 (<i>P</i> = 352)
Male dominance	− 232 (<i>P</i> = 715)	− 382 (<i>P</i> = 645)	− 460 (<i>P</i> = 525)	− 704 (<i>P</i> = 349)
Status/maledom	− 1 409 (<i>P</i> = 644)	− 332† (<i>P</i> = 068)	− 1 828 (<i>P</i> = 445)	− 714* (<i>P</i> = 048)
Alter is sexy			1 087** (<i>P</i> = 001)	1 692*** (<i>P</i> < 001)
Constant	− 2 028	− 1 899	− 2 39	− 2 086
<i>N</i>	732	809	732	809
<i>N</i> _{pos}	67	70	67	70
<i>N</i> _{neg}	665	739	665	739
−2LL	637 130	635 451	616 445	595 441

† *P* < 1, one-tailed tests
* *P* < 05
** *P* < 01
*** *P* < 001

between their having more power than alter, on the one hand, and the presence of a sexual relationship, on the other (compare the coefficient for ego has power for model 5 3 to the same coefficient for model 5 4) ¹⁹

¹⁹ The reader will notice that women are no more likely to report sleeping with men who have power over them than with men who do not, though they are more likely to report sleeping with men they find sexy and with high-status men. This might be taken as suggesting that the effect on sexual behavior of men's relational power over women is wholly absorbed by their resultant sexiness, while the high status of some men may lead some women to sleep with them even though they do not find these men sexy. Even though this status effect was not found to increase with the status deprivation of women, this might be taken to indicate that women are treating the decision of whom to sleep with as a rational calculation, expecting that there is a utility to sleeping with high-status men independent of their attractiveness. However, analyses of men's reports on women (available upon request) suggest the possibility of a different dynamic. Woman A is more likely to sleep with a man B who claims to have power over her, even though she is not more likely to sleep with a man C who she claims has power over her. Thus it may be that women (but not men) tend to suppress acknowledgments of power differentials with sexual partners, and that the "status" variable becomes in part a proxy for the power relationship. It also may be, however, that men wrongly tend to assume that they have power over female sexual partners. But because further analyses (available upon request) found that the re-

Thus far the results have been interpretable but not consistent with the simplest and most commonly heard explanations for the logic of attraction. There is some connection between sexiness and power, but it cannot be explained either as an exchange between partners with different assets nor as the residue from Darwinian selection. Instead, the results suggest that this connection must be understood phenomenologically—in terms of what power means subjectively to the person deciding whether another is sexy or not. I go on to explore this phenomenology.

The Phenomenology of Sexiness, Status, and Power

Let us return to the two fundamental principles of network structure discussed above, namely hierarchy and reciprocity (cf. Gould 2002). Regarding the former, we have already discovered that there is a moderate (though only moderate) degree of hierarchy in these data, and that this hierarchy is greater in attributions of sexiness to women than it is when the attributions are made to men. Can this nonindependence of choices be explained?

There are two possible, and possibly independent, explanations. According to the first (akin to Waller's [1937] "rating-dating" model), there need be no particular physical or behavioral basis determining which women are disproportionately nominated by men as sexy—the popular women are popular merely because of their popularity among men. But if men value women who are valued by other men as a way of increasing their intramale prestige, they would not be more likely to choose women who tend to be seen as sexy by other *women*. Thus we might expect cross-sex attributions of sexiness to be affected by the extent to which alter is seen as sexy by members of the *same* sex as ego, but not by the extent to which alter is seen as sexy by members of the *other* sex as ego.

According to the second possible explanation, which can be called the "intrinsic attractiveness" hypothesis, some women simply are sexier than others. Evolutionary psychology argues that such intrinsic attractiveness is quite reasonable, since attractiveness is simply our word for describing our estimates of others' reproductive potential. In particular, evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Campbell 2002, p. 180) propose that one should be able to derive on a priori grounds that males will prefer younger females

maining man's status effect on sleeping together was restricted to unions that then or later involved marriage, it is not yet clear that the data support the hypothesis that sexual pairing can be treated as an exchange in a market—they may instead support the related argument pertaining to marital choice.

While the logic of this association has been contested by some,²⁰ the pattern of male preference has been confirmed (see Cameron and Collins 1997) and could provide part of the explanation for endogenous hierarchy in sexual attractiveness

The age range in these data is too narrow for age to explain the convergence between men and women's preferences for women, though analyses below do control for the effects of alter's age. Without other data, we cannot determine whether the hierarchy in sexiness has a physical basis or only a social foundation. But we can examine whether men are only influenced by the popularity of women to other men, or whether they are also influenced by the popularity of women to women, the same may be said regarding women being influenced by men's popularity to women and to men. To determine this, for each dyad, I compute a measure of alter's general "sexiness," *subtracting* this ego's own judgment. Thus using the same notation as above for equations (2) and (3), I define a popularity of person j in group g to members of the *same* sex as person i (excluding i herself), Q_{ig}^{*S} , as follows

$$Q_{ig}^{*S} = \left[\frac{\sum_{f \in S(i), f \neq i} x_{fjg}}{\sum_{f \in S(i), k \in S(j), f \neq i} x_{fk g}} \right], \quad (4)$$

as well as a popularity of person j to members of the *other* sex as person i , Q_{ig}^{*O} , as follows

$$Q_{ig}^{*O} = \left[\frac{\sum_{f \in O(i), f \neq i} x_{fjg}}{\sum_{f \in O(i), k \in S(j), f \neq i} x_{fk g}} \right] \quad (5)$$

These terms will allow us to test whether men and women are influenced by the position of other persons in a general hierarchy of sexiness when making their own attributions, though it cannot be determined whether it is the personal attributes of alter, or the mere fact of alter's popularity, that causes this influence.

This discussion of hierarchy has an intuitive plausibility, yet so does the other dynamic discussed above, according to which instead of all people finding a few members outstandingly sexy, most members pair off and find a particular person sexy who finds them sexy in return. In other

²⁰ Hrdy (1997, pp. 3–4) points out that such a preference for youth is not characteristic of other primates, indeed, males generally prefer females who have already given birth. Younger women, like younger females of other primate species, are less likely to see a pregnancy through to term successfully and less likely to rear live-born young to independence. The preference for young females only makes sense if males are able to "lock in" a female's reproductive capacity for life or at least for a relatively long time. This does not accord with the general presumption that our ancestors in the Pleistocene practiced something more akin to serial monogamy.

words, here one postulates that persons are not simply moved by a hierarchical logic of competition, but by a logic of (or emotional response to) reciprocity. The effect of such reciprocity can be tested by including *alter's* report that *ego* is sexy as an independent variable in the model for *ego's* report that *alter* is sexy.

The models in table 4 also added terms tapping this hierarchy and reciprocity, as well as alter's age.²¹ To facilitate the comparisons of interest, I will use the phrases "same sex" and "other sex" to refer now to *ego* (the chooser) and not alter. This is because we are interested in whether men tend to be influenced by the opinions of women when they judge women (or men), and whether women tend to be influenced by the opinions of men when they judge women (or men), and so forth. Thus the same-sex terms for the cross-sex dyads mean (for model 4.2) the effect of other men judging this woman as sexy, and (for model 4.3) the effect of other women judging this man as sexy. As one can see, there is no effect of same-sex attractiveness compatible with the idea that men (or women) are more likely to desire women (men) the more the women (men) are desired by other men (women). Indeed, the coefficient is negative for women judging men (model 4.3), though this has to do with the effect of reciprocity (the zero-order relations are, in all cases except women judging women, weakly positive).²² However, there is some evidence that the opinions of those of *different* sexes are not independent. Men tend to agree with women as to who are the sexier women, since men are disproportionately likely to pick women who are picked by other women as sexy (other-sex attractiveness coefficient, model 4.2), and women are also disproportionately likely to pick women who are picked by men as sexy (other-sex attractiveness coefficient, model 4.4). (While men seem somewhat more likely to see as sexy those men that *women* tend to see as sexy, this effect turns out not to be robust, see app. B.)

Thus the dyadic results basically confirm the individual-level results, there is a close relation between which women *men* think are sexy and which women other *women* think are sexy. Since these cross-sex effects are not weakened by taking *ego's* own report or alter's reciprocity into

²¹ Ego's age was found not to be significant.

²² This does not in any way imply that outside of the context of the formation of partnerships, women's opinions of men will not be interdependent, as experimental studies (e.g., Graziano et al. 1993) have found. The rejection is specific to the context of making attributions of sexiness to well-known alters, where there is a strong tendency toward reciprocity. The measure of same-sex hierarchy used above necessarily eliminates *ego's* own judgment, leading to a measure of zero for the many cases in which this is the only attribution of sexiness garnered by alter. Since there are hence many observations of $Q^* = 0$ and $\text{sexy} = 1$, the relation must rely on the people with many attributions, but the low tendency toward hierarchy means there are not enough

account, they remain strong even in the multivariate analysis. But this should not be interpreted as painting a picture of a pure popularity contest. The coefficient for reciprocity is positive and significant for cross-sex attributions of sexiness. While this effect is somewhat larger for women judging men, it is also clearly significant for men judging women. Finally, there is indeed a tendency for men to find younger women sexy.

Further Explorations

We have seen strong findings that are interpretable yet not reducible to the major explanatory frameworks for the production of sexiness. There are, however, a number of possible confounding factors that need to be considered. First of all, the results indicate that male dominance seems to suppress same-sex attraction. But of course, it might be that some groups are more traditional in their sex and gender ideology, which leads both to heteronormativity and to male dominance. If so, the effect of male dominance would be spurious, and so might the interaction between male dominance and alter's status that was found to be significantly associated with men's choices of women. Fortunately, the original observers coded the traditionalism versus liberalism of gender ideology in a five-point scale that has been shown in other research (Martin and Fuller 2004) to be related linearly to other social psychological phenomena pertaining to gender. But adding this variable and an interaction between it and alter's status does not affect the conclusions—the coefficients for ideology are insignificant, while those for male dominance remain significant (all these analyses are publicly accessible and available upon request).²³

It also might be supposed that instead of finding that power is sexy, there might be a set of traditional male-female couples where the man has more power than the woman, and both partners list each other as sexy. While I do not think that the mere existence of an institutionalized relationship would detract from the relevance of such dyads to this question, it is worth seeing whether the above results are driven by such effects. In particular, it might be that according to this scenario, the relation between women seeing men as more powerful and sexiness is an artifact caused by the following. First, the woman sees the man as sexy. Second, she consents to enter a traditional heterosexual relation associated with patriarchal institutions. Third, the man assumes power over her. This might be the case if the institution in question is marriage.

Fortunately, in a wave of data in the 1980s, respondents were asked for each member whether they had ever been legally married, or whether

²³ They will be found at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~jlmartin/data_and_programs_getting_page.htm

they had ever been in a committed partner relationship. Adding dummy variables for either of these scenarios does not change the results at all, except to depress the strength of the reciprocity coefficient. If one suspects that these measures are too far away in time from the data on attributions of sexiness, one might use the report on "sleep with" to indicate active couples in 1974. Replicating the models using these variables as controls does not change the results at all (all analyses available from the author).

Throughout this article, I have been investigating factors increasing the likelihood that ego will nominate alter as sexy. I have thus assumed that status and power are causes of sexiness, and not vice versa. But it is of course possible that sexiness increases power and/or status. It is difficult if not impossible to disentangle convincingly such mutual effects given cross-sectional data, but if conventional methods for doing so suggested that causality went the other way, we should be hesitant to accept the findings presented above. I fit simultaneous-equation models using instrumental variables to estimate reciprocal effects between power/status and sexiness and found—somewhat surprisingly—*no* evidence of a structural effect flowing from sexiness to power or status (all analyses available on the aforementioned Web site or by request). While I do not believe that this establishes that sexiness *does not* ever lead to status or power in these groups, we need not worry that the above results are fundamentally incorrect. Finally, the data have been gathered from different groups, as discussed in more detail in appendix B; fitting a multilevel model does not change the results at all.

CONCLUSION

Is power sexy? Of course, the answer is, sometimes. But we are now in a position to give a more theoretically generative answer. In a sample of young Americans in 1974 who might have been expected to rebel against conventional gender relations, this study found evidence of a significant tendency for attributions of sexiness to be related to power relations in interpretable ways. But these ways were not consonant with the most frequently heard theories of attraction. According to the one, if there is some connection between power and attractiveness, it should be that women prefer high-status men who have access to resources that women lack. The association of sexiness with interpersonal power (irrespective of overall status) which this study found was not expected.

Of course, this does not mean that when it comes to making durable partnerships, people will act in contrast to the predictions of rational choice theory. Indeed, there was suggestive evidence that if the rational calculation model applies, it is not to preferences, but outcomes—not to

desires, but to sexual behavior—though the data made precision impossible here. Thus if there is a moment of rational calculation in sexual pairing outside of a transfer of material resources, it seems that men's social status is not something that is perceived as attractive by women, but as something that may compensate for a lack of attractiveness.

But this lack of a connection between men's status and their sexiness to women is not compatible with the basic tenets of evolutionary psychology as it has been developed, according to which women should always prefer the men who are dominant in whatever context men and women find themselves. Of course, it is worth pointing out that evolutionary psychology is only one strand of sociobiology, and there may be other strands that lead to different predictions (for a recent discussion of different approaches uniting biology and sociology, see Freese, Li, and Wade [2003]). Instead, the results are more in line with a phenomenological interpretation of some claims made in feminist theory and by Randall Collins (2004) in more recent work. What is sexy about power to women judging men is different from what is sexy about power to men judging women (and this is not so different from what is sexy about power to men judging men). Both men and women tend to find men who have power over them sexier than men who do not. It is not the *status* of the men that is attractive, so far as I can tell, it is that for some reason, it seems a bit harder for men who are not more powerful in a relationship to be perceived as sexy.

As one reader has pointed out, this conclusion seems at odds with a great deal of experimental research that has examined the effect of either the perceived status or the dominance behavior of a potential male partner on women's choices (e.g., see Townsend and Wasserman 1997, Sadalla et al. 1987, also see Keating 1985). But precisely because this research has never separated power as position or personality trait from power as relationship, it would be impossible to reach such a conclusion. If in real life women and men respond to the nature of their relationship with a man when attributing or not attributing sexiness to him, then one of two things is occurring in these experiments. Either women construct a day-dreamlike extrapolation of the likely nature of relationship with this alter, a process which has never been investigated, or they reply on the basis of this alter's status, a process which lacks ecological validity in that it would not guide their actual choices outside of an experimental situation. Indeed, recent work using acquainted persons (Kniffin and Wilson 2004) has found that judgments of physical attractiveness depend on the nature of the relationship while men's judgments of women are more in line with first impressions, it appears that the processes that lead to such attributions in actual social life have rather little to do with the task of

judging photographs of strangers, which has been the linchpin of most research

When it comes to men judging women, this study found that what is sexy about power is the effect of women's status, especially in groups in which men are on average more powerful than women. The fact that there is greater agreement between the genders about women's sexiness than about men's, and that it is not the quality of the dyadic relationship but an individual attribute of the woman (though one embedded in a relational context) that affects her sexiness, is compatible with a reconstructed idea of the "objectification" of women. If, as Dewey (1929, also cf. Knorr Cetina 1997) might say, an object is a stable bundle of relations, then women's positions in these groups are more objectified, in that they have greater intersubjective validity.

These groups were not representative of US society, yet the ways in which they are not representative probably make this a conservative test for the general connection between power and sexiness.²⁴ The results are of course far from definitive, and one would argue that no set or even series of results should be definitive, since the system of sex and gender relations is likely to be in flux. Yet these results are the first systematic contribution to untangling the relationship between actual sexual decision making and power in naturally occurring, informal communities. Replications will either use them as a benchmark for assessing change or find perhaps that there has been little change. Most important, these results strongly suggest that future investigations must distinguish between power as *relation* and power as *position*, and seriously explore the possibility that positions of power are more important when others consider the sexiness of women, while relations are more important when they are evaluating men.

²⁴ Further, as Wood and Eagly (2002, p. 705) have stressed, we must pay more attention to contexts that are similar to the EEA to test evolutionary psychology's arguments, to make sure that these arguments are not simply overfitting contemporary US observations.

APPENDIX A
Descriptives

TABLE A1
INDIVIDUAL- AND GROUP-LEVEL VARIABLES, MALE AND FEMALE

	MALE			FEMALE		
	Status	Age	Male Dominance	Status	Age	Male Dominance
Valid <i>N</i>	242	238	245	190	196	196
Min	− 920	16	−4 32	− 824	13	−4 32
Max	914	53	7 65	936	61	7 65
Mean	070	26 09	848	− 072	25 75	1 03
SD	328	5 46	1 86	279	6 08	2 24
Listwise <i>N</i>		235			190	

TABLE A2
DYADIC VARIABLES

Dyadic Variable	Alter Is Sexy	Alter Has Power	Ego Has Power	Same-Sex Attractiveness	Opposite-Sex Attractiveness	Sleep with Alter
Male ego, male alter	038 (191)	162 (368)	199 (399)	064 (191)	104 (238)	036 (187)
Male ego, female alter	168 (374)	113 (317)	270 (444)	136 (267)	183 (265)	090 (287)
Female ego, male alter	109 (312)	208 (406)	168 (374)	080 (215)	111 (235)	088 (284)
Female ego, fe-male alter	128 (335)	188 (391)	214 (410)	099 (203)	193 (289)	057 (233)

NOTE —Nos in parentheses are SDs For all variables, min = 0, max = 1

APPENDIX B
A Fixed-Effects Multilevel Model

Above, I used methods that assume that individuals, if not dyads, have been sampled independently However, this is not the case, since whole groups were selected into the sampling frame In general, this means that statistical tests are likely to be overoptimistic in declaring effects significant that would not appear so had I a random sample (DiPrete and

Forristal 1994, Mason, Wong, and Entwistle 1983) Normally, the way this is handled is through a multilevel model which employs a set of random effects for group-level error terms (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992) But because the QAP test does not produce the covariance matrix adjusted by the multilevel model, I am unable to use this procedure

Instead, one can use a fixed-effects approach which simply fits a special effect for each group²⁵ Usually a dummy variable for every group (save one) is entered into the equation But because these effects are expected to be different for the four different cases of ego's gender and alter's gender, *four* terms are entered for each of the 47 groups, one for each model B1 1, B1 2, B1 3, and B1 4 (Not all of these effects are included in the final model, as there are not surprisingly a number of linear redundancies with so many terms The program DAMN [Dyadic Analysis for Multiple Networks, Martin 1999b] automatically selects a parsimonious and identifiable model that does not sacrifice theoretically important terms) Two things may be said about the resulting model First of all, no group-level coefficients should be expected to be interpretable, since all group effects are parameterized exactly However, the group-level effect (male domination) is left in the analysis, since there is an interaction between it and an individual-level variable (alter's status)

Second, the test is likely to be extremely conservative, and this is perhaps why, as far as I am aware, such a fixed-effects model for network data collected from multiple groups has never been used before Despite this, the results (see app table B1) show little or no difference from the previous analyses Both men and women find men who have power over them sexy, indeed, men find those men over whom they have power significantly less sexy than those over whom they have no power Men (and perhaps women) find high-status women increasingly sexy as the general male dominance of their group increases, and men find younger women sexier Reciprocity is important in cross-sex dyads, especially for women's reports of men In addition, men and women agree with one another as to which women are sexy These effects are not of overwhelming strength, but they do not appear to go away

²⁵ There are some reasons to expect that maximum-likelihood estimations for certain nonlinear (e g, logistic) regressions using dummy variables to estimate fixed effects are inconsistent (Hsiao 1986, p 159), but the problem seems to be minimal as long as there are a reasonable number of cases per clustering unit (Paul Allison, personal communication), which is the case for these data

TABLE B1
REPLICATION FROM FIXED-EFFECTS MODEL

Variable	Model B1 1	Model B1 2	Model B1 3	Model B1 4
Ego's sex	Male	Male	Female	Female
Alter's sex	Male	Female	Male	Female
Alter's status	707 (<i>P</i> = .188)	1 011 (<i>P</i> = .147)	903 (<i>P</i> = .159)	-1 467 (<i>P</i> = .123)
Ego has power	- 713* (<i>P</i> = .035)	331 (<i>P</i> = .168)	- 261 (<i>P</i> = .281)	- 791 [†] (<i>P</i> = .058)
Alter has power	978** (<i>P</i> = .004)	290 (<i>P</i> = .256)	1 031* (<i>P</i> = .011)	447 (<i>P</i> = .127)
Male dominance	15 122 (<i>P</i> = .104)	6 134 (<i>P</i> = .776)	7 186 [†] (<i>P</i> = .096)	-3 091** (<i>P</i> = .002)
Status/maledom	- 564 (<i>P</i> = .405)	5 285* (<i>P</i> = .038)	- 989 (<i>P</i> = .345)	3 638 (<i>P</i> = .116)
Reciprocity	-20 028* (<i>P</i> < .001)	373* (<i>P</i> = .043)	725** (<i>P</i> = .003)	- 245 (<i>P</i> = .214)
Same-sex attractiveness	-2 837** (<i>P</i> = .006)	-1 346* (<i>P</i> = .049)	-2 534** (<i>P</i> = .004)	- 608 (<i>P</i> = .226)
Other-sex attractiveness	776 (<i>P</i> = .149)	1 998** (<i>P</i> = .001)	- 120 (<i>P</i> = .491)	2 372*** (<i>P</i> < .001)
Alter's age	- 035 (<i>P</i> = .183)	- 113** (<i>P</i> = .006)	012 (<i>P</i> = .391)	- 001 (<i>P</i> = .589)
Constant*	3 309	-1 607	-5 627	-17 060
<i>N</i>	871	707	696	490
-2LL	172 052	522 047	345 535	305 507

NOTE —All fixed-effects coefficients suppressed

* Estimated parameter lacks meaning

[†] *P* < .1, one-tailed tests

* *P* < .05

** *P* < .01

*** *P* < .001

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Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem¹

Brian Uzzi

Northwestern University

Jarrett Spiro

Stanford University

Small world networks have received disproportionate notice in diverse fields because of their suspected effect on system dynamics. The authors analyzed the small world network of the creative artists who made Broadway musicals from 1945 to 1989. Using original arguments, new statistical methods, and tests of construct validity, they found that the varying “small world” properties of the systemic-level network of these artists affected their creativity in terms of the financial and artistic performance of the musicals they produced. The small world network effect was parabolic; performance increased up to a threshold, after which point the positive effects reversed.

Creativity aids problem solving, innovation, and aesthetics, yet our understanding of it is still forming. We know that creativity is spurred when diverse ideas are united or when creative material in one domain inspires or forces fresh thinking in another. These structural preconditions suggest

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that creativity is not only, as myth tells, the brash work of loners, but also the consequence of a social system of actors that amplify or stifle one another's creativity. For example, tracing the history of key innovations in art, science, and politics in the ancient Western and Eastern worlds, Collins (1998) showed that only first-century Confucian metaphysicist Wang Ch'ung, 14th-century Zen spiritualist Bassui Tokusho, and 14th-century Arabic philosopher Ibn Khaldun fit the loner model, a finding supported by historians and cultural sociologists who have shown in great detail that the creativity of many key figures, including Beethoven, Thomas Hutchinson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Cosimo de'Medici, Erasmus Darwin (inventor and naturalist grandfather of Charles Darwin) and famed bassist Jamie Jamison—who, as a permanent member of the Funk Brothers, cowrote more number-one hit songs than the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, the Beach Boys, and Elvis combined—all abided by the same pattern of being embedded in a network of artists or scientists who shared ideas and acted as both critics and fans for each other (Merton 1973, DeNora 1991, Padgett and Ansell 1993, Slutsky 1989).

One form of social organization that has received a great deal of attention for its possible ability to influence creativity and performance is the small world network. Since Stanley Milgram's landmark 1967 study, researchers have plumbed the physical, social, and literary realms in search of small world networks. Although not universal (Moody 2004), small worlds have been found to organize a remarkable diversity of systems including friendships, scientific collaborations, corporate alliances, interlocks, the Web, power grids, a worm's brain, the Hollywood actor labor market, commercial airline hubs, and production teams in business firms (Watts 1999, Amaral et al. 2000, Kogut and Walker 2001, Newman 2000, 2001, Davis, Yoo, and Baker 2003, Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley 2003, Burt 2004).

In contrast to most other types of systemic-level network structures, a small world is a network structure that is both highly locally clustered *and* has a short path length, two network characteristics that are normally divergent (Watts 1999). The special facility of a small world to join two network characteristics that are typically opposing has prompted researchers to speculate that a small world may be a potent organizer of behavior (Feld 1981, Newman 2000). But do small worlds make the big differences implied by their high rates of incidence? Surprisingly, research on this question is just beginning to form. Instead, most work has only hinted at this proposition by using the small world concept to classify types of systems rather than quantify differences in the performance of systems. Newman (2001) examined scientific coauthoring in seven diverse science fields and found that each had a small world structure, leading to the conclusion that small worlds might account for how quickly ideas

flow through disciplines—a conclusion echoing Fleming, King, and Juba's (2004) study of the small world of scientific patents and Davis et al.'s (2003) study of the small world of corporate directors. Using simulations to study diffusion, Watts and Strogatz (1998) showed that in a small world, actors in the same cluster were at high risk of contracting an infectious disease, but so were actors distant from an infected actor if separate clusters had even a few links between them, an outcome that is also consistent with the microlevel diffusion function of weak ties (Granovetter 1973) and structural holes (Burt 2004). A pioneering study by Kogut and Walker (2001) examined the small world of ownership ties among the 550 largest German firms and financials from 1993 to 1997. They determined that the central firms were more likely to acquire other firms and that the virtual deletion of many interfirm links would not splinter the small world—suggesting that small worlds can forcefully affect behavior and that their effects are robust over a range of values.

We attempt to extend this line of research by developing and testing arguments on how a small world affects actors' success in collaborating on new products. If a small world is more than a novelty or collection of "spandrels"—inconsequential side effects of micronetwork variables—then it should independently impact the performance of actors in the system.

We argue that a small world network governs behavior by shaping the level of connectivity and cohesion among actors embedded in the system (Granovetter 1973, Markovsky and Lawler 1994, Frank and Yasumoto 1998, Friedkin 1984, Newman 2001, Moody and White 2003, Watts 1999). The more a network exhibits characteristics of a small world, the more connected actors are to each other and connected by persons who know each other well through past collaborations or through having had past collaborations with common third parties. These conditions enable the creative material in separate clusters to circulate to other clusters as well as to gain the kind of credibility that unfamiliar material needs to be regarded as valuable in new contexts, thereby increasing the prospect that the novel material from one cluster can be productively used by other members of other clusters. However, these benefits may rise only up to a threshold after which point they turn negative. Intense connectivity can homogenize the pool of material available to different groups, while at the same time, high cohesiveness can lead to the sharing of common rather than novel information, suggesting the hypothesis that the relationship between a small world and performance follows an inverted U-shaped function.

Our context is the Broadway musical industry, a leading U.S. commercial and cultural export and, like jazz, an original and legendary American artistic creation (White 1970, DiMaggio 1991). Examining the

population of shows from 1945 to 1989, we examine how variation in the small world network of the artists who create musicals affects their success in inventing winning shows. As an industry in which both commercial and artistic recognition matters, our measures of creative success quantify a show's success in turning a profit and receiving favorable notices by the Broadway critics. In our design, we control for alternative factors that affect a show's success, including talent, economic conditions, and the local network structure of production teams, which helps us to isolate small world effects relative to other conditions known to favor creativity (Becker 1982, Uzzi 1997, Collins 1998, Ruef 2002, Burt 2004). Our data also contain rare failure data on musicals that died in preproduction—a condition similar to knowing about coauthors' papers that never made publication but that produced the same tie-building (or tie-breaking) consequences as published papers—which enables us to avoid underestimating key relations in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994).

To bolster the strength of our inferences, we use a new statistical model for examining bipartite-affiliation networks. Occurring often in social life, bipartite-affiliation networks occur when actors collaborate within project groups—for example, directors on the same board within the wider network of interlocks or authors on the same paper within the wider citation network. Bipartite-affiliation networks are distinctive in that all actors in the network are part of at least one fully linked cluster (e.g., all directors on the same board are linked directly to each other), which affects critical social dynamics as well as artificially inflates key small world network statistics. We use the Newman, Strogatz, and Watts (2001) method to adjust properly for these unique network dynamics.

We begin by describing the original Milgram thesis and finding, which illustrates the basis of the small world concept, and then develop our conceptual model with a focus on the mechanisms by which variation in a small world affects behavior. We then turn to applying the abstract small world model to the case of the Broadway musical industry with an eye to developing testable conjectures about performance and to testing the construct validity of our small world mechanisms.

MILGRAM'S SMALL WORLD THEORY

Although the general notion of a small world had been in circulation in various disciplines, the powerful idea has been best illustrated by the famous work of Stanley Milgram. Milgram was interested in understanding how communication worked in social systems in which each member of the social system had far fewer ties than there were members of the total social system. To explain this process, Milgram hit on the idea of a

small world and described its remarkable nature with the story of a chance encounter between two strangers who meet far from home and discover they have a close friend in common

Fred Jones of Peoria, sitting in a sidewalk cafe in Tunis, and needing a light for his cigarette, asks the man at the next table for a match. They fall into conversation, the stranger is an Englishman who, it turns out, spent several months in Detroit studying the operation of an interchangeable-bottle cap-factory. "I know it's a foolish question," says Jones, "but did you ever by any chance run into a fellow named Ben Arkadian? He's an old friend of mine, manages a chain of supermarkets in Detroit." "Arkadian, Arkadian," the Englishman mutters. "Why, upon my soul, I believe I do! Small chap, very energetic, raised merry hell with the factory over a shipment of defective bottle caps." "No kidding!" Jones exclaims in amazement. "Good lord, it's a small world, isn't it?" (Milgram 1967, p. 61)

In large networks, Milgram surmised that connections influence behavior because most people's friendship circles are highly clustered, that is, most people's friends are friends with each other ("I know a guy who knows a guy who knows me"). And in a small world network, the clusters can be linked by persons who are members of multiple clusters, making it possible for even large communities that are made up of many separate clusters to be connected and cohesive. To test this idea, he concocted an ingenious experiment to see just how small the world actually was. In one experiment, Milgram randomly chose a stockbroker in Boston and 160 residents of a small town near Omaha, Nebraska. He sent each person in the small town a letter with the stockbroker's name and asked them to send the letter to the stockbroker if they knew him personally, or to send it to someone they knew personally who could deliver it to the stockbroker or deliver it to him through a personal contact of their own. Counting the number of intermediaries from the senders in Nebraska to the target in Boston, Milgram found that it took "six degrees of separation" or just six intermediaries on average to link the two strangers, a finding that prompted intense inquiry in science and pop culture (Watts and Strogatz 1998, Watts 1999, Amaral et al. 2000, Gladwell 2000, Moody 2004).²

² Another way to look at these ideas is through the parlor game Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon, which does a better job of capturing a key feature of bipartite networks by examining the connections among actors who appear in the same movie. The game works as follows: Name an actor or actress. If the person acted in a film with Kevin Bacon, then they have a "Bacon number" of "1." If they have not acted in a film with Kevin Bacon but have acted in a film with someone who has, they have a Bacon number of "2," and so on. Using the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com), University of Virginia computer scientist Brett Tjaden, the inventor of the game, determined that the highest Bacon number is "8," but that Bacon himself is connected to

Milgram's conjecture on why small world networks could connect strangers rested not only on the surprising finding of few degrees of separation but on the supposition that people interact in dense clusters, friends of friends tend to be friends. Friends are close to one another—they have just one degree of separation. But if at least one person in a cluster also is in another cluster, that person could create shortcuts between many people. This means that people and their ideas no longer have to travel along long paths to reach distant others because they can *hop* from cluster to cluster. Linked clusters enable degrees of separation to be much shorter across the global network than is anticipated, the average person can theoretically link to anyone else by using shortcuts, enabling resources to flow from different ends of the network. Milgram illustrated this idea with a folder that made it from Kansas to Cambridge in just two steps.

Four days after the folders were sent [from Cambridge] to a group of starting persons in Kansas, an instructor at the Episcopal Theological Seminary approached our target person on the street. "Alice," he said, thrusting a brown folder toward her, "this is for you." At first she thought he was simply returning a folder that had gone astray and had never gotten out of Cambridge, but when we looked at the roster, we found to our pleased surprise that the document had started with a wheat farmer in Kansas. He had passed it on to an Episcopalian minister in his home town, who sent it to the minister who taught in Cambridge, who gave it to the target person. Altogether, the number of intermediate links between starting person and target amounted to two! (Milgram 1967, pp. 64–65)

The powerful idea that even distant individuals who are cloistered in densely connected local clusters could be linked through a few intermediaries drew attention by highlighting how resources, ideas, or infection can rapidly spread or dissipate in social systems. Clusters hold a pool of specialized but cosseted knowledge or resources, but when clusters are connected they can enable the specialized resources within them to mingle, inspiring innovation.

Small World Theory for Bipartite (Affiliation) Networks

Watts (1999) built on prior work (Feld 1981) and provided a sophisticated theoretical advance in small world analysis. Focusing on important social and structural aspects of large, sparsely linked networks, Watts (1999)

less than 1% of the actors. Similarly, if one looks for the most connected actor or actress in Hollywood, it turns out to be Rod Steiger. Why are Bacon and Steiger well-connected actors? Steiger is even more connected than Bacon because he has worked in more diverse film genres than most actors, making him a node who links diverse movie-cast clusters.

showed that two theoretical concepts define a small world network: short global separation and high local clustering. Short global separation could be quantified by the average path length (PL), which measures the average number of intermediaries between all pairs of actors in the network, while the cluster coefficient (CC) measures the average fraction of an actor's collaborators who are also collaborators with one another (Holland and Leinhardt 1971, Feld 1981).³ To determine whether a network is a small world, Watts's model compares the actual network's path length and clustering coefficient to a *random graph* of the same size, where random graphs have both very low path lengths and low clustering. Specifically, the closer the PL ratio (PL of the actual network/ PL of a random graph comparison) is to 1.0 and the more the CC ratio exceeds 1.0 (CC of the actual network/ CC of the random graph comparison), or simply the larger the small world quotient (Q), which is CC ratio/ PL ratio, the greater the network's small world nature.⁴

Newman et al. (2001) added a significant theoretical innovation to Watts's integrative work by reformulating the general small world model for bipartite networks. As noted above, bipartite networks are widespread and occur whenever actors associate in teams: directors on the same board, collaborators on the same project or paper, banks in a syndicate, actors in a movie, or, in our case, the creative artists who make a musical. Bipartite networks have a special structure: all members on the same team form a *fully linked clique*. When these teams are combined into a systemic-level network, the global network is made up of fully linked cliques that are connected to each other by actors who have had multiple team memberships. Figure 1 illustrates a theoretical bipartite network and its unipartite projection.

A key structural implication of the unipartite projection of the bipartite network is that it significantly overstates the network's true level of clustering and understates the true path length when compared to the relevant random network because of the pervasiveness of fully linked cliques. Newman et al. (2001) showed that once the small world statistics of the

³ A note on terminology to avoid confusion: the term *cluster coefficient* has been used to refer to two different quantities. The *local CC* is an egocentric network property of a single actor and indicates how many of an actor's ties are tied to each other, an index often called *density*. The *global CC* is a property of the macronetwork and can be computed as (1) the weighted average of each actor's local density, or (2) the global network's ratio of open to closed triads, i.e., the fraction of transitive triplets (Feld 1981). In this analysis we use operationalization (2) because it is properly distinguished from local density and is consistent with recent small world analysis (Newman 2001, Newman et al. 2001). For more details, see the PL and CC equations in the methods section.

⁴ Davis et al. (2003), Kogut and Walker (2001), and Amaral et al. (2000) present values across a range of networks.




FIG 1—Bipartite-affiliation network and its unipartite projection. Top row represents four teams, and the bottom row represents the teams' members (e.g., coauthors on a paper or artists who make a show). Teammates are members of a fully linked clique (e.g., ABC, BCD, CE, and DF). Connections form between agents on separate teams when links like BC connect the ABC, BCD, and CE teams.

network of the boards of directors of major U.S. companies were corrected for their bipartite structure, the level of clustering in the network was not appreciably greater than would be expected in a random bipartite network of the same size—suggesting that the *CC* of the one-mode projection from a bipartite network could be a misleading indicator of a small world if it is not correctly adjusted.

Following this line of reasoning, Newman et al. (2001) developed a model for correcting the estimates of the *CC* and *PL* in random bipartite networks. They reasoned that the “true” clustering in a bipartite network is the clustering over and above the “artifactual” within-team clustering, which is the *between-team clustering* or how clustered actors are *across* teams, a view that draws on the theory of cross-cutting social ties and community embeddedness (Frank and Yasumoto 1998, Moody and White 2003). A way to visualize the logic of between-team clustering is to imagine a bipartite network where all actors are part of only one team—no actors are members of multiple teams. In the unipartite projection of this bipartite network there will be many small but disconnected fully linked clusters. Consequently, if one created a bipartite random network of the same size, then the level of clustering in the random and actual network would be the same because any random *reassignment* of links among the actors on the teams reproduces the structural topology of fully linked cliques of the actual network.

Returning to the original theoretical concepts that define a small world, the *PL* ratio and *CC* ratio, Newman et al. (2001) showed that the bipartite *PL* ratio has the same interpretation as in a unipartite network—the greater the *PL* ratio, the greater the mean number of links between actors. In contrast, the bipartite *CC* ratio has a related but *different* interpretation than the unipartite *CC* ratio. They showed that when the bipartite *CC* ratio is approximately 1.0, the clustering in the actual network is a result

mostly of *within-team clustering*, and there is *little between-team clustering*. As the *CC* ratio exceeds 1.0, there are increasing amounts of between-team clustering that connect the network's separate teams and personnel. Moreover, as the *CC* ratio rises, the cross-team links are increasingly made up of actors who have previously collaborated (i.e., repeated ties) or who have third-party ties in common. This occurs because actors who work on multiple project teams are inclined to prefer teammates with whom they have worked in the past or who have worked with others with whom they have worked in the past, a process that is a result of reciprocity and reputation principles (Granovetter 1985). For example, Newman et al. (2001) showed that the *CC* ratio is positively correlated with between-cluster ties that are made up of repeated ties similar to the *BC* link shown above in figure 1.

These structural changes suggest that a small world influences behavior through two mechanisms in bipartite networks. (1) *Structurally*, the more a network becomes "small worldly" (formally, the more the small world quotient exceeds 1.0), the more links between clusters increase in frequency, which potentially enables the creative material within teams to be distributed throughout the global network. (2) *Relationally*, the more a network becomes small worldly, the more links between clusters are made up of repeated ties and third-party ties, which potentially increases the level of cohesion in the global network. Thus, as the small world quotient increases, the clusters within the network become more connected and connected by persons who know each other well. It is the small world consequences on the level of connectivity and cohesion among actors in the global network that we expect to affect their ability to collaborate successfully and create winning productions.

COLLABORATION AND CREATIVITY: THE BROADWAY MUSICAL

While associated with Broadway in Midtown Manhattan, the neighborhood from which it takes its name, the eldest ancestor of the modern Broadway musical debuted in Philadelphia, the original capital of the United States, 11 years before the Revolutionary War. An American company tried to produce the musical *The Disappointment* but was prevented from doing so by the town elders, because the portrayals of racy social values, though dressed up in song and witty innuendos, were considered unfit for the stage (Bordman 1986). This combination of entertaining yet critical viewpoints on American values, though the source of the first production's censorship, eventually became the industry's professional aspiration and moniker of fame in such classics as *Gay Divorce*, *Cabaret*, *Hair*, *Evita*, *Rent*, and *On the Town* (which was nicknamed "On the

Make”) By cleverly embedding rebellious or taboo ideas in irresistible comic songs and dance, creative giants like Noel Coward, Anne Caldwell, Irving Berlin, Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein, Agnes de Mille, Harold Prince, and Stephen Sondheim could artistically treat and make approachable to the general public issues of oppression, civil rights, alienation, bigotry, or homosexuality

During the 1945–89 historical period that we study, the industry supported many of its most renowned talents even as greats from previous eras such as Cole Porter, Rodgers, Berlin, and Oscar Hammerstein II extended their pre–World War II success. New talent with innovations in directing and producing, composing, writing, choreography, and marketing also entered the network. Prince, Sondheim, Leonard Bernstein, David Merrick, Cameron Macintosh, Andrew Lloyd Webber, Tim Rice, and Bob Fosse—the first man to win the Triple Crown, an Oscar for *Cabaret*, a Tony for *Pippin*, and an Emmy for *Liza with a Z*, all in the same year—produced unmatched hits (and flops) with shows like *Cats*, *Les Misérables*, *Sweeney Todd*, *Hair*, *Evita*, *The Pajama Game*, *A Chorus Line* (the longest-running show in Broadway’s history), and *West Side Story* (whose soundtrack remained the number-one album in the country longer than any other album in U.S. history). While great talent continued to flourish, a mix of coinciding phenomena battled for Broadway’s talent and consumer dollars. Hollywood and television thrived, creating appealing options for Broadway’s creative talent, while the drug and protest culture, the alienated and crime-stricken New York City, the Civil Rights movement, new family values, and the internationalization of the musical, while lowering the curtain on earlier subject matter and artistic conventions, raised it on new ones.

Dynamic Structure of the Creative Artist Network

Though it has varied throughout the history of Broadway, the core team that makes a musical is made up of six freelance artists: a composer, a lyricist, a librettist who writes the story’s plot and dialogue (aka the “book”), a choreographer, a director who facilitates the team’s collaboration, and a producer who manages financial backing. In most cases, there is one specialist per role, although a single artist can play two roles (e.g., composer and lyricist), or two artists might partner on a single role.

Figure 2 illustrates the bipartite structure of the Broadway musical network of artists. The top row of the model represents musicals, and the middle row represents the fully linked cliques of artists formed by musicals. The bottom row of the figure represents how the global network emerges from the separate creative artist teams that enter the industry each year with new productions. Consistent with figure 1, which illustrates




FIG 2 —Broadway creative artist network Figure is illustrative but based on actual data, A = Harold Prince (producer), B = Stephen Sondheim (composer/lyricist in *Gypsy* and lyricist in *West Side Story*), C = Arthur Laurents (librettist), and D = Jerome Robbins (director) As the fully linked cliques are connected to each other through artists who are part of multiple teams, the frequency of between-clique connections is disproportionately made up of repeated ties and third-party ties This pattern is illustrated by the high connectivity among the artists who separately worked on *West Side Story*, *Gypsy*, and *Fiddler*, and the frequency of the repeated and third-party ties among B and C, and C and D, Sondheim and Laurents, and Laurents and Robbins

the generic bipartite structure, the Broadway musical network shows that between-team links arise when artists work in more than one musical and create dense overlapping clusters of the type that are prototypical of a small world network (Note the resemblance between our fully linked cliques and satanic pentangles in this figure is coincidental) Using an illustrative example based on the actual data (Uzzi and Spiro, in press, Guimera et al 2005), figure 3 shows the internal typology of the small world with different levels of Q When there is a low level of Q , there are few links between clusters, and these links have low cohesion in the sense that they are not disproportionately formed through third-party or repeat ties among the actors in the network As the level of Q increases, the network becomes more interconnected and connected by persons who know each other well because there are more between-team links, and these links are disproportionately made up of repeat collaborators and collaborators who share third parties in common At high levels of Q , the small world becomes a very densely woven network of overlapping clusters Many teams are linked by more than one actor, and the relationships that make up the between-team ties are highly cohesive

The production routine of a musical is varied yet follows a basic pattern A show originates when at least one artist develops material for a show and then recruits other artists to develop their specialized parts For example, *A Chorus Line* began as a medley of dance numbers by choreographer Michael Bennett before the music (Marvin Hamlisch) and other elements were added by other artists, a new musical could also begin around a librettist's (Mel Brooks) book as in the case of *The Producers* (Kantor and Maslon 2004) Once the artists have their material in prototype form, they work together in an intensive, team-based collaboration in which they simultaneously incorporate their separate material into a single, seamless production It involves full days of collaborative brainstorming, the sharing of ideas, joint problem solving, and difficult editing, as well as flash points of celebration and commiseration that promote strong social bonds among the teammates After this "preproduction stage" has finished, the musical is evaluated in previews If a show is deemed worthy for Broadway during previews it is released as a Broadway musical, otherwise, it is considered a failure and never released in its current form Shows that make it to Broadway go on to be hits or flops

Creative Material and Creativity

Because a musical is a serious art form as well as a business venture (as the song says, "There's no business like show business"), shows are created with an eye to both artistic and commercial value Although successful shows can emphasize one aspect of success over the other, paying audi-




FIG 3—Variation in small world network structure. Figure is illustrative but based on the actual structure of our network data for various years. Each inset reflects the structure that is multiplied many times to create a large global network for three levels of Q . When Q is low there are few links between teams (cliques), and the ties that make up these links are not disproportionately made up of repeated and third-party ties as represented by the white (repeated tie) and gray (third-party tie) links. This topology has low connectivity and cohesion. As Q tends toward a high level, there are many between-team links, and these links are disproportionately made up of repeated and third-party ties—there is high connectivity and cohesion in the network's topology. At medium levels of Q the small world network has an intermediate amount of connectivity and cohesion.

ences demand entertainment, and critics (while understanding the requisite need to please audiences) demand that serious subject matter be treated beneath the surface of hit tunes and infectious dance, characters, and story lines (Rosenberg and Harburg 1992). Nevertheless, while there is no certain formula for a hit, and the inner workings of the synaptic lighting behind creativity remain illusive (Flaherty 2004), it is hypothesized that the more accessible and diverse the creative material available to artists and the more artists can lower the risks of experimentation, the more likely it is that artists can see opportunities for creativity or be forced to assimilate material from earlier periods into something fresh and new that succeeds with audiences, critics, or both (Becker 1982, Lawrence 1990, Garebian 1995). For example, in his classic study of art and the marketplace, Becker concluded that the distribution of available material shapes the ambitions and capabilities behind the creativity of artists.

Artists use material resources and personnel. They choose these out of the pool of what is available to them in the art world they work in. Worlds differ in what they make available and in the form in which they make it available. What is available and the ease with which it is available enter into the thinking of artists as they plan their work and into their actions as they carry out those plans in the real world. Available resources make some things possible, some easy, and others harder, every pattern of ability reflects the workings of some kind of social organization and becomes part of the pattern of constraints and possibilities that shapes the art produced. (Becker 1982, p. 92)

What constitutes creative material in the art world of the musical? Becker (1982) showed that creative material is embedded in conventions—accepted standards of construction of basic components of music, dance, lyrics, and more (see chap. 2 for examples). These conventions provide standards around which artists can easily collaborate. They tend to produce predictable reactions from mass audiences as well as potentially gain the critics' praise when innovatively embedded in productions that only the trained ears of a professional can appreciate. In music, categories such as jazz, rock, hip-hop, and so forth all have their separate conventions. The genre of the "musical" organizes the separate artistic parts into a whole that is distinguished from related arts such as burlesque, opera, operetta, and vaudeville, which use elements of music, dance, plot, and so on. Original artists, as opposed to cover artists, create styles that personalize conventions by adding novelties, twists, and fresh ideas. As styles become popularized and imitated they become conventional material. In the early 1970s, choreographer Bob Fosse worked within the historic dance conventions of old vaudeville and burlesque. He added the dis-

tinctive novelties of dancing with down-rounded shoulders, small, rapid, twinkle-toe steps, straight arms, and the wearing of hats to the basic conventions. After winning the first Triple Crown his style became conventional material for other artists to mimic and creatively extend.

Artists learn material through personal collaborations, wherein they can observe firsthand the production process and not just the final product (Becker 1982). Other artists can observe performances of material. Although they do not observe firsthand how the material is created, they can at least extract elements of the material for their routines. The distribution of conventions and styles practiced by related artists for the music, dance, lyrics, and song that combine into a Broadway musical provide the extensive “pool of variation” (Becker 1982, p. 92) from which artists create original work.

Any successful production is likely to be a combination of convention and innovative material—material that extends conventions by showing them in a new form or mode of presentation. “Without the first it becomes unintelligible, without the second, it becomes boring and featureless” (Becker 1982, p. 63). An example of innovation and convention is provided by *Carousel* (1945), a Rodgers (music) and Hammerstein (book and lyrics) show that creatively extended the convention of the big love song. Because the conventional use of the big love song required it to come in at roughly the middle of the program after the leads meet, audiences had to wait to hear the show’s favorite number. Rodgers and Hammerstein reasoned that they could enhance the appeal of their shows by adding more big love songs. But how could they have a love song before the leads had a chance to know each other? The extension they hit upon was to take the convention of the love song being sung in the present time and extend it to “dream” time and future time (Kantor and Maslon 2004). In the former case, they created a love song about an imaginary lover, and in the latter case, a love song about falling in love with a future lover.

Just as conventions are learned and gather strength within networks of personal contact and repeated public performance, innovative extensions often emerge when artists are exposed to other conventions besides the ones they have been gifted in applying, inspiring or forcing creativity (Becker 1982). To continue with the example of *Carousel*, it has been estimated that the cynicism about love that had been Rodgers’s forte in writing love songs before collaborating with Hammerstein came into contact with Hammerstein’s command of the conventions for writing about wide-eyed, optimistic love to create the right balance between fantasy love, future love, and dream love. Together they creatively combined the musical and lyrical conventions of the whimsical lovers with those of the doomed lovers (in collaboration with de Mille’s innovative choreography), keeping the fantasy behind the songs and plot real enough for audiences.

to believe in (Kantor and Maslon 2004) This risky creative gamble was supported by their close personal relationship, which had formed two years earlier during *Oklahoma* (1943), their first musical together In this way, the distribution of different conventions and personal relations around an art can inspire creativity either by revealing previously unseen connections in material or by necessitating that an innovative solution be found that enables a synthesis of different material

SMALL WORLDS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR PERFORMANCE

While the above cases recount the dynamics of creativity at the level of specific team interactions, we are interested in how the *distribution* of talent around the small world of artists affects the creativity of individual teams and the creativity of the industry as a whole The concept of the small world suggests that it can productively organize the distribution of creative material in an art world as well as promote the ability and desire of artists to take risks collaboratively on creating something new Clusters of interacting artists help incubate conventions As the same time, between-cluster connections increase the likelihood that different conventions will come into contact, while the within-cluster connections, which are disproportionately made up of people who know each other well, further encourage risk taking on new material In this way a small world works not just by bridges that bring together different ideas (Burt 2004) but also by creating the cohesion needed for innovators to take risks on unfamiliar material

We argue that as the distribution of connections and cohesion across the small world changes, the likelihood of creative discoveries should also go up and down This is because artists' creativity will be partly governed by the increase or decrease in contact among collaborators embedded in separate clusters, and because successful new material innovations, once publicly shown, also stimulate creativity among artists in other parts of the network that attempt to incorporate successful fresh ideas into their material In this way, the distributed nature of creativity and creative material cannot be fully captured by ego- or team-level network effects because they do not account for how the joint distribution of links among individuals and teams are embedded in the larger, bipartite global network of relations

The structural and relational mechanisms by which a small world affects behavior suggest that when the small world Q of the network is low, the ability of creative artists to develop successful shows is also low Because there are few between-team links to promote the transfer of creative material between teams in the global network, the creative ma-

material that is generated within a production team is unlikely to circulate to other teams. At the same time, because the between-team links are made up of few repeated or third-party-in-common ties, the creative material passed between teams in the global network may be perceived as having indefinite value. This is because it has not been spread by known and trusted sources who can effectively communicate to new teammates the value of unfamiliar yet novel ideas imported from other teams they have worked on, making promising material costly to obtain or risky to employ. This remains true even if creative material can be observed after the musical is staged because the finished product only partly reveals the full effort needed to adapt the material for new purposes (see Menon and Pfeffer [2003] on the reverse engineering of innovations).

For the same reasons, as Q begins to increase, the network's more connected and cohesive nature should facilitate the flow of creative material and promising collaborations across clusters. This argument is consistent with Merton's studies of the "invisible college" (1973), which showed that connectivity between coauthors and labs nurtured research through the sharing of ideas, soft information, and resources—a finding reproduced in contemporary studies of science and the arts (Etzkowitz, Kemelgor, and Uzzi 2000). Granovetter's (1985) arguments about relational embeddedness also suggest that the greater the level of repeated and third-party links, the greater the risk sharing and trust in a community. Repeated ties can lower innovation costs by spreading the risk of experimentation over the long term. In a similar view, repeated interactions tend to create expectations of trust and reciprocity that "roll over" to common third-party ties, increasing the likelihood that risks of collaboration or creativity are spread among friends of friends (Uzzi 1997). These findings suggest that increases in a network's small world character can boost the performance of the global network by making the exchange of conventions as well as risk taking more likely.

While theory implies a positive relationship between small worldliness and success, research also suggests that connectivity and cohesion can be a liability for creativity. A robust social psychological finding is that cohesive cliques tend to overlook important information that is discrepant with their current thinking because members tend to exchange common rather than unique perspectives. Kuhn's (1970) study of creative change in science showed that the inability of cohesive teams of scientists to react to inconsistencies in their thinking can hold true despite empirical data that clearly refutes the current paradigm, especially if cluster members have had "hits" with the old research tradition or style. Moody and White's (2003) analysis of political behavior showed that as a cluster's connectivity intensifies, actors behave more similarly despite freedom to be different, while Becker (1982, p. 57) found that when groups with tastes and skills

in the same convention or style work predominantly with each other, the convention “becomes the automatic basis on which the production of art works can proceed, even among people deeply devoted to not doing things in the conventional way”

In exclusive ongoing relationships where friends are friends of friends, feelings of obligation and camaraderie may be so great between past collaborators that they risk becoming an “assistance club” for ineffectual members of their network (Uzzi 1997). Preserving a space for “friends” can further hamper the recruitment of outsiders that possess fresh talent into a cluster (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993) or promote recruitment by homophily, minimizing diversity and reproducing rather than advancing existing ways of thinking (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Expectations of reciprocity intensify an actor’s exclusive involvement with certain others at the cost of forming new ties with persons who have a fresh artistic view or who are “with-it.” These findings suggest that the high levels of connectivity and cohesion associated with a high Q can potentially undermine a productive distribution of the kinds of conventions and extensions that are critical for creativity in an art world.

How can these opposing arguments about a small world’s effect on performance be reconciled? We suggest that the effect may be parabolic. When there is a low level of Q , there are few links between clusters, and the links are more hit-and-miss, on average, in the sense that they are not disproportionately formed through credible third-party or repeat ties, isolating creative material in separate clusters. As the level of Q increases, separate clusters become more interlinked and linked by persons who know each other. These processes distribute creative material among teams and help to build a cohesive social organization within teams that support risky collaboration around good ideas. However, past a certain threshold, these same processes can create liabilities for collaboration. Increased structural connectivity reduces some of the creative distinctiveness of clusters, which can homogenize the pool of creative material. At the same time, problems of excessive cohesion can creep in. The ideas most likely to flow can be conventional rather than fresh ideas because of the common information effect and because newcomers find it harder to land “slots” on productions.

These arguments suggest that a small world network affects the performance of the actors within it by shaping the distribution of creative material and talent available to them—specifically, the joint distribution of actors and teams. The small world quotient tells how connected and cohesive the relations in the global network are, indicating how productive or unproductive the distribution of creative material and relationships are across the global network. Are creative ties and materials poorly distributed among strangers in disconnected cliques or tightly woven into

a single, undifferentiated mass of close relations? Or are they richly distributed in a structure that is between these extremes? In this sense, the small world simultaneously governs the distribution of material for all the actors in the network. Thus, while collaboration happens between direct relations, the small world influences lower-level mechanisms such as actors' egocentric webs (Burt 2004) that generate their returns contingent on the distribution of resources of the small world network in which they are embedded. In this sense, the small world network influences to different degrees, but by the same mechanisms, the performance of individual actors as well as the performance of the aggregate system.

HYPOTHESIS —The relationship between a network's small world typology and performance is U-shaped. Specifically, the financial and artistic success of a production increases at medium levels of Q and decreases at either low or high levels of Q . The financial and artistic success of a season of productions increases at medium levels of Q and decreases at either low or high levels of Q .

DATA AND METHODS

Our data include the population of all 2,092 people who worked on 474 musicals of new material produced for Broadway from 1945 to 1989. For each musical, we know the opening and closing date, artists on the creative team, theater of showing, and measures of commercial and artistic success. In addition to the shows that were released on Broadway, our sample also includes data on 49 shows that died in preproduction. The artists on these shows experienced the same intense collaborative interactions as the artists who worked on shows that did get released on Broadway. Consequently, they provide rare "failure" data that is often inaccessible for the purposes of studying networks and that can cause statistical biases when excluded from the analysis. The sources of the above data are Bloom (1996), Green (1996), and Simas (1987), which are directories that record the above data for each musical from the musical's original Playbill. Following the industry convention of dating events in the industry by the calendar year, we measure time in years. Revivals and revues of non-original shows were excluded.

The nodes in our network are all the creative artists who have worked on Broadway musicals during this time period. Actors who perform the shows are excluded. In the global network, artists are directly linked to each other when they collaborate on the same show and indirectly to each other through third parties when their separate shows share at least one common artist (see figs. 2 and 3).

In defining a tie, the issue arises as to how long it should persist. In

the extreme case of no relationship decay, all artists from 1945 and 1989 would be linked in the global network. However, this is unrealistic and skews many network statistics because it maintains false links to inactive artists (i.e., Andrew Lloyd Webber ca. 1970–2001 would be linked to Cole Porter ca. 1920–50 [Porter died in 1964]). Our review of the literature and interviews with industry experts suggested that if an artist was inactive for seven years (did not collaborate on a musical during that time), that artist and all of his or her links should be removed from the network in year seven. If an inactive artist reactivates in a new show after being removed, the artist and his or her recent ties are added to the network—ties that were deleted are not reconstituted on the basis that experts described this pattern of reentry as “breaking back into the business.”⁵ We also used decay functions of five and 10 years, and the results were very similar.

Using the above definitions for nodes, links, and decay, we constructed the global network. We began with the creative artists who worked on the shows that opened in 1945 and then added to that network all the active artists who had worked on shows prior to 1945 to make the information on the 1945 network match all subsequent years. After that step, we worked forward in time, adding new artists to the network each calendar year in accordance with the release of new shows.

The so-called giant component of a network measures the collection of actors that are linked to each other by at least one path of intermediaries (Moody 2004). Despite the conservative decay function, the giant component in this network averages over 94% from 1945 to 1989. In the average year, the average number of active artists is about 500, and the average number of links per artist is 29. Consistent with other work on small worlds, our network is both very large and sparse and made up of essentially one large interconnected network (Watts 1999).

Dependent Variables

To operationalize financial success, we used the industry standard measure, a three-category index devised by *Variety* (1945–89). A “hit” is a production that makes enough money to recoup its costs before ending its run, a “flop” makes money but fails to recoup its costs before ending its run, and a “failure” is a musical that closes in preproduction before it makes any money at all. Data on how much money a hit makes or a flop loses is not publicly available for our shows. Of the 474 musicals, we have complete data for 442. The distribution for hit or flop or fail is what is

⁵ We interviewed Stuart Okun, former vice president of Disney Stage Productions International, and Frank Galati, actor, writer, and Tony Award winner.

expected in show business. Of a total of 442 shows, 23.68% are hits, 65.06% are flops, and 11.26% are failures. In constructing this variable we defined failures equal to zero, flops equal to one, and hits equal to two. In order to be most conservative in our coding we also coded financial success as a two-category variable with a hit equal to one and a flop equal to zero by recoding failures to flops (collapsing the two financial dud categories into one category) and by excluding flops from our analysis. These changes did not affect the reported results (see app. table A1).

To measure artistic success, we used another industry gold standard, the average of the critics' reviews of the musical (Suskin 1990, Rosenberg and Harburg 1992). Broadway critics' reviews partly define shows as being "art," "not art," "good or bad," "beautiful," "imaginative," "derivative," and so on (Becker 1982). Our data on reviews come from Suskin (1990, 1997), who coded and recorded all critics' reviews from 1945 to 1981 from the following publications: the *Daily News*, the *Herald Tribune*, the *Journal-American*, the *Mirror*, *PM*, the *Post*, the *Star*, the *Sun*, the *New York Times*, and the *World-Telegram and Sun*. Critics' reviews exist on a five-point critics' scale: pan (−2), unfavorable (−1), mixed (0), favorable (+1), and rave (+2). For each musical, we averaged the reviews, which resulted in score ranges from −2 (all pan reviews) to +2 (all rave reviews). These data are not available for 1982 to 1989, dropping our *N* for artistic success from 435 to 315.

The virtue of the average is that it measures the overall critical artistic impression of a show (Baumann 2001). On Broadway this scoring takes place on opening night, making the review process fairly independent of the exchange of opinions among critics.⁶ We confirmed the validity of this measure in several ways. First, we checked to see if the number of critics varied across review categories. The average number of reviews across our five categories was nearly identical. Second, we examined whether the scores of shows receiving mixed reviews might be confounded with the variance of agreement among critics. That is, do the middle three categories indicate the mean strength of the valence of the reviews or

⁶ The sociology of culture literature suggests that other measures of artistic success exist and that the appropriateness of a measure is partly contingent on the historic and cultural conditions of the time (White 1993). For example, another measure of critical success is the variance of reviews rather than the average, which operationalizes critics' agreement about, rather than keenness for, a production. The Tony Award is a broad measure of artistic success because it is influenced by end-of-the-season economic information and the career-long celebrity of the artist (Faulkner and Anderson 1987). Others cite the production of a legitimate product of high culture (Bourdieu 1996), genius and patronage (DeNora 1991), or reputation (Becker 1982). Our measure of artistic success reflects a standard used by artists to evaluate their own work in a field where critics can define what has artistic merit (as well as entertainment value) in the world of the professional performing arts (Verdaasdonk 1983, Baumann 2001).

simply shows that had more variable reviews? The data showed that the variance around the mean for mixed notices was lower than around hits or flops, suggesting that a musical receiving a mixed review is picking up valance rather than level of agreement among critics

In this industry, financial and artistic success are correlated 0.56, a situation that is expected given the aims of creative artists. However, the measures are not substitutes for one another either substantively or empirically. Table 1 shows that the better the review, the better the show tends to do financially. This is because (a) artists *actively* strive for success in both arenas, and (b) consumers shy away from pricey shows that critics pan. Nevertheless, it is clear that a nontrivial number of shows overcome poor notices, and critics do frequently praise what the public ignores, 23% of the shows with rave reviews were financial flops, and 13% of the shows with pan reviews were hits. This disparity creates a need for both dependent variables.

Finally, we constructed three system-level variables: (1) the annual percentage of hits, (2) the annual percentage of rave reviews, and (3) the annual average of reviews. We modeled both percentage of rave reviews and the average of all reviews because both measures of artistic success are used to describe the performance of the industry. These variables were operationalized as the yearly number of hits divided by the yearly number of new shows, the yearly number of shows with rave reviews (values between one and two on our critics' scale) divided by the yearly number of new shows reviewed, and the average of each individual show's critic score divided by the total reviews made that year. This yielded an *N* of 45 for the percentage-of-hits model and an *N* of 37 for the percentage-of-rave models, two small samples that test the power of the model.

Independent Variables

To generate our *CC* ratio, a *CC* for our actual network and a random network of the same size must be computed. To compute the *actual CC*, we determined how many pairs of artists have a shared acquaintance, or how many triads are "closed" (Feld 1981, Newman et al. 2001). Three different configurations can yield a triad: person A is linked to person B who is linked to person C, both persons A and B are linked to person C, or both persons B and C are linked to person A. Three links among persons A, B, and C comprise a closed triad (i.e., a triangle). Thus, the percentage of closed triads in the network is three times the total number of closed triads (to account for the three possible configurations of triads) divided by the total number of triads (eq. [1]). The actual *CC* is on a scale from zero to one. Zero represents no clustering, and one represents full

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF FINANCIAL HITS AND ARTISTIC SUCCESS, 1945–1989

Range of Artistic Score	No of Observations	Hit Percentage
Favorable to rave (1 to 2)	71	77
Mixed to favorable (0 to .99)	79	29
Unfavorable to mixed (–.99 to –.01)	91	15
Pan to unfavorable (–2 to –1)	80	13
Total	321	28.97

NOTE —Only 321 cases have artistic review data while 442 cases have hit, flop, failure data

clustering An actual *CC* value of .65 means that 65% of the triads are closed.⁷

$$CC = \frac{3 \times \text{no. of triangles on the graph}}{\text{no. of connected triplets of vertices}} \tag{1}$$

To calculate the *random CC*, we use Newman et al.'s (2001) solution for a bipartite graph. The logic that created a random bipartite graph counterpart to our actual network followed these steps. First, we calculated the tie distributions (i.e., *k*) for teams as well as artists from the actual network for each year. Second, for each show and artist in the random graph, we created as many links as its degree distribution dictates by linking team and teammate nodes randomly.

Specifically, the bipartite random *CC* computes two different degree distributions in the network: the number of individuals per team and the number of teams per individual. The probability that an individual is in *j* groups is *p_j*. The probability that a group has *k* individuals is *q_k*. These probabilities are used to construct the functions in equation (2).

$$f_0(x) = \sum_j p_j x^j, \quad g_0(x) = \sum_k q_k x^k \tag{2}$$

⁷ To make our link to past work clear, it is worth noting the relation between the *CC* and the concept of transitivity (Holland and Leinhardt 1971, Feld 1981, Wasserman and Faust 1994). Eq. (1), the equation for the actual *CC*, is identical to the equation for “transitivity.” Because of this history, it might be apt to refer to the actual *CC* as transitivity. However, two factors appear to make the term *CC* more apt in our study. First, prior work treats transitivity and clustering as almost empirically interchangeable because they operationalize the same concept of clustering. For example, Feld (1981, p. 1022) observes, “The extent of clustering is equivalent to the extent of ‘transitivity’ among mutual relationships.” Second, because we use the Newman et al. (2001) model, we follow their nomenclature, for consistency, while recognizing its debt to the concept of transitivity.

The above functions are then used to calculate the number of neighbors that an individual has in a unipartite projection of the network, a network represented by actors only (teams are not shown)

$$G_o(x) = f_o(g'_o(x))/g'_o(1) \quad (3)$$

Equations (2) and (3) are used to calculate a bipartite random cluster coefficient (eq [4]) In equation (4), M is the total number of groups in the network, and N is the total number of individuals in the network

$$bCC_r = \frac{M g_o'''(1)}{N G_o''(1)} \quad (4)$$

The random CC lies on a scale that varies from zero to one and has the same interpretation as the actual CC except for the random graph The CC ratio is $CC \text{ actual}/CC \text{ random}$ As noted above in the theory section, as this ratio exceeds 1.0, the amount of true clustering, or between-team clustering, increases, and the types of ties that account for the clustering are disproportionately repeated ties and ties with third parties in common

The actual PL is calculated by taking the weighted average of the PL of each actor in the network The average path length for a random bipartite graph is computed by using the same degree distribution as the bipartite random cluster coefficient In a unipartite random graph, the PL is estimated as $\log(n)/\log(k)$, where k is the number of links, and n is the number of actors in the network for large networks In the bipartite network, paths are traced from both the perspective of the actor and the team of which the actor is a member This is done by using the first derivative of the functions defined in equation (2), evaluated as one This is used to construct equation (2), which is the random bipartite path length (Newman et al 2001) The PL ratio is equal to $PL \text{ actual}/PL \text{ random}$ Formally, the random PL is

$$bPL_r = \ln(n)/\ln[f'_o(1) g'_o(1)] \quad (5)$$

To test our hypothesis inclusively, we use two specifications of the small world model First, we separately include the CC ratio and PL ratio as linear and squared terms in our equations Second, we enter the small world quotient (hereafter, small world Q), calculated as $CC \text{ ratio}/PL \text{ ratio}$ as a linear and squared term⁸

⁸ Because in a mature small world like ours, the PL ratio behaves like a fixed effect with a constant value near one, many researchers have used the small world quotient to incorporate the effects of the CC ratio and PL ratio in one variable (Kogut and Walker 2001, Davis et al 2003) This measure's drawback, however, is that the separate effects of each ratio are hard to discern Consequently, we apply an inclusive treatment of the theory and model the small world quotient, as well as the CC ratio and PL ratio, as separate variables

Construct Validity

As one of the first empirical tests of the effects of a small world on performance, we conducted tests of construct validity to bolster our inferences about how changes in the small world Q affect changes in the network's level of connectivity and cohesion. We use the widely accepted multimethod-multitrait matrix (MMTM) approach. In the MMTM approach, the theoretical construct under scrutiny is valid if it positively correlates with related constructs (convergent validity) and is unrelated to different constructs (discriminant validity).

Structurally, we argued that increases in the small world quotient positively correlate with more between-team ties. This happens when more people work on multiple productions. If every artist made just one show or made multiple shows but always with the same teammates, the network would be made up of isolated clusters. This suggests that a network is more connected if 20% of the artists have worked on 10 shows versus 5% on 10 shows. This distributional relationship is conveyed in a power-law graph, which graphs on the y -axis the probability of an actor having worked on a certain number of shows against the number of shows on the x -axis, formally $\text{prob}(\text{no. of shows})$ versus number of shows. When the regression line coefficient fit to the above quantities is *nearer zero*, the odds of working on one show are closer to the odds of working on many shows and vice versa. If the odds of working on one show are close to the odds of working on many shows, it indicates that there are many between-team ties connecting the global network. Thus, if we are correct in arguing that the structure of the network becomes more connected as Q increases, the coefficient of the line fit to $\text{prob}(\text{no. of shows})$ versus number of shows should move closer to zero as the small world Q increases.

To test this relationship, we constructed power-law graphs by calculating how many links each artist has per year in the global network (Moody 2004). To account for the bipartite structure, we used number of shows as a proxy for number of ties. From these numbers, we calculated the probability of having a given number of links as well as the probability of having more than a given number of links. These probabilities were then graphed as the $\text{prob}(\text{no. of shows})$ versus number of shows for each year, and a regression coefficient was calculated to estimate the power-law exponent for each year. Thus, if we are right that global connectivity increases with the small world, then there should be a positive and significant correlation between the regression coefficients from the power-law graphs and Q . Consistent with this test, we found that the correlation was $\rho = .81$ ($P < .000$).

Similarly, if changes in the small world nature of the network signify

changes in the type of connectivity of the network, then Q should be positively correlated with the number of ties per artist per year, or k , because global connectivity increases with k (Moody and White 2003). Consistent with this expectation, table 2 shows that for a given k equal to at least 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 ties, the probability of any artist having k or more ties is positively and significantly related to the small world Q . After about 50 ties the correlations remain positive but drop off in magnitude because the number of artists with more than 50 ties is small. Consequently, the correlation between the small world Q and the cumulative probability of $\text{prob}(k)$ has fewer observations and many zeros. The statistical insignificance of 10 ties or more also makes sense because nearly all actors have about 10 ties, since the average team size is about seven.

Relationally, we argued that as a small world network becomes more connected, repeated and third-party-in-common ties disproportionately make up the connecting links. To test these relationships, we constructed a variable that is the percentage of teams each year with at least one repeated tie, where a repeated tie indicates that those individuals worked on at least two shows and with one another. This variable provides the most conservative test of our claim because we underestimate the number of repeat ties to the degree that teams have more than one repeated tie at a time. Consistent with our arguments the small world Q and repeated ties are highly positively correlated ($\rho = .47$, $P < .001$), which indicates that as Q increases, connectivity is increasingly a result of repeated ties.

To test the relationship between the small world Q and third-party ties, we constructed a variable with the percentage of teams with at least three, five, seven, and 10 third-party ties in common. A third-party tie occurs when two collaborators work with each other for the first time on a show and have previously worked with the same person or persons on a prior show. If there are five third-party ties on a team, it means that two collaborators can have five prior third-party collaborators in common, or that two teammates have two third-party collaborators, and two other teammates have three prior third-party collaborators. Thus, the more third-party ties in common, the more the global network is linked via cohesive ties. Consistent with our expectations, Q is positively correlated with the number of third-party ties per team: three third-party ties per team ($\rho = .61$), five third-party ties per team ($\rho = .63$), seven third-party ties per team ($\rho = .65$), and 10 third-party ties per team ($\rho = .60$), where $P < .000$ for all tests.

Finally, when all the comparisons between Q and the above variables are tested for the CC ratio, the same patterns emerge as expected given the relative constancy of the PL ratio in this mature network. Thus, the

TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NUMBER OF TIES
PER ARTIST, k , AND SMALL WORLD Q

Power-Law Estimate of the Probability of an Artist with This Many Ties or More	ρ with Q	P -Value
10 ties or more	2154	1554
20 ties or more	4349	0028
30 ties or more	6650	0000
40 ties or more	4962	0005
50 ties or more	3021	0437

above evidence corroborates our arguments that our small world measures operationalize what they purport to measure

Control Variables

To account for other factors that can affect the success of a musical production, we control for production-team-level network structures, the human capital of creative artists on each team, and economic variables at the level of the production and the economy. Production-team-level network variables capture the degree to which the network arrangements of the team shape success (Faulkner and Anderson 1987, Lazer 2001), human capital variables capture the degree to which talent rather than the organization of talent affects success (Faulkner 1983, Baker and Faulkner 1991), and market controls capture the degree to which economic and period conditions independently affect success. Although we do not make hypotheses about these effects, we control for them empirically in our models.

Team Network

To control for the production team's ability to reach talent in the global network of artists, we computed the *closeness centrality* of the production team by calculating the closeness centrality for each team member (i.e., librettist, composer, etc.), summing the centrality scores, and then dividing that sum by the number of teammates. Teams with a high centrality score are at the center of the network and can reach the greatest number of other artists through the fewest intermediaries (Borgatti and Everett 1999).

Weak tie bridges and structural holes also govern a team's ability to reach easily the talents of diverse artists (Granovetter 1973, Burt 2004).

To account for these relationships, we computed Burt's (2004) *structural hole* measure for each person on the team, summed these quantities, and divided the sum by the number of teammates. To be conservative, we also adjusted this measure for the number of "redundant" holes there are among teammates for cases where two or more teammates were the only third persons to connect two otherwise disconnected artists. Each non-redundant hole got a score of one, if there were two teammates who acted as structural holes between the same two people, each hole got a score of $1/4$ (one divided by the number of people squared, $1/4$ for two, $1/9$ for three, etc.) so that the value of the structural hole was shared among teammates. The adjusted measure was highly correlated ($P < .000$) with the unadjusted measure and produced similar results.

We controlled for a production team's local cohesion with several measures. First, we used the standard measure of *local density*, which looks at the fraction of each teammate's ties that are tied to each other. We constructed this measure by calculating the density of each artist on the team (number of each artist's ties that are tied to each other divided by the total possible number of ties among the focal artist and all his or her ties), summing that ratio for each artist on the team, and then dividing that sum by the number of team members. Second, to gauge the importance of the connections between individuals, it is important to differentiate between single- and multiple-time encounters. In the Broadway musical industry, artists have significant control over whom they work with and probably prefer to repeat collaborations with others whom they believe will enhance their chances of future success. To construct a measure of this construct, we created *percentage of repeat ties*, which is a count of the number of repeat ties on each production team divided by the number possible. We also tried the count of repeated ties per team, which did not alter the results. Third, to measure the degree of similarity among the members of the production team, we calculated a *structural equivalence* score for each team. A high structural equivalence score indicates that the production team is made up of artists who have worked with many of the same past collaborators even if they have not worked with each other before, a condition that increases cohesiveness and familiarity with similar creative material. If the structural equivalence score is low, then the artists have had few collaborators in common, and it is plausible to assume that the creative team's makeup has varied artistic styles. We calculated structural equivalence two ways. First, we used the straightforward Euclidian distance measure. Second, we used Jaccard matching, which is specifically designed for binary data like ours. It is computed by taking a , the number of links that both artists share, and dividing by the sum of a , b —the number of links artist 1 has but artist 2 does not have—and c —the number of links artist 2 has but artist 1

does not have, or $a/(a + b + c)$. Both measures produced similar results. Consequently, we presented the more familiar Euclidian distance measure

Individual Talent

To gauge the past talent of the production team, we calculated the *success in prior shows* by summing across teammates the number of unique past hits that they had achieved. A high number indicates that the production team members on average have been hit makers and have established reputations that can influence the success of the current show (Baker and Faulkner 1991). However, the binary nature of hits excludes shows that were good but not quite great. Consequently, we also calculated success in prior shows by taking the average of the count of the number of performances of each teammate's prior shows. Empirically, number of prior hits and length of prior runs were indistinguishable in the analyses, and so we present only the number of hits. To measure the accumulated past experience, know-how, and developed skill of the production team, we computed the *number of past collaborators* for the production team by counting the number of past collaborators of each teammate and then dividing by the number of teammates.

Market Characteristics

We constructed an extensive range of market variables to account for differences in the cost of a show, competition among shows, location, economic conditions, period effects, and year. The production costs of a show are typically associated with a large cast that drives up recruitment, directing, and salary costs, set and costume design costs, and other administrative costs. Because this effect is likely to diminish as the production grows, we took the log of the size of the cast to operationalize *production size*.

Independent of a new musical's quality, the competition among shows for the consumer's dollar can also affect success. New shows benefit from competition when the market has a small fraction as opposed to a large fraction of new releases (Faulkner 1983). To control for competition, we created a variable called *percentage of new show openings that year*, which is the number of new shows opening that year divided by the number of shows playing. Another possible specification of this variable is to split it into two separate variables where one variable is the numerator and the other is the denominator of the percentage of new shows variable. The drawback of this measure is that the number of new releases and number of shows playing is highly correlated ($\rho = .84$), creating multi-

collinearity problems. Nevertheless, to be conservative we tried both specifications, and the results were similar.

Another measure of competition among shows is the theater in which the show plays. It is well known that the Broadway region between 42d Street, 49th Street, 8th Avenue, and Broadway is the "core district." The playhouses in the core district are tightly packed and located next to bistros, pubs, and convenience stores. Thus, independent of the show's quality, the bustling, well-lit, and public environment makes shows in this district "crime safest" as well as best situated for a night out on the town, especially for the out-of-town theater goer who will likely gravitate toward the center of the action. To measure this effect, we categorized each theater's physical location as being in the center or periphery of the district with the variable *core theater* (1 = yes). It is notable that the placement of a show in a core playhouse is driven by numerous factors—competition (i.e., the other shows already playing in the core theaters), size of musicals, and perhaps the anticipated hit potential of the show. In our model, we control for competition and production size. We cannot control for the anticipated hit quality of the show. However, this factor is unlikely to create a systematic bias because of the difficulty of predicting a hit show (Rosenberg and Harburg 1992). Thus, this variable may correlate with factors other than theater goers' convenience, but probably in unsystematic ways.

We included the standard economic control variables for this industry (Vogel 2001). To control for changes in sources of revenue, we included the variable *inflation-adjusted ticket price*, where tickets are the main source of revenue. This variable was measured as the average yearly ticket prices for a Broadway show (*Variety* 1945–89) adjusted for inflation relative to other goods and services that compete for the consumer's leisure dollar. Because the price of a Broadway show is relatively similar across all shows within seating categories (e.g., house seats vs. mezzanine), one average price controls for how differences in yearly ticket prices might affect a show's success over time (Vogel 2001). We used the following formula to compute the inflation-adjusted ticket price per year: $\text{adjusted price per year} = 1989 \text{ price} \times (\text{year's CPI}/1989 \text{ CPI})$. For example, the inflation-adjusted price for 1945 is $\$5.09 = \$35.07 (18/124)$.

The cost of capital can affect the scale of a production, the hiring of top talent, or the length of time investors permit a weak show to stay open in the hope of rebounding from a poor start. To control for the cost of capital, we included the *prime rate*.

General economic conditions also affect the level of disposable income consumers have for entertainment, the amount of investment capital in the hands of financiers, and inflation. To control for this bundle of economic conditions, we included *change in the GDP*.

Finally, to control for key changes in the marketing- and performance-related technology of the industry between 1945 and 1989, we included a period effect called *post-1975* (1 = yes). After 1975, “two-fers” were introduced—discount two-for-one tickets that made the high price of a Broadway show more affordable to the masses. At nearly the same time, inconspicuous microphones for vocalists were introduced. This allowed a “new breed” of voices to appear in musicals. Before that time, Broadway favored vocalists like Ethel Merman who could “sing to the back row.” After 1975, critics’ notices also grew longer in allied arts like film, which enabled reviews to contain more commentary than before (Baumann 2001). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on our variables.

Statistical Model

Our design uses an ordered probit to model for the three-category hit-flop-failure financial success variable and uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to model critics’ reviews as well as system-level outcomes, which are measured on a continuous scale. To capture the effect of a small world on the performance of a musical, we follow the multilevel modeling practice of regressing the lower-level variable (i.e., the probability of a musical’s success) on the higher-level variable (i.e., the small world Q).

Although the multilevel modeling technique is common practice in many scholarly domains (Maas and Hox 2004), the method can suffer from three methodological threats to validity. These threats are reverse causality, omitted variables, and clustering (Duncan and Raudenbush 2001). We handle these issues as follows. Reverse causality concerns whether individual-level action causes the macrolevel outcome, rather than the reverse. In our case, this problem is negligible because our small world constructs are measured prior to the musical’s opening, while the musical’s performance is measured after the musical’s opening. The omitted variable issue reflects the concern that some third, unmeasured variable accounts for the macrovariable’s effect. While it is impossible to control for all imaginable variables, there is a relatively finite set of critical variables for which to control. We control for change in the GDP, prime rate, ticket prices, and intershow competition. In particular, GDP is important because it correlates at about .90 with many other macroeconomic variables that affect the industry such as the unemployment rate, DOW, and disposable income (Vogel 2001). Moreover, we control for most individual-level and production-team-level variables, further minimizing the chance that we have omitted a crucial variable at higher or lower levels of analysis. Clustering is appropriately handled by adding Huber-White corrections to control for the nonindependence of observations across rows (i.e.,

TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Hit, flop, or fail	1 127	577	000	2 000
Artistic score	- 142	1 164	-2 000	2 000
% hits per season	226	130	000	600
% raves per season	154	132	000	444
Average artistic score per season	- 14	53	-1 2	75
Small world Q	1 853	447	1 331	3 019
Small world Q squared	3 635	1 952	1 771	9 117
Cluster coefficient ratio	1 971	500	1 437	3 313
Cluster coefficient ratio squared	4 136	2 358	2 065	10 977
Path length ratio	1 348	058	1 258	1 471
Closeness centrality	2 952	431	1 000	5 185
Structural holes	273	160	000	679
Local density	354	220	101	1 000
% repeated ties	096	157	000	1 000
Structural equivalence	5 221	2 066	000	10 899
No. of past hits	3 311	5 854	000	43 000
No. of ties	28 571	25 568	2 000	396 000
Production size	1 694	604	000	2 639
% of new musicals released	482	102	238	667
Core theater (1 = yes)	315	465	000	1 000
Adjusted ticket prices	10 595	8 012	4 800	35 070
Prime rate	6 528	3 996	1 500	21 500
% change in GDP	006	023	- 007	154
1975 year indicator	284	451	000	1 000

shows) opening the same year (Duncan and Raudenbush 2001). We also ran the reported models with a year trend. Because year trend did not affect the reported results, was not of theoretical significance, and had to be omitted to include the Huber-White correction, we did not include it in the analysis. Along with the sandwich estimator approach, the hierarchical linear model (HLM) can be used to model multilevel analyses. HLM confirmed the sandwich estimator's results.⁹

SMALL WORLDS AND PERFORMANCE

Table 4 displays the number of new musicals, average team size, Q , actual CC , random CC , and CC ratio, and the same quantities for PL for each

⁹ The sandwich estimator in OLS is considered statistically preferable to HLM because it produces more reliable estimates of the SEs despite the fact that the coefficient estimates might be more reliable in HLM (Maas and Hox 2004). However, precise estimates of the coefficients are important only if one is interested in computing the variance of the group-level variable across groups, which we are not. Consequently, we present the more familiar and straightforward OLS sandwich model.

year in our data. Consistent with small world theory, the table shows that the *CC* ratio varies considerably, that the actual *CC* is always significantly greater than the random *CC*, and that the *PL* ratio is consistently near 1.0.

Our main independent variable, *Q*, peaks in the 1940s and then declines at an uneven rate from the 1950s through the early 1970s. From the early 1970s through the early 1980s it significantly rises and then levels off before dropping again through the mid-1980s, after which it rebounds to its mid-1960s level. This drop and rise in *Q* signifies that the small world nature of our network decreased and increased over the time frame of this analysis. How does this pattern agree with the historical narrative of the period?

As mentioned above, while the hit machine of Broadway slowed and quickened from 1945 to 1989 it was not because Broadway suffered from a lack of outstanding creative talent, nor did it fail to produce some of its biggest hits of all time. Nevertheless, it faced an accumulation of overlapping conditions that dislocated and relocated the industry's creative talent and traditional audience, reducing and increasing the degree to which the network was strongly or weakly organized as a small world. For creative artists, the historic impact of Hollywood and television (and, to some extent, rock and roll) furnished new prospects for lucrative forms of their artistry. For audiences, Hollywood and television meant that the same entertainment dollars could be split among three rather than just one medium. Both effects created the kind of career uncertainty that would make it less likely for the same creative artists to work on multiple shows and for artists to coordinate their repeat collaborations predictably. Although there are no systematic data on how many Broadway artists split their time between artistic media, Bob Fosse's winning of the Triple Crown indicates that the elites of the network received high praise for working in multiple artistic domains, while the co-location of the television industry and Broadway in New York City meant that television probably recruited local Broadway talent. At the same time, the post-World War II peep shows of 42d Street and the high crime and offensive decay of the 1960s and 1970s Midtown Manhattan area made planning and bank-rolling a show a bigger gamble, which further lowered the ability of creative artists to coordinate their collaborations.

While the historical record has provided an indeterminate answer as to whether the "moonlighting" of Broadway's talent on television and in Hollywood brought more back to Broadway than Broadway gave to television and Hollywood, our results suggest that it was disruptive to the small world order of the network. *Q*'s decline reflects the drop in connectivity and cohesion across the global network as it became harder

TABLE 4
SMALL WORLD STATISTICS WITH NEWMAN ET AL (2001) CORRECTION FOR BIPARTITE NETWORKS

YEAR	NEW MUSICALS	AVERAGE TEAM SIZE	CLUSTER COEFFICIENT			PATH LENGTH			$\frac{Q}{CCr/PLr}$
			Actual	Random	Ratio	Actual	Random	Ratio	
1945	14	7.1	287	077	3.7	3.13	2.23	1.40	2.63
1946	19	6.8	295	073	4.02	3.11	2.24	1.38	2.90
1947	12	6.7	311	074	4.15	3.12	2.27	1.37	3.01
1948	16	6.6	315	078	4.04	3.14	2.34	1.34	3.01
1949	9	5.8	319	089	3.55	3.04	2.36	1.29	2.75
1950	16	8.4	325	097	3.34	3.09	2.40	1.28	2.59
1951	11	6.4	33	109	3.02	3.06	2.41	1.26	2.38
1952	8	7.0	328	109	3.01	3.03	2.36	1.28	2.35
1953	8	8.0	338	116	2.9	2.98	2.28	1.30	2.22
1954	11	7.9	328	115	2.85	2.98	2.24	1.32	2.15
1955	12	7.8	33	133	2.47	2.93	2.22	1.31	1.88
1956	10	7.8	345	135	2.55	2.93	2.24	1.31	1.94
1957	11	7.2	355	14	2.53	2.97	2.25	1.31	1.92
1958	11	7.0	353	136	2.58	3.06	2.25	1.36	1.89
1959	16	7.4	342	139	2.45	3.03	2.27	1.33	1.84
1960	13	6.8	343	144	2.38	3.06	2.34	1.31	1.81
1961	17	6.1	338	146	2.31	3.09	2.38	1.29	1.78
1962	13	6.0	344	16	2.13	3.14	2.39	1.31	1.63
1963	13	6.9	324	154	2.09	3.21	2.38	1.34	1.55
1964	17	6.9	314	147	2.12	3.17	2.38	1.33	1.59
1965	18	7.2	304	141	2.15	3.12	2.40	1.29	1.65
1966	13	7.5	301	146	2.05	3.04	2.37	1.28	1.59
1967	7	8.3	302	148	2.04	2.98	2.33	1.27	1.59
1968	16	7.9	329	165	1.98	2.96	2.32	1.27	1.55
1969	13	7.3	33	166	1.97	2.97	2.36	1.25	1.57
1970	14	7.0	331	167	1.98	2.97	2.36	1.25	1.57
1971	17	6.0	354	18	1.96	3.2	2.46	1.30	1.51
1972	16	6.7	381	188	2.02	3.53	2.51	1.40	1.43
1973	12	7.4	389	193	2.01	3.48	2.56	1.36	1.47
1974	9	6.4	391	189	2.06	3.54	2.57	1.37	1.49
1975	17	7.3	371	146	2.54	3.74	2.58	1.44	1.75
1976	14	7.7	376	146	2.57	3.75	2.58	1.45	1.77
1977	7	7.0	375	139	2.69	3.72	2.53	1.47	1.82
1978	19	6.6	364	141	2.57	3.61	2.49	1.44	1.78
1979	16	8.6	358	148	2.41	3.42	2.45	1.39	1.72
1980	14	7.9	365	149	2.43	3.54	2.49	1.42	1.71
1981	17	7.8	355	153	2.31	3.48	2.53	1.37	1.68
1982	15	7.1	355	169	2.09	3.57	2.53	1.41	1.48
1983	10	8.6	361	178	2.02	3.61	2.59	1.39	1.45
1984	4	7.0	358	178	2	3.59	2.58	1.39	1.44
1985	9	7.9	366	183	2	3.58	2.61	1.37	1.46
1986	8	7.5	369	173	2.12	3.69	2.61	1.41	1.50
1987	8	6.3	383	207	1.85	3.71	2.67	1.39	1.33
1988	8	6.9	409	2	2.04	3.87	2.69	1.43	1.42
1989	10	6.9	406	182	2.23	3.6	2.62	1.37	1.62

NOTE —All figures use the Newman et al (2001) correction for the estimation of the *CC* and *PL* of a bipartite random graph and include a decay function of seven years (see methods section for details)

for creative artists to coordinate their collaborations predictably than it had been in the past

Also, consistent with these observations is the recovery of Q in the 1980s with the renaissance of Times Square and the influx of international tourists to New York City (Remember the I Love NY marketing campaign?) The reelevated artistic and commercial options of Broadway enticed creative artists to return to Broadway and to coordinate their collaborations better, prompting a rise in Q . Thus, Q agrees with the historical narrative while quantifying how exogenous shocks decreased and increased the small world's potential ability to shape the collaboration and creativity of the artists embedded within it, a conclusion examined in more detail below in our statistical tests

Table 5 and table 6 present our multilevel analysis of the success of a musical. Models 1 and 2 look at the control variables, and models 3 and 4 present our two operationalizations of a small world as linear and as quadratic terms. Appendix table A1 shows the full model with three separate specification tests: (1) outliers removed from the data, (2) a probit specification instead of an ordered probit specification that collapses failure and flops into one category, and (3) standardized coefficients.

Financial Success of a Musical

Table 5 presents the results of the financial success analysis. Together, the control variables for economic and team-level network variables explain about 27% of the variation in hit, flop, and failure according to our pseudo- R^2 —a high value given the common belief that the success of artistic productions is essentially unpredictable (Bielby and Bielby 1994). Of the economic variables, size of production and playing in a core theater have two of the largest and most stable effects across the models. This suggests that a larger budget and cast widen the appeal of the show, presumably through investments in more extravagant visuals and performing talent, while a show in the core of the district is attractive to theatergoers. Our measure of competition failed to reach a level of significance. One explanation for this is that while competition among shows may influence which shows theatergoers will pay for, the amount of money theatergoers are willing to spend increases with the number of quality shows available. Our year dummy for 1975 does not reach significance, indicating that its effect on financial performance is netted out by other variables. This may be a result of the fact that the financial effects of television, Hollywood blockbusters, and cable television could only be partially offset by new technology and “two-for-one” marketing strategies.

The team-level network variables have important effects, increasing R^2 by about 12%, but the effects are unevenly distributed across our mea-

TABLE 5
ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SMALL WORLDS ON THE FINANCIAL
SUCCESS OF A MUSICAL, 1945–1989

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Small world Q				4 045**
				(1 680)
Small world Q squared				– 836**
				(359)
CC ratio			3 181***	
			(1 001)	
CC ratio squared			– 490***	
			(157)	
PL ratio			766	
			(1 895)	
Closeness centrality		421**	485***	452**
		(180)	(187)	(186)
Structural holes		846	1 215**	1 220**
		(530)	(552)	(557)
Local density		875	1 222*	1 214*
		(571)	(651)	(646)
% repeated ties		294	276	328
		(571)	(605)	(587)
Structural equivalence		028	039	035
		(043)	(042)	(042)
No of past hits		032***	030***	030***
		(011)	(011)	(011)
No of ties		001	001	001
		(002)	(002)	(002)
Production size	1 284***	1 285***	1 324***	1 315***
	(164)	(189)	(196)	(195)
% of new musicals	–1 164*	–1 480**	– 594	– 797
	(698)	(708)	(801)	(786)
Core theater (1 = yes)	565***	480***	476***	483***
	(115)	(118)	(118)	(120)
Adjusted ticket prices	– 002	003	031	026
	(016)	(016)	(019)	(020)
Prime rate	– 038	– 031	005	– 002
	(027)	(026)	(028)	(028)
% change in GDP	–3 439*	–3 328	–3 053	–3 121
	(2 018)	(2 154)	(2 183)	(2 194)
1975 year indicator	– 182	– 112	– 730	– 428
	(419)	(457)	(529)	(473)
Observations	462	442	442	442
χ^2	130 76	157 1	169 2	172 0

NOTE — Robust SEs in parentheses. See methods section and app table A1 for additional specification tests.

* $P < .10$, two-tailed tests

** $P < .05$

*** $P < .01$

TABLE 6
OLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF SMALL WORLDS ON THE ARTISTIC SUCCESS OF A
MUSICAL, 1945–1989

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Small world Q				4 311** (1 794)
Small world Q squared				– 942** (379)
CC ratio			3 584*** (1 253)	
CC ratio squared			– 580*** (198)	
PL ratio			344 (1 904)	
Closeness centrality		591** (265)	558** (258)	527* (261)
Structural holes		– 105 (517)	117 (491)	147 (471)
Local density		– 464 (570)	– 286 (597)	– 264 (564)
% repeated ties		556 (382)	636 (392)	629 (386)
Structural equivalence		067 (040)	070* (039)	071* (039)
No of past hits		031*** (009)	028*** (009)	028*** (009)
No of ties		– 015*** (003)	– 015*** (004)	– 014*** (004)
Production size	341 (225)	282 (230)	365 (227)	350 (227)
% of new musicals	– 171 (724)	– 437 (690)	277 (837)	– 048 (845)
Core theater (1 = yes)	333*** (118)	149 (119)	130 (111)	139 (115)
Adjusted ticket prices	003 (048)	015 (055)	004 (043)	006 (045)
Prime rate	– 063 (038)	– 063 (042)	– 021 (048)	– 033 (051)
% change in GDP	– 2 166 (2 414)	– 1 389 (2 565)	– 1 505 (2 643)	– 1 387 (2 578)
1975 year indicator	– 164 (515)	– 062 (609)	– 498 (654)	– 266 (617)
Constant	– 442 (645)	1 526 (1 179)	– 4 906 (3 437)	– 3 833 (2 707)
Observations	321	315	315	315
R^2	09	20	22	21

NOTE — See methods section and app table A1 for additional specification tests Robust SEs in parentheses

* $P < .10$, two-tailed tests

** $P < .05$

*** $P < .01$

tures While the more central teams and teams with past hits are more likely to launch a hit, as expected, the number of past collaborators has a null effect, suggesting that for success, quality of experience is more important than quantity Teams with more structural holes also affect success in the full model, consistent with recent findings by Burt (2004) on the network sources of good ideas Local density, repeated ties, and structural equivalence have null effects Thus, a team that is locally densely connected, made up of many repeated ties, or made up of members who have had similar experiences with the same third parties is not a reliable indicator of financial success or failure once we control for other factors

Our hypothesis predicted an inverted U-shaped relationship between our network's level of small worldliness and the probability of financial success We argued that an intermediate level of small worldliness would increase the probability of success, while low and high levels of small worldliness would dampen prospects of success To test this hypothesis we used two specifications of small worldliness First, we introduced into our control variable models the small world Q as a linear and as a quadratic term Consistent with our prediction, the linear small world Q was positive and significant, and the squared small world Q was negative and significant Second, we introduced into control variable models the CC ratio and CC ratio squared along with the PL ratio as a control Again, consistent with our prediction, the linear term was positive and significant, and the quadratic term was negative and significant These findings suggest that as the level of connectivity and cohesion increase at the global level of analysis, the probability of success increases up to a certain threshold, after which point increases in the amount of order harm financial success

Artistic Success of a Musical

Artistic success is affected by economic and team-level network variables in ways that are similar to financial success but with notable exceptions As with financial success, a team with central artists and a track record of past hits gets high artistic marks from the critics The number of previous collaborators had no effect on the financial success model but had a negative effect on artistic success This negative effect seems somewhat counterintuitive given that conventional wisdom holds that experience breeds success One reason for this discrepancy may be that artists who develop expansive contact networks do so at the expense of depth (Faulkner and Anderson 1987)

Two other notable differences exist between the artistic and financial success models Whereas in the financial success models size of production

and core theater had large effects, in the artistic success model these variables have null effects. This suggests that whereas the public gravitates to large, extravagant, and centrally located shows, critics' notices are not swayed by these factors—a finding that is consistent with the belief that a critic's impression of a musical's artistic merits should be independent of factors that are weakly related to content.

As predicted by our hypothesis, both our operationalizations of small worldliness are in the expected directions. The linear term was positively related, while the squared term was negatively related for both the small world Q model as well as the CC ratio model, holding the PL ratio constant. Thus, consistent with our theory and prediction, we found that the small worldliness had a robust effect on two separate but related performance behaviors of the system, reinforcing the generality and originality of our results.

Financial and Artistic Success of a Season

It follows logically from our multilevel arguments that if a small world affects the behavior of actors within the system, it should also affect cognate behavior at the system level. If we are correct that the small world structure influences the creativity of production teams through variations in the level of connectivity and cohesion in the global network, then during periods of optimal connectivity and cohesion the *collective* success of teams in that year should also be superior to the collective success of teams in years of suboptimal connectivity and cohesion. By looking at the effect of a small world at multiple levels, we submit our arguments to tests that are both conservative and multifaceted.

To test the effects of small worlds at the system level, we regressed our three system-level variables: (1) the annual percentage of hits, (2) the annual percentage of rave reviews, and (3) the annual average of reviews on the other relevant system-level control variables: number of teams with a past history of producing hits, number of shows opening in core theaters, percentage of shows that were new musicals that year, ticket price, prime rate, and GDP.

Table 7 presents the results of our three system-level dependent variables. The models show good fit to the data, with an R^2 of .37, .40, and .48, respectively. Consistent with our predictions, all three measures of systemic-level performance have an inverted U-shaped relationship with our two operationalizations of a small world. These results provide another array of confirmatory evidence in support of our small world theory.

TABLE 7
OLS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF A SMALL WORLD ON THE PERCENTAGE OF HIT SHOWS, PERCENTAGE OF RAVE SHOWS, AND
AVERAGE CRITICS' REVIEWS PER SEASON, 1945-1989

VARIABLE	% HIT SHOWS			% RAVE SHOWS			AVERAGE CRITICS' SCORE ACROSS ALL SHOWS	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Small world Q			1 436*** (505)			1 636*** (493)		5 553*** (1 865)
Small world Q squared			- 311*** (114)			- 357*** (111)		-1 212*** (419)
CC ratio		1 117*** (354)			1 162*** (350)		3 953*** (1 314)	
CC ratio squared		- 181*** (059)			- 188*** (058)		- 639*** (219)	
PL ratio		262 (588)			- 090 (560)		- 913 (2 10)	
No of teams with hits	- 001	001	- 001	002	002	- 000	- 016	- 021

No of shows in core theaters	(012)	(011)	(011)	(012)	(011)	(010)	(039)	(039)
	004	-000	005	013	009	016	-006	017
% of new musicals	(018)	(017)	(017)	(020)	(018)	(017)	(067)	(066)
	-311	-065	-148	-203	151	024	827	351
% change in GDP	(294)	(285)	(279)	(295)	(284)	(273)	(106)	(1032)
	1184	1461*	1309	129	458	333	575*	5400*
Adjusted ticket prices	(907)	(835)	(836)	(877)	(780)	(766)	(293)	(2899)
	-003	007	005	-009	002	001	-032	-033
1975 year indicator	(005)	(006)	(005)	(012)	(012)	(011)	(044)	(042)
	-060	-202	-114	-037	-156	-120	-312	-284
Constant	(090)	(125)	(085)	(110)	(138)	(099)	(517)	(375)
	415***	-1717*	-1266**	310*	-1478	-1623***	-4630	-5929
Observations	(131)	(1010)	(582)	(161)	(1005)	(585)	(3770)	(2215)
R ²	45	45	45	37	37	37	37	37
	18	37	34	13	40	39	48	46

Note --OLS results are shown, Tobit models of the percentage dependent variables produced nearly identical estimates See methods section and appendix A1 for additional specification tests

* $P < .10$, two-tailed tests

** $P < .05$

*** $P < .01$

Effect Sizes

Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 visually present the bivariate relationships for our small world Q and the probability of a hit versus a flop, an artistic success, percentage of hits, and percentage of raves, respectively. All four graphs support one inference: an intermediate level of small worldliness produces the most beneficial small world effect on *both* financial and artistic success. Either too little order or too much order in the level of small worldliness dampens the likelihood that a musical succeeds.

Figure 4 shows the magnitude of the effect of Q on financial performance. The results indicate that at the predicted bliss point of Q (about 2.6), a musical's probability of being a hit is about 2.5 times greater than the lowest value of Q (about 1.4), while the probability of a flop drops by 20%. Figure 6 shows that the chance of the percentage of hits in a season is over three times greater at the bliss point (about 2.37) than when small worldliness is low (about 1.4). Figures 5 and 7 display the relationship between the small world Q and artistic success. The graphs show that the chances of a show's being an artistic success are about three times greater at the bliss point (about 2.3) than at the lowest level of Q , while in figure 7, the chances of the percentage of raves per year goes up about four times at the bliss point in figure 7.

Several noteworthy patterns are prompted by a comparison of the effects of small worlds on commercial and artistic success. First, the patterns suggest that both fiscal and artistic success is hurt more by too little connectivity and cohesion than by too much connectivity and cohesion, at least within the range of Q in our data. Too little order is worse than too much. Second, while artistic and commercial success are affected differently by different variables (e.g., being in a core theater had no effect on critics' appraisals), the effects of the small world structure on our dependent variables are similar across different specifications and levels of analysis. The consistency of effects of the small world suggest that they are structurally robust in their effect on behavior, perhaps governing a fundamental aspect of creativity in teams such that whether the objective is commercial success, artistic success, or both, an optimal balance of order in the network generates a regular pattern of effects, an effect that could partly account for the high incidence of small world networks in diverse systems of exchange as well as their robustness.

Post Hoc and Out-of-Sample Confirmatory Tests

Despite the consistent confirmation of the U-shaped effects for multiple estimators and model specifications, the removal of outliers, and compound levels of analysis, it is worth noting the uneven dispersion of data




FIG 4—Financial success of a show




FIG 5—Artistic success of a show




FIG 6 —Financial success of a season




FIG 7 —Artistic success of a season

across the curves. About 80% and 85% of the data lie to the left of the crest for the artistic and financial success models, respectively. These figures might suggest that the data to the right of the bliss point are rare, and if so, the analysis can simplify to a positive and linear relationship.

While a positive and linear relationship would still be an important finding for a truncated sample of data, we believe this conclusion is premature and may be misleading. First, under most circumstances, a result that involves 15%–20% of the population is nontrivial. Second, the inclusion of these cases is vital for theory building because they show how performance changes over the range of our small world's variation rather than a truncated sample. Third, a straightforward regression of the dependent variables on Q as a linear term does not reach significance (available from authors). Thus, if these data were disqualified they could produce misleading conclusions. One could falsely infer that increasing small worldliness is uniformly beneficial, leading to suboptimal decisions.

Another way to view this problem is to extend our analysis backward in time to the years prior to 1945, namely, 1900–1945, where Q is often above our bliss point value of 2.5. This suggests that Q -values to the right of our bliss point are not rare, but normative, when considered over a fuller time frame. Unfortunately, we could not include the Q -values from before 1945 in our statistical analysis because the detailed multilevel, multivariate data that we have for the 1945–89 period does not exist for the earlier period. The only data that were available for the earlier period were the names of the creative artists who worked on each musical, which we used to compute Q , and a list of hits for 1919–30 that was compiled by Bordman (1986) and corroborated by Jones (2003, p. 360–61). These hit data offer two experts' opinions of the successful shows for the 1919–30 period using criteria that are comparable to the hit criteria we used in the above statistical analysis. Another advantage of this period for comparison purposes is that it can be ruled out that either a poor economy or a lack of talent affected the rate of flops during the 1919–30 seasons, because the economy was strong, and Broadway was flush with talent (Porter had 2 shows, Rodgers and Lorenz Hart, 12 shows, Hammerstein, 13 shows, Berlin, 1 show, Eubie Blake, 3 shows, Anne Caldwell and Jerome Kern, 15 shows, Coward, 1 show, and Gershwin, 12 shows). Thus, while these data cannot definitively test our model outside the range of data we examined in this article, they do furnish data that can broadly refute or support the representativeness of our findings.

When we examined the relationship between Q and the percentage of hits 1919–30, the analysis substantiated our findings. From 1919 to 1930, Q attained an average value of 4.8, which is among the highest in the history of Broadway. According to our theory, this would suggest a low hit rate. Consistent with this prediction, about 90% of the new shows

were flops from 1919 to 1930. By comparison, in the 1945–89 period, when Q was around the bliss point, about 75% of the shows were flops. Thus, these data and tests, while only circumstantial, corroborated the U-shaped relationship for periods beyond the one studied.

DISCUSSION

Small world networks have been shown to arise in a surprisingly wide variety of organized systems, from power grids to brain cells to scientific collaborations. The high incidence with which they occur has led to the speculation that there is something fundamental and generalizable about how they organize and govern success in biological, physical, and social systems alike. The objective of this research was to test that speculation directly with regard to human creativity and to specify theoretical mechanisms that can explain it. We had hoped to create an understanding of the key performance properties and conditions that lead to beneficial, disadvantageous, or benign small world network effects.

Our context for study was the network of creative artists who create original Broadway musicals. We reconstructed the network from archival data that included every artist who worked on every original Broadway musical released from 1945 to 1989. These data also included vital time-varying statistics on the economic characteristics of the market, the productions, the relative talent of artists, the local network characteristics of the creative teams, and two measures of creativity on the musical—financial success and artistic merit. We found that small world networks have a robust and novel impact on performance. Small world networks do benefit performance but only up to a threshold, after which the positive effects of small worlds reverse.

To explain this behavior we focused on the two properties that define a small world—the CC ratio and the PL ratio, or simply the small world Q (formally, CC ratio/ PL ratio). We reasoned, following various branches of network theory, that as the small world Q increases, the separate clusters that make up a small world become more connected and connected by persons who know each other well through past collaborations or through having had past collaborations with common third parties. This suggested that if the small world Q is low, creative material remains cloistered in the separate teams that make up the small world. This isolating process is aggravated by the fact that the few links that do exist between teams and that can transfer novel but unfamiliar material are also more likely to be hit and miss in the sense that they are not disproportionately made up of firsthand third-party ties in common or repeat ties. As the level of the small world Q increases to a medium level, the level of connectivity

and cohesion in the network also rises. There is an increase in the level of connections among teams in the network, and these connections are increasingly made up of cohesive ties—repeated and third-party-in-common relationships—that add the necessary level of credibility needed to facilitate the spread of potentially fresh but unfamiliar creative material by artists in the network. We also reasoned that too much small worldness can undermine the very benefits it creates at more moderate levels. If the small world Q rises beyond a threshold, the network increases in connectivity and cohesion to a point at which the positive effects of connectivity turn negative. High levels of connectivity homogenize the pool of creative material, while repeated ties and third-party-in-common ties promote common information exchanges, decreasing artists' ability to break out of conventional ideas or styles that worked in the past but that have since lost their market appeal.

Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that the level of small worldness has a curvilinear effect on performance. Adding to the confidence of our inference is that these effects hold independent of levels of analysis, multiple operationalizations of our small world concepts, several model specification tests, and two different dependent variables.

Bipartite (Affiliation) and Unipartite Small World Networks

An important part of our framework rests on the distinctiveness of unipartite projections of bipartite graphs or what are also called affiliation networks. These types of networks are common in many types of social systems. For example, bipartite-affiliation networks characterize board of directors networks, scientific collaboration networks, movie actor networks, and project teams of all kinds (see figs. 1 and 2). In general, they occur whenever invention is based on teamwork such that the end product is collaborative handiwork. What is unique about these networks is that at the team level, they constitute fully connected cliques, and at the global level, they create a network of dense overlapping clusters joined together by actors who have multiple team memberships—or classic small world networks. Our conceptualization of how a small world affects behavior was specific to bipartite-affiliation networks. We did not speculate on how our theory would change for unipartite theories, a natural direction for future research.

Nevertheless, by addressing the key role and special features of bipartite-affiliation networks for social behavior, as well as their relative lack of attention in past network research, we hope to have enhanced the potential impact of this work. In that regard, the generality of our model seems most apropos for the many kinds of networks where production is team based and roles are specialized, decentralized, and interdependent.

For example, one could imagine extensions of our model for project teams, boards of directors, voluntary and community service teams, small-size military units and other security teams, or government cabinets. With regard to project teams based in commercial business firms or labs in research and development organizations, it follows logically that a testable hypothesis would be that the optimal level of product success increases with a medium level of small world connectedness and cohesion. In commercial firms, this level could even be targeted by design with purposeful levels of task rotation, job reassignment, or cross-training across practice areas. In more market-governed project teams such as coauthor or copatenting networks in science, the model might be developed to compare the relative creative potential of different fields (see Guimera et al. 2005). For example, do fields that come to rest too far to the left of the bliss point indicate a lack of ability to assimilate the diverse talent in their fields successfully? Will the science produced from fields far and close to the bliss point vary in their impact factors?

From another direction, a question could be asked as to whether our results hold for the creative enterprises not at the center of a field but at its edge. Would we find the same patterns for off-Broadway and experimental theater, where there is less of a focus on creativity through convention plus extension than there is for Broadway? While more research is obviously needed before extensions of this research can be made to other contexts and to target levels of Q , it does provide a new avenue of research that follows in the tradition of research on the strength of weak ties and embeddedness, which have been extended from their original sites of job search and organizational behavior to social movements, gender and race studies, mergers and acquisitions, norm formation, price formation, international trade, and other socioeconomic phenomena (Montgomery 1998, Rao et al. 2001, Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi 1992, Sacks, Ventresca, and Uzzi 2001, Ingram and Roberts 2000, Uzzi and Lancaster 2004).

Egocentric and Global Networks

The small world problem also relates to the interplay between egocentric and global network structures. While it seems true that most network research has focused on local network effects that are attached to specific individuals, or what is called egocentric network phenomena, it is also true that there exists a powerful literature on community structures (Feld 1981, Baker and Faulkner 1991, Padgett and Ansell 1993, Markovsky and Lawler 1994, Frank and Yasumoto 1998, Friedkin 1984, Stark and Vedres 2005, Kogut and Walker 2001, Moody and White 2003, Moody 2004, Bearman, Moody, and Stovel 2004). Our work follows other com-

munity-level analysis in looking at how the global structure affects performance. In this work, we have shown how one of possibly several conceptualizations of the global network can influence a system's performance, while treating the interplay of global and local network effects as net of one another.

Our main concept in discussing this aspect of the relationship between local and global properties is that the global network affects the *distribution* of creative materials, that is, the joint distribution of actors and teams, available to all actors in the network, and therefore the effects of their egocentric characteristics are contingent on the small world network within which they are embedded. This suggests that egocentric properties such as structural holes, weak ties, or embedded ties (Granovetter 1973, Uzzi 1997, 1999, Burt 2004) are likely to have consistent but conditional effects that depend on the small worldliness of the network they are embedded in. Thus, one path for new research could concentrate on the statistical interactions between global and local network mechanisms.

Another important distinction between egocentric and global network conceptualizations is that the behavior of the global network may be only partly a consequence of egocentric behavior, and its strategic design is therefore partly beyond the control of individual actors. This important concept of *randomness* is rarely addressed in the empirical modeling of egocentric networks but is actively conceptualized and estimated when computing the global structure as a way of separating systematic global network effects from a simple model of random consequences that can arise in a global network, like Broadway's, where actors act separately from each other and without knowledge of, or perhaps intention to shape the global network. Nonetheless, they affect each other's behavior through their collective simultaneous actions in the global network. This view implies an invisible-hand-like phenomenon for global social network structures. While this view may be in contradiction to the historic dichotomy of markets and networks as well as the emphasis of egocentric network analysis on strategic design and nonmarket behavior, it has a basis in other scientific disciplines where the robustness of the global network to breakdown, the emergence of networks, global welfare benefits, and other systemic network behaviors have been examined relatively more than egocentric behavior. Thus, one possible way to begin looking at the relations between egocentric and global network phenomena is to bring these two research traditions together, a process that is already showing fruitfulness (Frank and Yasumoto 1998, White 2003, Burt 2004, Bearman, Moody, and Stovel 2004, Moody 2004, Guimera et al 2005, Powell et al 2005, Stark and Vedres 2005).

Another path is to link the small world conception of global networks with other global conceptions such as cohesive subgroupings, community

partitions, or the core/periphery hierarchy. In particular, an important problem to analyze is how these other approaches to global network structure treat bipartite networks. We spot two issues. First, because of the dense overlapping nature of fully linked cliques in a bipartite network, it is not clear where the partitions of communities might begin and end (Abbott 1996). This is because the criteria used to define a community's boundary is that set of agents with more in-group than out-group ties, which in a bipartite-affiliation network is the team itself, because each team is a fully linked clique. Obviously, to make community partitions viable scientifically, there would need to be a logic for aggregating communities from teams, which brings up the second issue worth pursuing. As noted above, in bipartite-affiliation graphs, there is an inflated level of clustering because of the fully linked cliques. This means that before progress can be made toward analyzing the community structure of bipartite-affiliation graphs, there needs to be a null model of what constitutes the correct ratio of in-group and out-group ties as well as the correct number of partitions. We estimate that an answer to this issue might lie in a solution similar to that of the bipartite small world model. The key measures of connectivity and cohesion are not the within-team ties that have been typical of community network analysis, but the between-team ties. An examination of these methodological issues is beyond the scope of this article, yet provides one possible route for future research that can begin to show the points of commonality and complementarity between different approaches to the global structure of networks.

Small Worlds, Culture, and History

To better relate how our specific quantitative measures of the network coevolved with the culture and history of this creative industry, we showed how the behavior of Q varied with exogenous conditions, dropping and rising as other artistic domains struck at the foundations of artists' intentions and ability to plan their Broadway collaborations reliably. For Broadway, the emerging artistic media of television, post-World War II Hollywood, and rock and roll raised the uncertainty associated with building network ties with other artists. Artistic collaborations became more competitive to create and harder to schedule as artists split their time between domains, experimented in other domains, or permanently lost collaborators to non-Broadway undertakings, particularly television, which stole market share and tempted Broadway stars with a chance for overnight national stardom (e.g., Rodgers and Hammerstein agreed to be the first guests to appear on the *Ed Sullivan Show*).

It is worth mentioning here in more detail how our mathematical model registers these historic cultural changes in this creative industry. As we

noted above, the drop in Q represents a decrease in the number of between-team ties and the number of cohesive ties in the creative artist network. But Q is the CC ratio/ PL ratio, and so the exact source of the change may be a result of the numerator, denominator, or both. Our above results indicated that the PL ratio was relatively constant from 1945 to 1989. This means that the change in Q resulted from the CC ratio. When we examined the CC actual and CC random separately, we found that both quantities increased over the time period, but that the CC random increased faster than the CC actual (hence, the net drop in Q , holding PL ratio constant).

But what does it mean for the CC random to increase faster than the CC actual in terms of actual human behavior? The increase in the CC actual means that more artists were working on only one production (Remember, in the extreme case where all artists work on one production only, the network is made up of many isolated, fully linked cliques, and therefore would have a CC actual of 1.0, where 0.0 is no clustering and 1.0 is complete clustering). By the same logic, the estimate of the CC random for a network of isolated, fully linked teams would also have to be 1.0. Thus, the faster rise in the CC random relative to the CC actual means that our model (Newman et al. 2001) estimated that the percentage of between-team ties that were attributable to *random connections among artists* rose more quickly than did the actual percentage of between-team ties calculated with the CC formula.

This reasoning produces the interesting conclusion that the rising uncertainty in partnering and network building experienced by creative artists instigated a rise in the propensity of artists to form random links. This is not to say that artists randomly formed teams, but that the ability to forecast and design collaborations regularly was curtailed, infusing happenstance into the process by which collaborators were chosen. If an artist's first choice for a collaborator was unavailable for a production (perhaps the artist's first choice was waiting on a television or film production), the artist would be more inclined to experiment with partners with whom they had not worked in the past or with whom they did not have third-party ties in common. This is what is meant by more randomness in the network—the choices of our collaborators are less dependent on the persons with whom we have worked in the past or the affiliations of our third-party ties, and more on who is the best available of those beyond our circle of cohesive relations. In essence, as the intensity of the small world properties of our network decreased, the network acted more like a public market for talent.

Although these connections between history and our quantitative model are somewhat speculative, they raise interesting questions regarding the response of the network to uncertainty. One might argue that increased

uncertainty would have motivated actors to go with well-known associates rather than with strangers (Granovetter 1985), yet our findings suggest that the opposite occurred. What we cannot unequivocally determine at this point is whether the observed result was a second-best solution to being able to work with known associates who were simply unavailable, or whether the experimentation with new ties was a desirable strategy for coming up with fresh artistic material in an industry that was trying to adapt to the social milieu of the times.

Dynamics

These observations suggest that a next step is the study of network dynamics. If small world networks can have positive and negative impacts, how do they arise and evolve? What factors lead to the formation of a small world as opposed to another type of network? What factors lead to small worlds that have optimal Q 's? What is the role of the intentionality of individuals beyond the compositions of their local network ties? And conversely, what factors lead to stasis, the lock-in of a high- or low-performing network, or a network's transformation from one type of network into another? While work in this area is nascent, the findings that a small world affects performance can be enriched by understanding how they come to pass and change—an important goal in an epoch of connectedness.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A1
SENSITIVITY SPECIFICATION TESTS OF SMALL WORLD EFFECTS

VARIABLE	OUTLIER SENSITIVITY FINANCIAL SUCCESS		OUTLIER SENSITIVITY ARTISTIC SUCCESS		PROBIT OF HIT VERSUS FLOP		STANDARDIZED CO- EFFICIENTS FOR FINANCIAL SUCCESS		STANDARDIZED CO- EFFICIENTS FOR ARTISTIC SUCCESS	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Small world Q		5 930*** (2 048)		7 483*** (2 699)		5 795** (2 403)		1 8117		1 9338
Small world Q squared		-1 312*** (468)		-1 729** (654)		-1 369** (543)		-1 6337		-1 8735
CC ratio	4 431*** (1 199)		6 305*** (1 412)		4 730*** (1 385)		1 9855		2 1872	
CC ratio squared	- 727*** (206)		-1 092*** (240)		- 835*** (231)		-1 82312		-2 1291	
PL ratio	904 (1 828)		513 (1 690)		1 808 (1 786)		1177		0775	
Closeness centrality	497*** (178)	449** (177)	522* (270)	467 (279)	275 (243)	227 (241)	2074	1945	1892	1803
Structural holes	1 304** (584)	1 335** (588)	212 (557)	324 (509)	652 (728)	675 (729)	1958	1949	0243	0215
Local density	1 289* (695)	1 306* (686)	- 112 (659)	- 042 (605)	1 129 (833)	1 111 (816)	2718	2671	- 0445	- 0502
% repeated ies	446 (668)	519 (651)	666 (462)	664 (453)	742 (516)	829* (482)	0427	0515	0993	1001
Structural equivalence	044	038	074*	077*	099	088	0806	0733	1379	1370

	(047)	(046)	(040)	(042)	(061)
No of past hits	030***	030***	026**	026***	026**
	(011)	(011)	(010)	(010)	(012)
No of ties	− 001	− 000	− 013***	− 012**	− 001
	(006)	(006)	(004)	(005)	(008)
Production size	1 245***	1 234***	309	297	447**
	(190)	(189)	(238)	(238)	(208)
% of new musicals	− 323	− 631	660	228	− 706
	(869)	(855)	(900)	(936)	(933)
Core theater (1 = yes)	497***	510***	131	143	458***
	(120)	(121)	(110)	(117)	(141)
Adjusted ticket prices	037**	033*	000	006	021
	(019)	(019)	(043)	(043)	(026)
Prime rate	005	− 003	− 011	− 027	− 003
	(028)	(028)	(046)	(049)	(033)
% change in GDP	− 3 335	− 3 322	− 1 543	− 1 330	− 4 512
	(2 188)	(2 178)	(2 626)	(2 527)	(3 401)
1975 year indicator	− 794	− 473	− 638	− 350	− 615
	(507)	(449)	(627)	(602)	(603)
Constant			− 8 987**	− 7 373**	− 10 622***
			(3 409)	(3 434)	(3 464)
Observations	408	408	288	288	401
R ²	27	27	23	21	14

* $P < 10$, two-tailed tests

** $P < 05$

*** $P < 01$

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Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women's National Political Representation¹

Sheri Kunovich
Southern Methodist University

Pamela Paxton
Ohio State University

The authors extend previous research on women's participation in politics by examining the role of female elites in political parties in selecting and supporting women as political candidates. They hypothesize that political parties, in their role as gatekeepers, mediate the relationship between country-level factors, such as women's participation in the labor force, and political outcomes for women. The article focuses on three outcomes for women: the percentage of female political party leaders, the percentage of female candidates in a country, and the percentage of women elected. New cross-national measures of women's inclusion in political parties are developed and analyzed in a cross-national, path-analytic model of women in politics to find that (1) women's position in party elites translates into gains for women *as candidates* only under proportional representation systems, (2) women's position in party elites increases the likelihood that female candidates will be *elected* only in *non*-proportional representation systems, and (3) parties may be overly sensitive to the perceived liability of women as candidates, when in fact, women have success as candidates across all regions of the world.

Women's representation in formal politics matters both normatively and practically. From a normative standpoint, political elites should represent the interests of all citizens, including traditionally marginalized groups.

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such as women (Williams 1998, Phillips 1991). Practically, a lack of female participation can result in a state that legislates in the male interest (MacKinnon 1989, Connell 1990, Waylen 1994). In that case, society-wide decisions in the form of legislation and the allocation of resources may not be enacted in women's interests. In addition, political position carries highly visible status and prestige. While women have made remarkable inroads into both tertiary education and traditionally male occupations, the political sphere remains an arena in which women have not yet gained comparably visible status. Women are highly underrepresented in national politics, with the average percentage of women in parliaments only 15.2% as of January 2004 (IPU 2004). To understand the overall position of women within society it is therefore necessary to examine women's underrepresentation within the political structure.

The quantitative literature on women's presence in legislatures can generally be classified into two approaches. The first approach focuses on national-level patterns of women's parliamentary representation. In this approach, country-level variables are used to explain variation in the percentage of women in national legislatures across countries (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Paxton 1997, Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Matland 1998, Reynolds 1999). For example, the percentage of women in the labor force of a country is hypothesized to represent the "supply" of women available for public office and therefore increase numbers of women in parliament (e.g., Paxton 1997). These studies tend to be large-*N*, cross-national, statistical studies with the goal of explaining variation *across* countries.

A second approach focuses instead on *party*-level differences in the representation of women. This research has asked why parties differ with respect to the number of women they nominate as candidates, where those parties rank women on party lists, and the proportion of women they send to parliaments (Caul 1999, Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Kunovich 2003, Matland and Studlar 1996, Tremblay and Pelletier 2001, Sanbonmatsu 2002, Mateo Diez 2002, Welch and Studlar 1996). For example, leftist parties are hypothesized to provide greater support to women's candidacies because they espouse egalitarian ideologies (e.g., Caul 1999, Beckwith 1992). Similarly, parties with women in positions of power are hypothesized to positively affect the adoption of measures favoring female candidates (e.g., Tremblay and Pelletier 2001). Because the focus is on very detailed information about parties, these studies tend to focus *within* particular countries, or a small number of countries, across a range of parties.

In this article, we try to advance understanding of the *overall process* by which women are elected to national political office in two ways. First, we combine the two approaches outlined above, focusing on the ways in

which political parties *mediate and interact with* the effects of country-level variables in producing political outcomes for women. Second, we focus on multiple points of contact for women in the political system, arguing that to understand women in the overall process of politics, it is important to understand women's inclusion in parties, women as candidates, and women as elected officials.

We view the electoral process as creating two "filter" points for women. In passing through the first filter, women must be selected by parties in order to *run for* political office. In passing through the second, women must be selected by the electorate in order to *achieve* political office. We model both filters, hypothesizing that country-level and party-level factors should influence *both* the number of female candidates *and* how well those female candidates translate into female legislators.

Our study is cross-national in that we consider a large number of countries. This allows us to consider the country-level variables found to be important in so much previous research. At the same time, we include information about the inclusion of women in the political parties of each country. We hypothesize that, in their role as gatekeepers, political parties mediate and interact with the effects of the country-level factors in producing political outcomes for women. For example, some parties may have elites who are disposed to field female candidates, regardless of country-level pressures. Yet, it is likely that political parties are themselves strongly influenced by country-level factors. For example, parties operating under a proportional representation electoral system may feel pressured to balance male and female candidates on their party lists, regardless of their leaders' views on women (Matland and Studlar 1996). Interaction effects are also possible: party elites favorable to women may have an easier time influencing the number of female candidates in proportional representation systems compared to other systems.

Overall, our model of women in politics uses both country- and party-level characteristics to look at three sequential outcomes: women's inclusion in party elites, the percentage of female candidates fielded by the parties of a country, and the percentage of women elected to the national legislature. We also model the yield of female legislators from candidates to assess whether the "return" on female candidates varies across countries. We hypothesize that some or all of the effect of country-level variables operates through their effect on political parties and those parties' decisions to field and support female candidates. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to consider multiple points of contact for women in the political system. In addition, it is the first study to consider country-level and party-level influences simultaneously across a wide variety of

countries.² The process of election is complex and necessitates a model that accounts for this complexity.

We complement our quantitative analyses with qualitative information from case studies (e.g., Young 2000, Goetz and Hassim 2003) and a recently released international survey of women in politics (IPU 2000). Case studies provide rich detail documenting the internal operations and negotiations within political parties. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) survey of women in politics final report chronicles interviews with over 200 female politicians (IPU 2000). Including illustrative qualitative information from the case studies and the survey helps us corroborate our claims and adds depth to our statistical findings. Overall, our findings have important implications for policies directed at increasing the number of women in politics.

WOMEN AS CANDIDATES, WOMEN AS ELECTED OFFICIALS

Understanding women's participation in politics begins by acknowledging that in no country do women make up 50% of the national legislature. Regardless, there is a great deal of variation across countries, from less than 5% in countries such as Egypt, to over 40% in some Scandinavian and African countries. On average, women were 9.5% of national legislatures worldwide in 1995, the year of this analysis.

Political parties also vary substantially in the proportion of women they field as candidates, and, therefore, in the proportion of women they may send to parliament. Across the 460 political parties in 76 countries used in this analysis, women were 15% of candidates. Some parties fielded no female candidates, while others (generally women's parties) fielded 100% women. Table 1 records information on the percentage of female candidates, percentage of female members of the national legislature, and the ratio of the two.

An initial manipulation of the numbers in table 1 reveals two important insights.

² In her 1997 edited volume, Norris develops a theoretical model of recruitment that is used by others to understand the candidate selection process in a variety of individual country studies. However, the model is not consistently tested across the studies (see also Matland and Montgomery 2003, Norris 1996, and Rule 1981). Caul (1999) tests the effects of party characteristics on women's electoral outcomes, but with data for only 12 advanced industrial nations, she is unable to include any country-level predictors except proportional representation system. In our opinion, the lack of cross-national research focusing on process results primarily from a lack of data rather than a lack of interest. To our knowledge, the IPU data that we use in this article are the first such comprehensive information on parties and candidates available cross-nationally.

- 1 The relationship between the percentage of female candidates fielded by parties and the percentage of female legislators elected is tight—the percentage of female candidates explains nearly 70% of the variance in the percentage of females in national legislatures
- 2 For a 1% increase in the number of female candidates, there is only a .67% increase in female legislators. Thus, the “return” on female candidates is low.³

The first insight suggests that to understand female legislators, we must first understand female candidates. The second insight suggests that understanding candidates is not enough—we must also understand the factors that enhance or inhibit the translation of female candidates into female legislators.

The strong relationship between female candidates and female elected officials is the result of the political process of election. In most countries, the recruitment and selection of political elites occurs entirely within political parties (Norris 1993, Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Indeed, candidate selection is viewed as an essential function of political parties (Bille 2001, Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Rahat and Hazan 2001). Therefore, in order for an individual, man or woman, to run for political office, he or she must be selected and supported by a political party. In this way, party-specific decisions about fielding candidates lead to the countrywide representation of women as candidates.

Relatively little is known about candidate selection methods because it is a power few party elites want to share with the general membership. As explained by Pesonen (1968, p. 348), “The nomination stage eliminates 99.96% of all the eligible people, the voters choose from only .04%.” Unlike the primary system in the United States, candidate selection is not open for public inspection and participation in most other nations. For example, both the Conservative and Liberal Democratic parties in Britain generate a list of centrally approved candidates that local constituency members use in selecting candidates (British Broadcasting Corporation News 2001). Access to the political elite is “controlled by a series of ‘gatekeepers,’ and the narrowest gate of all is that guarded by the candidate selectors” (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. 2).

³ In fact, the return is even lower if other important variables are controlled, as shown in table 3 below. In table 1, with the exception of four countries (the Netherlands, Mexico, Grenada, and Seychelles), the percentage of women in the national legislature is never more than 5% higher than the percentage of female candidates. On the other hand, there are numerous examples where the percentage of women in the legislature is substantially lower than the percentage of female candidates. For example, in Iceland, women are 50% of candidates and 25% of representatives.

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE CANDIDATES AND WOMEN IN NATIONAL LEGISLATURES

	% FEMALE			Ratio		% FEMALE		
	Candidates	Parliament	Ratio			Candidates	Parliament	Ratio
Western industrialized								
Australia	27.9	15.5	55		Asia			
Austria	39.3	26.8	68		Cambodia	4.8	5.8	1.21
Canada	22.1	18.0	81		India	4.2	7.2	1.71
France	19.2	6.4	33		Japan	7.3	4.6	1.59
Germany	29.5	26.2	88		Kiribati	1.5	0	0
Ireland	18.9	13.9	74		North Korea	20.1	20.1	1.00
Italy	12.7	11.1	87		South Korea	2.2	3.0	1.36
Monaco	12.0	5.6	47		Laos	10.4	9.4	90
Netherlands	25.5	31.3	122		Mongolia	8.6	7.9	92
Spain	32.5	24.6	76		Nepal	6.0	3.4	57
Switzerland	34.8	21.0	60		Philippines	8.5	10.8	1.27
United Kingdom	19.4	9.5	49		Samoa	4.9	4.1	84
Scandinavia					Singapore	3.2	2.5	78
Denmark	30.0	33.0	110		Sri Lanka	2.7	5.3	1.96
Iceland	50.4	25.4	50		Vietnam	30.3	26.0	86
Sweden	43.6	40.4	92		Latin America			
					Argentina	30.0	25.3	84

Once selected, parties are the major source of support for candidates in their bid for public office. Parties in proportional representation systems can support candidates by placing them in favorable list positions, while parties in plurality-majority systems can improve a candidate's chances of election by providing additional financial and institutional resources for campaigning. Previous research has documented that under proportional representation systems women are less likely than men to be placed in "safe" list positions or in open districts where their likelihood of electoral success would be higher (Kunovich 2003).

The role of parties in the selection and support of candidates looms large across single- and multiparty systems, and across full democracies, transitional democracies, and even authoritarian regimes (Abukhalil 1997, Gallagher and Marsh 1988). The *process* of candidate selection may vary across different contexts according to how centralized the process is, how extensive participation of party members is, and the degree to which objective or subjective characteristics of the aspirants matter for selection (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Bille 2001, Rahat and Hazan 2001). But it is always parties that control the process. Even under the most tightly controlled political system there is still competition among aspirants for seats in the national legislature, and political parties are generally the institutions within which the struggle occurs.

Thus, while the sentiments of the electorate and the nature of the regime in power are obviously important in getting candidates elected, parties play a crucial role as well. Understanding the relationship between certain party characteristics and political outcomes for women is a major goal of this paper.

A MODEL OF WOMEN IN POLITICS

Figure 1 presents a general theoretical model of women in politics. We view the inclusion of women in politics as a process with three visible sequential outcomes. Briefly, country-level factors, such as the percentage of women in the labor force and whether a country has a proportional representation system, directly influence all outcomes of interest: women's inclusion in party elites, the percentage of women fielded as candidates across all political parties, and the percentage of women elected. Women party elites can influence the percentage of women fielded as candidates, and both the presence of women in elite party circles and the number of women who run influence how many women actually attain a legislative position. It is also important to note that country-level factors and women party elites should also influence how well female candidates translate into female legislators, or the "return" on female candidates. The yield of




FIG 1 —The process of women's inclusion in politics

legislators from candidates is captured by the ratio of female legislators to female candidates. In what follows, we explain this process in more detail.

National-Level Explanations

Cross-national research on women in national legislatures has identified three country-level factors that influence the percentage of women in parliaments: structural, political, and ideological. Although the focus in previous theoretical work has typically been on women's national legislative representation, the arguments are transferable to other political outcomes of importance to women.

First, *structural* explanations predict that women's educational achievements and women's participation in the labor force will positively affect women's levels of representation. Based in the observation that political elites are pulled disproportionately from the highly educated and from certain professions such as law (Putnam 1976), structural explanations argue that women need human and financial capital (gained through educational and work experience) to stand for office. It follows that the percentage of women who are economically active and who are highly educated should influence political outcomes for women, such as the percentage of female candidates in a country.⁴

⁴ Empirical evidence for the impact of structural variables on women's national legislative participation is mixed (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Norris 1985, Paxton

Qualitative evidence supports the importance of structural factors. As a respondent from Southeast Asia in the IPU survey explains, "Educated women (tertiary level) and professionals in their mid-thirties onwards form a pool from which candidates would be selected" (IPU 2000, pp 96–97). The importance of a growing pool of qualified candidates is one explanation for the dramatic increases in women's representation in several African legislatures in recent years (Tripp 2001). Considering figure 1, at each point in the political process of election, the "supply" of available women (those with the requisite human and financial capital) should impact the number of women who make it through each filter.

In contrast to the "supply" of women, *political* explanations stress that political systems may have different "demands" for female candidates. Political and electoral systems either enhance or limit the ability of men, women, and other groups in government to promote their own interests and can be crucial factors in allowing women access in equal numbers (Caul 1999, 2001, Matland 1998, Giele and Smock 1977, Kohn 1980). Thus, system-level political factors, such as whether the country is a democracy or whether it has a proportional representation electoral system, are important in understanding the number of women in national legislatures.

For example, it is generally accepted that the presence of a proportional representation system, rather than a plurality-majority system (e.g., as in the United States), aids women in gaining access to the political system (Lovenduski and Hills 1981, Norris 1985, Rule 1987, Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Matland 1998). Proportional representation systems attempt to correlate the number of seats won by a political party with the number of votes cast for that party. In a proportional representation system, if a party wins 30% of the votes, they receive 30% of the parliamentary seats. In proportional representation closed-list systems, citizens vote for party lists of candidates rather than individual candidates. If a party won 30% of seats, legislators would be selected by moving down the party list, in order, until all seats were filled. This type of system almost always makes

1997). Several researchers have included a measure of women's educational attainment to predict women's representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Moore and Shackman 1996, Paxton 1997, Rule 1981, 1987). However, with the exception of Rule (1981), no cross-national study has found a statistically significant effect. This is most likely because data limitations have prevented researchers from measuring women's achievements in particular fields such as law, which should more accurately predict the supply of women. With the exception of our earlier work (Paxton and Kunovich 2003) and Oakes and Almquist (1993), general measures of the share of women in the paid labor force do not predict women's representation. When more specific measures of relevant occupations such as the percentage of women in professional or managerial professions are available, the findings are significant in some studies (Kenworthy and Malami 1999) but insignificant in others (Paxton 1997).

use of multimember districts, which means more than one candidate can be elected from a particular district. In contrast, plurality-majority systems like the United States ask citizens to vote for single candidates, typically in single-member districts.⁵

An electoral system that uses a proportional representation closed-list system and multimember districts offers several advantages to female candidates (Matland 2002, Norris 1993). Since parties operating under closed-list systems publish lists of candidates, they may feel pressure to balance their party's ticket across genders, leading to greater numbers of women. As a respondent from the Pacific in the IPU study states, "There has been recognition over the last 10 years (1988–98) that it is essential for the credibility of any political party to be seen to be preselecting and electing women to parliament" (IPU 2000, p. 57). In multimember districts, balancing is used to attract voters but also to achieve equity across different factions of the party and resolve internal party disputes through compromise (Matland 2002, Gallagher and Marsh 1988).⁶ In contrast, single-member districts result in zero-sum contests in that parties must make a choice between male and female candidates rather than being able to place both on the ticket.⁷

The extent to which institutions are democratic can also affect the representation of women as candidates and the translation of those candidates into legislators. Fair elections and open competition may be more conducive to women entering politics since fewer artificial and arbitrary constraints would act as barriers. Women can research, understand, and possibly manipulate the rules of the game if they are clearly stated and consistently followed (Matland 2002), suggesting that democracy can help women. Alternatively, in nondemocratic systems women do not have to go through the electoral process and can be placed into power (Abukhalil

⁵ There are a variety of variations on these two basic types of electoral systems, as well as hybrid systems. We recommend the International Institute on Democracy and Electoral Assistance's Web site (<http://www.idea.int/esd/systems.cfm>) for a brief overview of electoral systems.

⁶ Unfortunately, some of this balancing is not truly meaningful, with women placed in hopelessly low electoral list positions (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. 254).

⁷ Previous statistical research has clearly demonstrated that proportional representation systems have higher percentages of elected females. Case studies of nations with hybrid systems provide additional compelling evidence. Within a country with both systems, women are elected at much higher rates under the proportional representation system than under the alternative single-position system (Henig and Henig 2001, Norris 1993, p. 313, Rule 1987). For example, after Germany's 1990 election, women won 28% of the party-list seats and only 12% of the plurality-majority constituency seats. Similarly, in Australia's 1990 election, women won 25% of party-list seats but only 7% of the plurality-majority districts.

1997, Howell 2002) Previous research (e.g., Paxton 1997) indicates that this second explanation may in fact be the more likely scenario.⁸

Quotas and legislative appointments are two political mechanisms used in both democratic and nondemocratic nations that may increase women's representation. There are generally two types of quotas—those put forward by the state to apply to all parties, and those established within a particular party. Quotas can either be voluntary or they can be required. When quotas are mandated by the state, they can result in dramatic increases in the proportion of women elected depending on context (e.g., Jones 1998, Schmidt and Saunders 2004, Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, Krook 2003, 2004a). Quotas are highly regarded by theorists and female parliamentarians alike as a means of increasing women's representation in politics (IPU 2000, Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, p. 134). Previous research has also demonstrated that when parties adopt required quotas there is an increase in elected female representatives over time, at least among advanced industrial nations (Caul 2001). Even when only a subset of parties adopt quotas, diffusion effects are seen that result in other parties' increasing their percentage of female candidates and representatives (Matland and Studlar 1996, Caul 2001, Lovenduski 1993, McDonagh 2002).⁹

Legislative appointments are another strategy used by the state to increase women's or other groups' overall levels of representation, especially in countries with historic gender, ethnic, or religious inequalities. Legislative appointments reserve a specific number of seats in the legislature and then select individuals to fill those positions after the election. For

⁸ Rather than excluding nondemocratic and less democratic countries from an analysis, we feel it is important to model explicitly how democratic processes can influence women's entry into politics. There is evidence that in both emerging democracies and communist nations women aspire to hold positions in the national legislatures (Tripp 2001, Howell 2002). While the political parties within these new democracies may be weak and/or government controlled, women's presence in party leadership should positively impact women's selection as candidates and ultimate election to the national legislature. Finally, nondemocratic governments may have extraelectoral means at their disposal to increase or decrease the ultimate number of female legislators. Studying women's political outcomes in less democratic nations is further necessary because even in an inefficient and relatively weak legislature, women's presence provides an opportunity for women's voices to be heard and can be interpreted by the citizens of the nation as symbolic support for women. Similarly, having no women in the legislature sends a clear message as to the status of women.

⁹ Quotas are increasingly being used to increase women's participation in politics. In the late 1990s, 11 nations in Latin America passed national legislation requiring a minimum of 20%–40% female candidates. In France a constitutional amendment in 1999 established that 50% of candidates must be women (Dahlerup 2002). At the time of our study, however, only a small number of nations had passed federal laws mandating national legislative quotas or systematically adopted political party quotas (Krook 2004b).

example, in Egypt, the president has the right to appoint 10 seats to the parliament, and these are typically filled by a varying number of women and Christians (*Al-Ahram* 2000). Appointments are different from quotas because they are “extraelectoral” in that they occur outside the electoral system. Appointments can be considered nondemocratic, in the sense that women who gain legislative position through appointment have not been elected.

Finally, the ratio of effective parties to all operating parties may influence how many women participate in politics. The higher the ratio, the more likely all parties will be elected to a meaningful number of seats. Parties that typically win a meaningful share of seats may be unwilling to go against the status quo and do things differently than in the past. So, a high ratio of effective parties indicates a system with mostly comfortable, possibly complacent, parties. In such a situation, the promotion of women as candidates and their support in elections may not be a high priority. In contrast, if the ratio of effective parties to all operating parties is low, it indicates an increased presence of marginal parties, who may be more likely to take risks on fielding and supporting women as candidates.

Ideology constitutes the third country-level explanation for levels of female participation in parliament. Ideas about women’s role and position in society can enhance or constrain women’s ability to seek political power (Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Paxton 1997, Arceneaux 2001, McCammon et al. 2001). Ideological arguments state that, even in the presence of favorable political systems or an adequate supply of qualified female candidates, cultural norms can limit women’s opportunities to participate in politics (Rule and Zimmerman 1994, Norris and Inglehart 2001).

Ideology is not diffuse or abstract. Ideologies and arguments against women having the right to participate in politics have created very substantial barriers to women’s participation for many years. For centuries, Western political theorists such as Aristotle, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Locke justified the exclusion of women from politics, citing their assumed non-rational nature. “If women were to control the government, the state would be in danger, for they do not act according to the dictates of universality, but are influenced by accidental inclinations and opinions” (Hegel 1977, p. 167).¹⁰

¹⁰ The same themes can be found in non-Western philosophy. There, too, women were portrayed as inferior in reasoning and intellect. For example, Walda Heywat, an Ethiopian teacher writing in the 17th century, cautions, “O man, remember that a woman is weak by nature and less intelligent than man” (Bonevac and Phillips 1992). On another continent and in a different century, Avicenna, an Islamic metaphysician writing around the year 1000, states, “For in reality [woman] is not very rational and is quick to follow passion and anger” (Avicenna 1963). Nizamu’l-Mulk Tusi, writing

Such attitudes about women in politics persisted even after women gained the right to participate in politics. After having gained suffrage, women found that their ability to make rational decisions was still questioned theoretically and empirically. For example, despite breaking ground in explaining women's electoral participation, Duverger (1955, p. 129) explains sex differences in voting by a psychological female dependency on men. "While women have, legally, ceased to be minors, they still have the mentality of minors in many fields and, particularly in politics, they usually accept paternalism on the part of men. The man—husband, fiancé, lover, or myth—is the mediator between them and the political world."

In the IPU study, female politicians cite a negative ideology more often than any other reason as their explanation for low female participation in politics. As a respondent from Central America states, "The patriarchal ideology prevailing in our society is the biggest stumbling block we have to face" (IPU 2000, p. 61). Another respondent, from Central Europe, contrasts an ideological explanation with structural and political factors:

In spite of a long tradition of active participation in the workforce by a vast majority of women, both women and men see motherhood and marriage as the most important goals in a woman's life. A common standpoint is that "politics is a man's business," and that women are too emotional to deal with affairs of the state. The reasons for this are not to be found in education, with women in [my country] being as educated as their male counterparts. It is simply because of the stereotyped and traditional structure of society (IPU 2000, p. 20).

It is likely that ideologies about women affect their representation throughout the political process, from individual women's decisions to enter politics, to parties' candidate selection, to the decisions on election day made by the electorate. Indeed, even after women have gained office, cultural norms can limit their effectiveness when dealing with their male counterparts. For example, harassment of women was commonplace in Uganda's parliament (Tamale 1999), and in Bangladesh Islamic fundamentalists turn their backs during speeches by female political leaders (Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, p. 35).

While recent work (Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Norris and Inglehart 2001) finds that a precise measure of gender ideology has a large impact on women in national legislatures, most earlier research relied on proxies for ideology, such as region or religion, as cross-national information on

around the same time, warns his king not to allow women's influence because women are by nature inferior to men in the field of politics and administration (Nizamul-Mulk Tusi 1977). See Giele and Smock (1977, chaps. 2–3) for further discussion of negative historical ideologies in non-Western nations.

gender ideology is sparse (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Paxton 1997, Reynolds 1999). A commonly used proxy for ideology is region, with the prevailing ideology of all non-Western regions viewed as negatively affecting the percentage of female candidates and the willingness of the electorate to accept female candidates. While Western industrialized nations certainly have their own biases against women,¹¹ women do hold differential status across the regions of the world. Such differences are readily apparent if we consider the measures of ideology available in the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2000). Regressing a range of ideological questions (e.g., "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do," "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl") on five regions predicts approximately 70% of the variance.¹² The Scandinavian countries demonstrate significantly more positive gender equality views, Asia and Western industrialized countries are at similar levels, and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and other regions demonstrate significantly more negative gender ideology views. Indeed, in predicting women in parliaments, we (Paxton and Kunovich 2003) moved from a model with five regional variables to a model that included the regions plus a direct ideological question, and found that the impact of all regions except Scandinavia could no longer be distinguished from Western industrialized countries and that the coefficient for Scandinavia was halved.¹³

Numbers of religious adherents provide other measures of ideology because religions of the world are differentially conservative or patriarchal

¹¹ Consider an Australian female politician's views: "Social values that it is a women's role to be wives and mothers are still strong in Australia. This creates psychological and emotional barriers to women participating in formal politics" (IPU 2000, p. 25).

¹² Auxiliary analysis is available upon request.

¹³ Case studies indicate that attitudes about women differ by region. Scandinavia in particular has been shown uniquely committed to women in politics (see Kelber 1994, Karvonen and Selle 1995). In Scandinavia, there is an ideology that Hernes (1987) describes as a "passion for equality," with extensive commitment to abolishing poverty and achieving social justice through political reform. Scandinavian countries have been practicing this passion for equality in their politics for three-quarters of a century—the first reforms concerning women took place before 1920. Heckscher (1984, p. 172) notes, "It is no exaggeration to say that the fundamental principle of equality between men and women is more widely accepted in Scandinavia than in most other countries of the world, this is seen in legislation, in the apparent attitudes of the public, and in actual practice." Contrast the Scandinavian region to the rigid separation of men's and women's spheres in Middle Eastern countries: "The men's world has two major manifestations: the sphere of earning a living and the public sphere of communications including public affairs. Access of women to the former is limited and formally none in the latter—old grandmothers being an exception" (von Nieuwenhuijze 1965, p. 71). The separation of spheres is an unequal one, in Iran, e.g., women need permission from a husband to work, travel, or divorce.

in their views about the place of women, both in the church hierarchy and in society. Generally, religious beliefs can be used by those in power to preserve patriarchal dominance (Botman 1999). And religious legacies leave a distinct and lasting impression on contemporary values and behaviors (Norris and Inglehart 2003).

Generally, conservative religious ideologies promote a less public role for women. Protestant religions vary, but are generally less patriarchal than Catholicism or Islam. Therefore, we expect the strength of adherence to conservative religious ideologies to affect women's performance at the polls negatively. Countries with many Islamic adherents would be expected to have the fewest number of women in their national legislatures, since Islamic law is typically interpreted in a manner that constrains the activities of women (Ahmed 1992, Glaser and Possony 1979) and results in women's lack of control over their own lives (Caldwell 1986, pp. 175–76). As explained by the 2003 Nobel Laureate, Shirin Ebadi, "Many people use Islam to justify the unequal position of women. They are wrong" (Associated Press 2004).¹⁴

The Role of Female Elites in Political Parties

A central argument of our article is that the effects of these national-level factors in producing outcomes for women are at least partially mediated through women's inclusion in political parties. As noted above, parties play an important gatekeeping role in political systems (Caul 1999, Sanbonmatsu 2002, Kunovich 2003). Political parties make decisions about what candidates to field and how much support to give them (e.g., through placement on party lists). As an IPU respondent from Central America states, "the 'key' is undoubtedly the political parties" (IPU 2000, p. 96). In this article, we consider how the presence of women in the party elites of political parties influences their selection and support of women as candidates.¹⁵

The presence of many women in the party elite of a country should

¹⁴ Islam is not a monolithic trait: there is variation across countries and across individuals (Abukhalil 1997). More generally, there is certainly variation in the expected roles and place of women within regions (and even within countries, see Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001). Still, without more precise measures of gender ideology, the religious and regional proxies provide some information about important ideological differences across nations.

¹⁵ While other features of parties, such as their organizational structures, rules, and ideologies, have been found to be important in women's representation in Western and Eastern Europe (Caul 1999, Kunovich 2003), we limit our focus to only those aspects of parties that can be measured cross-nationally at the present time. Unfortunately, we know of no systematic cross-national measures of party organizational structures, rules, and ideologies.

increase the overall number of women fielded as candidates for at least three reasons. First, high percentages of women in party elites may indicate a greater supply of qualified (or perceived to be qualified) women for the parties of a country (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Second, membership in such positions are seen as a “necessary apprenticeship before a party member is considered worthy of selection as a candidate” (Henig and Henig 2001, p. 48). Finally, female party elites may themselves advocate a greater number of female candidates (Caul 1999). As a female legislator from Western Europe stated: “It was the women in the party who encouraged me to get more deeply involved and to register on a list for the elections” (IPU 2000, p. 75). Female party elites should also positively affect the ratio of representatives to candidates since they may be able to better support female candidates in their bids for election, influencing list placement or party contributions to candidate war chests. Consider this West African respondent: “Women asked me to stand in the legislative elections and they supported my candidacy in the one-party state system” (IPU 2000, p. 82).

Of course, women in elite positions need not act in the interests of other women. As stated succinctly by Lovenduski (1993, p. 6), “A great dilemma for the second wave of feminism has been whether women will change institutions before institutions change women.” Female leaders may feel the need to follow party rules, wish to avoid seeming to play favorites, or simply have concerns that outweigh their gender identity. As Lovenduski summarizes in the introduction to her edited volume on women in parties across the 11 cases studied, party divisions tended to outweigh gender divisions (Lovenduski and Norris 1993).

Still, as those who study the candidate selection process argue, the attitudes and values of the candidate selectors matter for who is selected. Presumably, some percentage of female party elites would actively look to promote women as candidates. Indeed, 78% of women responding to the IPU survey believed that the presence of women had brought about a change in their party’s priorities. And women may be better able to see what must be done to recruit female candidates. As documented by the Commonwealth Secretariat (1999, p. 20), in Australia, a current female party leader made it possible for a former female party leader to return to politics (and ultimately be elected) by promising to make all the necessary flexible arrangements so that she could juggle the demands of a new baby.

For these reasons, we argue that higher average levels of women in elite party positions (across all parties) should positively influence the countrywide representation of women as candidates. More specifically, we can distinguish women’s inclusion as highly visible party elites such

as party chairperson, vice chairperson, or spokesperson, from the presence of women in the party bureau, which is the governing body of the party

Mediation

Figure 1 hypothesizes that the presence of women in party elites mediates the country-level variables in producing political outcomes for women. How would this process work? Some of the country-level effects may be *completely* mediated through political parties, while others are likely to continue to have direct effects on the percent of female candidates nationally. Considering the categories of country-level variables, it is most likely that the structural factors will be mediated through the parties, as they suggest the “supply” of potential candidates that can be picked up by these parties. In contrast, the national ideology of a country is likely to continue to have a direct effect on outcomes down the line of sequential outcomes. This is because, despite women’s general inclusion in the workforce or education, parties know that women’s leadership must be ideologically accepted by the population at large. It is an open question whether country-level political factors will continue to have a direct effect after the mediating party variables are included. Ultimately, we expect that while some country-level variables may continue to have direct effects on women in national legislatures, the direct path may not exist for others, with all influence working through party processes.

Interaction

Rather than being *influenced* by their electoral system, political parties may *operate differently* across proportional representation and plurality-majority systems. As Gallagher and Marsh (1988, p. 260) explain, “The electoral system strongly affects the *mechanics* of the selection process in every country.” Each electoral system offers different opportunities and constraints for party elites, indicating a possible interaction effect rather than simple mediation.¹⁶ For example, Czudnowski (1975, p. 221) argues that when seats are assigned proportionally, using party lists, the central party has much more influence on candidate selection.

As for a party’s selection of female candidates, party gatekeepers’ perception of women as desirable candidates depends on their country’s electoral system (Matland 2002). “Qualities which candidate selectors might feel, accurately or otherwise, could be electoral liabilities in a party’s sole candidate, like being a woman or a member of an ethnic minority,

¹⁶ We thank the *AJS* reviewers for asking the questions that led us to consider this interaction effect.

are needed for purposes of balance when several are being picked” (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. 260). Thus, female leaders may find it easier to get women on the ballot in proportional representation systems because they are not fighting a zero-sum process. However, considering that ticket balancing is often combined with “hopeless” list placement (placement on a list below the number of seats a party can reasonably expect to win), female leaders in proportional representation systems may be less able to produce gains for women as elected officials.¹⁷ That is, while female elites may be able to articulate the need for female candidates under a proportional system, they may be less successful in getting them placed in winnable positions on lists.

DATA AND MEASURES

All data pertaining to women’s presence in party elites, the percentage of female candidates, and the percentage of female representatives were collected by the IPU and made available in their 1997 publication *Democracy Still in the Making: A World Comparative Study*. The IPU surveyed national legislative bodies to obtain data for elections occurring between August 1991 and December 1996 for all countries. In a substantial number of countries the political parties participating in these elections provided data about women’s participation in the party, their inclusion as electoral candidates, and their electoral outcomes. We analyze data for all countries where both the percentage of female candidates and the percentage of women elected are available.

Even though not all countries provided these data, there is remarkable regional variation. As discussed above, table 1 contains information on the percentage of female candidates, percentage of female legislators, and the ratio of the two for the 73 countries in our analysis. In the following sections we describe all variables used in our analysis (for a summary of this information, see app. table A1).

Women’s Inclusion in Political Party Elites

Within each country, the IPU surveyed political parties participating in the election for an assortment of data. We used the party’s responses to

¹⁷ Since individual candidates are typically less important in proportional representation systems, female elites can also not differentially support female candidates to help them win. The exception is open-list proportional representation systems, where voters can prioritize among the list of candidates. However, when organized list-switching drives to improve women’s position on party lists were tried in the past (e.g., Norway’s local elections in the 1970s), they ultimately backfired (Matland 2002).

construct aggregate measures of party characteristics at the national level. We measure our first outcome, women's inclusion in party elites, with two variables. The *percentage of women in leadership positions* is based on the percentage of women who occupied five possible positions of power across parties: party chairperson, party vice-chairperson, secretary general, party spokesperson, and head of the parliamentary group. To calculate the percentage, we pooled the parties and calculated the percentage of women who held those positions across all of them. Women held 10% of the positions of power on average across the countries of our sample.

Our second measure of women's inclusion in party elites is the *percentage of female party bureau members*. Generally the party bureau is regarded as the governing body of the party and is responsible for establishing and enforcing party rules. In a similar manner to women's presence in leadership positions, we pooled all parties and determined the percentage of female party bureau members across all parties. For example, if a country had three parties where the percentages of female party bureau members were 30%, 15%, and 5%, this country would then be assigned an average value of 16.7%. Women accounted for 17% of members of the party bureau on average.

Female Candidates

Our second outcome is women's selection as candidates. We calculated the *percentage of female candidates* for the country by dividing the total number of female candidates by the total number of candidates running for election. On average women accounted for 15% of female candidates, with a low of less than 1% in Jordan and Yemen and a high of 50% in Iceland.

Women in National Legislatures

Our third outcome is women's election to the lower house of the national legislature. We calculated the *percentage of women in the national legislature* by dividing the total number of women elected by the total number of positions in the legislature. In cross-national studies, representation in the lower house rather than the upper house is used because in countries with two legislative chambers, lower houses generally have more legislative power than upper houses. On average women accounted for 12% of representatives, with a low of no women in Kiribati to a high of 40% female representatives in Sweden.

Ratio of Female Elected Officials to Female Candidates

An alternative outcome of interest is the yield of female representatives from the female candidates. We create a *ratio* measured as the percentage of female representatives elected to the lower house of the national legislature divided by the percentage of female candidates. Values of one indicate a one-to-one relationship between percentage of candidates and percentage of female representatives. In our sample the yield of female representatives ranges from values of considerably less than one (e.g., 0.3 in Morocco) to values greater than one (e.g., 1.22 in the Netherlands). Thus, while the “return” on female candidates is very low in Morocco, 3% female elected officials for every 10% female candidates, the return is greater than expected in the Netherlands.¹⁸

National-Level Factors

Our exogenous national-level variables are measured per previous research. Our models include three social structural variables. As in previous research, we include the percentage of the economically active population who are women (*women economically active*) and the percentage of tertiary students who are women in 1990 (*women tertiary education*, United Nations 2000). As discussed above, these measures control for the size of the eligible pool of women for political office.¹⁹ We also include the log of energy use per capita in 1995 (World Bank 1999) as a measure of *industrialization*. Structural arguments predict that a certain level of development frees up time for women to pursue political careers. Although not included in every model of women in politics, industrialization has been found to be significant in some previous research (Paxton 1997). The inclusion of industrialization also controls for developmental differences across the regional variables.

A key political variable is a country’s electoral system. The variable *PRPL electoral system* identifies those countries that use a proportional representation party-list (PRPL) system to elect any seats in their national

¹⁸ Although the ratio can generally be viewed as a return on candidates, there are a few other factors that can influence it. For example, female legislative appointments may artificially raise a country’s ratio because women are being placed into legislative positions without running as candidates.

¹⁹ Ideally we would like to measure the percentage of women with a tertiary degree in 1990. However, these data are not widely available cross-nationally. Therefore, research in the area routinely uses the percentage of women in tertiary education to measure women’s access.

legislatures²⁰ Another political variable included in our analysis is a country's level of democracy *Liberal democracy* is measured using Bollen's (1998) political democracy index, a value of 100 is the maximum, indicating a well-functioning system and regular use of democratic procedures²¹

To control for nondemocratic access to the legislature for some groups through the use of reserved seats, we include a dichotomous measure called *appoint* (United Nations 1995) to indicate whether a country appoints members to the national legislature on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or religious affiliation We also control for countries where parties require that a certain proportion of candidates be women or where national laws mandate the increased representation of women through the use of *quotas* Our final political variable is the *ratio of effective parties* and is based on data from two sources The number of effective parties comes from Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) and is a count of the number of parties with 10% or more of assembly seats The total number of parties competing comes from the data collected by the IPU (1997) We divide the number of effective parties by the total number of competing parties to control for the influence of marginal parties A value of 100 indicates that all parties typically receive at least 10% of the available seats

As noted above, ideology has traditionally been measured with proxies such as region and religion In our analyses, we include six regional dichotomous variables *Africa*, *Asia*, *Eastern Europe*, *Middle East*, *Latin America*, and *Scandinavian countries* Western industrialized countries are the omitted category²² To measure religion, we include the percentage of *Catholics*, *Muslims*, and *Orthodox* religious adherents (World Almanac 1996) Not all nations adhere to religions, instead, individuals within those nations adhere to religions So, using a percentage measure rather than a dichotomous variable acknowledges variation within countries considered predominantly "Muslim," "Catholic," or "Orthodox" Also, it is reasonable to assume that larger groups of conservative adherents are better able to use their religious beliefs to influence women's selection and rep-

²⁰ While electoral systems are relatively fixed characteristics of the political environment some countries experienced a change between their electoral system in 2003 and the one in place when these data were collected Therefore, we used both the *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections* and Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) to identify the electoral system The reference category includes all other types of electoral systems, such as first past the post, single transferable vote, and mixed systems that do not include a PRPL system Together, these reference category electoral systems are generally plurality-majority systems in that candidates must individually obtain a certain percentage of the vote (a plurality or majority) to obtain political office

²¹ To get 1995 data, we used an updated version of Bollen's (1998) data set

²² For the exact classification, see table 1

resentation as political figures. Although regional and religious proxies are inferior to more precise measures of ideology, our earlier work (Paxton and Kunovich 2003) demonstrates that these are indeed good proxies for ideology when a more precise measure is unavailable.²³

Research Model and Methodology

Given the nature of the electoral process, the constituent variables have a causal ordering that we assume is unidirectional (see fig. 1). In most political parties, party elites and party bureau members are put in place prior to the candidate selection process and subsequently oversee the process. Since the selection committee is established prior to candidate selection, we are able to use cross-sectional data that documents the percentage of women in party leadership positions at the time the candidates were selected and ultimately elected. Thus, we estimate a recursive model in which we hypothesize that each exogenous variable will affect all endogenous variables and that endogenous variables occurring earlier in the electoral process will affect endogenous variables occurring later in the electoral process. We can therefore determine both the direct and indirect effects of our national-level variables.²⁴

Missing data were accounted for using multiple imputation procedures (Allison 2002) available in the SAS statistical package.²⁵ This procedure allowed us to retain the full 73 cases and is the most appropriate method

²³ Unfortunately, the available sample of countries constrains our ability to use the national gender ideology measure we developed earlier (Paxton and Kunovich 2003).

²⁴ It could be argued that the full model is nonrecursive in one important respect—high levels of legislative participation by women could influence gender ideology through increases in citizens' comfort with women in politics. In our earlier work (Paxton and Kunovich 2003, pp. 101–2), we tested this hypothesis directly with a Hausman endogeneity test and found that the percentage of women in the legislature does *not* have a reciprocal effect on gender ideology. Of course this endogeneity test does not rule out a reciprocal effect over a longer time period. Indeed, we would expect any effect of legislative participation to have a *long-term* effect on gender ideology, much longer than the period considered here.

²⁵ Using available data, the imputation procedure generates estimates, including a random component, for each of the missing values. Treating imputed cases like real data would produce artificially low SEs, so the random imputation is carried out several times, producing multiple full data sets. The variability across these multiple imputations is then used to adjust the SEs upward. In addition, variables not used in the model were included in the imputation model to improve the accuracy of the imputed values. These included date of women's suffrage, a scale of abortion rights, and the percentage of women in the country's national legislature in 1980. Variables were transformed where necessary to produce appropriate imputed values. For imputing female party elites, the arcsine transformation is preferable to the logit or probit, because the arcsine is defined for proportions that take values of zero (von Hippel 2003).

when sample sizes are small. As with any small cross-national sample, demonstrating robustness is crucial—we therefore considered whether any outliers were influential to the results.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In table 2 we provide unstandardized path coefficients and standard errors for the model depicted in figure 1.

Country-Level Effects

Country-level ideology, politics, and structure all affect political outcomes for women. Across the ideological factors we generally see effects of the regional variables on women's inclusion in parties and as candidates. Asia and Latin America are consistently lower than the West, while Scandinavia is generally higher. For example, net of other factors, countries in Asia had 11% fewer women in party bureaus than did the Western industrialized countries. Countries in Latin America had 16% fewer women in party leadership positions than found in Western industrialized countries. In comparison to the Western industrialized nations, Scandinavian countries had 20% more women in party bureaus and a positive but not significant difference with respect to women in leadership positions.

The regional ideological proxies have an impact on the percentage of female candidates fielded by the parties of a country, even after their indirect effects through women's inclusion in party elites are controlled. That is, the ideological variables continue to have a direct effect as well as indirect effects. For example, we see that the Scandinavian countries have almost 12% more candidates while countries in Asia and Latin America have between 8% and 12% fewer candidates than Western industrialized nations.

Among the religious measures of ideology, the effects of conservative religious ideologies on the mediating party variables are also generally negative, although substantially weaker than the regional proxies. Only percentage Catholic has a significant effect on women in party elites. The effect is fairly small; countries with 20% more Catholics have 2.2% fewer women in party bureaus. The percentage Muslim and percentage Orthodox in a country do negatively affect the percentage of female candidates, however. Having 20% more Muslim adherents in a country results in almost 4% fewer female candidates.²⁶

²⁶ Multicollinearity is an issue here. It is difficult to separate the effect of Muslim from that of the Middle East in this sample. Reflecting this uncertainty, diagnostics suggest that the SEs for those two variables are substantially inflated. Removing Muslim

It is interesting that although the ideological proxies have an impact on the percentage of female candidates, they do *not* influence the percentage of female elected officials or the ratio of elected officials to candidates (the “return” on candidates)²⁷ This suggests that while parties are reducing or increasing their numbers of female candidates in response to their perceived acceptability as candidates, women are actually *not* any more unacceptable as candidates in any region. Research on Western industrialized countries has often shown that the public is willing to elect women when they are nominated as candidates (Welch and Studlar 1986). Our results indicate that this is true across a variety of regions.

In contrast to the ideological effects, the structural factors have fewer significant effects on political outcomes for women. We do see that countries with 10% more women attending tertiary education have 2% more women in leadership positions. What is more surprising is that the effect of women’s economic activity on women’s inclusion as party elites is the opposite of what is typically hypothesized. With each single-unit increase in women’s economic activity (measured as a percentage) there is a .31 *decrease* in the percentage of female party bureau members and a .45 *decrease* in the percentage of women in leadership positions.²⁸ In other words, countries with 10% more women in the labor force have 3% fewer women in party bureaus and 5% fewer women in positions of leadership.

The negative effect of women’s labor force participation is unexpected, but perhaps not unreasonable. Without information on the *types* of jobs in which women work, it is unclear whether women are gaining politically relevant human capital from their job or are simply working too many hours to find the time to participate politically. This argument is supported by two pieces of evidence. First, an examination of the relationship between women’s economic activity and women’s presence in the party bureau and leadership position shows that countries in Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe are concentrated at high levels of economic activity and low levels of inclusion. The concentration of countries in Southeast Asia is best explained by a distinction between jobs that provide skills and resources that can be translated into political capital versus jobs that

countries from the analysis (countries with greater than 80% Muslim adherents) is not an option in this sample because it would leave only one country that could be classified as Middle East—Cyprus. Still, if the Muslim countries are removed from the sample (and Cyprus is reclassified as African), it makes no difference to the rest of the results, except that the effect of *women economically active* is reduced and no longer significant.

²⁷ In the legislator equation, Scandinavian countries continue to have a slight advantage (4%) over other Western industrialized nations in the percentage of women that are elected. Only the percentage of Orthodox adherents in a nation continues to negatively affect the percentage of women elected, controlling for the other factors.

²⁸ This effect is significant and stronger if one outlying case, Samoa, is removed from the analysis.

TABLE 2
MULTIPLE IMPUTATION ESTIMATES THE PROCESS OF WOMEN'S INCLUSION IN POLITICS

	WOMEN'S INCLUSION IN PARTY ELITES						POLITICAL OUTCOMES					
	Party Bureau		Leadership		Candidates		Legislators		Ratio			
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE		
Ideological factors												
Africa	-6.01	5.81	-14.17 ⁺	7.74	-1.37	4.77	1.52	3.45	41	35		
Asia	-10.90*	5.49	-12.38 ⁺	6.61	-12.17**	4.58	-3.20	3.64	23	35		
Eastern Europe	-5.92	4.68	-4.36	6.94	-6.12	4.00	-1.66	3.07	29	30		
Middle East	-2.36	8.20	-28.67*	12.75	-2.15	7.12	-3.60	5.71	-08	58		
Scandinavia	20.74**	6.43	4.09	9.56	11.61 ⁺	6.06	3.91 ^d	4.55	-24	44		
Latin America	-6.85*	5.00	-16.46*	6.72	-7.88 ⁺	4.23	-1.46	3.51	18	33		
% Catholic	-11*	05	-06	05	00	04	-02	03	00	00		
% Muslim	-10	10	07	14	-18*	08	-07	06	00	01		
% Orthodox	-02	07	00	09	-11 ⁺	06	-07 ⁺	04	00	00		
Structural factors												
Industrialization	-40	1.50	-02	1.75	1.31	1.12	09	87	-09	09		

Women economically active	- 31 ^b	23	- 45 ^b	28	09	18	- 05	15	- 02	01
Women in tertiary education	01	13	20 ^c	17	07	11	11	09	01	01
Political factors										
PRPL electoral system	- 95	2 93	- 37	4 02	5 50*	2 40	82	1 89	- 10	18
Liberal democracy	07	06	02	08	- 15**	05	- 07 ⁺	04	00	00
Appoint	- 8 24 ⁺	4 31	1 36	5 44	- 8 62*	3 56	- 1 24	2 73	37	26
Quotas	4 64	2 79	56	3 21	2 97	2 22	- 84	1 71	- 13	17
Ratio effective parties	00	05	06	06	- 08 ⁺	04	- 02	03	00	00
Inclusion in party elites										
Party bureau					- 03	14	10	09	02*	01
Party leadership					09	10	- 01	08	01	01
% female candidates								44***	10	
R ²	51		20		64		68		08	

NOTE - N = 73

* If Guyana is removed, then the coefficient for Latin America is -11.0 and is significant at $P < 0.1$. Also, the coefficient for % Catholic is -0.07 and nonsignificant.

^b If Samoa is removed, women economically active significantly ($P < 0.05$ coefficient) affects party bureau (-0.46) and leadership (-0.70).

^c If Mongolia and Namibia are removed, the coefficient for women in tertiary education becomes .33 and is significant at $P < 0.11$.

^d Without Iceland, Scandinavia is highly significant (coefficient = 9.4), but % Orthodox is reduced in significance. In the ratio equation, Scandinavia has a positive coefficient.

⁺ $P < 0.10$

* $P < 0.05$

** $P < 0.01$

*** $P < 0.001$

exploit women for the low cost of their labor. In fact, Matland (1998) found that across less developed countries, women's economic activity negatively affected their rate of election (although his coefficient was non-significant). Similarly, others have argued that the withdrawal of women from politics in Eastern Europe was in part because of the triple burden (work, politics, and home) they experienced under communism (Nechemias 1994, Wolchik 1993). Eight women in the IPU survey mentioned how their careers helped prepare them for a career in politics. All eight were professionals, four were lawyers, two were journalists, one was an engineer, and one was an economist (IPU 2000, p. 84).

The second piece of supporting evidence is based on an auxiliary analysis that includes the percentage of women in professional positions. These results show that, although nonsignificant, the coefficient is positive, so that as the percentage of women in professional positions increases, there is an increase in the percentage of women in the party bureau and leadership positions. Thus, a more precise measure of employment that increases human and financial capital yields coefficients in the expected direction.²⁹

It is also important to note that the effects of the structural variables are generally mediated by the party characteristics. Structural factors do not have any effect on female candidates, elected representatives, or the ratio of female elected officials to candidates. The fact that none of the structural factors are significant suggests that differences in women's participation in other public spheres, such as the labor force and education, do not directly explain the underrepresentation of women. Instead, these structural factors work only indirectly, through their impact on political parties.

Turning to the political, we find that PRPL systems do not significantly affect women's inclusion as party elites or their representation in the legislature once female candidates are controlled. Instead, the effect of a proportional representation system is exactly where we expect—on candidates. Proportional representation list systems have 5% more female candidates than do other systems. This finding supports the argument that a PRPL system holds parties accountable to voters and results in the selection of more female candidates for balance. However, a party-list system does not improve women's situation within the political party. This may be because the sex composition of leadership positions and party bureaus receive less public scrutiny.

We find that liberal democracy has a *negative* effect on the percentage

²⁹ There was a great deal of missing data on women in professional occupations, however, and given the lack of a significant effect we do not include the variable as part of our main analyses. Auxiliary analyses are available upon request.

of female candidates, controlling for other variables. This finding is not unprecedented (Paxton 1997). The negative effect of liberal democracy results from the fact that less democratic countries, such as Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam, are able to manufacture high legislative percentages of women precisely through a lack of democratic institutions. When women do not have to experience a competitive democratic system, they can be placed into political positions. The well-documented decrease in women's national legislative participation in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism demonstrates the sometimes surprising effect of democracy on women in politics (Saxonberg 2000, Matland and Montgomery 2003). Indeed, in auxiliary analyses where the least democratic countries of our sample were removed (Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, and Yemen), there was no significant effect of democracy on either candidates or legislators.

An additional result to highlight here is the negative effect of a national policy of nonelected appointment to the national legislature on women's inclusion in parties and as candidates. Legislative appointments decrease the percentage of women in the party bureau, as well as the percentage of female candidates, without an appreciable impact on the percentage of female legislators. Thus, country-level mechanisms to increase disadvantaged groups such as women at the legislative level appear ultimately to negatively impact women's participation through their indirect effects on the percentage of female candidates fielded by political parties.³⁰ It may be that party officials do not feel responsible to promote women or other disadvantaged groups from within their own parties when the state takes on the role of appointing such groups to the national legislature. This finding suggests that the unintended consequence of national formal procedures to increase the representation of traditionally underrepresented groups might actually discourage political parties from actively supporting these groups themselves.³¹

We also find that quotas at the national or party level do not result in increases for women on any outcome, including the percentage of female

³⁰ Without longitudinal data we are unable to definitively show that the percentage of female candidates declines as a direct result of the use of appointments. Data for Egypt are suggestive, however. In 1976, prior to presidential appointments, only six women were elected. Between 1979 and 1990, anywhere from five to seven women were elected, while 7–30 women were appointed. However, the size of the legislature increased from 392 seats in 1979 to 454 seats in 1990 so that women held a smaller proportion of elected seats after the adoption of presidential appointments (IPU 1995, p. 113).

³¹ Legislative appointments are viewed as further problematic because occupants are not held accountable, and the seats can be easily withdrawn. When seats are reserved specifically for women, the system may give the impression that women are not fit to contest for the general seats (Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, pp. 28–35).

candidates³² We remain cautious in our interpretation of this lack of an effect, however, because not all quotas are created equal In fact while some countries mandate 10% of candidates, others mandate 30% If parties tend to only meet the minimum requirements required by quota laws, then women's chances of being candidates in countries with a low threshold are clearly compromised In addition, while one party in a country might use quotas, the other four parties operating in a system might not Finally, if list positions are not explicitly stated (e g , alternation of men and women), parties can circumvent the spirit and purpose of the quota system by only placing women in list positions or electoral districts they already expect to lose (Freedman 2004)³³ As an IPU Central European respondent explains, the "country list has to include 25 women Unfortunately they were in the second part of the list" (IPU 2000, p 65)

Ideally, therefore, one would measure particular aspects of the quota system and the extent of its use rather than simply relying on a dichotomous indicator Unfortunately, with so few countries using quotas during this election period we were unable to follow this strategy As information on the number of countries and parties adopting quotas increases, researchers will be able to tease out the effects of party versus national quotas, differences in quota thresholds across countries, and quotas requiring certain list placements³⁴

We find that as the ratio of effective parties to all parties increases, there is a decrease in the percentage of female candidates A 10% increase in the ratio of successful parties results in approximately 1% fewer female candidates This indicates that complacent parties may feel little need to increase numbers of women, and that innovation must come from smaller, more marginal parties Indeed, a respondent in the IPU survey who left a major political party to run a slate of women as independents stated,

³² In order to determine the independent effects of national quotas and party quotas, we measured their effects separately In this model neither measure had a significant effect on any of the outcomes We attribute this to the fact that prior to 1996 few countries had adopted these types of quotas The political situation as of 2005, however, is quite different

³³ Voters can circumvent quotas too—Jones and Navia (1999) find that quotas are less effective in open-list proportional representation systems where voters can prioritize candidates

³⁴ The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has recently released the "Global Database of Quotas for Women," which provides very detailed information on types of quotas across countries The database cannot be used for the current analysis, however, because the elections we analyze occurred prior to the institution of many of the quotas recorded in the database As the quota database does not provide dates of implementation for all countries, we were unable to determine whether the quotas reported there applied during the election we studied

“There were endless frustrations there. Political parties need to be totally overhauled and reformed” (IPU 2000, p. 99)

Finally, it is worth noting that once female candidates are included in the legislators equation, few other variables reach statistical significance. Clearly, the percentage of women that make it to parliament is heavily dependent on the percentage of women who run. It is also worth noting, however, the small return for female candidates, as indicated by the coefficient of .44. A 10% increase in female candidates yields only a 4% increase in female legislators, once other variables are controlled. As we shall soon see, however, this yield can be influenced in certain circumstances.

The Impact of Women in Elite Party Positions

We have argued that women’s presence in party elites will influence the percentage of female candidates fielded in a country and how many legislators those candidates yield. Our results demonstrate that these party characteristics have mixed effects on female candidates and legislators and ultimately depend on the type of electoral system being considered. To begin, in table 2 we find that women’s inclusion among party elites, measured both as members of the party bureau and by holding leadership positions, does not significantly affect the percentage of female candidates or legislators and has only modest effects on the yield of female elected officials from these candidates (a 10% increase in the percentage of female party elites leads to a .2 increase in the ratio, less than half an SD change).³⁵

However, as indicated by table 3, the picture is quite different if we consider the interaction between a PRPL electoral system and women in party elites. In brief, the significant interaction effects suggest that female party leaders are able to produce more female candidates in *proportional representation systems*. But, female party leaders can help female candidates get elected in *plurality-majority (nonproportional representation) systems*.³⁶

Interpreting the interaction effect in column 1 of table 3 is straightforward since PRPL electoral system is coded as a dichotomy. The effect

³⁵ Modeling the percentage of women in parliament without the party variables (party bureau, party leadership, and female candidates) results in a lower R^2 (.57) and findings similar to those in previous research.

³⁶ We considered two other interactions of female party elites with country-level political characteristics: democracy and the ratio of effective parties to all operating parties. Neither of the interactions was significant. In addition, we investigated possible nonlinear interactions with democracy (e.g., an interaction between female party elites and the most nondemocratic countries in our sample). There was no indication of a nonlinear interaction between party elites and democracy either.

TABLE 3
MULTIPLE IMPUTATION ESTIMATES, INTERACTION BETWEEN ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND
WOMEN IN PARTY ELITES

	POLITICAL OUTCOMES					
	Candidates		Ratio		Legislators	
	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Ideological factors						
Africa	-2.49	4.78	42	35	1.85	3.34
Asia	-14.51**	4.60	31	37	-2.39	3.66
Eastern Europe	-6.00	3.82	29	29	-1.29	2.88
Middle East	-1.76	6.84	-24	62	-4.13	5.72
Scandinavia	-2.04	7.22	38	55	7.16	5.35
Latin America	-10.19*	3.99	33	35	-94	3.42
% Catholic	.00	.04	.00	.00	-.01	.03
% Muslim	-.23**	.08	.00	.01	.05	.06
% Orthodox	-.11*	.05	.00	.00	-.07 ⁺	.04
Structural factors						
Industrialization	.86	1.08	-.05	.09	.23	.83
Women economically active	.01	.17	-.01	.01	-.07	.15
Women in tertiary education	.07	.10	.01	.01	.12	.08
Political factors						
PRPL electoral system	-5.86	4.37	45	36	-1.40	3.25
Liberal democracy	-.15**	.05	.00	.00	-.07 ⁺	.04
Appoint	-9.55**	3.34	41	26	-.94	2.62
Quotas	2.56	2.13	-11	18	-.88	1.58
Ratio effective parties	-.10*	.04	.00	.00	-.01	.03
Inclusion in party elites						
Party bureau	-.23	.18	.04**	.01	.11	.13
Party leadership	.09	.13	.00	.01	-.04	.12
Interactions						
Party bureau × PRPL	.53*	.23	-.04*	.02	.03	.18
Party leadership × PRPL	.23	.21	.01	.02	.16	.17
% female candidates					.49***	.11
R ²	.68		.13		.072	

NOTE --The interaction effect of party bureau × PRPL on female candidates is stronger if Guyana is removed
⁺ $P < .10$
^{*} $P < .05$
^{**} $P < .01$
^{***} $P < .001$

of a 1% increase in female party bureau members results in a .3 increase in female candidates in PRPL systems ($- .23 + .53[1]$) but a .2 decrease in female candidates ($- .23 + .53[0]$) in other systems. Looking at a larger increase, we see that a 10% increase in female party bureau members results in 3% more female candidates in PRPL systems but 2% fewer candidates in other systems.³⁷

These results are exactly what we would expect, considering what we know about differences between proportional representation and plurality-majority systems. As noted in the discussion above, candidate selectors in PRPL systems feel pressure to balance their party's list for both external reasons (voters) and internal reasons (factional peace). Thus, it should be relatively easy for female party elites in PRPL systems to convince the party to field female candidates. In contrast, plurality-majority candidate selection is a messy, zero-sum process, where the inclusion of a woman necessarily indicates the exclusion of a man (Matland 2002). Our results suggest that under such competitive circumstances, having women in some positions of leadership may actually result in a trade-off for women as candidates.

In contrast, turning to the yield of legislators from female candidates (see the ratio column of table 3), we see something quite different. Increases in female party bureau members do not increase the ratio of legislators from female candidates in PRPL systems ($.04 + -.04[1] = 0$). Instead, for this outcome, *non*proportional representation systems show a positive effect of women in leadership positions ($.04 + -.04[0] = .04$). A 10% increase in female party bureau members in a non-PRPL system lead to a .4 increase in the ratio of elected women to candidates. The standard deviation for ratio is .53, so this is a relatively large effect size.

These results suggest that female leaders in PRPL systems are less able than their counterparts in plurality-majority systems to increase the electability of their female candidates. Again, this is reasonable given differences across the electoral systems. In PRPL systems, candidates appear on lists, and voters typically vote for the party (and its list), rather than for individual candidates. So, female leaders in PRPL systems are relatively unable to influence the fate of any one candidate relative to the others by giving them more financial support. As one Central European respondent noted in the IPU survey, "Once a woman is on a party list, or a party candidate, she has the same material and financial support as her male colleagues" (IPU 2000, p. 89). Instead, what matters is placement

³⁷ The effect of female elites in proportional representation systems is even stronger if Guyana is removed from the sample. A 10% increase in female party bureau members leads to a 7% increase in female candidates in that case. The effect of female party bureau members in plurality-majority systems remains the same, $-.18$.

on the party list. And, as previous quantitative and qualitative research has shown, women tend to be placed lower on party lists (e.g., Kunovich 2003). Our results suggest that while female leaders can articulate the need for female candidates, they are less able to place those candidates in winnable positions. As a West African IPU respondent complained, "Women actively participate in the same way as men, but they don't manage to move upwards, always holding subordinated positions in political organizations and on electoral lists" (IPU 2000, p. 60).

Contrast this to the situation of female leaders in plurality-majority systems. Once the battle for who will be a candidate is over, each party has the incentive to support their candidate fully, whether male or female. And, female party leaders are in a position to provide additional support to their female candidates in the form of campaign money or better institutional resources for campaigning. In the United States organizations such as Emily's List raise money and provide additional training and institutional support for female candidates in their bid for office. These types of organizations have also been crucial to women's success in several African nations (Tripp 2001). Female party leaders can tap into these external resources to help women gain a legislative seat once they are nominated as a candidate.

An important question remains: Why do we see these interaction effects for women in party bureau positions but not for women in leadership positions such as party chairperson or party spokesperson? The answer is likely because of critical mass (Dahlerup 1988, Staudt 1996, Jaquette 1997, Kanter 1977, but see Studlar and McAllister 2002). It is important to remember that, generally, women's representation in elite positions is low.³⁸ When women are only a small part of the leadership, their impact is also likely to be small. IPU respondents from Central and West Africa, Southern Europe, and South America all commented that because

³⁸ Even before women had suffrage and the right to stand for national office, women played some roles in the success and failures of political parties (Ostrogorski 1902, chap. 6). But after gaining suffrage and the right to stand for office, women continued to be primarily relegated to informal roles within political parties. Women's level of involvement in party politics has been steadily increasing. By 1990, women comprised 40%–50% of party members in several Western European nations (Henig and Henig 2001). Despite these high levels of participation in the lower ranks, the proportion of women among party executives and key committee members is substantially lower (Norris and Lovenduski 1993). "So far, very few women are leaders of political organizations. Usually they simply join political parties created and led by men" (West African respondent, IPU 2000, p. 55). This occurs not just in countries where women are new to the political arena. As a female legislator from a Nordic country stated in the IPU's survey of female legislators, "We have the highest women's representation in the world (43%) but men still dominate as party leaders and in the most 'heavy' positions" (2000, p. 19).

women's participation in parties and party elites was minimal, female members were unable to change the party culture or increase support for female candidates (IPU 2000, pp 59–61) When women make up only a small portion of the party, they are, according to an East African respondent, vulnerable "The few who are determined to confront the male politicians within the party end up being called all sorts of names—insolent, would-be men, etc—and they are often ignored and pushed to one side" (IPU 2000, p 56) Active discrimination on the part of male leaders may also occur a legislator from East Africa claims that "even though I am a member of the executive committee of the party I am often kept out of important decisions and even meetings" (IPU 2000, p 20)³⁹

With critical mass in mind, it is worth noting that the average percentage of women in leadership positions in parties is 10%, while the average percentage in the party bureau is 17% More telling, the median percentage of women in party bureaus is 14% compared to only 5% women in leadership positions Indeed, in 30% of the countries we examined, there are no women in leadership positions On average, women in party bureaus may be better approaching levels that produce results "The central committee of the RCD has included 21.3% women The change is tangible In meetings, when a woman speaks in favor of a proposal which concerns women, the applause is louder and more sustained, at least from her female colleagues They can have a decisive influence during debates and on decisions A significant percentage can sway a vote" (North African respondent, IPU 2000, p 68) When women in leadership positions approach these numbers on a more regular basis, we may begin to see more positive results for women⁴⁰

³⁹ Further, without a critical mass of women for support, women may be unwilling to support other women (Sawyer 2002) An IPU respondent from Southern Europe states "if the number of women politicians is small as in the case of my country, politics may change women because, in order to survive politically, women may copy the men in their methods and behavior" (IPU 2000, p 23) This statement echoes Lovenduski's (1993) warning that institutions can change women before women change institutions Especially in highly visible positions, women may need to be cognizant of sanctions for being seen to act in the interests of women Relating the experience of Labour MPs in Great Britain, Childs (2002, p 151) explains, "The most common perception is that women who seek to act for women act only for women This results in a tension between a woman MP's parliamentary career and acting for women If an MP desires promotion, she cannot afford to be regarded as acting for women too often or too forcefully"

⁴⁰ It is important to note that some of the women interviewed by the IPU felt strongly that the quality of female leaders was as important as numbers "Just one courageous woman can be a vehicle for profound change where 30% may be of little effect" (Pacific respondent, IPU 2000, p 68) Still most of the respondents appeared to feel that vehicles to increase percentages, such as internal party quotas, could only produce positive benefits

CONCLUSION

In order for women to be elected to Parliament, the political parties have the responsibility of trusting in women, encouraging them, and putting them forward in constituencies where they can be certain of electoral success (Central African respondent, IPU 2000, p. 97)

Despite advances in women's levels of education and participation in the paid economy over the last 20 years (Clark, Ramsbey, and Adler 1991, Jacobs 1996), women have made little significant progress with respect to their representation in national politics. In the United States, women account for 46% of the paid labor force and 55% of tertiary students (United Nations 2000). However, their representation in Congress and the Senate remains 13% and 14%, respectively. The situation is similar in other nations. Currently 182 countries allow women to stand for office. Yet women make up fewer than 20% of elected representatives in the great majority of these countries (IPU 2004). Women's low rate of participation at the highest levels of politics remains an enduring problem in gender stratification (Paxton and Kunovich 2003).

In this article, we have attempted to expand our understanding of the problem of women's political representation by thinking of politics as a *process* with several important stages for women. First, women must be selected as candidates, and second, female candidates must be elected. In most countries, political parties are the primary means by which individuals are selected and supported in their bids for the public office. Thus, our primary focus is on women's inclusion in political parties and how that impacts both the selection and support of female candidates. We argue that features of political parties mediate and interact with country-level factors, such as a country's electoral system, in influencing women's political outcomes.

We find that women's inclusion in parties is important in helping women to become candidates and elected officials, but that the ways in which female elites can make a difference varies across electoral systems. Put briefly, female party leaders are able to increase numbers of female candidates in proportional representation systems. But female party leaders can help female candidates *get elected* in plurality-majority (non-PRPL) systems. This finding has important implications for the ways in which women can use their growing presence in leadership positions to the benefit of other women. Female leaders need to recognize the electoral constraints under which they operate and work to overcome those constraints. At the same time, female leaders can work to exploit the opportunities their electoral system may provide.

While the state or various parties may wish to redress historic ine-

qualities by instituting quotas, we do not see an effect of quotas in this analysis. However, we believe that this finding is likely the result of the constraints of our data. With better measures of quotas, especially those accounting for quotas of different types, we expect that, like other studies, we would find positive impacts for women's political outcomes, at least under certain types of quotas. On a related note, we see that complacent parties do not feel pressure to field women—without marginal parties challenging the more complacent, established parties, women's representation as candidates is reduced.

Finally, we find evidence for the importance of ideological proxies, which corresponds to much previous research (e.g., Paxton 1997, Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Norris and Inglehart 2001). However, it is interesting that while we find ideology influences the gender composition of party elites in a country and the percentage of women candidates, we do *not* find that ideology influences how well women fare at the polls. This suggests that parties may be overly sensitive to the perceived liability of women as candidates, when in fact, women have equal success as candidates across all regions of the world.

Overall, our results stress the importance of parties for women's political representation. Even if parties do not actively discriminate against women, political parties are the gatekeepers that can limit women's access to national legislatures. Through the candidate selection process, political parties limit the choices available to voters. By differentially supporting candidates, parties also influence the election process. Since the percentage of female candidates largely determines the percentage of women elected, it is clear that parties must rise to the challenge by recruiting and supporting female candidates.

While forces outside an individual party's control, such as the electoral system under which it must operate, have an effect on women's representation as candidates and how well female candidates do at the polls, parties could do more to increase women's achieving elected office. First, our results indicate that parties should not assume that the electorate will not accept female candidates. Second, when the state acts to appoint women or other traditionally marginalized groups to the legislature, political parties should not assume this means they have no personal responsibility to increase their own selection of these groups as candidates. Finally, parties should remove any barriers to women's full participation as political elites. Without the internal barriers mentioned by the respondents in the IPU's survey of elected officials, women might be better able to translate their numbers in party bureaus or other positions of power into increased gains for women.

What role do female elites within parties play in changing or perpetuating female underrepresentation? Echoing Sanbonmatsu's (2002) con-

clusions about women in the United States, we could say that there is no single path for women to elected office. Female leaders need to consider the constraints of their electoral system and plan strategies to increase women's representation as candidates and legislators accordingly. In PRPL systems, female elites should remember that stressing a balanced party list will not translate into more female legislators unless they also press for better list positions. The situation may be more difficult in plurality-majority systems. There, female party elites must fight the perception of electoral contests as zero-sum outcomes to ensure better representation of women as candidates.⁴¹

Our study demonstrated the utility of developing measures that allow cross-national researchers to investigate the entire process of women's inclusion in politics. However, our study remains limited by its focus on only one cross-section of elections. Longitudinal data would be better able to address how the positive impact of female party leaders and party bureau members might evolve over time as women's representation in these positions increases and their influence strengthens. Longitudinal analyses could also more rigorously test the propositions outlined here by examining changes in parties, leadership, and electoral rules on the proportion of women in office over time. Finally, longitudinal data would be able to test whether women's political fate is tied to the fate of certain political parties, and whether the ideological composition of the national legislature (percentage of seats held by socially liberal vs. conservative parties) influences women's electoral outcomes.

While the countries in our sample are representative of national leg-

⁴¹ While the focus of this article is the number of women selected as political candidates, and how many of those are elected, we acknowledge that diversity among women selected and elected is also of paramount importance. It is likely that the women who run for, and are elected to, political office are not typical of women in their country. An important challenge facing female political leaders is the ability to represent the interest of a wide variety of women while maintaining good standing with constituents and party leaders. In fact, women's parliamentary caucuses have been formed in a substantial number of countries in order to provide an institutional structure within which representatives from competing parties can pool resources in order to focus on issues of concern for women and children. In a recent address, Edna Madzongwe, the Deputy Speaker of the Zimbabwe Parliament and head of the Women's Caucus, referenced this challenge faced by female representatives: "Women parliamentarians have a dual representative role in that, apart from representing constituencies, you also represent women who constitute 55% of our population. As such you should remain focused on the challenging task before you of representing the largest but marginalized group in our society. You are therefore expected to spearhead change in societal attitudes by virtue of your being in Parliament by ensuring that legislation passed by the House is gender sensitive" (see archive of speeches from public figures in Zimbabwe, <http://www.kubatana.net>). Even as women begin to comprise 30% of national legislatures, it may take considerably more time before women have the authority and resources to represent the diversity of interests among women.

islatures worldwide, the range of variables we could consider was constrained by available data. For example, party ideology is an important variable, as theory and some research have demonstrated that left parties are more likely to field female candidates. But data, especially for non-Western countries, are not currently available. Similarly, we would ideally have also considered women's presence in professional careers such as law, the strength of any feminist movement, and the percentage of voters who are women. It is critical that future research collect and include these variables in quantitative studies.⁴²

Finally, it is important to remember that candidate nomination procedures vary cross-nationally in ways not considered here (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. 237). For example, in some countries like the United States, party leaders have much less influence in the candidate selection process. Candidate selection also depends on the level of centralization of decision making and the level of party bureaucracy (Matland 2002). Thus, researchers need to collect additional measures of the candidate selection process, such as party centralization and the institutionalization of rules, in order to further understand this process. Proportional representation systems are hypothesized to be beneficial for women for a variety of reasons, including larger district magnitudes and the publication of lists. Further research could consider which specific features of PRPL systems facilitate the ability of female party leaders to promote female candidates. For example, in closed-list systems, a voter cannot change the order of the list of candidates provided by the party. In an open-list system, voters can. Extrapolating from our results, among PRPL systems, female party elites should have more influence on the return of female candidates in open-list systems as they have more of a chance to influence voters by spending money or organizing list switching. As a South American IPU respondent explained, "I was the last person on the list, but a campaign helped me to be elected with preferential votes of more women voters" (IPU 2000, p. 89).⁴³

Ultimately, this article demonstrates that the characteristics of parties mediate and interact with more general country-level factors in producing outcomes for women. The interaction we find here between electoral system and female party leaders provides a tantalizing glimpse of how we may ultimately understand the relationship between political structures at the national and party level in providing both opportunities and constraints for women to increase their numbers. While it is challenging to obtain the appropriate data to study this process cross-nationally, it is

⁴² The IPU should be recognized for collecting party-level data for a range of countries. We hope that, in the future, such data sets will be less rare.

⁴³ Organized list-switching drives can backfire (Matland 2002).

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clear from these results that the candidate selection process needs to become part of the standard model

APPENDIX A

Variable Description and Data Sources

TABLE A1
VARIABLES

Variable	Definition	Source	Range	Average
Dependent variables				
% women in leadership positions	Calculated by averaging the percentage of women occupying positions of power for five distinct positions across the parties for each country	IPU 1997	0–43	10
% female party bureau members	Calculated by averaging the percentage of female members across the parties for each country	IPU 1997	0–50	17
% female candidates	Calculated by dividing the total no of female candidates by the total no of candidates running for election in each country and multiplying by 100	IPU 1997	6–50	14.7
% women in the national legislature	Calculated by dividing the total no of female elected representatives by the total no of seats in the lower house for elections held between August 1991 and December 1996 (× 100)	IPU 1997	0–40	11.8

Ratio (ratio of female elected officials to female candidates)	Calculated by dividing the percentage of female representatives by the percentage of female candidates in each country. Countries with a value of 0 have no elected representatives, values < 1 indicate fewer representatives were elected than the percentage of candidates would have suggested, a value = 1 indicates a one-to-one relationship, values > 1 indicate more women were elected than expected by the percentage of candidates	IPU 1997	0 0–2 75	95
Structural factors				
Women economically active	Percentage of women who are in the paid labor force	United Nations 2000	9 21–54 00	37 94
Women tertiary education	Percentage of tertiary students who are female	United Nations 2000	13 02–65 11	43 82
Political factors	Log of energy use per capita in 1995	United Nations 2000	2 77–8 99	7 04
PRPL electoral system	Identifies those countries that use a proportional representation party-list system to elect all or some seats in their national legislatures (20)	From the <i>Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections</i> (IPU 1985–2002) and Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996)		
Liberal democracy	Bollen's political democracy index	Bollen 1998	0–100	72 63
Appoint	Identifies those countries that appoint seats to their national legislature on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity, or minority status (6)	United Nations 1995		
Quota	Identifies those countries that have a federal law mandating the use of a quota system to insure a minimum level of representation for female candidates or that some political parties operating in the system have a voluntary quota (28)	IPU 1997		

Ratio of effective parties	The no of effective parties (parties with 10% or more of assembly seats) divided by the total no of parties ($\times 100$)	Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996 (effective parties), IPU 1997 (<i>N</i> of parties competing)	6 25–100	49 99
Ideological factors				
Region	Seven region dummy variables Africa (10), Asia and the Pacific (14), Eastern Europe (13), Middle East and Northern Africa (8), Scandinavia (3), and Latin America (13) The baseline region is Western industrialized nations (12)			
% Catholic	Percentage of the population that is Catholic	World Almanac 1996	0–99	31 82
% Muslim	Percentage of the population that is Muslim	World Almanac 1996	0–99	7 63
% Orthodox	Percentage of the population that is Orthodox	World Almanac 1996	0–100	16 71

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Black-White Wage Inequality, Employment Rates, and Incarceration¹

Bruce Western
Princeton University

Becky Pettit
University of Washington

The observed gap in average wages between black men and white men inadequately reflects the relative economic standing of blacks, who suffer from a high rate of joblessness. The authors estimate the black-white gap in hourly wages from 1980 to 1999 adjusting for the sample selection effect of labor inactivity. Among working-age men in 1999, accounting for labor inactivity—including prison and jail incarceration—leads to an increase of 7%–20% in the black-white wage gap. Adjusting for sample selectivity among men ages 22–30 in 1999 increases the wage gap by as much as 58%. Increasing selection bias, which can be attributed to incarceration and conventional joblessness, explains about two-thirds of the rise in black relative wages among young men between 1985 and 1998. Apparent improvement in the economic position of young black men is thus largely an artifact of rising joblessness fueled by the growth in incarceration during the 1990s.

Inequality between black men and white men is often measured by wage differences in the civilian labor force (e.g., Cancio, Evans, and Maume 1996, Sakamoto, Wu, and Tzeng 2000, McCall 2001, Grodsky and Pager 2001). However, comparisons of wage earners may inaccurately describe

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the relative economic status of black men. There are strong race differences in labor force attachment, and the labor force participation of black men has been relatively low since the 1950s (Wilson 1987, Fairlie and Sundstrom 1999). Because the jobless rate is high among men with low potential earnings, relatively few low-skill black men are included in assessments of wage inequality. The lower tail of the black wage distribution is truncated by a high rate of joblessness, and the observed wage gap between black and white men understates racial inequality. In short, the black-white wage gap is partly the artifact of a sample selection effect.

Interest in the sample selection effects of unemployment on wage inequality arose in studies of antidiscrimination policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Wage convergence between black men and white men in this period was widely attributed to improvements in school quality, expanded public-sector employment, and equal employment opportunity (Burstein 1979, Hout 1984, Heckman 1989, Card and Krueger 1992, Darity and Myers 1998, pp. 44–45). In contrast to this research, some studies observed that growth in the relative wages of black men accompanied declining employment. Part of the decline in black-white wage inequality thus appeared as a result of increased joblessness among low-skill black men (Butler and Heckman 1977, Brown 1984, Jaynes 1992). Consequently, the wage-equalizing effects of antidiscrimination policy were overestimated.

This article revisits the sample selection effect of joblessness on estimates of wage inequality. Although economists have conducted most research on sample selection and wage inequality, the topic is also of clear importance for sociologists. Three main issues are at stake. First, sociological research on wages and research on employment proceed largely on separate tracks, producing an inconsistent assessment of black economic progress. Analysis of wages often emphasizes the economic gains of African-Americans and the progressive effects of public-sector employment and measures for equal employment opportunity (Burstein 1979, Burstein and Edwards 1994, Grodsky and Pager 2001, cf. McCall 2001). On the other hand, studies of employment find persistent inequalities rooted in historic and contemporary discrimination (Wilson 1987, Massey and Denton 1994). Analysis of sample selection helps reconcile these findings by explaining how the appearance of relative wage gains may result from declining employment opportunities among low-skill men.

Second, recent debate disputed the relative effects of skill and discrimination on racial inequality in wages (Cancio et al. 1996, Farkas and Vicknair 1996, Johnson and Neal 1998). This debate bracketed the issue of sample selectivity even though low-skill black men are likely to be underobserved in analyses of wages. If sample selection effects are large, the effect of skill on wages may be significantly underestimated.

Finally, the selection analysis shows that statistics like the black-white

wage gap cannot be taken at face value. Wage differentials are embedded in broader patterns of racially differentiated labor force attachment (Mare and Winship 1984). Although earlier research focused on the 1960s and 1970s, the effect of labor force participation on the economic standing of black men has acquired renewed importance. The growth of the U.S. penal system through the 1980s and 1990s removed an ever-growing fraction of young, low-skill black men from the noninstitutional population. By 1999, over 40% of young black male high school dropouts were in prison or jail compared to 10.3% of young white male dropouts (Western and Pettit 2002). High incarceration rates have the effect of concealing poor young men in conventional labor force statistics. Earlier work (Western and Beckett 1999) argued that the U.S. labor market gains through the 1990s economic expansion were overstated by the usual measures of employment. That earlier article examined the effects of incarceration on employment statistics by imputing an employment status to prison and jail inmates. In this discussion we also consider the economic status of the penal population to see whether joblessness through incarceration created the appearance of relative wage gains by black men during the 1990s.

Our analysis estimates the black-white wage gap, adjusting for relatively high rates of joblessness and incarceration among black men. Although we build on earlier work that studies the effects of labor force attachment on black-white inequality (Mare and Winship 1984, Blau and Beller 1992, Western and Beckett 1999), our analysis goes further in several ways. First we examine data through the 1990s, a period of wage convergence among young black and white workers. Second, we impute wages to the penal population using correctional surveys that report preincarceration wages for prison and jail inmates. Finally, we develop a predictive Bayesian analysis of the wage adjustment that yields standard errors for the selection effect of labor inactivity on wage inequality. By including economically marginal men that are usually ignored in labor force research, our analysis aims at a comprehensive assessment of racial inequality between black men and white men.

RECENT TRENDS IN WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT

Table 1 reports the mean of log hourly wages for non-Hispanic, nonfarm black men and white men between 1980 and 1999 using the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Mean wages are reported for all employed men, including those in part-time work. The data show two patterns. First, the wage advantage of working-age whites changed little from 1985 to 1999. The hourly wage

TABLE 1
AVERAGE LOG HOURLY WAGES, WHITE MEN AND
BLACK MEN, 1980-99

	Whites (1)	Blacks (2)	Difference (1) - (2)
Men ages 22-64			
1980-84	2 188	1 902	286
1985-89	2 361	2 053	308
1990-94	2 504	2 190	314
1995-99	2 639	2 334	305
Men ages 22-30			
1980-84	1 968	1 777	192
1985-89	2 097	1 869	228
1990-94	2 224	2 006	218
1995-99	2 327	2 140	187

of working-age white men exceeded that of blacks by about 30%. Second, inequality increased among young men until the mid-1980s and then declined through the 1990s. Like other research, these tabulations show that the relative earnings of young black men were falling through the early 1980s (Bound and Freeman 1992, table 1, Cancio et al. 1996). Observed wage inequality peaked in 1985 and fell by about 20% over the next 15 years.

Relative wage trends contrast with shifts in joblessness. The jobless can be divided into two categories—the noninstitutional jobless and those institutionalized. Among young men, most of the institutional population is incarcerated. The noninstitutional jobless, whom we call nonworkers, consist of the unemployed and those not in the labor force. Nonworkers are counted by the CPS. Prison and jail inmates are counted using aggregate administrative records and correctional survey data (see the appendix). This approach follows the census employment concept in which the institutional population are counted among those without work.

The incarcerated significantly increased their share of total joblessness between 1980 and 1999 (see table 2). Among all white men of working age, about 2% of those without jobs were in prison or jail in 1980 compared to 6% by 1999. The share of inmates among the jobless is almost twice as high for white men ages 22-30. Incarceration's share of joblessness is much higher for blacks. More than 20% of nonworking black men of working age were in prison or jail in 1999. Among black men ages 22-30, incarceration accounted for 30.5% of all joblessness in this same year. The final column of table 2 shows changes in racial inequality in joblessness. In contrast to patterns of wage inequality, racial inequality in employment increased for all working-age men and young men between

TABLE 2
% JOBLESS MALES IN THE POPULATION AND AMONG THE INCARCERATED, 1980-99

	JOBLESS WHITES		JOBLESS BLACKS		BLACK- WHITE RATIO (3) / (1)
	% in	% Incarcerated	% in	% Incarcerated	
	Population (1)		Population (3)		
Men ages 22-64					
1980-84	15.5	3.2	30.5	10.8	1.97
1985-89	14.4	3.5	28.8	14.9	2.00
1990-94	15.3	4.6	31.2	18.6	2.04
1995-99	14.6	6.2	30.8	23.4	2.11
Men ages 22-30					
1980-84	15.4	4.5	34.9	16.0	2.27
1985-89	12.5	8.0	30.4	23.0	2.43
1990-94	14.2	8.5	34.2	26.6	2.41
1995-99	13.2	10.6	33.5	32.8	2.54

1980 and 1999. Among young men, the black-white ratio in joblessness increased by about 20%, driven largely by the rise in incarceration rates.

JOBLESSNESS AND SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS

Research on wage inequality often ignores the high rate of joblessness among blacks. Instead, inequality is chiefly explained by employer discrimination and the distribution of skills among workers. Declining racial inequality in wages through the 1960s and 1970s has been linked to protections offered by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, affirmative action policies in large firms, and increased government employment among blacks that helped to circumvent private-sector discrimination (Heckman 1989, Hout 1984, Donohue and Heckman 1991, Chay 1998). More recently, labor market researchers traced the black-white wage gap to low levels of skill among black workers (Farkas and Vicknair 1996, Johnson and Neal 1998, cf. Cancio et al. 1996). Discrimination and skill surely affect racial inequality in wages, but they cannot account for declining wage inequality during periods of relatively low or shrinking employment among black workers.

The divergence between wage and employment trends for African-American men can be reconciled by considering the sample selection effects of joblessness on average wages. The effects of sample selection are illustrated in figure 1, which shows hypothetical distributions of log wages for blacks and whites. We can interpret these distributions as the wage offers that would be received by blacks and whites if they all were work-




FIG 1—Hypothetical black and white wage distributions (shaded areas indicate wages unobserved because of joblessness, means estimated from the observed wage distribution are given by $\bar{\mu}$, means of the complete wage distributions are given by μ)

ing Racial inequality is measured by the white-black difference in means, $\mu_w - \mu_b$. The lower tail of each distribution is shaded indicating that wage offers for those with low-potential earnings are unobserved because of joblessness. The shaded area is larger for blacks than whites, because joblessness among blacks is relatively high. Mean wages, $\bar{\mu}$, calculated just from the the observed wages, will exceed the mean of the wage distribution μ . This implies

$$\mu_w - \mu_b > \bar{\mu}_w - \bar{\mu}_b$$

Because the black wage distribution is truncated more than the white, naive estimates of inequality based just on observed wages, $\bar{\mu}_w - \bar{\mu}_b$, will underestimate inequality in the economic standing of black men.

Sample selection analysis tries to impute wages to the lower tails of these distributions and adjust estimates of the wage gaps. Imputing wages can be understood as an effort to monetize the economic status of marginal segments of the population that are typically ignored in studies of economic inequality. We monetize economic marginality, not by putting a dollar value on joblessness, but by predicting the wage offers that would be received by the jobless if they were working.

Why are jobless rates for blacks persistently higher than those for whites? The employment gap between black men and white men is often given a structural interpretation. Residential segregation, the decline of

urban manufacturing industry, or some combination of the two accounts for high rates of joblessness among black men with low levels of education in urban areas (Wilson 1987, Lichter 1988, Massey and Denton 1994, cf Wilson, Tienda, and Wu 1995). Although structural explanations commonly account for the race gap in male employment, labor inactivity is also linked to institutions outside the labor market. Butler and Heckman (1977) offered an early analysis of this type, noting that income-transfer benefits increased at the same time as the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. They conjecture that the increase in benefits drew low-wage men out of the labor force. Increased average earnings were the result of declining employment among low-pay workers rather than an upward shift in the income distribution. Mare and Winship (1984) observe that institutional forces can also reduce labor force participation among more able workers. Their analysis of school enrollment and military service between 1964 and 1981 showed that around half the increase in the race gap in employment through the 1960s and 1970s was because of these institutional attachments. Conventional employment figures understated the economic position of black men at a time when black school attendance and military enlistments were rising.

Growth in incarceration rates through the 1980s and 1990s motivates a reexamination of an institutional basis for the selection effects of labor inactivity. Rising incarceration rates result mostly from changes in criminal justice policy. From the 1970s to the 1990s, a punitive shift in criminal processing—including the intensified criminalization of drug-related activities and tough-on-crime sentencing—led to an increased likelihood of a prison sentence and longer prison sentences for convicted offenders (Blumstein and Beck 1999). Researchers also claim that the growth in incarceration has likely been concentrated among disadvantaged minority men (Tonry 1995, Wacquant 2000). While public policy may have significantly reduced discrimination in hiring, labor market inequality may still be affected by racial disparities in the criminal justice system.

DATA AND METHOD

Earlier studies of racial inequality combined observed earnings from workers with imputed earnings from nonworkers. Earnings for nonworkers were either set by assumption or imputed from marginal workers for whom earnings were observed (Brown 1984, Smith and Welch 1989, Welch 1990). Similar to the current approach, Blau and Beller (1992) regressed earnings on human capital and other covariates and predicted hypothetical wages using the observed covariates of nonworkers. Chandra (2003) elaborated this approach by imputing earnings for age-education

subgroups, where the imputation methods varied for the unemployed, those not in the labor force, and the incarcerated

Earlier research focused on trends from the 1960s through the 1980s. To study wage inequality through the 1990s, we analyze data from the CPS and correctional surveys of inmates. Our estimates of inequality are based on log hourly wages, although we found similar results for weekly earnings. The analysis is restricted to non-Hispanic, nonfarm, civilian men. We report results for white men and black men in the age groups 22–64 and 22–30. Excluding those under age 22 minimizes the number of students in the sample. Employment-population ratios for the noninstitutional population are calculated using the CPS survey weights. Labor inactivity caused by incarceration is estimated using aggregate administrative data and correctional surveys.

If log wages of white and black men are written y_w and y_b , then the difference in mean wages is given by $\bar{d} = \bar{y}_w - \bar{y}_b$. Since hypothetical offer wages of the jobless are not observed and the jobless are likely to come from the lower tail of the wage distribution, \bar{d} is a biased estimate of the wage differential. To adjust the wage differential for selective attrition from employment, we calculate

$$\hat{d} = \hat{y}_w - \hat{y}_b,$$

where the adjusted means, \hat{y}_i , are based on imputed mean wages for nonworkers. Omitting the race subscripts, the adjusted mean wage is the weighted average,

$$\hat{y} = (1 - p_N - p_I) \bar{y}_W + p_N \bar{y}_N + p_I \bar{y}_I,$$

where the subscript W denotes the mean calculated for workers from observed wages, \bar{y}_N is the mean wage for nonworkers (the unemployed and those not in the labor force), \bar{y}_I is the mean wage of the incarcerated, and the weights p_N and p_I are proportions of the population not working or incarcerated.

Like previous research, we predict the wages of the jobless given age and education (Blau and Beller 1992, Chandra 2003). These covariates capture the main human capital differences in wages. (We also experimented with region and marital status but those variables added little to the results reported below.) Age is measured discretely in five categories: (1) 22–25, (2) 26–30, (3) 31–40, (4) 41–50, and (5) 51–64. Education is divided into three categories: (1) less than a high school diploma or equivalent, (2) high school diploma or GED, and (3) at least some college. The covariates are used not to estimate the effects of age and education on wages, but to help sharpen predictions for the wages of the jobless. The

predicted mean wage for workers and prison and jail inmates is obtained from the regression,

$$\bar{y}_j = \bar{X}_j' b_j, \quad (1)$$

where $j = W, N$, or I , where age and education data are collected in the matrices, X_j , and \bar{X}_j is a vector of covariate means. Following Chandra (2003), we take a nonparametric approach to the regression in which age and education are interacted, yielding predicted wages for each age-education subgroup. If X_j consists of $5 \times 3 = 15$ columns of dummy variables indicating each cell in the age-by-education table, \bar{X}_j is simply a vector of cell proportions for workers, nonworkers, and prison and jail inmates. With this model, the regression coefficients, b_j , give the mean log wages for each age-education cell.

The adjusted means, \bar{y}_j , in equation (1), depend on unknown quantities. The population proportions of those not working and incarcerated, p_N and p_I , can be calculated along with the age-education cell proportions, \bar{X}_j . However, the regression coefficients, b_j , can only be estimated for workers since the counterfactual wages of nonworkers and inmates are not observed. We adopt two strategies to impute wages to the age-education tables of nonworkers and the incarcerated.

First, nonworkers and inmates are matched to the mean wages of workers. The matching estimator can be written as regression equations $\bar{y}_N = \bar{X}_N' b_W$ for nonworkers and $\bar{y}_I = \bar{X}_I' b_W$ for prison and jail inmates. Mean wages are predicted accurately if, given age and education, the mean offer wages of nonworkers and the incarcerated are identical to the mean wage of workers. We call this approach the AE (age-education) adjustment. With the AE adjustment, wage differences between workers and the jobless are the result of differences in the age-education distribution. The mean counterfactual wage of nonworkers is lower than the observed mean wage of workers if nonworkers are clustered in the low-wage cells of the age-education table. Table 3 reports the age and education distributions for workers, nonworkers, and prison and jail inmates. Nonworkers tend to be older but less educated than workers. Nonworkers are about three times more likely than workers to have dropped out of high school and only three-quarters as likely to have attended college. The age and education disadvantage of prison and jail inmates is even larger. Inmates are relatively young and six to seven times more likely than workers to have dropped out of high school.

The key assumption of the AE adjustment is that the wage offers received by the jobless, given age and education, are equal to those of the employed. Of course, the assumption is unrealistic because those at risk of prison and unemployment earn less than others in the labor force.

TABLE 3
WORKERS, NONWORKERS, AND INMATES, 1999

	Workers	Non- workers	Inmates
White men			
Age			
22–25	8.2	9.3	13.7
26–30	12.0	7.3	19.1
31–40	29.1	15.4	39.4
41–50	29.1	19.8	19.8
51–64	21.6	48.1	8.0
Schooling			
< high school	7.0	19.4	50.8
High school or GED	31.7	35.4	30.7
Some college	61.3	45.2	18.6
Black men			
Age			
22–25	9.4	12.7	17.4
26–30	15.2	11.4	22.5
31–40	32.9	20.5	40.6
41–50	27.6	23.9	15.9
51–64	14.9	31.5	3.6
Schooling			
< high school	10.6	31.5	59.4
High school or GED	39.7	39.3	27.8
Some college	49.3	29.1	12.8

(e.g., Bound and Freeman 1992, D'Amico and Maxwell 1994). The wage deficit unexplained by age and education is likely to be especially large for prison and jail inmates. Typically, former inmates obtain relatively low returns to education, and crime-involved men have low levels of cognitive ability given their schooling (Waldfogel 1994, Western 2002). By neglecting their low productivity, we may overestimate the hypothetical wages of the jobless. As a result, the analysis will underestimate the impact of labor inactivity on average wages.

Earlier sample selection studies of wage inequality accounted for the influence of unobserved variables by assumption. For example, Blau and Beller (1992) assume that the jobless earned 40% less than workers with the same observed characteristics. Chandra (2003) assumes that the long-term unemployed earn less than the median wage of workers of the same age and education. Predictions that acknowledge the low productivity of the jobless may be more realistic than predictions based on the AE adjustment. Still, the estimated effect of sample selection in earlier research remains sensitive to untested assumptions about the effects of unobserved variables on hypothetical wage offers.

We address this limitation with our second strategy, which introduces data on the earnings potential of prison and jail inmates. Correctional surveys of inmates, fielded periodically by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, ask respondents about their wages immediately before incarceration. About a third of the inmates were not working when admitted to prison or jail. Preincarceration wages are reported by 30%–50% of respondents in each of the nine correctional surveys we analyze. The data provide estimates of inmate wages by age and education, b_i . The mean offer wage for inmates is predicted by $\hat{y}_i = \bar{X}_i' b_i$, which we call the AEI (age-education-incarceration) adjustment.

Do the wage data from inmate surveys accurately predict the wage offers that criminal offenders would receive if they were working? The correctional data may understate wage offers if a loss in income causes or is otherwise related to the crime that leads to imprisonment. On the other hand, hypothetical wage offers are likely to be relatively low among the many inmates who are jobless at the time of incarceration. Our imputation strategy matches these jobless offenders to the wages of those who were working at the time of incarceration, likely leading to an overestimate of mean wages in the correctional population. Because the predicted wages may be too high or too low, we are uncertain about how well the inmate wage data can predict the wages these men would be offered if they were not in jail. This uncertainty is incorporated in the calculation of standard errors and confidence intervals.

Mean wages from the correctional surveys for 1999 are compared to mean wages for workers in table 4. Wages for inmates are reported at time of admission. Although wages at admission are not adjusted to current age, jail inmates (a third of the penal population) were incarcerated less than a year earlier, and about two-thirds of prisoners reporting wages were incarcerated for two years or less, so the time between age at admission and current age is short.² Moreover, wages grew slowly for criminal offenders and those with little schooling in the 1980s and 1990s (Western 2002), reducing the chance that the inmate wage data are out of date. At all ages, the hourly wage of prison and jail inmates is only about half the wages of men who have not been to prison. Returns to education also appear to be lower for incarcerated men. The wages of inmates before incarceration are lower than those for employed men at every level of education. The wage gap between inmates and the employed grows with increasing education.

The AE and AEI adjustments set upper and lower bounds on the effects

² The wage data are adjusted for inflation from prison and jail admission to current age. We also experimented with wage data just from inmates admitted in the previous year and obtained results that were essentially the same as those reported below.

TABLE 4
MEAN HOURLY WAGES FOR MALE WORKERS AND MEAN PREINCARCERATION WAGES
FOR MALE PRISON AND JAIL INMATES, 1999

	White Men		Black Men	
	Workers	Inmates	Workers	Inmates
Age				
22-25	11 04	7 65	9 68	7 37
26-30	14 79	12 53	11 88	5 92
31-40	18 62	8 92	13 35	8 70
41-50	21 12	11 77	14 64	6 04
51-64	21 45	9 83	15 19	10 31
Schooling				
< high school	11 71	9 03	9 57	6 74
High school or GED	14 57	11 01	11 67	6 82
Some college	21 92	12 06	15 62	10 40

NOTE — Wages are given in 1999 dollars

of sample selection on racial inequality in wages. Relying just on the wages of workers (the AE adjustment) likely overstates the offer wages of the jobless, minimizing the impact of labor inactivity on wage inequality. Predicting hypothetical wage offers of inmates with preincarceration wages (the AEI adjustment) may accentuate the sample selection effect on inequality. Still, any overestimate of offer wages in the correctional survey data is offset by the use of workers' wages to predict the offer wages of nonworkers.

Uncertainty about the size of the wage adjustments motivates a Bayesian analysis that specifies a subjective probability interval for adjusted wages and the sample selection effect. Building on Rubin's (1977, Little and Rubin 1987) analysis of missing data, we calculate a Bayesian distribution for the predictive mean, $\bar{y}_j = \bar{X}_j' b$. Here, \bar{X}_j is scaled to reflect the proportion of workers, nonworkers, and inmates in the population, so the sum of the elements of \bar{X}_N , say, equals the proportion of workers in the population, p_N , and the sum of all the elements of \bar{X}_W , \bar{X}_N , and \bar{X}_I equals 1. Parameterized this way, the predictive distribution of mean wages conditional on the observed wage data for workers is the sum of the predictive distributions for workers, nonworkers, and inmates,

$$p(\bar{y}|y) = p(\bar{y}_W|y) + p(\bar{y}_N|y) + p(\bar{y}_I|y)$$

With diffuse prior information on the regression coefficients, the predictive distributions are given by the integral,

$$p(\bar{y}_j|y) = \int p(\bar{y}_j|b_j)p(b_j|y)db_j,$$

where $j = W, N$, or I , where $p(\bar{y}|b_j)$ is the predictive distribution of the mean given observed wages, and $p(b_j|y)$ is the posterior distribution of the coefficients given observed wages. The mean and variance of this distribution can be found by simulating from the posterior distribution for the coefficients, $p(b_j|y)$. For workers, the posterior is normally distributed with a mean located at the least-squares estimate of b_w and a variance equal to the least-squares covariance matrix, \hat{V}_w . Randomly generated coefficient vectors, b_w^* , are used to simulate from the predictive distribution for \bar{y}_w by calculating $\bar{y}_w^* = \bar{X}_w' b_w^*$. In this case, the variance of \bar{y}_w^* is known to be s^2/n , where s^2 is the least-squares estimate of the error variance and n is the sample size for the regression. Although the mean and variance of the predictive distribution are simply calculated for this case, we use simulation because it provides an easy way to incorporate prior information and to estimate selection effects based on ratios of predictive distributions.

There are no sample data on wages for nonworkers and inmates, but prior information is given by wage data in the CPS and correctional surveys. Uncertainty about the predictive mean is a function of prior uncertainty about the coefficient vectors b_n and b_i . With the AE adjustment, prior uncertainty about the counterfactual wages of nonworkers and inmates depends partly on sampling uncertainty in the CPS wage estimates and subjective uncertainty about the utility of the CPS for predicting counterfactual wages of the jobless. Prior means for the coefficients, b_N and b_I , are given by the mean wages for workers, b_w , yielding predictive distributions centered at $\bar{y}_N = \bar{X}_N' b_w$ and $\bar{y}_I = \bar{X}_I' b_w$. We set prior variances for the coefficients to multiples of the least-squares variances, $\psi_1^2 \hat{V}_w$ (for nonworkers) and $\psi_2^2 \hat{V}_w$ (for inmates). The prior parameters ψ_1 and ψ_2 describe our confidence that the offer wages of the nonworkers and inmates match the CPS wages for workers. If we think that the AE assumption is true and the conditional wages of workers accurately describe the counterfactual wages of the jobless, then $\psi_1 = \psi_2 = 1.0$. Throughout this analysis we set $\psi_1 = \psi_2 = 2.0$ reflecting our skepticism that the survey data on which our priors are based accurately predict the unobserved wages. With these priors, uncertainty about the true location of the coefficient vectors b_N and b_I is set to twice the conventional sampling uncertainty that we would usually calculate from the CPS and the correctional data. For the AEI adjustment that uses preincarceration wages to predict inmates' wages, the predictive mean is $\bar{y}_I = \bar{X}_I' b_I$. The prior variance is given by $\psi_2^2 \hat{V}_I$, a multiple of the least-squares covariance matrix calculated from the correctional survey data.

We simulate the predictive distribution of mean wages for all (white or black) men by taking random draws from a normal distribution centered at the least-squares estimates of b_w and b_i with the least-squares

covariance matrices multiplied by ψ_1^2 and ψ_2^2 . We randomly draw from the predictive mean distribution by taking 5,000 random draws of the coefficient distributions for workers, nonworkers, and inmates and calculating the weighted sum, $\hat{y}^* = (1 - p_N - p_I)\bar{y}_W^* + p_N\bar{y}_N^* + p_I\bar{y}_I^*$. We use these distributions of adjusted mean wages to simulate distributions of the selection-adjusted wage differential, $\hat{d}^* = \hat{y}_w^* - \hat{y}_b^*$. The simulated values, \hat{y}^* and \hat{d}^* , are used to construct standard errors and confidence intervals reported below.

The Bayesian analysis produces subjective predictive distributions. As Rubin (1977, p. 538) observes in his Bayesian analysis of missing data, subjective analysis is unavoidable because "one cannot make totally objective probability statements about how respondents would respond without some response data from them." Similarly, our analysis does not observe the hypothetical wage offers received by nonworkers and inmates. Consequently, standard errors and confidence intervals describe our subjective uncertainty that the selection-adjusted mean wage lies within a particular interval. Uncertainty is the result of the usual sampling variability in observed wages and subjective judgments about how well the priors predict the offer wages of nonworkers and inmates. The predictive distribution also depends on prior parameters, ψ_1 and ψ_2 , that are subjectively chosen. Because others might prefer different values for ψ_1 and ψ_2 , we explore the sensitivity of our results to the priors below.

Several biases affect our method for estimating the sample selection effect of joblessness on relative earnings. Two biases lead to an overestimate of the wage gap. First, the adjusted wage gap is overestimated because the analysis ignores the selection effect of the military. Blacks have higher rates of military service than whites, and Mare and Winship (1984) show that the military siphons off many of the most able black workers. Although military service is bracketed from this analysis, bias in the adjusted wage gap is small and likely declines over time. Chandra (2003) found that by 1990, the selection effect of incarceration was about four times larger than the selection effect of military service. Unlike the penal population, which has grown rapidly, the number of active-duty troops fell by about 25% between 1989 and 1995. The tight labor market of the 1990s may also reduce the selection effect of military service as skilled workers reject enlistment for work on the open labor market (Brown 1985). Second, bias will also result from the likely endogeneity of some of the independent variables in the wage regression to incarceration. For example, low education among inmates may result from interruptions to schooling by prison time. If the incarceration rate was zero, levels of schooling may be higher and our selection-adjusted wage for inmates would be too low. This endogeneity bias leads us to overestimate the selection effect of incarceration.

These biases are balanced by labor supply effects. When selective labor force attrition is lower and the jobless are employed, earnings are likely to fall because of the increased supply of low-skill workers. Neglecting the impact of labor supply leads us to overestimate the offer wages of nonworkers, which in turn contributes to a conservative estimate of the sample selection effect.

Although the analysis is subject to offsetting biases, it is unclear if any of these effects will dominate. Still the analysis goes further than earlier work by introducing more direct information about the wages of those who are incarcerated and by accounting for uncertainty in unobserved mean wages of nonworkers and inmates.

RESULTS

Table 5 details the wage adjustment in 1999 among men ages 22–64 and men ages 22–30. Matching workers' wages by age and education to those of nonworkers and inmates reduces the mean for whites by .012 log points from 2.763 to 2.751. Among working-age blacks, the AE adjustment reduces mean wages by .034 log points. Accounting for the relatively low rate of employment among black men thus increases the estimated black-white wage gap by 7.5% from .302 to .325 log points. By simulating the full predictive distribution for observed and adjusted mean wages we can also calculate standard errors and confidence intervals for all functions of mean wages, including the adjusted wage differential and the selection effect, $100 \times (\hat{d} - \bar{d})/\hat{d}$. The standard error for the selection effect indicates that we can be highly confident that the AE adjustment yields a mean wage gap that is larger than the observed mean wage gap.

The introduction of correctional survey data to impute the wages of inmates substantially increases the adjustment for sample selectivity. Among working-age men, the AEI adjustment lowers the mean wage of whites by .016 log points. Black men's mean wages are reduced by .057 log points, indicating the extreme economic marginality of criminal offenders reflected in the correctional surveys. Because the wage adjustment for black men is so large, the black-white wage gap is estimated to increase by one-fifth if we account for the economic status of nonworkers and those incarcerated.

Because conventional joblessness and incarceration rates are much higher among black men in their 20s, the lower half of table 5 shows that sample selection effects are large for young men. The AE adjustment increases the observed racial gap in wages among young men by 15.8%. Standard errors are larger because sample sizes are smaller, but a confidence interval for the AE selection effect for young men still excludes

TABLE 5
OBSERVED AND ADJUSTED LOG MEAN EARNINGS AND SAMPLE
SELECTION EFFECTS, 1999

	Whites	Blacks	Difference	Selection Effect (%)
Men ages 22–64				
Observed earnings	2 763 (001)	2 461 (004)	302 (004)	
AE adjustment	2 751 (001)	2 427 (004)	325 (004)	7 5 (1 9)
AEI adjustment	2 747 (001)	2 384 (003)	364 (003)	20 3 (1 7)
Men ages 22–30				
Observed earnings	2 460 (002)	2 291 (008)	169 (008)	
AE adjustment	2 451 (002)	2 256 (009)	195 (009)	15 8 (7 3)
AEI adjustment	2 445 (002)	2 178 (006)	267 (007)	58 2 (6 6)

NOTE.—Nos. in parentheses are SEs except where noted otherwise

zero, indicating that we are 95% certain that the adjusted mean wages exceed the observed mean wage. The AEI adjustment yields extremely large selection effects because incarceration rates for young black men at the end of the 1990s exceeded 10%, and because the preincarceration wages of black men were lower than those for whites. High incarceration rates and low counterfactual wages contribute to a selection effect of nearly 60% for young workers. That is, accounting for the very low earnings potential of incarcerated men increases the estimated wage advantage of whites from 17% to 27%. The small standard error (6.6 percentage points) again indicates that a confidence interval for the selection effect excludes zero.

Time series of the adjusted and observed earnings differentials for all years between 1980 and 1999 are shown in figures 2 and 3. The time series for the observed wage differential indicates that the black-white wage gap for working-age men increased slightly in this period from about 28 to 30 log points (fig. 2). Accounting for increased joblessness among young, low-education men suggests that the relative economic position of black men deteriorated more than is indicated by the observed wage gap. Using workers' wage data to predict age-education wages among the jobless provides an adjusted wage gap that increased from about 28 to 32 log points. This is a conservative estimate of the relative decline in the economic position of black men because we do not account for the unusually low productivity of incarcerated men. The AEI adjustment,




FIG 2—The white-black difference in mean log hourly wages, men ages 22–64, 1980–99 *Top panel* observed earnings differential, d , and adjusted differentials, \hat{d} , *middle panel* selection effect using the AE adjustment, \hat{d} , *bottom panel* selection effect using the AEI adjustment. A smooth line indicates the trend. The selection effect and 95% confidence intervals are measured as a percentage of the observed difference, d .

using correctional survey data, suggests a much larger decline in the relative economic status of working-age black men. With this adjustment, the economic advantage of white men is estimated to have increased from 30 to 36 log points between 1980 and 1999.

The lower panels of figure 2 plot the annual sample selection adjustments as a percentage of the observed earnings differential. These plots also show error bars indicating a 95% confidence interval. The middle panel of figure 2 shows that under the AE adjustment, the sample selection effect of labor inactivity drifts upward from about 4% to 8% of the observed black-white wage gap. Accounting for sampling variation in observed mean wages and prior uncertainty about the counterfactual wages of the jobless yields confidence intervals of about five to seven percentage points, indicating strong evidence that the selection-adjusted wage gap is larger than the observed black-white gap in wages.

The upward trend in the selection effect is clearly indicated once we account for low wages among inmates. The AEI adjustment indicates that declining labor force participation and increasing incarceration rates among black men between 1980 and 1999 increased the white wage advantage from about 5% to 20%. Standard errors in this case are about the same magnitude on the log scale as for the AE adjustment. Because the selection effect is much larger, we are quite sure that the selection-adjusted wage gap exceeds the observed wage gap, and the size of the selection effects increased significantly between 1980 and 1999.

Results for young men, ages 22–30, are shown in figure 3. Observed wage differences suggest that young black men gained on their white counterparts between 1985 and 1999 as the observed difference in mean wages declined from about 25 to 17 log points. The selection analysis suggests that this large improvement in economic status is overstated, as low-wage young black men increasingly withdrew from employment. Under the AE adjustment that imputes CPS wages to the jobless, the selection-adjusted wage differential falls from about 26 to 20 from 1985 to 1999. The AEI adjustment, which uses correctional surveys to correct for the low productivity of inmates, suggests that wage gap falls from 30 to 27, less than half the decline in the black-white wage gap recorded by observed wages. The AEI adjustment suggests that if employment and incarceration rates had remained at 1985 levels, observed racial inequality in wages at the end of the 1990s would be significantly higher because of the low wages earned by low-education and crime-involved men.

Selection effects and 95% confidence intervals for young men are plotted in the lower panels of figure 3. With smaller sample sizes for the analysis of young men, standard errors are larger. The middle panel, showing the trend in the AE adjustment, shows that the selection effect roughly doubles in size from about 7% to 15% of the observed black-white wage gap.




FIG 3 — The white-black difference in mean log hourly wages, men ages 22–30, 1980–99 *Top panel* observed earnings differential, \bar{d} , and adjusted differentials, \hat{d} , *middle panel* the selection effect excluding inmates, *bottom panel* selection effect including inmates. A smooth line indicates the trend. The selection effect and 95% confidence intervals are measured as a proportion of the observed difference, \bar{d} .

Confidence intervals are frequently large, regularly overlapping zero in eight years out of the 15 before 1994. From 1994 to 1999, there are only two years, 1995 and 1998, where we cannot be 95% certain that the selection-adjusted wage gap exceeds the observed wage gap.

Using correctional data to allow for the low earnings potential of inmates produces a larger selection effect and a dramatic increase in the effect of sample selection in the two decades from 1980. In the 1980s, the AEI adjustment suggests that accounting for the low economic status of the jobless increased the racial inequality by nearly 20%. By 1999, the selection effect increased threefold to nearly 60%. Confidence intervals for the selection effects are far from zero, indicating that, under the AEI assumptions, we are quite sure that the selection-adjusted wage gap exceeds observed racial inequality in mean wages among young men.

As in all statistical analysis, our conclusions depend on our assumptions. Some of these assumptions are captured by the prior parameters, ψ_1 and ψ_2 , which represent our confidence that the wages of the jobless are described by the wages of workers (for the AE adjustment) and the preincarceration wages of inmates (for the AEI adjustment). Point estimates for the selection effects depend only on the age-education mean wages in the CPS and correctional surveys. Standard errors however, depend on the choice of prior parameters.

The sensitivity of standard errors to priors is reported in table 6. The table reports the average change in standard errors over the 1980–99 period for different choices of ψ_1 , which indexes our uncertainty about nonworkers, and ψ_2 , which indexes uncertainty about prison and the jail inmates. We selected $\psi_1 = \psi_2 = 2$, indicating that we were twice as uncertain as sampling error that our survey data accurately predicted the offer wages of the jobless. If we measure our prior uncertainty with sampling error in the survey data, $\psi_1 = \psi_2 = 1$, standard errors for the selection effects would be about .95 as large as those reported. Standard errors based on the AE adjustment are more sensitive than those based on the AEI adjustment. This reflects the relatively low residual variance of wages in the correctional surveys.

Results in table 6 shows that our main conclusions about the effects of sample selection would only change for the AE adjustment, not the AEI adjustment, if more conservative priors were used. In particular, if ψ_1 is chosen to be much greater than two, we could not confidently conclude with the AE adjustment that the selection effect significantly alters mean wages in the 1980s among working-age men. With this more conservative prior, the confidence interval for the AE adjustment for young men would include zero over the entire 1980–99 period. By contrast, the AEI results are robust to the specification of the prior. Even if we chose prior uncertainty to be six times larger than the sampling error observed in the

TABLE 6
SENSITIVITY OF SES OF SELECTION-ADJUSTED WAGE DIFFERENTIALS TO VARIATION IN
PRIOR PARAMETERS, ψ_1 AND ψ_2

	AE ADJUSTMENT			AEI ADJUSTMENT		
	$\psi_1 = 1$	$\psi_1 = 2$	$\psi_1 = 6$	$\psi_1 = 1$	$\psi_2 = 2$	$\psi_1 = 6$
Men ages 22-64						
$\psi_2 = 1$	95	98	1 24	95	99	1 19
$\psi_2 = 2$	95	1 00	1 41	95	1 00	1 31
$\psi_2 = 6$	95	1 01	1 55	98	1 01	1 42
Men ages 22-30						
$\psi_2 = 1$	94	98	1 28	95	99	1 19
$\psi_2 = 2$	94	1 00	1 49	95	1 00	1 31
$\psi_2 = 6$	94	1 02	1 64	98	1 02	1 42

CPS and correctional surveys, we could still be 95% certain that the selection-adjusted mean exceeds the observed gap in mean wages between black men and white men

CONCLUSION

Given low rates of employment, are relative wages a good indicator of the economic status of African-American men? Like Mare and Winship (1984), who studied the selection effects of school attendance and military service, we also find that labor force statistics for black men cannot be taken at face value. Our analysis indicates that estimates of mean relative wages of black men are inflated by low rates of labor activity. By 1999, the high rate of black joblessness inflated black relative earnings by between 7% and 20% among working-age men, and by as much 58% among young men. The appearance of strong wage gains for young men between 1985 and 1998 must also be assessed in light of rising joblessness. The analysis suggests that if black employment had been maintained at 1985 levels, black-white wage inequality would have fallen by just 10%, instead of the 30% actually observed.

How do these estimates compare to earlier research? We report larger sample selection effects than do Brown (1984) and Blau and Beller (1992), who find that race differences in employment account for around 10% of the observed wage gap (see also Welch 1990). Our estimates are smaller for the whole population, however, than those reported by Chandra (2003, table 5), in which the adjusted wage gap is as much as 45% larger than the observed wage gap. Our finding that relative black joblessness accounts for about two-thirds of black-white wage convergence between 1985 and 1999 is similar in magnitude to Chandra's (2003) finding that

86% of wage convergence between 1970 and 1990 is because of selection. In sum, the sample selection effects we estimate are relatively large but still in line with estimates in earlier research.

The effects of sample selection on observed wage inequality are large through the 1990s because black joblessness climbed to very high levels, and a historically large proportion of very low-wage black men were not working because of incarceration. We found that a third of all jobless young black men are in prison or jail compared to just 10% of jobless young white men. Incarceration is a major source of employment inequality, contributing significantly to selection bias in the estimation of black relative wages. Furthermore, the counterfactual wages of incarcerated men are likely to be much lower than the wages observed for men of the same age and education. Correctional survey data showed a weak relationship between inmates' education and their preincarceration wages. The preincarceration wages of black inmates were also much lower than those of white inmates, even when taking into account age and education.

These results point to the pitfalls of using the black-white wage gap as an indicator of the relative economic status of African-Americans in the two decades from 1980. In particular, the analysis suggests that improvements in black relative wages are not substantially because of improvements in the market position of black workers. Instead, jobless rates increased among black low-wage workers, and incarceration rates increased among young black workers, removing those with little earnings power from standard labor market accounts.

Our findings of increasing sample selectivity cast doubt on research suggesting that the 1990s' economic expansion improved the economic position of young African-American men. Freeman and Rodgers (1999) report that local area unemployment rates affect the employment and earnings of young workers, especially young African-American workers after 1996. Our analysis suggests that conventional labor force data, like those analyzed by Freeman and Rodgers (1999), may inaccurately measure labor utilization among young black men because their incarceration rates are so high. This bias grows if we focus on workers with little schooling. Ignoring the sample selection effects induced by low black employment rates can cause overestimates of earnings. The relative gains of young black men in the 1990s may be partly explained by high rates of joblessness and incarceration among young black men.

While our results suggest how the penal system conceals inequality by removing low-wage men from the labor market, this analysis provides only a partial picture of the economic effects of high incarceration rates. Recent cohorts of low-skill minority men who face high risks of incarceration are likely to experience reduced earnings and earnings growth (Western 2002, Nagin and Waldfogel 1998). The penal system may thus

substantially increase sample selectivity by contributing to the joblessness of large numbers of ex-inmates. Incarceration may also contribute to labor market inequality in a more direct way by reducing the earnings of ex-offenders.

More generally, this analysis reassesses the impact of institutional change on black economic progress. Previous research claimed that gains in earnings, particularly since the 1960s, resulted from the positive effects of school desegregation and expanded equal employment opportunity. Changes in state institutions helped reduce racial discrimination, insulating some African-Americans from the negative economic effects of manufacturing decline and residential segregation. However, institutional effects are not unambiguously progressive. We find that the penal system increased inequality in employment, especially among youth. This employment disparity had large measurable effects on observed earnings inequality. Although deprived of economic status in official statistics, the institutionalized population contributes significantly to economic inequality, affecting our assessment of the economic status of African-American men.

APPENDIX A

Data Sources

Labor force data—The earnings regressions and noninstitutional employment-population ratios were estimated using annual labor force data from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files of the Current Population Survey (NBER 2001).

Survey correctional data—Covariate means for prison and jail inmates and employment-population ratios were estimated using data from the *Survey of Inmates of Federal Correctional Facilities, 1991* (BJS 1994a), the *Survey of Jail Inmates, 1978* (BJS 1997d), the *Survey of Inmates of Local Jails, 1983, 1989, 1996* (BJS 1997a, 1997b, 1999), the *Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities, 1979, 1986, 1991* (BJS 1993, 1994b, 1997c), and the *Survey of Inmates of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 1997* (BJS 2000). Intersurvey years were interpolated.

Administrative correctional data—Unpublished annual counts of prison and jail populations for blacks and whites were supplied by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Jail figures are the estimated overnight count for June 30 each year. The prison population is the count at year's end.

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Institutionalizing Collective Memories of Hate: Law and Law Enforcement in Germany and the United States¹

Joachim J Savelsberg
University of Minnesota

Ryan D King
University at Albany, SUNY

The institutionalization of distinct collective memories of hate and cultural traumas as law and bureaucracy is examined comparatively for the case of hate crime law. A dehistoricized focus on individual victimization and an avoidance of major episodes of domestic atrocities in the United States contrast with a focus on the Holocaust, typically in the context of the destruction of the democratic state, in Germany. Such differences, in combination with specifics of state organization and exposure to global scripts, help explain particularities of law and law enforcement along dimensions such as internationalization, coupling of minority and democracy protection, focus on individual versus group rights, and specialization of control agencies.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of hate and hate-inspired violence has grown globally. It joins other concerns, where global scripts have increasingly informed nation-level policies and practices, including environmentalism (Frank, Hiron-

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aka, and Schofer 2000), education (Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 1992), economics (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002), social control (Deflem 2002), and human rights (Boyle 2002). Fueled by the genocides of the 20th century, the rise of the issue of hate was most recently advanced after the fall of the Soviet Union, when the demise of the Cold War ended the balance of nonengagement between the two superpowers (Hagan and Greer 2002).

Despite these global forces, hate crime law and its enforcement take distinct forms in different countries. We seek to develop an explanatory frame that places collective memory (Halbwachs 1992) and cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004) center stage and considers their interaction with institutions and selective exposure to global concerns (Saguy 2000, Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001) to approach an explanation of nation-specific laws and enforcement mechanisms.

We are concerned here with the cases of Germany and the United States, both modern Western democracies that nevertheless show important differences in the phenomena under question: collective memories, exposure to global scripts (i.e., taken-for-granted cognitive and normative models), and local institutions (Bendix 1949, Rueschemeyer 1973, Roth 1987, Kalberg 1987, Savelsberg 1994, Munch 2000). While law and law enforcement against hate have experienced massive growth in the post–World War II histories of both countries (Jenness and Grattet 2001, McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003, Nier 1995), a closer look reveals stark differences in hate-related laws and their enforcement. First, American law's focus on potential vulnerability contrasts with German law, which links protection of the vulnerable with concerns for the state. Second, American law's protection of individual victims along a set of clearly specified dimensions (e.g., ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, U.S. Congress 1994) differs from German law's declared goal to protect minority groups generally, with the exception of the relatively broad group "victims of the Holocaust," for whom it establishes a group-specific right (e.g., *Strafgesetzbuch* 1985, paragraph 194, see also Nier 1995, p. 260). Third, also in contrast with American law and law enforcement, the protection against hate in German law involves limitations on civil rights such as the right to free speech and free association for the sake of protecting minorities and the state against extremist activities (Nier 1995). Fourth, German law, different from American law, explicitly accepts its subordination under international law (*Grundgesetz* 1949, article 25). Finally, differences in codes are reflected in enforcement. While special hate or bias crime units in American prosecutors' offices are rare, German prosecutors' offices typically have specialized units for hate-motivated offenses in the context of crimes of political extremism (*Extremismusdezernat*), and German police departments handle hate crimes in the context of specialized units.

“for the protection of the state” (*Staatsschutz*, Romelt 1977) Also, while American enforcement discourses are relatively free from references to both international scripts and major chapters of inhumanity and genocide in American history, German agencies and their discourses are rich with international references and closely associated with the memory of German history, especially the Holocaust

Why do we encounter such distinct national patterns despite the globalization of hate concerns and hate crime issues? More specifically, why are precautions for the protection of minorities not linked with precautions regarding social stability and the state in America even though this link is common in Germany? Why does American law not place special emphasis on the protection of victims of national inhumanity such as the near extinction of the Native American population, the slave trade, and the slavery system, despite regular references to foreign atrocities? Why does German law, seemingly paradoxically, limit civil liberties to protect them, while the United States shows that democracy can work, as citizens use such liberties generously, even to the point of propagating anti-democratic and racist talk?

Despite such pressing questions and profound cross-national variation, explanatory efforts are missing, and even descriptive analyses of variation in legal responses to hate and xenophobia are scant (for exceptions, see Commission of the European Communities 1993, Nier 1995) Crucial comparative questions about the conditions of national laws and law enforcement remain unaddressed even though important contributions about law making (e.g., Jenness 1999, Jenness and Broad 1997, Jenness and Grattet 2001) and implementation (King 2005, McVeigh et al. 2003, Martin 1995, 1996, Boyd, Berk, and Hamner 1996) within the United States are available Filling such gaps not only adds to our comparative understanding of hate crime law, it also promises to enhance basic sociological ideas about the institutionalization of culture and the interplay between globalization and the organization of local institutions

We first present a theoretical model, situating our concerns in the literature on culture, institutions, and control, and introducing central concepts We explore this model for the German–U.S. comparison, justifying the selection of these countries and describing differences between their collective memories of hate Then, we show how structures of collective memory are institutionalized in laws and law enforcement in each country while simultaneously examining the role of institutions and global scripts Finally, we discuss our findings and draw conclusions

THEORY COLLECTIVE MEMORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND CONTROL

While previous lines of work have examined the direct relationship between culture and control (Garland 2001, Melossi 2001, Savelsberg 2000, 2004, Smith 2003) or the effect of nation-specific institutions on control and punishment (Savelsberg 1994, 1999, Reicher 2004, Sutton 2000, 2004), here we pursue a third path. We explicitly link these two strands of research by exploring the cultural foundation of institutions of control. The search for cultural roots of institutions, of course, is not new (e.g., Gorski 2003). Yet, while previous work on the cultural sources of institutions focused on religion, much in line with Max Weber's (2002a) ideas (for criminal law, see Savelsberg 2000, 2004), we emphasize a different aspect of culture, collective memory, and cultural trauma. These cultural forces, however, do not work in isolation but in the context of group conflict, nation-specific institutions, and global scripts.

Specifically, our analytic model links intergroup conflict via the interpretation of history with the formation of collective memory. The analysis moves on to the institutionalization of collective memory as law and then as law enforcement. At each of these stages, collective memory is modified while laws and enforcement agencies join previous actors in the constitution of collective memory. The transition from each stage to the next occurs under country-specific conditions. Simultaneously, global actors contribute to collective memory and to its institutionalization at each stage. Each of the elements in this model has been addressed by previous work. We introduce and link central arguments and findings before we apply the integrated model to our American-German comparison of collective memories of hate and hate crime law.

Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma, and Their Carriers

Maurice Halbwachs (1992) laid the foundation for the sociology of collective memory, demonstrating that the past we know is always constructed, and that present-day interests of social actors profoundly affect our understanding of the past. Halbwachs's concerns with collective memory have recently been pursued in a rich and growing body of research that has supported some of his central theses (Schumann and Scott 1989, Schwartz 1982, 1996, Fine 2001).

Cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004) is a specific form of collective memory, that of catastrophic past events. The concept of cultural trauma, like sociological conceptions of collective memory, suggests that the trauma of such events is culturally processed, or socially constructed. Consequently, groups and individuals experience an event that they have not themselves lived through as traumatic. Alexander (2004), applying

the concept to the Holocaust, proposes that facts are emotionally, cognitively, and morally interpreted through a supraindividual, symbolic grid that distinguishes, for example, between good and evil and between relative and absolute evil. How this grid is applied depends on who is providing the account. It obviously matters for our understanding and sense of horror of the Holocaust that Nazi Germany was defeated in the Second World War. It also matters that the Western powers were among the liberators of the concentration camps, not the Soviets alone.²

Collective memory and cultural trauma vary across social categories and carrier groups (Kalberg 1987). Schumann and Scott (1989), for example, examining which historic events Americans deem most important, confirm Mannheim's (1952) classic thesis that knowledge of history varies by generation (in addition to some gender and race effects). Attitudes, too, vary by generation, as Weil (1987) finds in his cohort analysis of positions Germans take on the Nazi past and on the value of democracy. Finally, collective memory and cultural trauma are not just passively preserved by broadly defined social categories, but are also actively mobilized by actors, individuals, movements, and more or less organized groups for a diversity of political, moral, and legal purposes (e.g., Schwartz 1982, Fine 2001). Given the role of social actors in the preservation and construction of memory and given the varying representation of diverse racial, status, ethnic, religious, and other groups in each country, collective memory and cultural trauma will necessarily vary in cross-national comparison (Scott and Zac 1993).

Path Dependency and Institutional Contexts

An actor's effort to shape collective memory is not only restricted by competing contenders but also by the path dependency of collective memory. Most recently, Olick and collaborators (Olick and Levy 1997, Olick 1999) have examined the history of commemoration or, in other words, the long-term development of commemorative forms, and the memory of commemoration or "prosaic path dependence." Olick (1999), for example, examining the history of German May 8 commemorations between the 1950s and the 1990s demonstrates that the message of speeches on the German capitulation after World War II always referred back to commemorative contents of the preceding decade.

We build on the idea of path dependency of commemorations. Yet, we take their institutional context seriously as the rules of commemoration.

² In a related argument, Novick (1999) shows that discussion of the Holocaust was scant in the United States until the early 1970s, after which time it became both a defining feature of Jewish identity and a salient topic in American political discourse.

differ by societal sectors and nation-states. Prohibitions and taboos, requirements and obligations in the memory of hate and horror (Olick and Levy 1997), are distinct in politics, scholarship, journalism, or religion. So are methods by which statements are backed and the mechanisms through which the memory of past statements is preserved. In addition, each sector takes on different forms across countries. American legislators faced with primary elections and weak parties submit to different rules of the game than do their German colleagues who are members of strong platform parties. The same applies to popularly elected heads of the executive branch versus those elected by the legislature, and to elected judges and prosecutors versus their civil servant counterparts (Bendix 1949, Kalberg 1987, Roth 1987, Rueschemeyer 1973, Savelsberg 1994).

Collective memory and commemorations do not only affect future commemorations but also events in which decisions are debated and made on laws, enforcement organizations, and control actions. These very situations constitute, in fact, specific forms of commemoration. Consider a legislative session in which German representatives meet to decide on enhancing penalties for the distribution of neo-Nazi propaganda through the Internet. Speeches will deal with legal principles such as due process, weighing free speech protections versus protections of groups and the constitutional state, and with deterrent effects of enhanced penalties. These speeches, however, also commemorate the Nazi past, the Holocaust, and the conditions of the Weimar Republic as ones that provided fertile ground for the rise of the Nazi Party. While they may have less public visibility than purely commemorative speeches, held on official days of remembrance, such applied commemorations and the decisions to which they contribute crystallize collective memory as they mold it into institutional structures of new law norms or control agencies.

Global Scripts

Global concerns supplement concerns within countries. After the Nuremberg Tribunal addressing the hate-inspired war crimes and acts of genocide of the Nazi regime, the theme subsided for almost five decades—despite massive hate campaigns and human rights abuses in many countries (Kuper 1977)—before it reemerged in the 1990s. Until then the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union created a barrier against intervention in hate-based human rights abuses by either side. The world was divided into two competing regions, and neither side was interested in allowing international law in these spheres (Turk 1982). Only the post-Cold War era witnessed a rebirth of international concerns and intervention such as the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague and attempts at establishing

an International Criminal Court, ratified by the vast majority of countries Hagan and Greer (2002, p 232) argue that the tribunal of the Hague “marks a major advance in the movement to establish international authority to intervene in what traditionally has been considered ‘off-limits’ as ‘internal affairs’ of the state ”

Such internationalization of moral concerns should have consequences at the level of nation-states, as a rich body of neoinstitutional literature has documented (e g , Boyle 2002, Meyer et al 1992, Frank et al 2000) Yet, the same neoinstitutional literature also shows that different nation-states are differently exposed to global pressures, depending on the number of “receptor sites” and their dependency on the global community An international comparison has to take differential exposure to global scripts into account

COLLECTIVE MEMORIES OF HATE AND INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION

Germany and the United States lend themselves to a controlled comparison Both countries are Western democracies with advanced economies They have histories of hatred and excessive cruelty against minority groups, and both have engaged in law making against hate in the post–World War II era Yet, they differ along the dimensions of our theoretical argument, in addition to having differences in the timing and nature of cruelty

Histories of Hate and Cruelty

Each country’s history of hate and inhumanity is well known and needs only brief mention here In America, the early destruction of much of the Native American population during the colonial era was continued, after the foundation of the United States, by further atrocities, wars, broken treaties, forced migration and death marches, and the destruction of livelihood (Gottesman 1999) The slave trade and the system of slavery equally resulted in immense suffering and massive loss of the lives of Africans and their descendants (Eltis 2000, Genovese 1976, Berlin 1998, 2003) While the figures are likely to go into the millions, the losses are uncounted

Inhumanity did not end with the abolition of slavery Instead, long-standing racial hatred gained a new quality and reached new heights during the Reconstruction period Jim Crow laws, the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, and the history of lynching are well known, as are the anti-immigrant “know nothing” movement of the late 19th century, anti-Catholicism, anti-Semitism, hateful resistance against desegregation pro-

jects in the wake of the civil rights movement (Lipset and Raab 1978), current-day repression and segregation (Massey and Denton 1993, Sampson and Wilson 1995), as well as discriminatory law and law enforcement (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003, Jacobs and Carmichael 2002, Hagan and Peterson 1995) Excessive cruelty committed by the U S military in foreign wars has also become known (e g , Kelman and Hamilton 1989, pp 1–20)

Germany's history of hate and inhumanity is even better known A long history of anti-Semitism dates back into the Middle Ages, with pogroms and expulsions of Jewish populations from many towns beginning in the 12th century (Cohn-Sherbok 1997) It is supplemented by resentment and discrimination against Polish immigrant labor in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, against mostly Southern European and Turkish labor immigrants in the second half of the 20th century, and by a wave of anti-immigrant assaults in postunification Germany (Wallraff 1985, Ohlemacher 1994, Pettigrew 1998) All of this history was overshadowed by the hatred cultivated against Jews and other groups before and during the Nazi regime It culminated in the Holocaust with its industrialized murder machine and uncounted acts of individual cruelty that resulted in the killing of 6 million Jews and additional millions of victims, other minorities such as Roma (Gypsies) and homosexuals, nationalities such as Poles, and political opponents (Browning 2000, Hilberg 1985, Goldhagen 1996)

While the history of both countries thus includes chapters of deadly hate against minorities, and while both countries underwent legal efforts against hate in recent decades, they differ in important respects With regard to timing, the greatest excesses of German cruelty occurred in the 20th century Further, the Shoah is unique in its purposely planned, industrialized destruction of millions of human lives We argue, though, that such variation does not sufficiently explain distinct collective memories and their institutionalization Instead, differences between both countries with regard to carrier groups, national institutions, and exposure to global scripts play crucial roles

Distinct Institutions, Political Cultures, and Exposures to Global Scripts

Five German–U S differences are crucial for our concerns First, the public spheres are characterized by an active civil society in the United States, in contrast with neocorporate arrangements in Germany (e g , Knoke and Pappi 1991, Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2002, Curtis, Grabb, and Baer 2001, for historical evidence, see Tocqueville [1862] and Weber [2002b]) The state, in collaboration with major aggregations of

social interests, should thus play a central role in the definition of collective memory in Germany, while civil society groups should play a bigger role in the United States

Second, the distinct nature of public spheres in each country gains weight as a result of different citizenship laws. Most members of vulnerable groups in the United States are citizens because of the *jus soli* of a long-term immigration country in which citizenship is granted in the country of birth. Naturalization has traditionally been much more difficult under Germany's *jus sanguinis*, where citizenship, despite recent reforms, depends primarily on German ethnicity (Brubaker 1992, Joppke 2000). This policy has consequences for the contribution of immigrant minorities to public discourses. Minorities in Germany show relatively little involvement in domestic German issues even if they are immediately affected. When they make public claims, they address the issue of homeland politics (41.5%) much more frequently than the xenophobia (32.1%) or minority integration politics (6.3%) of their host country (Koopman and Statham 1999, p. 682). Minority groups should thus play a bigger role in the construction of collective memory and in its transformation into antihate law in the United States than in Germany.

Third, the nature of the political system also affects the involvement of different actors in public discourses. America's relatively weak political parties have no place in the constitution and are further weakened by a system of primary elections. Political parties in Germany, on the other hand, are recognized by the Basic Law (constitution). Party committees determine candidates for elective office, and renominations depend on the loyalty with which representatives act toward their parties while in office. Similarly, the American general public plays a greater role *vis-à-vis* the executive branch as a result of popular elections of the president, and on the side of the judiciary because of the jury system and the popular election of most judges and prosecutors. These differences in all three branches of government should translate into the more porous nature of the American political and legal spheres (Bendix 1949, Kalberg 1987, Rueschemeyer 1973, Roth 1987, Savelsberg 1994).

Fourth, differences in the political sphere are complemented by distinct legitimacy ideas of political culture. American constitutional democracy considers its primary aim the protection of civil rights and the limitation of government power, in line with the Federalist Papers. Such liberal democracy offers formal procedures, preferably court procedures, for the management of conflicts that emerge in the use of individual liberties (Munch 2000, pp. 21–22). In clear contrast, the German model of consensus democracy, based on Kantian ideas, aims at the consideration of all interests, formulated in general laws and concretized by experts. The outcome of state decision making is not meant to reflect the sum total of

articulated interests but a model that ought to be agreeable to all reasonable citizens apart from their individual interests (Munch 2000, pp 16–17) These differences should inspire a stronger individual-rights focus in American ideas about discrimination and hate crime laws compared to a more collective approach in Germany

Finally, in addition to institutional differences, both countries are also differently exposed to global scripts The course and the outcome of World War II, in combination with the Nazi dictatorship and the Shoah, left Germany under the watchful eye of the world and with a special burden of proof that it is a worthy member of the international community This normative pressure is joined by Germany's higher level of international dependency, resulting, on the political side, from the country's membership in the European Union, with its sets of rules, including human rights standards (Arnull 1999) It results, on the economic side, from the German economy's dependence on foreign trade, with exports worth \$6,940 per capita in 2003, which is high compared to other large countries such as the United States (\$2,554), Japan (\$3,170), France (\$4,959), and the United Kingdom (\$4,480) in the same year (Statistisches Bundesamt 2003, p 248)

In sum, differences in institutional arrangements and global dependencies should contribute to country-specific collective memories They should further result in distinct ways in which memories become institutionalized in laws and enforcement agencies

Data and a Methodological Note on Generalization

Our sources of information are diverse For the identification of publicly certified collective memory at the national level, we searched government Web sites and scholarly publications on national holidays, monuments, and memorials in the nations' capitals, and we reviewed catalogs and Web sites of prominent historical exhibits supported by the national governments For hate crime law and its enforcement, we reviewed relevant law texts and related literature In addition, given the scarcity of literature on the enforcement of hate crime law in comparative perspective, we conducted a set of in-depth interviews with prosecuting attorneys who were likely to handle potential hate crime cases in both countries, supplemented by a review of media reports ³

³ We interviewed 14 prosecutors in the United States and 10 in Germany Interviews were conducted in the spring and summer of 2002 in the state of Minnesota and in the German state of Lower Saxony, and in the spring of 2004 in Wisconsin In each setting we interviewed attorneys who would be likely to prosecute or be involved in decision making if the office encountered a potential hate crime or extremism case These prosecutors were identified by reviewing organizational charts of the respective prosecutors' offices, or by communication with the justice minister, county attorney, an office liaison, or the head of the criminal division in the respective offices

On a methodological note, a comparative analysis of two countries obviously does not allow for testing hypotheses. Instead we provide an in-depth comparison to contribute to theory. Germany and the United States represent different types of countries. Those who seek generalizability may read the following as stories of civil society versus neocorporate countries, of countries with low versus high international dependency, or of winner-of-war versus loser-of-war countries. Yet, these and other dimensions overlap, creating relatively unique cases, generalizations from which can only be undertaken with the greatest caution (e.g., Bendix 1976, p. 247). In all of these readings, this article develops theoretical ideas that should be pursued in future work.

Collective Memory

A nation's collective memory is always contested. Its construction is the result of conflicts between different social groups who carry and may seek to spread their specific views of the past. At times the official recognition of historic events as evil by the political establishment, in school curricula, and in the public consciousness itself provokes the construction of exculpating memories at the microlevel, as Welzer, Moller, and Tschuggnall (2002), working in the Halbwachs (1992) tradition, have shown for German family memory of the Holocaust. Also at the macrolevel, interested groups regularly challenge established historic memory, for which the 1985–86 debate on the conditions of the Holocaust, the so-called *Historikerstreit*, is but one example (Olick and Levy 1997, pp. 931–33). Yet, some groups are more successful in these struggles than others, and their relative success is reflected in commemorative events such as major national holidays (Konig 2003), memorials, historical museums, and highly visible exhibits in the countries' capital cities (Schwartz 1982).

A comparative examination of memorial days and holidays, monuments and memorial sites, and national history exhibits indicates the official representation of collective memory in both countries. We are especially interested in if and how collective memory attributes evil and hate or liberation to the home country or to foreign powers. Further, are groups recognized who fell victim, as groups, to collective cruelty? Finally, are evil and liberation discussed in historic context or in abstraction of the historic reality of the country in question?

Memorial days and holidays—National days of commemoration and celebration are relatively few in number. They are decided on in binding political decision making, even if they are always contested and even if their meaning varies across carrier groups (Konig 2003). The Federal Republic of Germany has constituted nine days of celebration (*Feiertage*) and commemoration (*Gedenktage*), on which public congregations and

sessions of the legislature remember crucial historic events. In the United States national holidays are formally state matters. Yet, several holidays are designed by the U.S. Congress and observed in the majority of states (see table 1).

These American and German holidays and memorial days can meaningfully be categorized into five types. Most common in the United States is the celebration of domestic achievements, foundational events, personalities, or symbols (Presidents' Day, Flag Day, Independence Day, and Thanksgiving Day). This type of holiday is also prominent in Germany (Constitution Day, Unification Day, and the Fall of the Wall Day). Just as common in Germany are days that commemorate domestic resistance against or liberation from evil (Labor Day and the days commemorating the assassination attempt against Hitler and the East German uprising). The United States knows two such days, as it celebrates Labor Day (albeit depoliticized) and Martin Luther King, Jr., Day. While these days imply histories of national evil and hate such as labor exploitation, racism, and political repression, they focus on celebratory domestic events and personalities who fought these evils. Distinct from the United States, however, Germany also commemorates national evil directly with the Victims of National Socialism Day (on the date of the Auschwitz liberation) and a remembrance of the Reichspogrom night. One further German particularity is the commemoration of liberation from domestic evil by foreign powers (May 8). Finally, common to both countries is the commemoration of soldiers killed in war, to which the United States adds a day when veterans of the military are celebrated. In short, in addition to similarities between both countries, especially their preference for the celebration of national achievements and liberation, the German commemoration of national evil and hate and of liberation through foreign powers has no equivalent in the United States.

Memorials and monuments—Given the considerable number and diverse types of memorials and monuments and unclear boundaries between those with historical significance and those without, we sought guidance in listings by national political institutions. We screened, for each country, the Web sites of both chambers of the legislature, and, to capture the international representation of each country, the two countries' State Department Web sites. In Germany, the *Bundestag* Web site contains an entry on the history of German parliaments over the past 200 years. It also provides a link to an exhibit and a catalog on Germany's history, which we shall discuss below. Only the two chambers of the U.S. Congress and the German State Department (*Auswärtiges Amt*), however, provide guides to memorials and monuments in their respective nation's capital.

In the United States, a Senate Web site of May 28, 2004, lists 10 mon-

uments and memorials to which the House Web site adds two⁴ The German State Department's Web site lists 10 sites⁵ The focus of these memorials differs dramatically (see table 2)

Similar to the categorization for holidays and memorial days above, the following distribution emerges on the US government Web sites, memorials for domestic achievements and personalities, mostly focusing on great men of American history, constitute one of two important categories This type of memorial is missing completely on the German government Web site On the other hand, the German Web site lists one memorial for acts of resistance (against Nazism) and devotes most of its sites to events that reflect national evil and hate (committed by Germans during the Nazi era) The latter types of memorials that highlight dark chapters of the country's own history are almost completely missing from the US government Web sites (the Ford Theater being the exception, commemorating the assassination of President Lincoln) Neither site offers commemoration of liberation by foreign powers, but the American sites reference foreign evil by directing the visitor to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Finally, the largest category of memorials in

⁴ Other categories include cathedrals and churches, the Smithsonian Institution, government buildings, historic area houses, parks and gardens, and day trips from Washington, D C, see http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/visiting/one_item_and_teasers/monuments_img_coll.htm The House Web site of May 28, 2004 (http://www.house.gov/house/tour_dc.html), provides a similar selection under subheadings such as memorials, monuments, and points of interest, outdoor theaters, plantations, historical mansions, sports, theaters, and tours Most sites of historical interest are listed under the first and last headings They include all but two of the sites listed on the Senate Web site, while adding the Ford Theater where President Lincoln was assassinated (and Lincoln Museum), the Holocaust Museum (see below), and government buildings and museums that are not centrally related to the history of the nation (art, postal, Smithsonian) Nongovernment Web sites, directed at tourists to the nation's capital, offer similar lists, at times adding sites such as Constitution Gardens, the Family Tree of Life Statue (honoring the African-American family), the A Philips Randolph Statue (honoring the civil rights activist), and the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial

⁵ The State Department, of course, represents the Federal Republic in the international community The selection of memorials on its Web site thus provides a construction of national memory that documents to the world how contemporary Germany cultivates the memory of Nazism and its horrors, especially the Holocaust, thus distancing itself from the heritage of the terror regime while accepting responsibility for it, so that it may be considered a legitimate member of the international community of states Beyond those included in table 2 are the New Synagogue of Berlin, a "Topography of Terror," a memorial on the site of the Gestapo headquarters, currently under development, the Association of the Sponsors and Friends of the former Jewish Orphanage in Pankow, and a link to memorial sites to Nazi history in Germany generally, including the sites of former concentration camps that have been maintained as museums and memorials See http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/osze/as_konferenz/dokumente/links3_html

TABLE 1
OFFICIAL DAYS OF COMMEMORATION (MEMORIAL DAYS) IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Type of Memorial Day	Germany	United States
Domestic achievements	<p>May 23, Constitution Day (passing of the Basic Law in 1949)</p> <p>October 3, Day of German Unity (new states [former GDR] joining the FRG)</p> <p>November 9, Memory of the Fall of the Berlin Wall (events of 1989)</p>	<p>February 16, Presidents' Day (originally Washington's and Lincoln's birthdays)</p> <p>June 14, Flag Day (celebrating national symbol)</p> <p>July 4, Independence Day (commemorating the country's foundation)</p> <p>Last Thursday of November, Thanksgiving (commemorating friendly encounters between Europeans and Native Americans in early colonial history)</p>
Domestic resistance	<p>May 1, Labor Day (past working-class struggles and current-day labor issues)</p> <p>June 17, Memorial Day of the German People (1954 East German revolt against Communist regime, crushed by East German and Soviet military [before 1990 Day of National Unity])</p> <p>July 20, Memorial Day for the Assassination Attempt against Hitler and the German Resistance</p> <p>January 27, Day of Commemoration of the Victims of National Socialism (anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz concentration and extermination camp)</p> <p>November 9, Memory of the Reichspogromnacht 1938 (night of murder and destruction against Jews, synagogues, and Jewish property)</p>	<p>January 19, Martin Luther King, Jr., Day (commemorating the civil rights leader)</p> <p>September 1, Labor Day (removed from symbolically significant day of May 1 Chicago Haymarket riot)</p>
National evil		None

Liberation by foreign powers	May 8, Day of the End of the War and the Liberation from National Socialism (see Olck 1999)	None
Commemoration of military	People's Day of Mourning (day of mourning for soldiers killed in wars, typically last weekend in November)	May 23, Memorial Day (honoring America's war dead)
		November 11, Veterans' Day (honoring military veterans, originally Armistice Day, scheduled on date of end of WWI to honor veterans of foreign wars)

TABLE 2
MEMORIAL SITES IN OR NEAR NATION'S CAPITAL IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, AS LISTED ON GOVERNMENT WEB SITES

Type of Memorial	Germany	United States
Domestic achievements	None	(1) Washington Memorial (honoring first president), (2) Lincoln Memorial (defeater of slavery and savior of national unity [references to Gettysburg and second inaugural addresses]), (3) Jefferson Memorial (writer of the Declaration of Independence), (4) Roosevelt Memorial ("world leader who brought America through the Depression and World War II")
Domestic resistance	German Resistance Memorial	None
National evil	(1) Anne Frank Center (exhibit on her life, hiding, and death in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp), (2) Plotzensee Memorial Center (for victims of Nazi regime and its "justice" system), (3) Sachsenhausen Memorial Center and Museum (concentration camp closest to Berlin), (4) Kopenick Week of Bloodshed June 1933 Memorial (brutal mistreatment of political opponents by SA in Berlin neighborhood of Kopenick), (5) House of the Wannsee Conference (site where leading SS and high civil servants outlined the Holocaust on January 20, 1942), (6) Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (massive memorial to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust in Berlin's center)	Ford Theater
Foreign evil	None	United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (see below)

Military and war	None	<p>(1) Korean War Memorial (“determined to support the world’s imperiled democracies, the United States immediately sent troops”), (2) Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial (honoring “the men and women of the armed forces that served in Vietnam”), (3) Women’s Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial (“honoring women who served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era”), (4) Iwo Jima Memorial (“dedicated to all marines who have given their lives in defense of the United States”), (5) The United States Navy Memorial, (6) Arlington National Cemetery (“the final resting place of thousands of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen” [also listing the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, JFK and Robert Kennedy graves, Arlington House, and the Women in Military Service for America Memorial])</p>
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Washington, D C , listed on the U S Senate and House Web sites, is dedicated to the memory of the American military and wars, as places of mourning and as reminders of national sacrifice for democracy and for the liberation of the world from evil These memorials, mostly created in recent decades, are differentiated by specific wars, gender, and branches of the military This latter category of memorials is absent from the German government Web site

In short, notwithstanding the international showcase function of the German State Department Web site, the central, highly visible, or widely known sites listed there focus on the history of domestic evil and hate, especially as committed by Germans during the Holocaust against Jews American memorials instead focus on great presidents and on the military and its fights against foreign evil Domestic evil, such as the decimation of the Native American population and the system of slavery, does not appear Differences shown above for American and German days of commemoration are thus even more pronounced when we consider monuments and memorials in the nations' capitals

National history exhibits—While memorial days and monuments deliver powerful symbolic messages, history museums and exhibits provide more detailed accounts of a nation's reading of its history A 1971 government-sponsored exhibit on the political, economic, and social history of modern Germany, prominently set up in the building of the former Reichstag in Berlin (now the new seat of the German Bundestag) provided insights into the German government's remembrance of history, including the history of hate⁶ The exhibit's over 400-page catalog displays only a few instances of hate and discrimination beyond resentment, conflict, and riots or assassinations in the context of political conflict (*Deutscher Bundestag* 1983) Examples are "insensitive" and "bureaucratic" approaches toward integrating national minorities into the German Empire after its establishment in 1871 (pp 202–3) and the "Germanization" of Polish farms (expropriation of Polish farmers) in 1908 (p 223) The only major section dealing with issues of hate is on the Holocaust The text includes accounts and photos of the persecution (*Judenverfolgung*) and extermination of Jews (*Judenvernichtung*) Other victim groups are not mentioned, with the exception of political opponents (p 309)

This section on the Holocaust is embedded in the chapter on the Nazi regime and the demise of the Weimar Republic (pp 313–17) Further references to the terror of Nazism and the Holocaust appear throughout the remaining sections of the exhibition and its catalog They begin with

⁶ An updated exhibit is shown today in the *Deutscher Dom* in Berlin The link is provided by the Web site of the German parliament (*Deutscher Bundestag*), which provides a free catalog to the public

a discussion on the Parliamentary Council's (*Parlamentarischer Rat*) deliberations against the background of the Weimar experience "Based on experiences with the Weimar Constitution, in clear rejection of any kind of dictatorship and in line with liberal democratic traditions of the 19th century, a broad majority supporting the Basic Law subscribes to the order of law, parliamentary democracy, the welfare state, and the federalist principle" (pp 345–46)⁷

Subsequent chapters entail sections on "shadows of the past" (p 392) Included in these chapters are accounts of trials of former SS guards of the Auschwitz Concentration and Extermination Camp, the parliamentary debate on the temporal extension of criminal liability of Nazi crimes, and the temporary successes of the newly founded National Democratic Party, a neo-Nazi party, in the late 1960s "Especially abroad, the rise of Neo-Nazi forces evokes memories of the late phase of the Weimar Republic" (p 392)

On the American side, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (HMM) in Washington, D C , listed on the House Web site, is one of two exclusively historical museums in the nation's capital that is supported by the US government The other historical museum, the Smithsonian Museum of American History, lists 23 collections, more than 40 exhibits, and nearly 200 publications We find only one reference each to *Brown v Board of Education*, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, the sweatshop system, and discourses on slavery The museum is silent on the annihilation and mistreatment of Native Americans, the slave trade and slavery itself, or the repression of African-Americans

The HMM on the other hand is entirely dedicated to the issue of hate and genocide The museum was opened in 1993, adjacent to the National Mall, to "broaden public understanding of the history of the Holocaust through multifaceted programs," as the purpose statement of the museum's Web site declares It goes on to say, "The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is America's national institution for the documentation, study, and interpretation of Holocaust history, and serves as this country's memorial to the millions of people murdered during the Holocaust The Holocaust was the state-sponsored, systematic persecution and annihilation of European Jewry by Nazi Germany and its collaborators between 1933 and 1945"⁸

⁷ All translations from the exhibition catalog, legal documents, and prosecutors' interviews (below) are by the authors

⁸ Quote from <http://www.ushmm.org>, see also a quote by Jeshajahu Weinberg, the HMM's director, in Berenbaum (1993, p 30)

The Web site also invokes the role of the United States as a liberator and a place of refuge for survivors of the Holocaust

As Allied forces moved across Europe in a series of offensives on Germany, they began to encounter and liberate concentration camp prisoners, many of whom had survived the death marches. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, many of the survivors found shelter in displaced persons (DP) camps administered by the Allied powers. Between 1948 and 1951, almost 700,000 Jews emigrated to Israel, including more than two-thirds of the Jewish displaced persons in Europe. Others emigrated to the United States and other nations.

In addition to Jews, a variety of victim groups is prominently displayed. The mission statement summarizes that which the later text elaborates: "Jews were the primary victims—six million were murdered, Roma, the handicapped, and Poles were also targeted for destruction or decimation for racial, ethnic, or national reasons. Millions more, including homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, Soviet prisoners of war, and political dissidents also suffered grievous oppression and death under Nazi tyranny" (see also Berenbaum 1993, p. 6).

In short, while the German government's exhibit on its country's history elaborates the historic conditions leading to the breakdown of the Weimar Republic, the rise of Nazism, and the conditions and execution of the Holocaust committed by Germans, the American museums focus more so on specific groups of victims of a brutal foreign regime and the role of America as a liberator and provider of refuge. Further, the plea for engagement against hate remains decontextualized from American life and elevated to general principles of humanity and citizenship.⁹

Comparing Collective Memories of Hate in Germany and the United States

Memories and commemorations of hate thus take on distinct forms in Germany and the United States. First, while government-sanctioned

⁹ Only below the surface of monuments and Web sites lie memories of American failures, e.g., in Berenbaum's (1993) *The World Must Know: The History of the Holocaust as Told in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, where we find references to the refusal to accept more Jewish immigrants after the Evian conference (pp. 3, 49), Roosevelt's failure to comment on the Nuremberg laws (p. 34), an aversion to allowing more Jews into the country in the late 1930s (pp. 56–57), the ill-fated *St. Louis*, the failure to bomb Auschwitz (the text gives the impression that this could have been done, p. 144), and the State Department's concealment of information that Jews were being murdered (p. 163). Here we also find references to other atrocities that are not subjects of the museum, such as the slave trade and mistreatment of Native Americans during the western expansion.

German collective memory focuses on evil and hate that were directed against specific groups and that are attributed to the country itself, American collective memory focuses on evil and hate committed by foreign powers. Second, while German collective memory shares its attention between domestic resisters and liberating foreign powers, American collective memory focuses on the role of heroic Americans as liberators from domestic evil and on the American military as a liberator of foreign lands from foreign evil and hate. Third, while the discussion of evil and hate is deeply historicized in German commemorations, discussed in the context of political-institutional, economic, and cultural preconditions, it is seen in relative abstraction from specific historic, especially American, contexts in the United States.

These patterns of collective memory are mostly in line with our expectations formulated above on the consequences of America's relative independence from global scripts and its legitimatory ideas of political culture. They are somewhat counterintuitive, however, in light of America's distinct strength of civil society and the greater integration of minorities into American society, in combination with the more porous nature of American institutions. The following sections examine whether historic memory becomes institutionalized in the passing and implementation of laws against hate, or if representatives of minority groups in civil society more successfully steer their grievances through porous institutions of government and legal decision making to affect hate crime law and its implementation than achieve the public commemoration of the evil they have suffered.

HATE CRIME LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

As we review hate crime laws and their implementation in Germany and the United States, we seek to identify structural similarities and differences between memories, law, and enforcement, as well as mechanisms through which collective memory may be translated into law and administrative forms. We shall see that laws against hate feature prominently in both countries, that they grew over time, typically with reference to previous law, that they nevertheless are highly nation specific, and that they reflect central features of national collective memory identified above.

Hate Crime Law in Germany

In Germany, legal concern with hate first appears in the quasi constitution (Basic Law) of 1949, in immediate response to the Nazi regime and the Holocaust, drafted by a group of elder statespersons, several of whom

had themselves been victimized by the Nazi state. Article 3 of the Basic Law, part of a series of articles guaranteeing basic human rights, states in section 3 that no one may be discriminated against or favored because of the person's sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. Importantly, the Basic Law imposes limits on civil rights if these rights are abused to endanger human rights or basic principles of democracy. For example, article 9(2) of the Basic Law limits the right to free association if goals or activities of these associations offend against criminal law or are directed against the constitutional order or against the idea of reconciliation and respect between peoples (*Volkerverständigung*). Further, according to article 21(2), political parties that seek to harm or abolish the democratic order of the Federal Republic can be outlawed. The constitutional limitation of civil rights reflects the memory of the Weimar Republic among members of the Constitutional Council who interpreted the demise of Weimar and the victory of Nazism at least partly as the consequence of a democratic order that was defenseless against the abuses of rights by its enemies (see discussion on Bundestag exhibit above, for an account by one of the Parliamentary Council's members see Schmid [1979] and Lepsius [1993, pp. 229–45]). The council's answer is the creation of a *wehrhafte Demokratie*, that is, a democracy with the means of self-defense, even if this implies the limitation of civil rights in particular situations. Importantly, the Basic Law further links threats against the democratic order with those against minorities and international peace. Finally, according to article 25, general rules of international law are part of federal law. They supersede federal law and immediately constitute rights and duties for residents of the Federal Republic. Clearly, the collective memory of the members of the Parliamentary Council, in combination with constraints set by the occupying powers, colored the Basic Law's central provisions regarding individual rights and the state's remedies against extremism and hate.

The Basic Law's restrictions of civil liberties are specified in path-dependant decisions on provisions of the German criminal code passed during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These provisions impose penalties (typically of up to three years' imprisonment or fines) for extremist activities (*Strafgesetzbuch* 1985) and are described below.

- 1 Paragraph 86 criminalizes membership in parties or associations that are directed against the democratic constitutional order or against the idea of international understanding (*Volkerverständigung*) or activities that are directed at the dissemination of propaganda seeking to continue efforts of any National Socialist association.
- 2 Paragraph 86a prohibits the dissemination of symbols of political parties proclaimed unconstitutional under paragraph 86. Such sym-

bols may include flags, medals, and pieces of uniforms, slogans, and forms of greetings

- 3 Paragraph 130 criminalizes (1) inciting hatred against sections of the population, (2) calling for violent or arbitrary measures against them, and (3) insulting them, maliciously exposing them to contempt, or slandering them (*Volksverhetzung*)
- 4 Paragraph 131 provides for a prison term of up to one year for producing, disseminating, exhibiting, or making available to persons below the age of 18 writings that incite race hatred
- 5 Finally, paragraph 194 determines that insult or slander, if directed against a person who was persecuted during the Nazi regime, or against a deceased person who lost his or her life as a victim of the Nazi regime, can be prosecuted without petition by the victim (as opposed to insult and slander generally) This paragraph is mostly directed against spreading the “Auschwitz lie,” that is, public denial of the existence of extermination camps during the Nazi era

In short, legal protections against hate are posed in general terms Individual groups such as women, gays, Jews, Roma, or immigrants are not spelled out While the Basic Law focuses on individual rights along abstract dimensions of social organization such as sex, parentage, race, language, or homeland and origin, the norms of the criminal code, on the one hand, are even more general They do not list specific dimensions of social organization but seek to protect the constitutional order and minorities generally They are more specific, on the other hand, as they refer to chapters of hate and broad categories of victims in German collective memory They seek to protect “international understanding” (*Völkerverständigung*, paragraph 86), “sections of the population” (paragraph 130) against “race hatred” (paragraph 131), and those persecuted and killed by the Nazi regime (paragraph 194) These protections are further linked with the memory of the Holocaust (paragraph 130) and Nazism (paragraphs 86 and 130) and with lessons drawn for the protection of the democratic order (paragraph 86) Such framing clearly reflects basic features of German collective memory and the cultural trauma of hate as outlined above

Law Enforcement in Germany

Institutionalization of collective memory as law may not reach beyond symbolic significance if law is not enforced The enforcement level also brings new social forces as well as old administrative trajectories to bear We thus briefly examine the consequences of policing history and collective

memory as reflected in legislation for later path-dependent institutionalization at the level of law enforcement

Administrative trajectories reach back to special police forces for the protection of the state that have a long history in Europe generally, dating back into the era of absolute monarchies (Deflem 2002). In Germany they originate in antidemocratic tools of the German Federation (*Deutsche Bund*) of 1815, specifically the Central Investigatory Commission (*Zentraluntersuchungskommission*). Such agencies survived through several mutations into the Weimar Republic until the Nazi regime turned them into centralized, streamlined tools (i.e., information-gathering and executive powers merged) that were no longer subjected to court supervision (Romelt 1977). Despite post-Nazism mistrust against agencies of state protection, the Allies, in a 1947 note to the Parliamentary Council, requested the “creation of central agencies for the collection of intelligence regarding ‘subversive’ elements” (quoted in Romelt 1977, p. 210). This initiative resulted in the Law on the Collaboration between the Federal Government and the States on Issues of the Protection of the Constitution of September 27, 1950, thus creating a new system that adapted the old model of state protection to conditions in the new democratic state. Offices for the protection of the constitution at federal and state levels now collect data on extremist political activities and publish annual reports. These agencies are structurally separated from law enforcement where special units within prosecutors’ offices focus on cases of political extremism (Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 2002). In line with constitutional norms and the criminal code, intelligence gathering and prosecution also include issues of hate and cases of hate crime. They closely reflect the concerns expressed in German hate crime laws, especially their embeddedness in the context of state protection. In the words of one prosecutor whom we interviewed from an “extremism unit” (*Extremismusdezernat*),

It is true that cases of xenophobic violence, also racial violence and political extremism, attract particular attention in the public and here in the prosecutor’s office and all law enforcement authorities. This is expressed in the reporting duty [to the Ministry of Justice]. All major violent offenses will be treated either in the homicide unit—because xenophobic violence constitutes malicious intent which implies mandatory life imprisonment, the highest penalty, or, apart from homicides, offenses with this background [hate] are handled in a special unit.

Organizational specialization is repeated at the level of the police, where “state protection units” (*Staatsschutz*) deal with cases of political extremism and hate-related offenses, from violent offenses to the spraying of xenophobic graffiti. Interviews with prosecutors indicate that collabora-

tion between police and prosecutors is especially close in these specialized units

In addition to organizational specialization, the state also provides training for those who work in specialized units. Interviewees report about regular seminars on radical right activities offered by the prosecutor's office. Such seminars are supplemented by internal memos on court decisions regarding extremism and hate cases and by regular articles in practitioner journals (e.g., *Kriminalistik* and *Juristische Rundschau*)¹⁰

Prosecutors are also aware that the sentencing stage of the criminal justice process provides for opportunities to consider hate motives

There is much discretion in the sentencing decision. Paragraphs 46 and 47 [regarding the purposes of punishment] of the criminal code [*Strafgesetzbuch*] highlight the offender's motives and goals, the state of mind that speaks from the offense. The effects of the offense, the reputation of the Federal Republic in domestic and foreign media—all of these are legitimate considerations. It is due to the Nazi past that the code includes provisions against inciting hatred against peoples, engagement in anticonstitutional organizations—there is nothing comparable in other countries. Downloading juvenile Nazi propaganda from U.S. Internet sites to distribute them here is illegal. The federal legislature has introduced these provisions into the code in light of our past, also because foreign countries keep an eye on us.¹¹

The reference to foreign countries in the last quotation indicates awareness of international concern among prosecutors. This is in line with increased international attention to the enforcement of hate crime laws, following reunification and a wave of antifoign violence in the early

¹⁰ Some uncertainty appears to exist, however, between the prosecution of hate crime for its own sake and its subordination to the goal of state protection. Former federal prosecutor Alexander von Stahl, e.g., stated in the wake of an attack on a group of foreigners in which the offenders proclaimed the Hitler salute that this was evidence of a desire to "re-establish a National Socialist dictatorship in Germany" (Fisher 1992), and thus that these attackers are "endangering the internal security of the German Federal Republic and seeking to liquidate, invalidate, or undermine the basis of [the] constitution" (HRW 1995, p. 60). Von Stahl thus interprets a hate crime in the context of state security and constitutional protection concerns. More extreme, another German prosecutor stated in a media interview that he would decline to get involved in cases where foreigners were attacked unless there was a *political motive* (HRW 1995, p. 59). Similar statements can be found in our prosecutor interviews, even though prosecutors also stressed the public interest in prosecuting hate crimes when offenses against the state are not involved. "In cases of extremism, xenophobia, racism . . . prosecution is always in the public interest [and thus required]."

¹¹ Yet, prosecutors also argue the need to weigh principles of retribution and deterrence with due process and with the principle of rehabilitation, especially in the case of juvenile offenders, as numerous statements in our interviews indicate. They further stress a need to withstand "press sensationalism."

1990s NGOs and foreign politicians alike express concern, while also reporting initiatives by the German government, such as increasing enforcement staff and cracking down on extremists¹²

In short, the recent history of law enforcement in Germany indicates the relevance of several factors highlighted in our theoretical model. First, cultural trauma associated with German history inspires intensified law enforcement. Second, the state, embedded in a web of international affiliations, is the prime carrier through which collective memories of hate are made relevant in law enforcement. Third, renewed international human rights concerns and post-Cold War initiatives affect law enforcement. Finally, administrative trajectories and the legacies of collective memories, partly mediated through law, are reflected in the organization of law enforcement and, through socialization, in the mindsets of its agents.

Hate Crime Law in the United States

The legislation of hate crime statutes in the United States, most thoroughly analyzed by Jenness and Grattet (2001), is a relatively new phenomenon. It began in 1981 in the states of Oregon and Washington. By 1988, 18 states had passed statutes, 28 by 1990, and 41 by 1999. In 1990 the federal government passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act (U.S. Congress 1990) and, in 1994, the Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act. Different from Germany, hate crime law is not associated with law that seeks to protect the state from extremist anticonstitutional activities.

Different states use different legal strategies against hate crime, indi-

¹² Human Rights Watch (HRW 1995), e.g., reports that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*) has enlarged its division to focus on right-wing and xenophobic violence and formed a special task force to coordinate and pool information about right-wing and xenophobic crimes. Later in the same year HRW reports that the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (*Bundeskriminalamt*, BKA) increased its personnel assigned to its division on right-wing extremism, restructured its operations, and established a working group to assist the states in developing strategies to deal with right-wing violence (letter dated September 5, 1994, from the Federal Ministry of the Interior [to HRW]). On the side of the politicians, U.S. Representative Joseph Kennedy, visiting Berlin, openly criticized the Kohl government, saying it did not appear to have any concrete plans to combat rightist extremism (Schiller 1992). Only two days earlier Chancellor Helmut Kohl had "sought to reassure the international community that Germany was doing everything possible to curb right-wing extremism and halt the violence against foreigners" (Dempsey 1992). The temporal coincidence between xenophobic violence and a state visit by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin further fueled international criticism. In response, German authorities engaged in an unprecedented crackdown on right-wing extremists. New political parties were banned, demonstration requests were denied, disturbing-the-peace laws were tightened, the state police agencies (*Landeskriminalämter*) created new positions to deal with right-wing extremism, and police raids occurred with greater frequency (Aronowitz 1994, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 1992).

vidually or in combination (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998) In 1994, the U S Congress passed the Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act, signed into law by President Clinton during that same year Modeled after sentencing enhancement laws passed by the majority of states, it allowed federal judges to impose penalty enhancements of “no less than three offense levels” above the penalty for the parallel crime ¹³ This applies to all cases in which hate can be established as the motive beyond reasonable doubt Like in most state-level laws, U S law identifies status provisions that speak to dimensions of social differentiation race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation

American law thus avoids explicitly seeking the protection of particular groups that have suffered from victimization in the past, instead offering protection to all individuals no matter on which side of these lines of differentiation they fall (e g , women *and* men, blacks *and* whites) In contrast to German law, American law also avoids making reference to historic events that would provide reason for protection (e g , slavery), in line with the lack of references to national terror in the major symbols of cultural trauma reviewed above (e g , memorial days, monuments)

Yet, the list of a specific set of dimensions in the law does allow civil society groups to identify the recognition of their interest in the legislative process It forges a compromise between the individual-rights focus of American doctrine and the avoidance of national evil in collective memory, on the one hand, and the work of civil society groups representing interests of minorities, on the other ¹⁴ This interpretation is in line with work by Jenness (1999), who concludes that interest group activity was important for a group’s inclusion in hate crime legislation, particularly early in the legislative process

In short, the absence of references to domestic evil in American collective memory and the activity of civil society groups and minority representation are both reflected in American hate crime law Yet, consistent with American collective memory, events of *foreign* evil and hate are mobilized by groups in legislative processes Consider a statement by Kevin Berrill, director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) during his testimony before Congress “I would like to point out that many of the witnesses at this hearing will be wearing a pink

¹³ These are murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation, arson, and destruction, damage, and vandalism of property

¹⁴ Multiple interest groups and social movement organizations played a role in the criminalization of hate crimes, including the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, the National Institute against Prejudice and Violence, the Center for Democratic Renewal, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and the National Victim Center (see Jenness and Grattet 2001, pp 32–39)

triangle, which was the badge that identified homosexual inmates of Nazi concentration camps. Although it is an often-overlooked fact, tens of thousands of gay persons were herded into the camps, and, along with the Jews, Roma, and others, were gassed and incinerated. We wear the triangle to remember them and to remind people of the terrible cost" (quoted in Jenness and Grattet 2001, p. 55).¹⁵

Groups strengthen their position though by supporting the memory of historic victimization abroad with statistical and individual accounts of more recent atrocities in the United States. For instance, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) recorded an increase in anti-Semitism between 1979 and the mid-1990s. This not only allowed the ADL to depict anti-Semitism as a serious social problem, but also suggested that data collection efforts were feasible. Subsequently, Senator Simon, at Senate hearings on the Hate Crime Statistics Act, suggested, "If Mr. Schwartz over here with the ADL can collect data on this kind of problem, we ought to be able to do it in the Department of Justice. I think it is an important service that is needed in the nation" (quoted in Jenness and Grattet 2001, p. 53). The NGLTF and the Southern Poverty Law Center undertook similar efforts. These self-collected data, in conjunction with narratives and media coverage of particularly shocking acts of bigotry, helped legitimate and give credibility to the hate crime movement (Jenness and Broad 1997, Jenness 1999, Jacobs and Henry 1996).

In sum, social movements in America created a general discourse on the vulnerability of particular social groups, which ultimately spawned the interest in hate crimes in the political sector. They did so by producing and presenting collective memories and cultural trauma, supporting them with references to the Holocaust, with statistical data, and with accounts of well-publicized, gruesome crimes (Becker 1999). Legislatures, open to the mobilization of such groups, ultimately debated and formally institutionalized the concept of hate crime. Yet, reference to horrors of American history were as absent as they are from the most visible symbols of collective memory. Again, the listing of a range of dimensions of social organization in the law, allowing civil society groups to recognize themselves without granting group-specific rights, constitutes a compromise between the avoidance of national horrors in collective memory and an

¹⁵ Members of Congress are receptive to such references. Senator Hatch, e.g., accompanied by movie director Stephen Spielberg, remarked before the Senate judiciary committee, "To Jewish Americans, who have witnessed and suffered persecution, the desecration, vandalism and burning of synagogues, of the Torah, and of places of business—the defacing of cemeteries and synagogues with swastikas and Nazi slogans are horrible reminders of the intimidation and persecution of the Nazi regime and of the 'blood-libel'." It is well worth remembering the true lesson of *Schindler's List*" (testimony of June 28, 1994).

individual-rights focus of American law, on the one hand, and the groups' mobilization, on the other. In short, our account supports the notion that the shape of American hate crime law can only be understood by considering the complex interaction between the partly contradictory forces of purifying collective memories that give scant attention to past national evil but highlight foreign atrocities, an individual-rights focused legal-political culture, and active civil groups in the context of porous political institutions, where the latter allow for groups' grievances to affect legislation even when these same groups only partially affected collective memory at the highest level of the American state.

Law Enforcement in the United States

The individualizing conception of victims of hate in American law is further institutionalized in the organization of hate crime law enforcement. While the number of prosecutors' offices with specialized hate crime units is currently rising (Jenness, personal communication), until recently only some larger offices, such as Los Angeles County, had units specializing in the prosecution of hate-motivated offenses. Others, such as the trial division of the New York County district attorney's office, work closely with their city police's Bias Crimes Units to investigate these crimes, and some districts have a liaison between police and prosecutors (APRI 2000, p. 21). Yet, it is more likely that prosecutors who normally handle property crimes will prosecute bias crimes involving vandalism, bias assaults are handled by violent crime units, ethnic intimidation by civil rights units, and so on.

In spite of the rarity of specialized offices, and despite the law's focus on individual as opposed to group rights, civil society groups that worked on legislation become active again at the enforcement level. Their engagement is encouraged in suggestions formulated by the APRI (2000), which suggests that prosecutors work with other "critical agencies and groups" when responding to hate crime (p. 15).¹⁶ Groups listed include community groups such as interfaith coalitions and churches, community health and mental health centers, victims' rights organizations, tenant resident associations, and minority or community media and newspapers (APRI 2000, p. 19).

Not only do prosecutors' offices appear to engage in regular exchanges with civil society groups, but the training of prosecutors on hate crime issues is also often facilitated by groups who are carriers of hate-related collective memories. "We seek to train and inform law enforcement about

¹⁶ The APRI describes itself as "the research, training, and technical assistance affiliate" of the National District Attorneys Association.

the issue of hate crime and how we might improve law enforcement practices" (paraphrase of an interview with an interest group attorney) Correspondingly, a prosecutor we interviewed reported about attending a meeting facilitated and funded by the Simon Wiesenthal Center In addition to their participation in training sessions, individual prosecutors report about information materials sent to them by traumatized groups While the "state," as represented by the Department of Justice and other agencies, also plays a role in training, and despite considerable state-movement interpenetration (Wolfson 2001), only one of the American interviewees attended a conference administered by the Justice Department

The localized organization of hate crime law enforcement and the strong role of local victim group mobilization appear to color prosecutors' cognitions and attitudes One prosecutor who attended training sessions facilitated by gay and lesbian organizations frequently referred to hate crime in the context of crimes against homosexuals¹⁷ Others contacted by race-based groups focused on race-based hate crimes in their interview responses¹⁸ What prosecutors see as typical hate crimes appears to vary with their group-initiated exposure to issues of hate

In short, our qualitative materials support our theoretical expectations First, international scripts do not noticeably affect law and law enforcement in the internationally less dependent United States Second, in line with quantitative research on the implementation of hate crime law as an outcome of social movement activity (McVeigh et al 2003, King 2004, 2005), its enforcement in the United States is strongly affected by activities of civil society groups in the context of porous institutions Third, specific groups' collective memories, through organization at the local level, inspire local law enforcement practice even if they do not affect collective memory at the national level Fourth, to the degree to which federal law, in combination with an individual-rights-focused political culture, constrains law enforcement organization and action, the latter are also informed by the institutionalization of collective memory at the national level Our exploration thus suggests patterns in which collective memories, crystallized differently at varying levels of society, differentially affect law and law enforcement

¹⁷ One such prosecutor says, "If there are laws saying you can't harm others that are different, I value that law People have been assaulted because of their sexual orientation "

¹⁸ This prosecutor's examples include one of "a Hmong gang vandaliz[ing] a Somali home " Further, he goes on to say, "We just do not see much [hate crime] because we are so white out here " He identified hate crime with race issues alone

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In line with a growing body of literature, our comparative case study has developed an argument about the path-dependant institutionalization of collective memory and cultural trauma in law and law enforcement. Comparative material for Germany and the United States at the level of nation-states has illustrated how collective memory (e.g., Halbwachs 1992, Schumann and Scott 1989, Schwartz 1982, 1996, Fine 2001, Lang and Lang 1988) and cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004) and their activation for political, legal, and moral purposes differ across these two countries. In terms of *substance*, the United States focuses on domestic achievements, liberation from domestic evil, American military contributions to liberation from foreign evil, and the military generally. This contrasts with German collective memory which stresses domestic evil itself and liberation by foreign powers but lacks commemorations of the military. In terms of *logic* of commemoration, the United States tends to avoid reference to collectivities or groups that suffered from domestic evil. In addition, evil is commemorated in isolation from the nation's sociopolitical and historical context. In German collective memory, evil is very much tied to the memory of failing state structures. Memory further embraces specific groups, particularly the victims of the Holocaust and, among these, especially the Jewish victims. It is likely that this focus is at least partly because of international attention directed at Germany and its intense exposure to global scripts.

Further, national memories of hate have become institutionalized in law and in law enforcement at the levels of law texts, organization, training of personnel, and cognitions and attitudes of enforcement agents. Yet, institutionalization differs between law and law enforcement as each is constrained by different institutional conditions.

Regarding law, civil society groups who are carriers of cultural trauma were most active in American legislative processes, and they were heard by legislators (Jenness and Grattet 1996, Jenness 1999, Jenness and Broad 1997). Yet, the absence of domestic group trauma in sanctioned national collective memory, in combination with a political philosophy that stresses individual rights and formal legal procedures (Munch 2000, pp. 21–22), did not allow for the protection of particular group rights in American law. The compromise was an enumeration of several dimensions of social organization (e.g., gender, race, sexual orientation) that establishes the protection of individuals on both sides of the dividing lines from hate crime (e.g., whites *and* blacks, gay *and* straight persons), while simultaneously indicating to mobilized minority groups (e.g., blacks and gays) that their memory was recognized. German law, on the other hand, more directly institutionalizes collective memory, as it creates special protections

for groups victimized by the Holocaust and links these with the protection of the state from extremist anticonstitutional activities. This approach is supported by a political culture in which public interest can be considered preserved even when specific groups are given particular consideration in the law (Munch 2000, pp. 21–22). The historically early legislative activity against hate crimes in Germany likely reflects international attention directed at that country, its particular international dependencies, and the representation of victims of the Nazi regime on the Constitutional Council.

Regarding law enforcement, the countries' collective memories are also reflected in their organization and strategies, even while enforcement is affected by institutional conditions that are specific to this level. In the United States, given the individualistic framing of collective memory and the law, law enforcement against hate is only rarely institutionalized in specialized agencies. Yet, traumatized groups become active again at this level. Relatively free from political philosophies that affect the legislative process, enforcement agencies are receptive to group claims, and the practice of law enforcement can at least partly be understood as a reflection of the activities of civil society groups who are carriers of cultural trauma (McVeigh et al. 2003, King 2004, 2005). German law enforcement is in line with German collective memory and the law that reflects it. Prosecution and police are specialized to enforce simultaneously laws against extremist activities directed against the state and hate crimes against minorities. While the relative lack of active civil society groups as carriers of cultural trauma at the enforcement level may result in a subordination of minority protection to state protection, intensified law enforcement activity after 1993 reflects sensitivity to issues of cultural trauma in light of a wave of antifoigner violence or awareness of global human rights scripts and the international expression of concern in the post-Cold War era (Hagan and Greer 2002, Turk 1982). Such observation is in line with a growing body of neoinstitutional research (e.g., Meyer et al. 1992, Frank et al. 2000, Boyle 2002). Yet, international concerns did not result in an abandonment of national memories but rather in an intensification of previous nation-specific cultural trauma. Further, new international scripts became communicated, filtered, and modified through national institutions (for a different area of law, see Saguy 2000, see also, for economics, Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002).

Collective memory and cultural trauma, in interaction with nation-specific institutional contexts and exposure to global scripts, have thus taken organizational shape. Their effects resemble those of other cultural phenomena such as religious orientations which, in interaction with additional social forces, have shaped laws and institutions of the state (Gorski

2003, Melossi 2001, Savelsberg 2000, 2004) Cultural trauma, a specific form of collective memory—distinct from the Protestant ethic in that it was never a “lightweight coat that could be thrown off at any time” (Weber 2002a, p. 123)—became itself partially independent of its carriers. Even if the institutions of law and law enforcement do not form an “iron cage,” they do channel social action. Our account thus supports the idea of the cultural and institutional path dependency of collective memory (Olick 1999, Shils 1981) and extends the argument into the spheres of law and formally organized institutions.

Finally, more questions and issues have been raised than could be answered. Future systematic time-series analyses of the emergence of collective memory and legal activity would allow for rigorous tests of what we have explored here qualitatively. Further research should also be conducted on applied commemoration, as we called commemoration in the context of decision-making situations such as legislative sessions, as one transmission mechanism in the institutionalization of collective memory. Finally, additional countries should be studied as well as other areas of law making and related state action. This includes compensation programs for victims of national atrocities, the state’s use of force—including military force against foreign evil—and force against its own citizens through means such as imprisonment or the use of capital punishment, legitimized or delegitimized through collective memory. The timeliness of this agenda is highlighted by current-day national and international events and trends.

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Book Reviews

The New Geography of Global Income Inequality By Glenn Firebaugh
Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 2003 Pp 257

Yu Xie
University of Michigan

When I first came to the United States in 1983 as a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, I was overwhelmed by how much money Americans made. Sure, I also noticed inequality in America, but what struck me the most was that almost all Americans were better-off than all Chinese. My parents were medical doctors and had higher salaries than their peers. With a combined income of about \$100 a month, however, they earned only a fraction of what a minimum-wage American worker would earn. As a graduate student in the United States, I was considered rich in China and was therefore expected to bring home luxury items (such as color TVs and cameras), which I did in 1984.

Twenty years later, I am now relatively well paid as a University of Michigan professor. China has changed far more dramatically during that time, however. When I visit China now, I often encounter situations in which friends make a concerted effort to let me know that they are financially more successful. Indeed, the rapid pace of economic development in China over the past 25 years has led to sharp increases in both personal income and income inequality, so that many among the Chinese elite now enjoy standards of living that surpass those commonly seen in America and other industrialized nations.

Personal observations are no substitute for systematic studies. If you want to understand how global income equality has evolved in recent decades and why, look no further. Glenn Firebaugh has provided the most complete, thoughtful, and intriguing study on the subject, *The New Geography of Global Income Inequality*.

Global income inequality can be divided into two components: income inequality *within* countries and income inequality *between* countries. Firebaugh's book centers on the latter—between-nation inequality. We know that income inequality within many countries (such as the United States and China) has been increasing in recent decades. However, the vast majority of global income inequality in the past two centuries has been attributable to between-nation rather than within-nation inequality. Firebaugh divides the history of global inequality into two phases. Phase 1, which occurred between the beginning of Western industrialization in the late 18th century and the middle of the 20th century, was characterized by rapid growth in between-nation inequality. In phase 2, which imme-

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diately followed, Firebaugh observes a reversal of that trend—a steady decline in between-nation inequality. Hence his “new geography of global income inequality” is one of a decreasing trend in between-nation income inequality accompanied by a modest increase in within-nation inequality. Firebaugh provides persuasive explanations for his new geography, chief among which is the spread of industrialization to poor countries and the reduction of distance barriers achieved through advances in technology and the culture of globalization.

This is an outstanding book, showcasing what sociology can offer by enhancing our empirical knowledge of the world. While powerfully conceptualized and methodologically sophisticated, Firebaugh’s case ultimately rests on the analyses of data from the Penn World Table. It is no small task to draw an empirical generalization from the data. Indeed, much of the book is devoted to discussions of measurement issues that may lead to an alternative conclusion—the continuation of the increase in between-nation inequality. Two issues are crucial. First, Firebaugh argues that an international comparison of economic well-being should be based on purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates. Second, because the focus is on individual-level economic well-being, he presents a compelling case that comparisons between nations should be weighted by population size.

As much as I like the book, I encourage readers to appreciate Firebaugh’s excellent scholarship as much for the questions it raises as for the concrete conclusions it reaches. I have a few questions of my own. First, as Firebaugh realizes, his conclusions are mainly driven by a single case: China. China is the most populous nation and has recently experienced rapid economic development. Since his measures are weighted by population size, China exerts overwhelming influence on the decreasing trend of between-nation inequality. How to interpret the rise of economic power in China in the post-1978 period is a complicated issue requiring further research, perhaps into the role of social institutions. Second, the national average of personal income, the raw material for the study, contains no information about within-nation variability. Yet, regional (thus geographical) variation and rural-urban difference in income can be very large in some countries (such as China). Would the trend look the same if we disaggregated China geographically? More broadly, should the “new geography” be based merely on discrete, internally homogeneous units called “countries”? If there is good reason for doing so, one would want to include the role of government and economic exclusivity within national boundaries in the discussion. Finally, despite the word “geography” in the book’s title, Firebaugh’s measures of between-nation inequality are not truly geographic, as distances between countries (within a continent) are not considered.

In the final analysis, these questions and comments do not detract from the important contributions made by this book. Firebaugh’s argument is articulate, forceful, and well presented. All who are concerned with issues

of income inequality, scholars and laypersons alike, will find much to learn from this book, as will students seeking to master the art of conducting empirical social science. For these reasons, I highly recommend Firebaugh's latest contribution.

The Pecking Order: Which Siblings Succeed and Why By Dalton Conley
New York, N.Y.: Pantheon, 2004. Pp. 309. \$24.00.

Rebecca L. Sandefur
Stanford University

The American dream notwithstanding, Americans' socioeconomic mobility across generations is limited. More than 40% of children born to families in the bottom quintile of the income distribution themselves end up in the poorest 20% (Bernard Wasow, "Rags to Riches? The American Dream Is Less Common in the United States than Elsewhere" [Century Foundation Guide to the Issues pamphlet, 2004]). The sons of families in the top decile of the income distribution have a greater than 20% chance of arriving in the top decile as adults, and a greater than 40% chance of attaining incomes in the top 20% (Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, "The Inheritance of Inequality," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16(2), 2002). Despite this intergenerational rigidity, conventional models consistently find that family background variables explain a small portion of the inequality between individuals. Thirty years ago, Christopher Jencks and his coauthors attributed 15% of income inequality among adult men to family background (*Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effects of Family and Schooling in America* [Harper & Row, 1973]). Dalton Conley, examining the correlation of adult siblings' incomes, suggests that "only one-quarter of all income inequality is between families" (p. 222, note 3). His goal in *The Pecking Order* is to provide some insight into the substantial disparities that remain.

Conley argues that inequality among children from the same family reflects in part the workings of family status orders, in which some siblings are given more attention, encouragement, education, love, and other resources—and less indifference, discouragement, and abuse—than others. While the evidence comes from a variety of sources, including three national surveys and a selection of past research, the main text reports largely on semistructured interviews with a snowball sample of 175 individuals from 68 families.

Conley paints a complex picture of individual social mobility. Position in the family pecking order is not a simple function of any one factor, such as birth order. Further, the effect of childhood rank on adult socioeconomic outcomes is highly contingent. For example, people who are "outsiders" in their own families, such as those who are extremely religious in families that are not especially devout, often experience "downward

mobility vis-à-vis their siblings" if they grow up in resource-rich families. In contrast, outsider status in a resource-poor family "often acts as a catapult to thrust" the outsider into upward mobility in comparison with siblings (p. 159). Major family transitions—death, divorce, economic and geographic mobility—affect members of the same sibship differently, depending on when they occur during a child's life and how they shake up or stabilize the pecking order. The book is filled with intriguing illustrations of such contingencies.

At the same time, Conley overstates his case. He asserts that "the best way to understand why one person succeeds and another does not" is not to focus on "big amorphous categories like class or economics or race," but rather "to examine differences within families, specifically to compare siblings with one another" (p. 9). Certainly, we can gain insight by doing so. But what are we to make of the fact that "when parents have enough 'class' resources to go around—time, money, and social connections—kids turn out more similarly since parents don't have to choose and can actively compensate for inequalities among their kids" (pp. 13–14)? Or the fact that sibling resemblance in college graduation and occupational prestige is half as large among blacks as among nonblacks (p. 16)? One could turn Conley's analysis on its head and suggest that the "big amorphous categories" explain a great deal here. Among the advantages of higher class or white skin appears to be protection from the creation of patterns of unequal investment in children and from adverse consequences of being lower in sibling status orders.

Conley's findings suggest another way in which family pecking orders might be understood as a subplot in a larger drama. The unequal distribution of sibling resemblance may not simply reflect complex patterns of intergenerational inheritance, but also work to legitimate the broader structure of inequality. Conley's analysis of the Study of American Families finds that people are most likely to nominate siblings as both their most and least successful relatives. When asked to explain that relative's success, the most common responses concern character: having a good work ethic, setting goals, being "motivated." If siblings' adult socioeconomic outcomes are less alike among disadvantaged families than among the better-off, this occurs because some siblings in disadvantaged families move up in adulthood. This pattern ensures that many, if not most, poor and working-class people will know someone who experienced circumstances similar to their own and yet "made it," whose success they are likely to attribute to hard work, good values, and persistent effort, rather than to concrete economic policies, institutionalized discrimination, good luck, or parental favoritism. Rather than understanding sibling pecking orders as primary engines of inequality, we might see them as mechanisms of the imperfect social reproduction of the "bigger" units of social organization.

This book is written for a general audience rather than for scholars. The emphasis throughout is on illustrations rather than abstractions.

Readers will find a provocative presentation of intriguing life stories that sheds light on the mechanisms through which social class, race, and gender, as well as migration, religiosity, and sexuality, interact with the internal dynamics of families to create the intergenerational mobility and stasis we observe. If we are lucky, scholars will read this book and be pushed to think more subtly about social mobility and social reproduction.

Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men
By Maria Charles and David B. Grusky. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp. xvii+381. \$55.00.

George Farkas
Pennsylvania State University

This book shows how much can be gained from the right analytic distinction. The authors distinguish between horizontal occupational segregation that segregates men and women across the manual-nonmanual divide, and vertical occupational segregation where men tend to occupy the most desirable occupations on each side of this divide. This enables progress in solving four puzzles. First, why, despite widespread occupational sex segregation, is such segregation only weakly correlated with occupations' socioeconomic status? Second, is the pattern of occupational sex segregation similar across nations, or does it vary widely as a consequence of idiosyncratic cultural, political, and institutional practices? Third, why do gender-egalitarian countries have particularly high rates of occupational sex segregation? Finally, why, despite the rapid expansion of gender-egalitarian beliefs in many countries, has occupational sex segregation been slow to decline in these countries?

The introductory chapter raises these questions and then addresses them by examining the way that the mechanisms causing sex segregation operate in the horizontal and vertical domains. These mechanisms include employer, institutional, and statistical discrimination, worker preferences, self-evaluations, expected sanctions, and labor force commitment, and employer and worker social networks. Key points include the following. Horizontal segregation is strongly supported by the correspondence between the task requirements of manual and nonmanual jobs and the individual traits regarded as essentially female or male (gender essentialism). Vertical segregation is supported by beliefs in male primacy. The spread of gender-egalitarian values has undermined vertical, but not horizontal forms of segregation. Economic forces such as the expansion of the service sector and the economic rationalization occurring via the growth of large discounters have tended to draw many less elite women workers into the lower levels of nonmanual occupations. This discussion is masterful and deserves wide readership.

The second chapter is tougher going. The focus is on measures of sex

segregation and is relatively technical. The authors argue that conventional segregation indices are inadequate to the tasks set for them. Instead, a twofold strategy is needed. First, researchers should move away from measures, such as the index of dissimilarity, that are affected by the marginal distributions of female labor participation and occupational composition. Second, researchers should utilize multiplicative models for contingency tables, which test for alternative sex-segregation regimes in a margin-free way.

The remainder of the volume applies this advice to the analysis of cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Two chapters analyze cross-national variability in occupational sex segregation at a point in time. Three chapters analyze the evolution over time of sex segregation in each of three nations—the United States, Japan, and Switzerland. A final empirical chapter brings industrial structure into the study of U.S. occupational segregation. The volume concludes with a summary of findings and a discussion of the future of occupational sex segregation.

The answers to the four puzzles are as follows. First, although men dominate the best occupations within both the nonmanual and manual sectors, this emerges clearly only when the horizontal distinction between these sectors is explicitly modeled. Thus, a three-parameter model is the minimum necessary to represent sex-segregation regimes appropriately: one parameter for the overrepresentation of women in nonmanual occupations and one parameter each for the tendency for men to dominate the most desirable nonmanual and manual occupations.

Second, once the three-parameter model is fit to cross-national data on major occupational groups, one observes a “deep structure” of segregation that holds in all countries. However, extensive variation exists at the level of detailed occupational groupings, reflecting the “loose coupling” of segregative practices amid national differences in cultures, politics, and institutions.

Third, gender-egalitarian countries continue to manifest high levels of occupational sex segregation because horizontal segregation is particularly strong there. Women with gender-traditional identities have been drawn into the routine (lower-level) nonmanual sector, which is increasingly sex segregated. This reflects the “different but equal” norm in gender-egalitarian countries such as Sweden.

Finally, gender integration has proceeded slowly because the cultural and structural forces associated with modernity have differential effects on horizontal and vertical segregation. In particular, egalitarian cultural ideals have proven to be compatible with essentialist occupational distinctions, and postindustrial economic restructuring has increased the flow of women into jobs toward the bottom of the nonmanual occupational hierarchy.

The authors conclude that even though liberal egalitarianism will continue to erode vertical segregation, an essentialist logic of “separate but equal” will continue to support horizontal segregation. This leads to a

discussion of the future of female-disadvantaging essentialism, which provides a suggestive basis for future studies

This book is a major contribution. It is required reading for anyone wishing to understand gender differences in the world today

The Sociology of Financial Markets Edited by Karin Knorr Cetina and Alex Preda Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 Pp. xii+319

Bruce G. Carruthers
Northwestern University

Financial markets have a special and contradictory relationship to sociological ideas about modernity. Of the agents of capitalist globalization, financial markets are among the most feared as their travails can overturn governments and decimate national economies. They contain the purest expressions of means-ends rationality but at the same time are populated by irrationally exuberant investors who blindly follow each other over financial cliffs. In existence for centuries, financial markets remake themselves endlessly as the leading edge of creative destruction. They operate in *gemeinschaft*-scale locales like Wall Street in New York or the City in London, but they are also electronically dispersed throughout a digitally anonymous world. And yet until now sociologists have shown little sustained interest in financial markets. The situation is clearly changing, however, and this welcome volume reveals that there are many different ways to apprehend these fascinating and perplexing institutions.

Some of the 14 chapters are obviously excerpted from ongoing research projects and have a summary quality that gives the reader only a taste of the larger argument. Others are free-standing productions that fully grapple with the questions they pose. In general, the quality of the chapters is high. The volume presents a refreshingly transatlantic selection of authors and reveals to good effect some of the differences between American and European approaches to economic sociology. It is also clear that many different approaches can make useful contributions: the sociology of science, network analysis, neoinstitutionalism, cultural sociology, detailed case studies, and ethnography.

There is too much in this volume to summarize it exhaustively, but a number of chapters particularly caught my eye. Donald MacKenzie develops a sociology of arbitrage that points out how fundamental its assumption is to formal financial economics. Beunza and Stark study search behavior in a Wall Street trading room, arguing that arbitrage involves not just the exploitation of price differences but also the management of valuation differences. Zorn et al. do a very nice job of showing how three external constituents (institutional investors, takeover firms, and financial analysts) were able to reshape U.S. corporate strategy and structure during the late 1980s and 1990s, and so end the conglomerate era. Richard Swed-

berg puts "conflict of interest," a legal idea at the heart of many recent corporate scandals, into proper sociological perspective. Davis and Robbins show how corporate director interlocks affect firm governance but not performance. And Alex Preda offers an interesting cultural history of the investor, a specific social role whose legitimacy has been critical in shaping modern financial markets.

Several important themes cut across the chapters. The first, underscored particularly in the chapter by Karin Knorr Cetina, is that action in financial markets is reflexive and performative. That is, people have ideas and theories about what it is they do (or are supposed to do) and they enact them (they also often have ideas about what everyone else is doing). When such ideas and theories appear to correspond with reality, it is not that they are "true" in any simple fashion, but rather that action is being self-consciously undertaken in conformity with them. They can be made true, but they matter even as fictions, if enough people act on them. As ideas change, so does action, and such feedbacks impart to financial markets an inescapably dynamic quality.

Another big theme is that cognition is distributed. Interpretation and action are not undertaken by monadic individuals or autonomous rational actors. Instead, people are joined together in various ways (loosely or tightly, formally and informally, and in technologically mediated fashion) that distribute the process of cognition across many minds and through various technical devices. People think together using their Bloomberg terminals, option-pricing models, and informal social networks. Much of their activity involves making collective sense of inherently uncertain situations in which preferences, alternatives, and consequences are, to varying degrees, unknown. Making sense of uncertainty has become highly formalized (as Power indicates in his discussion of risk management). Some interpretations are enormously powerful (witness the reaction to pronouncements of the Federal Reserve Board), while others contribute more as equals in an ongoing debate among competing understandings. But all such interpretations must be constructed by combining ideational materials with a stratum of social relations and networks.

Another common thread emphasizes the embeddedness of financial markets. Given how central "embeddedness" has become for economic sociology, no one should be surprised to see it appear multiple times. But given claims about how rationalized and abstracted financial markets have become, they offer a strong test of embeddedness arguments. Nevertheless, no matter how formal, mathematical, electronic, or computerized they become, these markets do not escape their coextension with networks of social relationships. Indeed, their ability to function may be critically dependent on such networks. Which relations matter varies from situation to situation, and so sometimes gender structures markets, or sometimes local communities, director interlocks, or formal deliberative bodies. Overall, the editors have done a nice job pulling together a volume on such a fertile area of research.

Gurus, Hired Guns, and Warm Bodies Itinerant Experts in a Knowledge Economy By Stephen R. Barley and Gideon Kunda Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. vii+342. \$29.95.

Jeremy Reynolds
University of Georgia

Gurus, Hired Guns, and Warm Bodies provides an ethnographic account of contingent work in the high-tech labor market of Silicon Valley. Rather than praising or decrying contingent work, the authors draw on massive amounts of data to depict the work experiences of computer programmers, database managers, and other technical contractors. They show that contingent work is not always unambiguously good or bad, but, more important, they highlight the many trade-offs and complex interactions that technical contracting requires.

The book begins by highlighting the complexities of technical contracting. The authors note that contractors both liked and disliked their work. Many were reluctant to start contracting but learned to value that lifestyle and even turned down permanent jobs. Contractors also managed complex, triadic employment relationships and were not simply pawns of large organizations. Finally, the authors argue that the debate about contingent work should not be misconstrued as a choice between market- and organization-based work. They maintain that occupation-based approaches to organizing work offer a third option and thus hint at the predictions they make later regarding the emerging postindustrial economy.

The authors then describe the major players in technical contracting: clients, contractors, and agencies. Clients hire contractors for many reasons. The practice helps them reduce labor costs, increase numerical and functional flexibility, and inflate stock prices. Contracting arrangements also allow clients to screen potential employees and to complete tasks that permanent employees avoid. Contractors themselves often started contracting to avoid the politics, incompetence, and inequality they saw as permanent employees. Many expected contracting to provide more money, flexibility, and autonomy than permanent employment. In other ways, contractors were heterogeneous. Only some chose to become self-employed, and they had different kinds and levels of expertise. Furthermore, some did routine work, whereas others were hired as gurus and supervised permanent employees. Staffing agencies earn money by matching contractors with clients, a task that is complicated by the technical nature of computer work. Many agencies respond to that challenge by focusing on volume and service, but some impressed clients and contractors with their technical understanding.

The authors reveal the inner workings of the market by showing how contractors, clients, and agencies interact and negotiate deals. Typically, contractors and clients prefer to avoid the costs of agency matches. Nev-

ertheless, their business networks are typically too small or inefficient to ensure quick and appropriate matches, and they ultimately turn to agencies for help. The actors, however, have separate goals. Agencies try to maximize profits by adjusting their markup, balancing volume and quality, and preventing contractors and clients from talking. Clients try to reduce costs and uncertainty by making special deals with small numbers of agencies. Finally, contractors attempt to maintain control by seeking information about markups and playing agencies against each other.

The book also provides an insightful analysis of the social ambiguities that contractors face. Agencies are not concerned with keeping contractors happy after matching them with clients. Furthermore, clients are often unsure of how to handle contractors, treating them like regular employees is legally dangerous and sometimes bad for morale, but segregating them limits their effectiveness. Consequently, contractors often find work socially awkward, and they must manage their behaviors, relationships, and professional identities to make their interactions at work tolerable.

The final section of the book describes the cycle of contracting. The authors note that contractors valued flexibility but worked many hours and took few vacations because they were hypersensitive to the opportunity costs of not working and could not predict periods of unemployment. Furthermore, contractors worked incessantly to maintain "job security" (i.e., the ability to find another job). Developing human capital was crucial, but it was also risky because the demand for specific skills changed quickly. Developing social capital was less risky but equally demanding, and contractors tried to build large, heterogeneous networks while maintaining their personal reputations and attending to norms of reciprocity. The authors do a nice job of exposing some of the hidden costs of contracting. My only regret is that they did not examine how contractors' work experiences affect their spouses and children.

The book concludes with the intriguing prediction that the future will bring a resurgence of occupation-based work and a "matrix economy" built on the temporary intersection of occupations and organizations. The authors could do much more to justify their prediction and clarify the nature of a matrix economy. They could also do more to relate their findings to less skilled occupations. These shortcomings, however, do not devalue their careful and nuanced depiction of technical contracting. They dutifully acknowledge, for instance, that focusing only on active contractors and gathering data during an economic boom may have influenced their conclusions. Ultimately, Barley and Kunda provide a valuable study that is sure to appeal to those interested in the various manifestations of contingent work or the inner workings of labor markets.

Reorganizing the Rust Belt: An Inside Study of the American Labor Movement By Steven Henry Lopez Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 2004 Pp xxii+292 \$55.00 (cloth), \$21.95 (paper)

Steven P. Dandaneau
University of Dayton

A stable market exists for books that claim to have located a specific labor movement. Its origin must lie in the unjust contradictions, exploitation, and irrationality inherent in capitalist property relations, and it must portend the revitalization of the sacred ghost of labor movement past (a spiritual force that, once revealed again in material form, shall tame the wickedness of ascendant postindustrial capitalism). This labor movement must also promise to deliver one day workplace and economic democracy for all, and universal health insurance in the meantime. The American labor intellectual's holy trinity has not changed appreciably in 100 years.

Steven Henry Lopez's revised Berkeley dissertation in sociology should succeed magnificently in this consumer niche. *Reorganizing the Rust Belt* provides sufficient evidence of organized labor's existence to nurture continued belief in Christmas (though perhaps not Santa Claus). It is likely to be gratifyingly received by the American labor intelligentsia as a gift neatly wrapped by arguably the nation's premier university press in sociology and authored by one of the discipline's brightest new leading lights.

Truth be told, however, only labor unions exist any longer. But, not unlike members of minority groups the world over, even enormous labor unions are relatively invisible in the United States. Many a serious student of contemporary society may not be aware, for example, that the largest and fastest-growing labor union in the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico is the AFL-CIO's Service Employees International Union (SEIU), which boasts a total membership of 1.7 million, over 500,000 of whom joined between 1996 and 2002 alone. Lopez's study is strategically and usefully situated within this important if also relatively invisible development and is based on fieldwork, interviews, and archival research conducted in 1997–99. In search of a setting in which “the new labor movement must really confront the legacies of the old” (p. xix), Lopez settled himself in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and took up arms with the local SEIU.

The book divides into three main parts. Part 1 analyzes antiunion attitudes among workers via comparison of an unsuccessful and, one year later, a successful organizing campaign at a single Pittsburgh-area nursing home. Part 2 addresses the “internal organizational limitations” of bureaucratically encumbered servicing unions through comparative analysis of an antiprivatization campaign and a bitter contract negotiation, both of which transpired within the Pittsburgh public-sector nursing home.

industry (p. 19). Entitled "Social Movement Unionism: Challenging the Power of Capital," part 3 describes two phases of a two-year statewide "struggle" by SEIU against the politico-legal "union busting" practices employed by "MegaCorp Enterprises, a giant for-profit nursing home company" (p. 23). For Lopez, "the organization of the book parallels the organization of social movement unionism itself" (p. 24).

Indeed, in addition to presenting the results of his "inside study" of labor organizing, contract, and public relations efforts in Pennsylvania's nursing home industry, Lopez challenges established social movement theory. On the one hand, Lopez observes that SEIU activists "viewed their activities as self-conscious attempts to turn organized labor from an ossified relic into a vital social movement" (p. 215). On the other hand, Lopez himself was "struck" by "how *difficult* mobilization was, how great the obstacles to it, how complex the problems actors struggled with" (p. 217, original emphasis). Lopez conceptually resolves this apparent paradox accordingly: "It is only by focusing attention on the *difficulties* involved in collective action that the creativity and agency of movement actors can be fully appreciated" (p. 218, original emphasis). Lopez then argues that his resulting social movement analysis of "nested obstacles" allows him to "incorporate *both* agency *and* structure into the analysis on an equal basis, something that has largely eluded analysis of social movements to date" (p. 218, original emphasis).

While *Reorganizing the Rust Belt* will be of interest to students of postindustrial work and occupations, labor studies, and social movement theory, its lasting public significance is likely to rise or fall with the number of citizens (measured in quantities of millions) who come to agree with Lopez's unapologetic political assumption that today's "McNursing home" low-wage workers and their postindustrial comrades at Wal-Mart and elsewhere "need a revitalized labor movement capable of forcing service employers to pay a fair day's wage for a fair day's work" (p. xv). Lopez concludes his study on exactly this note, but with forced optimism. After all, he writes, "Twenty years ago no one in labor's mainstream thought it possible to organize low-wage nursing home workers" (p. 221). If, in 2024, Wal-Mart stores are closed shops run by the sons of Sweeney instead of the sons of Sam, then *Reorganizing the Rust Belt* will be justly regarded as prescient. In the meantime, I suggest we pray for universal health insurance.

Democracy's Voices Social Ties and the Quality of Public Life in Spain
By Robert M. Fishman Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004 Pp
xi+194 \$29.95

Stephen Hart
State University of New York—Buffalo

In this innovative study of democratic discourse, Robert Fishman works in the traditions of both Tocqueville and Gramsci—not the most usual combination. His basic concern is with the quality of democracy—with lively debate and citizen involvement—rather than with its institutional forms. The kind of quality he foregrounds is robust discourse, carried on not only or primarily by politicians and media but by municipal-level leaders and activists as well. The particular dimension on which he focuses is “discursive horizons”, that is, globalizing discourse that links local and broader concerns, as opposed to localistic discourse lacking such links. Fishman seeks the sources of robust discourse in civil-societal social bonds, particularly as they are found in local communities. The factor to which he gives most weight—here Gramsci becomes central—is the strength of ties between local working-class leaders and intellectuals in their vicinity. Where those bonds are strong, he argues, globalizing and otherwise robust discourse is more likely.

Thus Fishman’s analysis complements recent work that describes the workings and implications of more versus less robust forms of discourse. Fishman provides insight as to the *social sources* of robust discourse. His argument will be of interest to graduate students and scholars concerned with democratization, political culture, and social movements, and to those working in the Tocquevillian or Gramscian tradition.

The empirical field upon which Fishman confronts these questions is that of contemporary Spain, where he conducted a nationwide survey of local working-class leaders and a round of in-depth interviews with some of them. This was a major and difficult undertaking, with a sample of over 300 spread among essentially all Spanish municipalities with a large working-class population. The quantitative data are interesting and important in themselves, and I hope that scholars will use them for secondary analysis; the qualitative data are fascinating, with often quite moving statements. The working-class leaders from whom we hear are thoughtful and inspiring; many suffered and persevered under the oppression of the Franco years.

Central to Fishman’s analysis is a distinction between the socialist and postcommunist strands within the Spanish left. All of his empirical analysis is carried out separately on each part of his sample, and the results are often different. He also distinguishes between formal and informal ties between intellectuals and working-class leaders. Ties that include an informal component, by and large, do more to promote robust discourse.

Fishman first describes the kinds and frequency of worker-intellectual

ties In Spain these are quite prevalent, involving 70% of his working-class leaders Next he gives definitions and examples of localistic and globalizing discourse, using two pairs of nearby cities, with one in each pair using predominantly one kind of discourse A characteristic demand in the localist category is for protecting all the jobs at a local factory On the globalization side, an example would be the assertion of the right of every citizen to a good job in the region in which they live, with a call for regional reindustrialization strategies to instantiate that right

He then shows how, under some conditions, ties between working-class leaders and intellectuals promote wider discursive horizons After a critique of social capital theory, in which he argues, theoretically and on the basis of these data, that the bonds he is studying are not well understood as just another example of social capital, he confronts a wide variety of alternate explanations for his basic findings through trivariate descriptive analyses and then a logistic regression analysis The data largely support his basic hypothesis, although the expected link between worker-intellectual ties and globalizing discourse is absent among members of the socialist strand of the left His explanation is that since the Socialist Party was in power for much of the recent past (from 1982 to 1996, and from 2004 on), links with intellectuals had more to do with negotiating access to power than with wide-ranging discussion of issues It appears that being in opposition is a major influence on the nature of discourse

Two key issues about Fishman's argument have to do with the generalizability that Fishman claims (with caveats and tentativeness, to be sure) to other nations and to other kinds of cross-group bonds These issues are connected In the United States, bonds between intellectuals and working-class leaders, and other leaders of progressive social movements with an economic justice focus, are definitely present but involve (as far as I can tell with no systematic data) relatively few intellectuals On the other hand, these bonds are much in evidence in noneconomic issue areas with local leaders in feminist, gay rights, and antiwar movements And the United States has a long history of cross-class organizations, such as fraternal associations and, in some cases, churches The bonds created in such organizations could easily be argued to have worked more often against than for robust public discourse, although there are exceptions, such as contemporary congregation-based community organizing The ties between intellectuals and noneconomic progressive movements in the United States, on the other hand, do seem to strengthen public discourse Intellectuals, I think, play a somewhat distinctive role rather than being a pole in yet another instance of cross-group connections And that role, in countries beyond Spain, may well have much in common with what Fishman describes, in what it means for the discourse of the progressive movements and leaders that in each national context are able to forge links, in local communities, with intellectuals Such leaders may not be as socially different from intellectuals as in Fishman's case, so the ties are less striking but arguably equally important Consideration of how

the processes attended to by Fishman operate in very different contexts will extend what we learn from this important contribution to our understanding of democracy and public discourse

Empowered Participation Reinventing Urban Democracy By
Archon Fung Princeton, N J Princeton University Press, 2004 Pp
x+278 \$39.50

Patrick J. Carr
Rutgers University

How is democracy possible in modern society? Specifically, what are the prospects for participatory forms of democracy in complex bureaucracies? How can we solve the problem of the public and encourage civic participation in increasingly complex and often remote public institutions? In a detailed and often compelling account, Archon Fung considers these questions by assessing the separate experiments in empowered participation undertaken by the Chicago Public Schools and the Chicago Police Department since the late 1980s. Empowered participation occurs when ordinary citizens have the capacity not only to participate in decision making, but also to shape actively the outcomes of such deliberation. The reforms that created local school councils (LSCs) and the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) provide the backdrop against which Fung details case studies in three Chicago neighborhoods—three school councils and three police beats.

The crucial institutional form of empowered participation is what Fung terms “accountable autonomy,” where decentralization and deliberation occur in equal measure. Accountable autonomy showcases the practices of directed discretion, local innovation, and cross-functional coordination, in essence, where ordinary citizens and officials work together and with other agencies to solve local problems. Accountable autonomy is distinct from other forms of devolved governance in that it balances inputs from centralized authorities with the needs and wishes of local citizens through the crucial linkage of organizers and facilitators, who instruct locals in the rudiments of problem solving.

Empowered Participation provides some much-needed empirical endeavor to a field that is mostly theoretical, and, in this regard, the most engaging parts of the work are the case studies of police beats and LSCs in action. Here, Fung’s keen observations, and his ability to make sense of his data in a theoretically rigorous and meaningful manner, bring the sometimes dense foregrounding to life in a compelling fashion. Notably, Fung reports that even in neighborhoods that lack resources, or where internal differences have crippled local institutions, citizens gained more from accountable autonomy arrangements than they did from bureaucratic organizational forms. That positive change is possible in poor neigh-

borhoods, and, over a short span of time, is encouraging from a practical standpoint and noteworthy from a theoretical perspective. Popular theories, such as strong egalitarianism or social capital, argue that the empowered participation model will be more beneficial to the better-off, either by reinforcing existing inequalities (egalitarianism) or by having difficulties getting started in the first place (social capital). Fung offers a great deal of evidence to encourage us to rethink these theories with respect to citizen efforts to improve education and public safety.

As good as *Empowered Participation* is, I have several issues with the argument and the style of the book. The most serious critique I have of this work is that the author has ignored, or is unaware of, a large amount of social science research that could have added considerably to the work, both in terms of generalized notions (e.g., collective efficacy) and in terms of more specific data on the Chicago landscape. The omission of the considerable work of Robert J. Sampson and his colleagues on the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods is both glaring and debilitating. For instance, where Fung speaks of "institutional performance gains" he might very well have noted this as an increase in collective efficacy. In essence, the political science and sociological literatures are talking past one another about similar processes, problems, and issues, and I cannot help but feel that much more is to be gained by critical engagement than by benign neglect. Fung is not alone in failing to capitalize on advances in a sister discipline—I number myself among the guilty parties—but future work should be mindful of the potential of interdisciplinary synthesis.

I have a few other critiques which are less fundamental but noteworthy. At times, I felt that the detail, particularly in the first few chapters, overwhelmed the narrative, and that the historical setups in particular could have benefited from a stricter pruning. Also, I wonder how accessible this work is to the practitioners that Fung purports to reach. The prose in *Empowered Participation* is, at times, opaque and jargon laden, and I wonder how many local school councillors and beat facilitators would have the patience to stay the course. Finally, I felt that the international examples that were elucidated in the final chapter were unnecessary and superfluous.

The forgoing criticisms notwithstanding, *Empowered Participation* is an important work which anyone interested in community organization, civic engagement, community policing, and democratic theory should read. Indeed, the major strength of this work is its ability to speak cogently to such a disparate set of literatures. Fung illustrates that citizens can ameliorate local schools and contribute to public safety given crucial resources and opportunities, and he demonstrates that market-based or hierarchical institutions are neither the sole nor inevitable solutions to the problems that beset public institutions.

Fascists By Michael Mann Cambridge Cambridge University Press,
2004 Pp 429 \$65 00 (cloth), \$23 99 (paper)

Roger Eatwell
University of Bath

This volume consists of 10 chapters. The first two are essays on the nature of fascism and comparative theories of success and failure. There then follow six national case studies of interwar Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Spain, with two chapters devoted to Nazism. A concluding chapter briefly examines alleged post-1945 manifestations of "fascism", concluding that essentially it was a "European-epochal" movement.

Mann begins by arguing that fascism was a "major political doctrine of world-historical significance," based on a serious body of thought that sought to create a "new man" and to forge a nation that would transcend class divisions. This view has become increasingly common in recent years, though it is still contested by major historians like Robert Paxton who see fascism as essentially conservative and opportunistic. However, while Mann makes some sharp points about existing interpretations, he ultimately has nothing new to say about the mercurial syncretic matrix of ideas that inspired fascists, including many intellectuals. Indeed, he manages to miss vital dimensions of this issue, especially the importance of geopolitics to fascist thinking, including the way in which war was seen as endemic in the international system and the implications of the rise of new powers such as Japan and the Soviet Union, with the latter posing a dual threat through its links to domestic communist parties.

The originality of this book lies more in its analysis of *support* for fascism, especially during its movement rather than regime phase (in most cases fascists did not achieve office through the ballot box, but rather by force of arms). Mann argues that many accounts of fascism are far too simplistic or one-sided. For example, there are regional ones, which posit that fascism was strongest in Catholic countries and weakest in the more Protestant northern Europe. There has also been a strong tendency for analyses to take either a nationalist-idealist approach or a socio-economic-materialist approach. Thus a common recent explanation of the former type revives the idea that fascism was an affective "political religion," while the classic approach of the latter type derives from the Marxist positions that fascism was either the movement of capitalism in crisis or of a pressured middle class.

Mann argues that the rise of fascism needs to be understood especially within the broader perspectives that he has developed over the years on the "sources of social power" namely, ideological, economic, military, and political. He points out that fascism, or at least some form of authoritarian right-wing response to the threat from the left, tended to be greatest where the executive relied on a relatively narrow power base and party systems were not well implanted. There was no simple geographical pattern of

success, though in general, democracy was more firmly planted in northern rather than southern and eastern Europe. And there certainly was no simple religious correlation, though religion tended to legitimize fascism where it was successful. Indeed, it is important to stress that Nazism was most successful in Protestant areas.

Mann goes on to identify a series of core constituencies that formed the basis of fascist movements. The first were ones favoring paramilitarism, especially young men influenced by the impact of war and institutions that encouraged militarism, such as schooling and a politicized military. The second were groups that were attracted by fascism's claims to "transcendence," typically those in sectors not in the front line of the struggle between capital and labor. Third, fascism appealed to nation-statist constituencies, such as veterans, those living in contested peripheral areas, and especially among state employees. As such, fascism appealed across class boundaries. Nor were these supporters the typical "atomized" man (and woman, for many females turned to fascism) of mass society theory. Indeed, fascism was often most successful where uncivil society was densest, for example, in Protestant small-town and rural Germany.

Although based on secondary sources, this constitutes arguably the most systematic analysis of fascist support ever undertaken within a comparative framework. Nevertheless, there are some notable flaws. For instance, many of the Nazis' public-sector supporters previously supported other right-wing parties. Why did they change after 1928, especially given the fact that they often had strong group attachments? One approach would be to stress the reorganization of the Nazi Party after 1928 and the remarkable campaigning efforts that went into some localities. Another explanation would be to focus on Hitler's charisma, aided by the media publicity given to him by the media baron Alfred Hugenberg in the 1929 campaign against reparations. It is not necessary to resort to simple political religion approaches to hold that charisma is a useful tool. Another way of conceiving the impact of charisma is to see it in terms of low-cost signaling of the new Nazi economic policies targeted at specific groups. The ability of leadercentric parties to lower cognitive dissonance is another important aspect given how eclectic fascist movements tended to be. Furthermore, the argument about charisma might have been pursued to consider support during the regime phase of fascism, which is largely neglected in this book. Undoubtedly, personality cults developed around the main fascist leaders, but major debates rage about whether leaders like Mussolini ever enjoyed "consensual" support in the mid-1930s.

Sir Ian Kershaw's endorsement on this book's cover states that this is "one of the most original studies of Fascism ever written." There is an element of exaggeration here, for the work builds on important earlier studies, including the sociology of Juan Linz and the comparative history of Stanley Payne. Nevertheless, this is a very good book—and some of the lacunae about the regime phase are rectified in a companion volume that considers ethnic cleansing more generally (*The Dark Side of De-*

mocracy [Cambridge University Press, 2004]) Together, they certainly confirm Kershaw's endorsement of Mann as "the outstanding historical sociologist of his generation "

Democracy without Representation The Politics of Small Industry in Mexico By Kenneth C Shadlen University Park Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004 Pp xvi+208 \$65 00

Leslie C Gates
Binghamton University

This study tackles the formidable task of teasing out democratization's influence from the well-known negative effects of economic liberalization on small industry With a focus on small industry's declining ability to regularly voice its concerns directly to policy makers in Mexico, Shadlen draws our attention to the structural vulnerabilities of key groups in democracies, provides practical guidance to those concerned with improving civic participation in young democracies, and reveals how democratization may have inadvertently aided neoliberalization

Shadlen employs extensive archival research and over 100 interviews to analyze small industry's (firms with up to 250 employees) diminishing representation in Mexico By representation Shadlen means "institutionalized input into policymaking" (p 7) The analysis reveals that, in the early 1990s, policy makers moved away from consulting a range of officially sanctioned business chambers, including the chamber that aggregated small industry's interests (Camara Nacional de la Industria de Transformación, or CANACINTRA), and toward consulting two voluntary peak business associations dominated by industrial-financial conglomerates Historically, CANACINTRA had actively participated in economic policy making, although it did not, according to Shadlen, control Mexico's economic agenda Mexicanists will be particularly interested in Shadlen's use of rarely viewed internal CANACINTRA documents, which reveal that CANACINTRA's leaders were not merely government pawns, but were strategic actors who reluctantly supported Mexico's economic policies favoring giant firms in order to preserve access to public officials

Shadlen demonstrates that CANACINTRA was unable to recover from its demoted status partly because it had to focus on preserving its organizational stability Thus Mexico illustrates Shadlen's proposed "third logic of collective action " Unlike large firms, Shadlen reasons, small industrialists have a hard time securing direct access to policy makers, controlling the agenda of peak business associations, or influencing policy makers through firm-based investment choices Like workers, small industrialists lack sufficient resources to build their own organizations Yet, because they are more isolated from one another than are workers, small

industrialists may have an even harder time than union organizers in monitoring free riders. This third logic of collective action, Shadlen argues, can explain why CANACINTRA prioritized obtaining, in the post-World War II period, and retaining, in the 1990s, state regulations that benefited officially sanctioned business chambers. These regulations required all eligible businesses to pay dues and made it hard for dissidents to establish rogue business chambers. Indeed, CANACINTRA's membership plummeted when legal reforms eliminated these regulations in 1997. Curiously, a sketch of Argentina in the conclusion suggests that small industrialists may be able to solidify their own organization without such state regulations and that doing so may still not secure access to policy making.

Shadlen, nonetheless, deftly delineates how democratization contributed to CANACINTRA's debilitation. While others have documented the mobilization of big firms during the NAFTA negotiations in the early 1990s, Shadlen helps establish their motivation for proactively restructuring state-business relations. Democracy threatened to destabilize the informal yet routinized modes of communication between big firms and policy makers. Big firms sought to institutionalize new modes of interest mediation to ensure their future access to policy makers. Additionally, Shadlen identifies how democratization energized and reinforced a challenge to CANACINTRA from dissident small industrialists. That neoliberal reforms motivated some small industrialists to leave CANACINTRA in the mid-1980s and seek more effective representation through a new organization is certainly not surprising. But Shadlen convincingly shows why their efforts to undermine the state regulations that had historically stabilized CANACINTRA succeeded in 1997: democratization generated public sympathy for their efforts to eliminate institutions associated with Mexico's semiauthoritarian past. By showing how democratization eroded small industry representation, Shadlen also reveals how it may have helped consolidate Mexico's neoliberalization.

Shadlen might have been able to strengthen his argument—that democratization, not just economic reforms, decreased small industry's representation—had he empirically linked CANACINTRA's marginalization from policy making and organizational collapse more directly to declines in actual benefits for small industrialists. CANACINTRA's documents allow Shadlen to demonstrate that CANACINTRA leaders previously secured benefits such as import licenses, protection against colonizing foreign investors, and access to financing for many small industrialists. But the reader must infer that CANACINTRA's political marginalization in the early 1990s and subsequent organizational debilitation directly resulted in fewer real benefits for small industry.

Shadlen's brief comparison of Mexico with Brazil and Argentina illuminates fruitful avenues for future research. The comparison suggests that cross-national variation in how political leaders incorporated business into formal politics during the early part of the 20th century may shape current variations in the degree of small industry representation in un-

expected ways. Although his analysis falls short of systematically developing the theoretical implications of this legacy, it indicates that doing so might help us better understand the shifting geography of Latin America's political dynamics today. This book should help students and scholars of contemporary Latin American politics see the contradictions within fledgling democracies and better grasp the domestic bases for the persistence of neoliberal policies even in the face of the region's current left-leaning political tilt.

Doing Development in Arkansas: Using Credit to Create Opportunity for Entrepreneurs outside the Mainstream. By Richard P. Taub. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2004. Pp. viii+148. \$45 (cloth), \$19.95 (paper).

Ross Gittel
University of New Hampshire

An important issue in community development is how to improve the prospects of depressed areas and expand the economic opportunities for low-income residents in these areas. There have been many theories put forward and thousands of efforts undertaken in the United States and internationally. Yet relatively little progress has been made and new knowledge and insights are needed.

In *Doing Development in Arkansas: Using Credit to Create Opportunity for Entrepreneurs outside the Mainstream*, Richard P. Taub contributes to community economic development knowledge and practice. He provides a detailed case study of the extensive efforts of the Southern Development Bancorporation (Southern) in southern Arkansas in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The Shorebank Corporation, having built a strong national reputation with successful neighborhood revitalization efforts in Chicago, was brought to Arkansas in 1988 by then-governor Bill Clinton, the Winthrop Rockefeller Foundation, and others. Shorebank formed a separate company, the Southern Development Bancorporation, to do development in Arkansas. An ambitious effort was organized at significant cost. It was initiated as an experiment to help transform the area's economy. The efforts by Southern in Arkansas were significant and important to document and assess.

The development approach used in Arkansas was different than Shorebank's focus in Chicago on housing and real estate. Southern in Arkansas gave priority to expanding entrepreneurship and business development. Development efforts were focused on increasing the availability of credit and start-up funds for business enterprises. There were many parts to this, including transplanting approaches that had been successful in other areas such as microenterprise lending (from the Gra-

meen Bank of Bangladesh) and venture capital funding (from high-technology-based economies) Development efforts were targeted toward but not limited to low-income and minority residents

The book's main contributions are its presentation of a detailed case study about an important community economic development effort and the extraction of some useful insights and lessons The book also includes overviews of economic development theories and practices for the relatively uninformed The book is most helpful and insightful for beginning community development practitioners

The key lesson from *Doing Development* is that context matters (a lot) in community economic development (p. 116) In this case, development and managerial approaches that worked in the northern urban context of Chicago, in India with Grameen Bank, and in technology centers with venture capital funding, could not easily be transplanted to the rural South There is also the lesson of who leads development matters In the Southern case, development efforts were led by outsiders The outsiders had different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds than local people Taub finds that having outsiders—without a connection to local people, politics, and networks—lead efforts can inhibit community development

Some other lessons highlighted in *Doing Development* include the limits of focusing development efforts too narrowly when problems are systemic In southern Arkansas increasing the availability of credit and promoting entrepreneurship proved not to be a panacea for local economic development When credit was made available, the demand was low, and extensive marketing and outreach was required to ensure that the newly made available credit was used Then when credit was used, there were high failure rates among the new businesses funded Technical assistance and job training were added and helped advance development efforts

Somewhat more novel lessons from *Doing Development* relate to the design and operations of local development organizations and emanate from the failures and shortcomings of Southern Development Bank-corporation These include the importance of local development organizations' having consistent and transparent development values and operating principles and the benefits of keeping development organizational design and delivery as simple as possible

Other lessons from the book include the importance of being realistic about what can be accomplished, especially in areas such as southern Arkansas, which have never had strong economies and where underlying economic conditions are not favorable There is also the lesson for all development practitioners—especially if they come from outside the community—to be humble and respectful of local people and local culture

The main weakness of the book is inadequate attention to some important issues from the Shorebank experience in Arkansas This includes failure to address adequately the issue of power Taub suggests that the main problems with Shorebank outsiders managing development activity in Arkansas were cultural and related to differences in style between

northern managers and southern people and the inability of outside managers to tap into local development networks and draw on trust and local ties and connections. While banking and using credit to stimulate economic development depend on trust, the “outsider problems” also related to power and politics. There was the real threat of Southern Development Bancorporation displacing the local power structure. The author should have considered this issue in greater depth.

There is also the issue of how development efforts and strategies should differ in urban revitalization situations such as on the South Shore of Chicago compared to “vitalization” efforts in areas such as southern Arkansas which have never had strong economies and are removed from strong central cities. Are strategies based on credit availability and entrepreneurship less likely to work in rural vitalization efforts? And finally, education and linkages to educational institutions are key factors in many areas’ economic development efforts currently—what about in southern Arkansas?

One of the author’s main contributions is highlighting the question and practitioner problem of what it means to “do development” (p. 119), for example, for whom, and to what purpose? While this is not answered in *Doing Development*, the question is an important one for practitioners and scholars to keep asking and thinking about.

While the community development field is better-off because of the efforts of Shorebank in Arkansas and Taub’s detailed study of those efforts, it is not clear that low-income and minority residents of southern Arkansas are better-off. *Doing Development* leaves this question unanswered, as the book ends in 1997 with the takeover of Southern by local elites. And what does it mean to do development if local people do not benefit?

Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor
By Elizabeth C. Dunn. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 204.

Zsuzsa Gille
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

That the best research on postsocialism has been produced by anthropologists (and not by sociologists or political scientists) is something I repeatedly hear from representatives of granting agencies and of professional organizations, and so far I have found no reason to disagree. Those with doubts about this claim should read Elizabeth Dunn’s book *Privatizing Poland* not only lives up to the good reputation of her discipline but also has much to teach us sociologists. Dunn unpacks the macrolevel concepts of privatization, marketization, commodification, democratization, and even globalization to show what they entail in the Polish baby-

food factory, Alma-Gerber. This is not a traditional ethnographic account, however. You will not find a detailed sociological analysis of the labor process or shop-floor culture. Rather, it is a multisited ethnography that takes her from the shop floor to workers' homes, from managerial meetings to business trips and even restaurants frequented by the new business elite.

What connects these sites as a key theme of the book is the transformation of and struggles around personhood. Dunn demonstrates a fundamental mismatch between how old employees of the factory understood themselves as persons under state socialism and in the immediate aftermath of its collapse and how the new, American or Americanized, management understood them. The former saw themselves as subjects and their initial ownership of company stocks as an earned right to exercise some decision-making power. The latter instead talked about and treated employees as assets and liabilities, and in their eyes employee "ownership" was yet another way to make workers more efficient and obedient. In state socialism, the former also preferred solving problems, such as shortages, through mutual favors—that is, by changing external conditions—while now they are taught to solve problems, such as unemployment, by transforming themselves—for example, by participating in self-help workshops or by consuming the right things. In a similar vein, female workers demanded to be evaluated not as mere employees but as worker-mothers who have special needs and deserve preferential treatment. (Lynne Haney made the same point about welfare mothers in postsocialist Hungary in 1999, see "But We Are Still Mothers" in *Uncertain Transitions*, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.)

Nevertheless, while Polish workers did talk about themselves as subjects, their actions did not exhibit what we might consider the attributes of a "real" subject: they did not strike, they did not vote for union representatives, in fact, their actions may be interpreted as acquiescent. Dunn notes, however, that their tendency to talk of their bosses as a father or mother to them indicates a more complex situation: while employees may not see themselves as equal partners to the "adult" subjects in management, neither are they willing to admit simply that they are the mere objects to which their employer reduces them. In sum, workers may not resist their subordination, but they do fight to choose the nature of their subordination. This is an elegant answer to the question (though not posed as such in the book) of why there was not greater resistance to marketization and increased discipline at least here, in the country that could boast the greatest workers' movement under state socialism—Solidarity.

Producing the right kind of personhood are the newly introduced audit systems, quality management programs, and job-rating systems that Dunn, following Foucault and Rose, conceptualizes as instances of governmentality. Critical as this theoretical move is, since it is not accompanied by an analysis of state socialist forms of governmentality, it implies that state socialism had no quality management programs (which the

author admits is untrue, see p 97), job-rating systems, or auditing—succinctly captured in the author’s italicized claim that socialist accounts were “fundamentally *mauditable*” (p 40) Equally problematic is the assumption underlying much of the book’s thesis that labor was not commodified in planned economies (e g , p 81) and the claim that the disciplines of marketing, sales, and human resources did not exist under state socialism (p 74) While they may not have been identified as such, there existed bodies of applied knowledge and institutionalized expertise that substantively dealt with the same issues, and commodification took unexpected forms not only in consumption but in production as well (see Martha Lampland, *The Object of Labor Commodification in Socialist Hungary* [University of Chicago Press, 1995]) I am pushing this point because I see a danger here of reproducing the view of state socialism as lacking the institutions, rationality, and expertise of the West, and Eastern Europe as in need of Western tutelage—a view I know the author does not share

What I want to conclude with, however, is the acknowledgment that I learned a lot from the book, and that I am eager to adopt it in my graduate courses on globalization and postsocialism It will serve as a great model for rich research, for connecting micro with macro, and for critically adopting social theory to empirical data It is an important contribution to the social science scholarship on globalization, labor, and consumption

Laughter Out of Place Race, Class, Violence, and Sexuality in a Rio Shantytown By Donna M Goldstein Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press, 2003 Pp xi+349 \$60 00 (cloth), \$24 95 (paper)

Kathleen J Ferraro
Northern Arizona University

Donna M Goldstein employs the frame of absurdist humor to convey the complexities of lived experience in the ironically named Brazilian *favela*, Felicidade Eterna (eternal happiness) Rio de Janeiro, the city of contrasts, is the setting in which she explores the multiple ironies of life in the urban underclass The lives she describes are filled with extreme poverty, violence, hard work, loss, and hopelessness Yet her attentiveness to the ubiquitous laughter of oppressed people offers a poignant pathway through the maze of intellectual obstacles that plague studies of the underclass Goldstein’s thick ethnographic description of Felicidade Eterna challenges simplistic dualities of structure/agency, power/resistance, and master/slave She leaves no doubt that the people we come to know are at the bottom of a global pecking order stratified by race, gender, and nation She simultaneously portrays their dignity, resilience, and of course, humor *Laughter Out of Place* takes the reader to the bleakest edge of

suffering without constructing villains, victims, or heroes. The residents of Felicidade Eterna are fully human, and Goldstein helps us to understand what makes them laugh.

The principle character in this ethnography is Gloria. When Goldstein first met Gloria in 1991, Gloria was 45 years old and caring for 14 children. She had eight biological children, two of whom died during the years of Goldstein's research. Five of Gloria's sister's children joined her household after their mother died, and three of Gloria's ex-boyfriends' children preferred living with Gloria. While Gloria took responsibility for these children, she also worked 14-to-16-hour days as a *faxineira*, a heavy-duty day cleaner. Earning the equivalent of five dollars a day after travel expenses, she spent each day's wages on food for her family. Gloria's harsh regimen of work and deprivation was matched by an equally harsh parenting style. Two of Gloria's daughters were cast out of her home, put on the streets, for violating Gloria's rules. One exile was the result of her 15-year-old daughter's, Filomena's, minor injury of a cousin. Goldstein explains that the severity of this punishment is an aspect of the survivalist ethos required in the *favela*. Working up to 17 hours a day, Gloria could not afford to house a child who threatened the well-being of the other children in the home. Moreover, at 15, Gloria no longer considered Filomena a "child," but rather an adult responsible for her conduct. As in so many other arenas, Gloria's survivalist ethos contrasts markedly with the middle- and upper-class notions of adolescence in Brazil and throughout North America. Through Goldstein's rich and empathic descriptions, readers come to appreciate the contexts of behaviors that in the abstract might be coded as abuse or neglect. The family's joke of referring to Filomena as "a falecida dois" (the second deceased) may not be funny to North American, middle-class readers, but it does become understandable.

Goldstein adds to the literature on domestic workers, black and interracial sexuality, lower-class childhood, and violent street gangs. For each of these substantive topics she weaves an intersectional analysis through the fabric of social theory. The greatest value of her work is the theoretical sophistication she brings to her analysis of everyday life. Cultural production theory, feminist theorizing on the body and resistance, Michel Foucault's theories of power, Mikhail Bakhtin's theories on carnival, and Patricia Hill Collins's theories about controlling images and the matrix of domination are employed to develop the theoretical relevance of the everyday lives of Gloria, her family, and her neighbors. Goldstein accomplishes this sophistication without jargon or compromise. When the lives of people fail to fit existing theory, she identifies the limitations and suggests a more nuanced understanding of the ironies of life. This is especially true in her discussion of the "carnivalization of desire" and women's ambivalent relationship to the "sex-positive" atmosphere of Brazil.

The ethnographic and theoretical richness of the text is supplemented by a brief political history of Brazil that helps to situate the current scene within a history of slavery and neocolonialism. There is also a glossary

of Portuguese words, maps of Brazil and Rio, and black-and-white photographs of Felicidad Eterna, Gloria, and her family. Except for a baby, no faces are identifiable in the photographs. The pictures are haunting and contribute to the images of the place and the people drawn so vividly with Goldstein's words. *Laughter Out of Place* is a work of grace and intelligence that would enhance any course on gender, stratification, or Latin America. It is also one of the rare books that analyzes race, class, and gender equally.

Rooted in Place: Family and Belonging in a Southern Black Community
By William W. Falk. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
2004. Pp. v+219.

Reuben A. Buford May
Texas A & M University

Through the early to mid-1900s blacks in the United States fled the American South to the North in great numbers. Many scholars have examined this black exodus, focusing on the social, cultural, and economic dynamics created by the influx of blacks to the metropolitan areas in the North. For instance, St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton's classic study *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (Harper & Row, 1962), examined the lifestyle shift of African-Americans who left the South for better social and economic opportunity in Chicago. In many similar studies, the South, with its Jim Crow segregation and highly publicized racial violence, was presumed to be a place worthy of escape. Given this understanding of the South, one might wonder, why did so many African-Americans, especially those from rural areas, choose to stay? What is life like now for the progeny of those families who elected to stay?

William Falk considers such questions in *Rooted in Place*. This ethnography, as Falk calls it, is about a black family in "Colonial County"—a rural coastal area of Georgia. This study grew out of Falk's initial interest in the lives of blacks from the Low Country (the coastal marshy area of South Carolina and Georgia) and the Mississippi Delta (areas covering central Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi). His original goal was to conduct analysis of census data about blacks from these areas and to supplement this analysis by visiting some of the historically black counties and collecting peoples' stories about their lives. For various reasons, including the inspiration provided to Falk by the ethnographies of Carol Stack and Mitchell Duneier, Falk decided to conduct an ethnographic study of AC and his family—local African-Americans from Colonial County (p. 7).

Falk seeks to demonstrate the strange and unique hold that "place" has on those African-Americans who have remained in the South. He views "place" as a "historically situated social construction, as something con-

structed that acts back on us" (p. 198). His ability to explain the hold that Colonial County has had on African-Americans of the Low Country hinges on his (1) negotiation of issues of subjectivity and race based upon being a white researcher studying a black family and community, (2) recognition of the limits of his method of inquiry for making broader arguments, and (3) contextualization of the South historically and of the ways that it is experienced in the present. Falk covers well the first two points, but less so the third.

One of the first things that we learn about Falk's study of AC and his family is that Falk is a white researcher and the people he is studying are black. He does an excellent job of making clear the various ways in which his racial, class, and regional background might intersect to influence both the information his respondents provide him and his interpretation of that information. Beyond his explicit discussion of this matter in the introduction, Falk periodically clarifies his role throughout the book. This gives the reader a clear sense of the relationships that Falk was able to create while conducting interviews.

Through his interviews Falk is able to present a rich description of life in Colonial County from the perspective of one family. We learn about the kind of work they do, how they define poverty, what they expect of education, how they handle religion, and how they negotiate racial identity. The interview data are well placed throughout the text and are both interesting and informative. Although Falk is successful at richly describing AC's family, he is quick to indicate that their perspective is limited. With this caveat in mind Falk makes guarded generalizations that are still helpful in thinking about the life circumstances of blacks from the Low Country.

An area where Falk is much less successful is in convincing the reader that his work is in fact an ethnography (a concept constantly in flux). While ethnographies tie in historical and biographical aspects of their subjects' lives, what sets them apart from the biographical life histories is the rich detail with which the ethnographer paints a picture of the subjects' everyday lives. Because Falk does little in-depth interaction (or at least it is not indicated in the book) with the families on a daily basis, his data represent the unidimensional historical recollections of a family in the Low Country. Had Falk spent more time observing the daily ins and outs of life in the Low Country, his book might be taken more seriously as an ethnography that explains racial dynamics as they exist in the South.

In conclusion, *Rooted in Place* is limited with respect to its representation of black families in the Low Country. Nevertheless it remains useful as a case study for the ways in which one family is embedded in a Southern culture of "place."

The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen By Ange-Marie Hancock New York: New York University Press Pp 209 \$60 00 (cloth), \$20 00 (paper)

Karen McCormack
Wellesley College

The public identity of the welfare queen, imagined as a poor, black, lazy young woman with many children, evokes disgust, an emotion that cripples democratic deliberation not only among the U S public but in congressional debate as well. This is the central premise of Ange-Marie Hancock's persuasive book, *The Politics of Disgust*. By silencing the voices of welfare recipients and constructing a political climate that makes speaking for welfare recipients politically untenable, the politics of disgust "shapes all citizens' capacities to act in the public sphere" (p. 149). Hancock argues for the use of public identity as a central concept to define politically constructed images of marginalized people, and she suggests that public identities are resistant to change or challenge by conflicting information.

To demonstrate the utility of the concept of public identity, Hancock engages with the welfare queen as a case study to demonstrate the profoundly undemocratic use to which this public identity is put. Hancock analyzes the content of five national newspapers and a random sampling of transcripts from the congressional debate surrounding the passage of the 1996 welfare reform act in order to (1) gauge the content of the welfare queen identity, (2) link the evocation of the welfare queen with particular policy prescriptions, and (3) analyze the effect of this identity on the deliberative process. She first discovers that the two central components of this identity are laziness and hyperfertility, consistent with her historical reading in chapter 2 of images of black women from slavery forward.

Second, she finds that media texts that refer to hyperfertility and laziness frequently link these characteristics with particular policy options, such as family caps that refuse additional payments for children born or conceived while a woman is receiving assistance. In relation to policy prescriptions, Hancock finds that media representations often conflate teen mothers with welfare recipients, despite the fact that in 1995–96, "teen mothers were 0.5 percent of the AFDC caseload" (p. 132).

Hancock's significant contribution to the literature on welfare stigma is her focus on the political effect of such representations. Her findings suggest that the media, in perpetuating the myth of the welfare queen, constructs a public consensus that has been used by congressional representatives as a justification for policies such as the 1996 welfare reform act.

The analysis of the congressional record is the most alarming of the author's findings. Hancock finds that not only were the voices of welfare recipients themselves completely absent from the floor debate, but rep-

representatives most likely to speak for the disadvantaged—women and African-American men—were unable or unwilling to ally themselves with the publicly reviled welfare queen as well. Sympathetic representatives allied themselves with the children of poor women, but never with the women themselves.

A significant strength of Hancock's analysis is her consistent attention to the intersections of race, gender, and class throughout the book. From her historical reading of the representation of black women that emerged during slavery through the Moynihan report on the black family in 1965, Hancock never loses sight of the importance and intersectionality of race, class, and gender.

In chapters 3 and 4, Hancock analyzes data from media coverage and the *Congressional Record*. I found these chapters disappointing. The analysis serves more to test the utility of the concept of public identity than to shed light on the nuances of the representation or content of congressional debate itself. In doing this, the chapter on media representation in particular appears rather thin and does little to further our understanding of the ways in which the welfare queen image was used. The congressional account sheds some light on the deliberative process, though a more subtle reading of the debates themselves would have been a wonderful supplement to the largely quantitative analysis.

Overall, this book makes an important contribution to the literature on welfare and poverty policy. Hancock makes significant connections between policy debates and the public, stigmatized identities of the people who are often the subject of such debates. While the book appears to be aimed at political scientists interested in conceptualizing public identity, sociologists engaged with questions of media representation, along with those concerned with welfare reform and poverty policies, will find the case study interesting.

Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation
Edited by Philip Kasinitz, John H. Mollenkopf, and Mary C. Waters
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004. Pp. xii+419. \$39.95.

Steven J. Gold
Michigan State University

The new second generation—the post-1965 cohort of immigrant children and children of immigrants who now account for more than 10% of the entire U.S. population—has been one of the major topics in sociological research on international migration in recent years. While existing research provides us with a great deal of information about immigrant youth, most is based on surveys. Accordingly, existing reports tend to emphasize easily quantifiable issues such as school achievement or self-identification while offering less information about the impact of context.

and the myriad factors that impinge on young people's lives, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or nationality

Becoming New Yorkers goes a long way toward filling these gaps and expands our comprehension of international migration, more generally. It draws on multiple ethnographies to understand the diverse experience of several migrant populations residing in the New York area. The volume's editors—Philip Kasinitz, John J. Mollenkopf and Mary C. Waters—are the principal investigators of a major, multimethod study of the new second generation in New York, and have each completed important studies of immigrant life in New York City. The authors of individual chapters are younger scholars who have explored the experience of the children of immigrants in depth.

These ethnographic studies cover a wide variety of topics. Some contribute additional insights into topics such as identity and educational outcomes that have already been explored in previous scholarship. Other chapters break new ground by considering the new second generation's involvement in realms of social life about which we know relatively little: work, politics, unions, religion, and relations with other migrant populations. (The latter is of special significance in New York, where immigrant youths have relatively few interactions with declining populations of native-born blacks and whites.) Another unique contribution of *Becoming New Yorkers* is that, in addition to addressing the experience of sizable and relatively well-studied migrant populations such as Dominicans, Chinese, Koreans, and West Indians, chapters are also devoted to groups for which there is a dearth of literature, including Indo-Caribbeans and Soviet Jews.

Earlier research on the new second generation has focused, to a large extent, upon cultural factors. While not denying the importance of culture, *Becoming New Yorkers* takes a decidedly structural approach, attending to race, class, structures of opportunity, gender, neighborhood, and the affect of local institutions. For example, chapters examine the impact of class on the mobility patterns and identities of Chinese and Korean youths and explore the political consciousness of Dominicans residing in Dominican majority versus ethnically mixed neighborhoods.

The book offers a systematic examination of the influential yet controversial model of segmented assimilation, wherein racialized immigrant youths are said to be socialized by their native-born counterparts into adopting a culture of resistance that discourages academic achievement and limits mobility. Reviewing segmented assimilation as addressed within several chapters, the editors turn the formulation on its head, concluding that "the discussion of oppositional culture among the children of immigrants confuses style for substance. For many young people, hip-hop is the mainstream, and being drawn to it is hardly evidence of joining a subordinated 'segment' of society that engages in self-defeating behavior" (p. 396).

Drawing upon ethnographic methods that allow observers to explore

the influence of a wide range of social factors beyond race and ethnicity, the editors assert that the logic of survey methods makes it too easy to concentrate on race and ethnicity as determining the lives of migrant youth while neglecting other bases of identification, solidarity, and differentiation. As such, this book incorporates youths' own systems of social classification, as well as the influence of popular culture, music, consumption, and New York's multicultural environment (where many respondents describe attending a whole series of ethnic festivals beyond that of their own group) as playing essential roles in shaping who they are. "The ethnographic approach taken by the authors in this volume enables us to see how such factors as gender and class become elements in young people's lives that are just as important as their race or ethnicity, and sometimes more important" (p. 397).

In conclusion, *Becoming New Yorkers* is an outstanding book. It provides detailed insights into the experience of a broad array of young immigrants. It greatly expands our understanding of the institutional settings in which the new second generation is making their lives in the nation's largest city, and it offers a powerful demonstration of the ability of ethnographic research to inform the policy-relevant concerns of the education, socialization, and economic adaptation of immigrant youths. Beautifully written and theoretically sophisticated without being ponderous, it will appeal to undergraduates and specialists alike.

Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connections By Anna Tsing. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Michael Goldman
University of Minnesota

Friction is an original, nuanced, and elegant work of ethnography and a significant contribution to the areas of globalization, environment and natural resource wars, the politics of indigenous peoples, NGOs, and development, and the sociology of expert versus local knowledge. Anthropologist Anna Tsing approaches her site of study—the rainforests of Indonesia—with a respectful humility and intelligence that seems necessary when trying to understand destructive capitalist practices and forms of resistance and resilience occurring at the interstices of the so-called local and global. Her research covers more than the physical boundaries of the forest, as global connections abound even in what seems to be the remote and isolated. To Tsing, the Indonesian forest has become a site both for the production of natural resources for the global economy and the production of universals more generally. In this innovative "ethnography of the universal," the overarching argument is that where global expertise has become hegemonic, local conditions are always being "predicted from the global model, that is the point of its globality. Local data

may adjust the global model but never defy it. Its globality is all-embracing" (p. 102). *Friction* is about the struggle over these universals.

Accomplishments of the universal are particularly evident in the realm of environmental politics, an arena dominated worldwide by scientific experts who busily invent new institutional arrangements based on colonial and neoliberal notions of forest utility, conservation, and economy. Over the past few decades in Indonesia, these ideas have complemented quite nicely the desires of large logging enterprises, international conservationists, and General Suharto's brutal military regime. In these forested junctions, Tsing finds an odd assembly of groups, including an energetic generation of backpacking students from the cities that decidedly eschews the military clampdowns on urban-based, antistate politics. Instead, they take to the mountains and become "nature lovers," musing about nature while mixing it up with the forest peoples. Their new middle-class dreams get rained on, or rather transformed, through their interactions with the natural elements of the rainforest, as well as the forest dwellers, well-capitalized loggers, and Western conservation NGOs. It is at this social-natural crossroads where trouble, and change, occurs.

The beauty of the book is not just in the stories, but also in the way stories are told. Tsing takes us with her on the bus and allows us to read her diary, she plops us down in the middle of conversations and events, all very low-key but illustrative. At once, we sit alongside "international experts" at a Ford Foundation meeting speaking a language of global resource management, next we recline beside a Meratus Dayak woman who, upon realizing the coming of the millennium, begins to compose a list of the *first* one thousand species she can think of that live in her neck of the woods. The margins of one chapter are filled with her categories and descriptions of species of snakes, beasts, vegetables, mushrooms, and "beings of the water." More than a mere list, her insights and descriptions perform as an animated critique of the *orientalizing* and *infantilizing* categories produced by outsider experts to describe "poor" people such as herself. The subaltern speaks and acts in ways that have the potential to undermine the exploitative plans of elites. Tsing makes a concerted effort to represent the actions and worldviews of the oppressed and to juxtapose them to their elite and middle-class counterparts in order to illustrate the friction that arises from their differences.

Critique and hope come together brilliantly in the multiple telling of a single small victory against the logging companies by a so-called rainforest community, Manggur. Why so-called? Because when the fast-rising star of international experts—Community Based Nature Resource Management (CBNRM)—reaches these "hinterlands" of forest dwellers, locals had already read the film script, and, in their own cosmopolitan way, they make "their stories . . . match middle-class dreams—and in the process, further their own leadership strategies" (p. 65). The outsiders' idea of empowering the community to manage the resources collectively sounds great, even radical, except that in most cases neither the community nor

nature exists as they are imagined by global experts—neither as collective nor resource. Many of the forest dwellers know full well that exploitation (rather than use) of the forests is destructive, however you package it. In their war of position, the politically weak Dayaks do some of their own conjuring of “universals” in order to ally with some sympathetic outsiders and fight back the more pernicious ones, such as the logging companies and development agencies. Although the forests and its people may appear static and understandable from afar, there is nothing settled or obvious about them. Forest groves, Tsing argues, are always engendering the social networks that surround them, and the forests and these networks are in constant flux. The Meratus Dayaks, for example, are continuously shifting their homes as they shift their swidden fields, as well as move from cities to markets and onward to other forest groves. In their fabrications, the Dayaks and their allies successfully pulled off a small victory. But more than that, these unexpected “global” encounters produced new social networks and forms of politics that have contributed to democracy movements in Indonesia and to social and ecological justice campaigns worldwide.

Friction is a welcome contribution to the literature on hegemony, especially to scholarship on how elites create tools for consent and coercion, and how oppressed people respond, especially through politically transnational strategies. Over the years, the forests of Indonesia have remained at the center of violent controversy and exploitation, locally and globally. Through her colorful narratives of forest collaborations and networks, Tsing formulates a powerful analytic perspective on the business of global science and expertise, forest management interests, and the embeddedness of these practices in both capital accumulation and military repression. Whenever Tsing gets stuck in her thinking, she consults her local experts, and then the global ones again, but undoubtedly finds that the former are more likely to have a much more sophisticated—and emancipatory—sense of social-natural relations. In their hands, and supported by empathetic transnational collaborators, the forest may survive. Far from—and in contrast to—London and Washington, D.C., a hopeful form of cosmopolitan politics thrives.

Near Northwest Side Story: Migration, Displacement, Puerto Rican Families. By Gina Perez. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. Pp. ix+276. \$21.95.

Sherri Grasmuck
Temple University

Near Northwest Side Story presents a portrait of Puerto Rican daily life in a unique transnational space, where borders divide, but not in the usual ways of citizenship. Although multiple forms of inequality operate here,

Perez focuses on gender hierarchies and how they have structured multiple levels of experience on both sides of the border, including employment and unpaid labor, representations of “blame agents” behind economic decline, place making, and kin work sustaining economic survival

Perez’s qualitative research effectively follows the circuit that her subjects travel. After beginning as a volunteer teaching GED classes to young and old Puerto Ricans in a cultural center in Chicago’s Near Northwest Side, Perez spent six months in San Sebastián, a town in the western central highlands of Puerto Rico with an extensive history of migration dating from the 1940s. She had the enormous good fortune of being the niece of the owners of a local store frequented by diverse members of the community. Her kin ties and work in the store provided her with legitimate entrée into the spaces of older local men who gathered there to socialize. These circumstances also helped her gather 22 family histories with extensive migratory histories in both sites.

By comparing the realities of labor market participation on the island with the evolving discourse on modernization and progress that accompanied it, Perez uncovers an interesting asymmetry between the high reliance on female labor of the Operation Bootstrap industrialization of the 1950s and the evolving folkloric rhetoric about the nation that stressed masculinist nostalgic symbols such as *el jíbaro* to signify the moral superiority of the nation. Perez then takes up residence in Humboldt Park in Chicago, an area undergoing rapid gentrification and displacement of many Puerto Ricans. She uncovers an interesting shift over time in the representation of Puerto Ricans in Chicago’s urban imagination. Characterizations in the 1950s were that of a Latino model minority (in contrast to blacks or their cousins in New York), blessed with a patriarchal Spanish sensibility and American determination. This gave way in the 1960s to hostile characterizations that stressed their cultural shortcomings. The shift in status from good to bad “immigrants” paralleled the decline of the manufacturing niche where Puerto Ricans were concentrated. Yet, little sympathy or public recognition of these factors emerged. On the contrary, Perez documents their relative neglect by public officials, including plans by the city’s health commissioner to send many of these “citizens” back to the island.

Chapter 4 provides the most grounded, creative use of her ethnographic data, as well as fascinating insights into internal boundaries within these transnational spaces. In contrast to romanticized transnational theorizing about hybridity and the creative blurring of difference, Perez uncovers extensive boundary making both in San Sebastián, where residents reject and stigmatize return migrants and Dominican immigrants (*los de afuera*), and in Chicago, where Puerto Rican migrants, despite their insecurities about cultural authenticity, do something similar against Mexicans. These findings are reminiscent of Pablo Vila’s ethnography of the Mexican border (*Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Borders* [University of Texas Press, 2000]). Some of the boundaries are internal, such as class, and there is

an interesting discussion of generational differences in the acceptability of blending hip-hop culture with more purely Puerto Rican expressions

Perez draws movingly from her family histories to uncover the striving for place making in the two distant communities. One of her agendas is to refute the "culture of poverty" characterization of the Puerto Rican community and to illustrate the extent to which structural factors rather than "too many moves" have dragged the community down. When Puerto Ricans have had to turn to welfare it was with great hesitancy and shame, they often looked elsewhere, like the military and mobilizing women's networks, to make independent survival possible.

One of the strengths of the book is the systematic way Perez highlights the importance of gender for understanding a wide range of areas affecting Puerto Rican movements, from early island displacement, to manufacturing decline on the mainland, to gentrification and its resistance, to ideological representations, to identities, kin work, and place making. Less effective is the dispersed way that many theoretical points along the way are presented. The jaggedness in their appearance and underelaborated references to internal debates within the Puerto Rican community often interfered with the storytelling, with too much looking over her theoretical shoulder to debates that did not always relate convincingly to the material at hand. These problems notwithstanding, the book succeeds in richly documenting the many inventive ways that Puerto Ricans have relied for half a century on the interconnections between their diverse locales to sustain the very sectors of the population stigmatized by others as they weathered periodic cycles of structural displacement.

Real Country: Music and Language in Working-Class Culture By
Aaron A. Fox. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004. Pp. ix+363.

Jennifer C. Lena
Vanderbilt University

Aaron Fox's *Real Country* is an ethnographic study of the cultural, social, musical, and linguistic construction of "country" in the small town of Lockhart, Texas. Country music is "situated at the very crux of a struggle for local meaning and the value of class-specific experience that of necessity endeavors to reappropriate the commodity form to the local life-world" (p. 318) in Lockhart and its honkytonk bars. Fox seeks to retrieve country people's poetry and complexity (even as they think of themselves as simple and profoundly "ordinary") and to argue against the cosmopolitans and music scholars who simplify country people and music or sweeten them "with saccharine nostalgia or cloying nationalist sentimentality" (p. 318).

Fox demonstrates that country people are "real country" only after they discursively produce an authentic identity in the face of commodity culture.

and engage in a “fantastic blurring of a recent modern-industrial social history with elements of a more conjured and mediated rustic past and with elements of nationalist, racial, and gender hegemonies” (p. 320). Readers will surely agree that Lockhart residents are neither simple nor ordinary, Fox notes their exceptional political and cultural self-consciousness and unusual expressivity (p. 65). But we are also asked to view them as representatives of a class-specific cultural response to economic changes that have produced a profound sense of political disempowerment and economic and cultural insecurity in periurban spaces (p. 25). This tension between uniqueness and typicality complicates comparisons with other musical communities where members grapple with commercial culture and negotiate between their social, political, and economically peripheral status and cultural centrality in a similar way.

While life “out the country” moves at a slower pace, Lockhart is situated in a rapidly transforming space: each year, Austin’s suburbs encroach and new highways thread around town to accommodate NAFTA loads heading north from Mexico. The text provides little insight into the impact of these changes on lyrical or discursive tropes of “real country,” yet Fox’s narrative beautifully describes Texans’ awareness of the “storm breaking on their community’s shore” and a growing “pessimistic, defensive anxiety” (p. 320).

Lockhart is more than just a musical community—it is a place, in a particular moment, marked by a specific discourse. This discourse is the principle site of *mediation*—the production of “conceptual and intuitive links between domains of social experience,” including abstract domains of memory, place, models of the self, emotion and feeling, and the concrete stuff of everyday life, like sociability, sensuality, work, and play (p. 34).

Lockhart’s residents seek shelter in local honkytonks, where distinctive qualities of talk and voice are concentrated and which are viewed as spaces for working-class alcohol consumption and socialization and are celebrated for their role as community centers and political institutions. In this way, Fox contributes to scholarship on how status hierarchies, norms, emotions, and sociability and social networks are built and sustained among patrons of cafeterias, bars, and taverns (e.g., Elijah Anderson, Mitchell Duneier, and Reuben May). In its link to the literatures on class, leisure, and space (e.g., Roy Rosenzweig, David Grazian, and Kathy Peiss), this text suggests new linguistic and musical approaches for the ethnographer’s tool kit.

Fox uses song lyrics, segments of conversation, thick ethnographic description, and brief but sufficiently analytical treatments of talk and discursive tropes to examine the subjectivity of a group of subjects largely inaccessible to sociologists. Fox’s description of the poetic discourse of place will interest urban and rural specialists in our discipline. In noting how places and objects “speak” in country spaces and country songs, Fox’s text will offer a new case study to sociologists interested in the social construction of meaning and identity in everyday life. It remains for us

to determine how the “ordinary” people in Lockhart, Texas, compare to other communities where talk and music interweave to form a complex structure of everyday meaning Fox’s text, though, provides a blueprint for inquiry and insight

State-Building Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century
By Francis Fukuyama Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press, 2004 Pp
xiii + 137

Joel Migdal
University of Washington

Francis Fukuyama has never shied away from dealing with the thorniest problems of our time, and this book is no exception His concern here is the alarming lack of state capacity in an arc of instability—what he terms a band of failed and troubled states—stretching from Africa through the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia right through to South Asia The central theme of *State-Building* is that the weak states of this arc are the source of the gravest international threats that we face today

Fukuyama is by no means the first to deal with the link between crippled states and world stability Robert Kaplan, a journalist, in magazine pieces and his book *“The Coming Anarchy” and the Nation-State under Siege* (U S Institute of Peace, 1995) pointed to similar threats long before 9/11 Academics of various stripes also wrote with growing alarm about foundering states in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War Fukuyama does not acknowledge much of this body of work in the text His attention, rather, is on the policy makers who initially failed to see “the dangers of liberalization in the absence of proper institutions” (p 17) Only with the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, he claims, did they go back to the drawing board, concluding that institutions really do matter

If the importance of institutions is now conventional knowledge, even among policy-oriented economists, why have poor countries made so little progress in beefing up their institutional capacity? Fukuyama offers two reasons First, the local populations, especially the elites, generate pitifully little demand for serious institutional reform in their countries And, second, outside forces have accomplished very little in building up poor states On the contrary, while they may have the best of intentions, outsiders usually end up supplying services directly to local populations, generating “programs that undermine or suck out [borrowing Michael Ignatieff’s felicitous term] institutional capacity in the name of building it” (p 42)

So, what is to be done? How can outsiders stimulate institutions in poor countries halfway around the globe to be capable and responsive? While Fukuyama’s answer to that question remains maddeningly vague,

he does manage to deliver a blistering critique of those whose solutions have received the most attention—the very same economists who belatedly understood that organizational issues deserve serious attention. In the strongest chapter of the book, “Weak States and the Black Hole of Public Administration,” he puts to rest the notion that cookie-cutter prescriptions, based on a general theory, could be developed to improve institutional performance. Organizational ambiguity, Fukuyama argues, precludes a science of institution building. What works for markets does not work for complex organizations. His critique is far more satisfying than his general conclusion: “There is simply no theory that can provide generalized guidelines for an appropriate level of discretion in public administration. The same degree of discretion will work well in some societies and not in others, within the same society, it can be functional at one time period and not in another. Everything depends on context, past history, the identity of organizational players, and a host of other independent variables” (pp. 74, 76).

For Fukuyama, the question of state capacity is compelling because of the relationship of what happens in poor countries to the stability of the larger international system. That connection, though, is not so easy to fathom, and he falls victim to facile conclusions. Without much serious consideration, he states “that failed governance can create intolerable security threats in the form of terrorists wielding WMD” (p. 98). Do all such states pose these threats? And do all threats by WMD-toting terrorists stem from failed states? Indeed, as the book wears on, the shades of gray so evident in his analysis of institutional reform—his emphasis on complexity, discretion, and ambiguity—give way to black-and-white formulations. Complex problems, such as the collapse of the Oslo peace process, are reduced to “its failure to demand democratic accountability within the Palestine authority or prevent high levels of corruption and rent-seeking there” (p. 94). Criticisms of the radical shift in the Bush administration’s foreign policy through the doctrine of preemption are dismissed by saying that “the grounds for the erosion of sovereignty were laid much earlier in the so-called humanitarian interventions of the 1990s” (p. 96). Is the claim of a radical shift really at the heart of the criticisms of the administration? Beyond the oversimplifications, the narrative meanders to a close as it tries to figure out how to tie its insights on the difficulty of creating viable institutions with the mostly unexamined assumption that weak institutions in poor countries are the termites eating away at the foundation of international stability.

Time Maps Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past By Eviatar Zerubavel Chicago University of Chicago Press, 2003 Pp xii+180 \$18 00 (paper)

Barry Schwartz
University of Georgia

The wave of collective memory scholarship that swelled 25 years ago shows no sign of breaking, and no one has contributed more to its continued force than Eviatar Zerubavel. His latest book, *Time Maps*, is unique because it recapitulates his earlier discoveries as it provides a fresh look at the "social shape of the past."

Time Maps is about collective memory's "structural" underpinnings—its elementary (decontextualized) points of reference. These include (1) conceptions of historical movement: progress and decline, eventful and empty phases, (2) articulation of ancestry and descent, and (3) origins, exemplified by the social uses of priority and antiquity. The key analytic chapters, however, identify conventions cultivating perception of (4) historical continuity, including analogy, discourse of continuity, assertions about similarity of time and place, and (5) historical discontinuity-periodization and the differentiation of eras, including history and prehistory. Zerubavel perceptively illustrates each reference point with material from a wide array of cultures. His erudition and insight are dazzling.

Zerubavel, unlike many of his colleagues, declares that historical events are knowable as they were. Historical continuity, on the other hand, is an experience shaped by the way the relationship among events is subjectively construed. For example, "intergenerational transitivity" transforms discrete, generationally adjacent pairs like parent-child, into a continuous line of succession. "Historical contact chains," including the "last link to Dixie," an 82-year-old Confederate veteran, create the same sense of connection (p. 57). Experience of historical discontinuity, by contrast, ignores objective continuities. Whatever existed in the Western hemisphere prior to and after the arrival of Europeans is, thus, "pre-Columbian" and "post-Columbian." Likewise, the Zionist narrative depicts the diaspora as an interruption in rather than a part of Jewish history.

For Zerubavel, historical continuities and discontinuities result from ways of classifying the past. The history of the species is a case in point. Purely social conventions determine whether definition of a species is based on anatomy, behavior, or genetics. Taxonomic identification also depends on classification habits—whether one is a "lumper," inclined to bring things together, or a "splitter," inclined to set things apart—and these habits, in turn, must be learned in social environments.

Although "the way in which we actually map nature and its history is ultimately social" (p. 81), mnemonic patterns transcend any specific context of remembering. American memory, no less than Samoan memory, is readily broken down in terms of a dominant historical path, articula-

tions of ancestry and descent, origins, and conceptions of continuity and discontinuity. Focusing on cross-cultural commonalities rather than variations, Zerubavel's ambitious program—to build a foundation for a general theory of collective memory—is largely successful.

Zerubavel's deficiency, however, is twofold. First, his distinction between essential and constructed phenomena is plausible, but he fails to tell, directly or by example, how to distinguish the essential and the constructed from one another. In consequence, he often gives the impression of representing the essential as a construction, history as an "invention," and the past as a product rather than an origin and source of life. Presupposing a knowable past, his theoretical model is essentialist, but the substance of his argument, emphasizing the contrast between the real and imagined past, is largely constructionist. The second and more important shortcoming is explanation. It is simply not part of Zerubavel's program. If Darwin projected onto the natural world the essence of England's free market, with its notions of competition and the survival of the fittest, contemporaries like John Bodnar see in the representation of history an expression of political interests (*Remaking America* [Princeton University Press, 1992]), Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., multicultural imperatives (*The Disuniting of America* [W.W. Norton, 1992]), and Gary Fine, reputational enterprise (*Difficult Reputations* [University of Chicago Press, 2001]). Zerubavel may, in fact, see economic, political, cultural, and interactional structures driving classification conventions, but he never analyzes them. Classification's *function*, he says, is to legitimate power and affirm identity, but he tells us little about classification's *source*. To define that source as "social" is quite vacuous, for its referents range from families through tribes, ethnic groups, nations, and races that are themselves products of classification. Thus, Zerubavel's mnemonic uniformities appear independent of the structures they articulate and sustain.

Whatever *Time Maps*'s shortcomings, no one can ignore it. Here is a book for historians, educators, and social scientists alike. I cannot imagine it not appealing, as have all Zerubavel's previous books, to graduate students and liberal arts undergraduates. No work better captures the generic forms of collective memory, no investigator defines more clearly the objects of collective memory scholarship. *Time Maps* embodies the research tradition that Eviatar Zerubavel has done so much to advance.

Jurors' Stories of Death: How America's Death Penalty Invests in Inequality. By Benjamin Fleury-Steiner. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.

Geoff Ward
Northeastern University

The racialization of U.S. justice administration is no longer clearly identified by "black codes," all-white decision-making bodies, the spectacle of

lynching, or other overt indicators. Today one finds a diverse if segregated cast of workers (judges, lawyers, jurors, police, etc.) in justice systems ostensibly regulated by formal rules and normative pressures of civil rights reform. And yet, ethnoracial minority defendants (especially African-Americans) in U.S. courts today are often punished more severely than are their white counterparts. Few will find further evidence of discrimination in American criminal justice surprising. But while many acknowledge race and class inequality in justice administration, understanding *how* these processes operate remains limited. *Jurors' Stories of Death* provides insight on these dynamics from the indispensable perspective of the condemned's supposed peers.

In this intriguing exposé of the inner workings of capital punishment, Benjamin Fleury-Steiner employs interview data from former capital jurors to deconstruct the "story worlds" and socially interactive dimensions of their life-and-death decisions. Of primary interest is how class and particularly race order these deliberations and relations and the consequences of these processes not only for sentencing outcomes but for broader social conflict and inequality as well. Fleury-Steiner argues that narrative elements of death penalty deliberations and the working dynamics of capital juries themselves reflect and reinforce U.S. societal stratification. We see how the bits of "evidence" jurors consider and the evaluative scales they apply relate as much or more to their own politics as to formal court rules and proceedings. Drawing on Erving Goffman's work on identity, the study draws attention to the various social types, moral claims, and alleged facts (i.e., that prisoners with life sentences are very often released early) that populate juror discourse. Punctuated by a criminalization of poverty and drug addiction, fear of crime, racial resentment, a distrust of criminal justice systems, and still other preoccupations, these extralegal interpretive frameworks "make sense" of both the defendant and their appropriate sanction. By specifying categories of moral and immoral, deserving and undeserving, and, ultimately, *us* and *them*, these "normative grammars of punishment" organize the sorting of life-and-death sentences.

The book posits that racially differential treatment in modern criminal justice, in death sentencing and otherwise, "[is] the function of the dominant group's normative expectations of poor blacks as dangerous, lawless, or immoral" (p. 4). This is meant to be distinguished from the overt discrimination characterizing earlier periods, however, the ideological framework has hardly changed. The change is in the ordering of the argument. Overt racism insists blacks be punished severely because they are dangerous, lawless, and immoral, modern racism insists that we severely punish the dangerous, lawless, or immoral, who, it happens, are disproportionately black. Also changed is the composition of the courtroom workgroup, including the empanelled "peers." Interestingly, black jurors in this study mobilize distinct normative grammars, marked by cynicism toward the law and a more nuanced and human regard for

defendants, but not greater leniency (this perhaps reflects earlier excusals of potential jurors who oppose the death penalty) Voices of black jurors were significantly underrepresented and marginalized in these cases, however, and they proved largely ineffective in countering the sometimes hostile tide of dominant juror discourse

Fleury-Steiner argues that death sentencing is not simply morally or legally objectionable on these procedural grounds, but that the very process of death deliberation reproduces social conflict Because the construction of "insider" and "outsider" identities is fundamental to jurors' deliberations and interactions, he argues, the routine of capital sentencing reifies race and class stratification, thwarting our progress toward the desired multicultural society I, too, oppose capital punishment, but the multiculturalism argument was unsatisfying Death sentencing clearly threatens societal interests by reinscribing dominant-subordinate group relations, but every institution tends to reflect and reinforce societal organization One might also question (before and with these findings) whether genuine multiculturalism is more than a mythical American ideal If so, multiculturalism seems to anticipate and even require clashing narratives In this sense a stronger case emerges in these data for promoting substantive diversity among the arbiters of justice (including jurors), than for abolishing their contested terrain

This use of narrative to examine how identity politics operate in jurors' interactions with defendants, the law, and each other is an intelligent and original decoupling of processes at work in racialized social control Readers will appreciate the sociological perspective the author brings to the study of inequality in justice administration, as researchers too often engage these as problems internal to closed systems (i.e., police organizations) or as aberrations from normal and rational functioning caused by deviant (i.e., biased) individuals This book illustrates how courts, and particularly their juries, provide stages for the social interaction of "normal people" routinely engaged in the negotiation of multiple identities, very often in conflict with each other, the accused, and broader societal interests

Hoodlums Black Villains and Social Bandits in American Life By William L. Van Deburg Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004 Pp. xi+283 \$29.00

Robert E. Washington
Bryn Mawr College

It seems only yesterday that the O. J. Simpson verdict jolted American race relations as the jubilant celebration by black Americans were seen by the mainstream (mostly white) media commentators as puzzling Why, many asked, did blacks not feel as outraged as whites when Simpson, the apparent killer of two white people, was declared innocent? The answer

to this and related questions about black America's seeming defense of black criminals is the focus of William L. Van Deburg's *Hoodlums*. A work in the field of cultural studies with much relevance to sociology, the book's primary aim is to examine throughout the history of American race relations the contested meanings of black villainy.

In four chapters—(1) a historical overview on the concept of black villainy extending from the Greco-Roman era to the Atlantic slave trade, (2) an overview of white popular culture images of black villainy during slavery, (3) an account of black America's reaction to those white cultural images, and (4) an examination of late 20th-century images of black villains—the book presents a comprehensive review of conceptions of black villainy and ends with a brief conclusion that delineates its implications for contemporary American society. The book's methodology, which uses varied sources of data (autobiographies, personal correspondence, period newspapers, travel accounts, Hollywood films, music lyrics, folklore studies, and novels) is illustrative and discursive rather than systematic. In defense of this methodology, the author tells us that “(the book) is not meant to be definitive,” which apparently means its argument is hypothetical and speculative.

Setting forth that argument, the author suggests that the racially contested meanings of black criminality, or villainy, resulted from white America's racialization of good and evil as the primary basis for categorizing deviance early in the nation's history. “By placing a far higher value on white lives than on black, America's governing elite institutionalized the belief that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ were color coded values” (p. 38). These inherited images of black Americans as a race of villains provided ego enhancement for whites and helped shape white supremacist beliefs. Hardly passive in response to this hegemonic white supremacist culture's stigmatization of their moral character, black Americans developed an oppositional culture that blunted and inverted that racial stigma. As the author puts it, “Most recognized that what whites considered to be villainy more accurately could be conceptualized as social banditry—the act of being bad for good reason. Black social bandits typically were depicted as tough, self-reliant subversives steeped in the warrior tradition and grounded in communal mores. As agents of change, they might kill or maim, but they would do so in order to improve the lives of beleaguered kinsmen” (p. 68). In the eyes of ordinary black Americans, these black social bandits were heroic symbols of defiance.

Moving to the conception of black villainy in contemporary America, much of the book's subsequent discussion encircles this crucial question: Have the 1960s and subsequent civil rights reforms rendered the alternative black normative view of black villainy obsolete? The author's answer is ambivalent. Arguing, on the one hand, that black distrust of whites is still warranted by the persisting problems of racial inequity and discrimination and, on the other hand, that many blacks, in the wake of expanded opportunities and the threats posed by sociopathic black inner-

city crimes, are less hesitant to acknowledge that there are villains in their midst, he shifts to exhortation "Celebrating the social bandit's idiosyncratic code of honor and giving racial kinsmen benefit of doubt in interracial disputes may still be warranted, but uncritical acceptance of bad behavior is not. A willingness to ask hard questions without fear of self-incrimination will be needed if community leaders hope to solve problems created by both black villains in their midst and by mythic beliefs about racial villainy that continue to circulate in middle America" (p 219) In short, new attitudes and a new will are required of all Americans. If we are to bridge the chasm over black criminality, we must build an interracial coalition to solve the problems of the urban black underclass.

A few comments about the book's shortcomings should be noted. Though it addresses a phenomenon pertaining to deviance, the book betrays an unfortunate lack of familiarity with the sociology of deviance, whose perspectives on normative boundaries, labeling, subcultural development, secondary deviance, cultural conflict, and social control would have given the study greater analytical depth. The book's methodological reliance on literary works as reflections of earlier black public opinion is dubious. In reference to a 19th-century black community with high levels of illiteracy, that influence should be demonstrated rather than assumed. And, finally, the book should have been more coherently organized, as it tends often to veer into tangential discussions of black popular culture that do little to illuminate its argument about black villainy.

Those shortcomings notwithstanding, this book addresses a fascinating topic. It should interest sociologists working in the fields of social deviance, race relations, or cultural sociology.

God, Sex, and Politics: Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies By Dawne Moon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp. xi+281. \$25.00.

Thomas J. Linneman
College of William and Mary

Conflicts involving religion and homosexuality have intensified in recent years. Hardly a week goes by without a new development involving gay marriage, antidiscrimination policies, or hate-crimes legislation. While religious authority often achieves a voice in these developments, it is the figureheads of the religious right who are heard from most often. Receiving far less attention is what goes on within actual churches, especially those of the mainline denominations. Dawne Moon's *God, Sex, and Politics* goes a long way toward filling this void, and it does so with an enviable level of sophisticated theoretical analysis.

Moon uses a critical ethnographic approach to study how members of two Methodist churches have handled homosexuality. She spent 14

months at City Church, an urban congregation aligned with the Reconciling Congregations Program which seeks to welcome gays and lesbians. After this, she spent seven months at Missionary Church, a congregation in a smaller city 70 miles from City Church. Missionary aligned with the Transforming movement, which deals with homosexuality by attempting to turn gays into ex-gays. In both congregations, Moon takes on the dual roles of participant (she attends church services, functions, and small groups) and observer (she conducts interviews with a number of church members). As a critical ethnographer, she pushes her respondents to articulate fully their positions on homosexuality, exposing some interesting contradictions.

Through her discussions with these congregants on God and sex, Moon develops a major theme surrounding the last word of the book's main title: politics. One commonality among her respondents, even the political activists, was "their nearly ubiquitous disdain for 'politics'" (p. 5). They viewed the church as a haven from politics, a place where they could transcend conflicts inherent in everything political. Moon argues that by equating politics with all that is bad, and by insisting that intrachurch discussions eschew the political, the progay congregants severely limited their ability to make progress on gay issues. Moon invokes Foucault by arguing that power relations pervade every aspect of culture. To avoid politics, then, is to lock these power relations into their current state, leaving gays and lesbians forever trapped in their second-class status in the church.

In developing these arguments, Moon offers a potent explanation for why progress on gay issues has been so slow in coming. One important theme she identifies is that "gayness, for many, seems trapped in the physical realm" (p. 156). For example, progay congregants in City Church often invoked the biologically essentialist "They can't help it" argument to explain why gays and lesbians should not be held accountable. This position, Moon argues, keeps gays and lesbians down within the realm of the physical, not allowing them to participate in the spiritual transcendence that is key to full participation in the church. Gays and lesbians are also held back by another common strategy used by progay congregants: "Members used a language of pain to attempt to negotiate the terms under which gay members would be brought into the church" (p. 207). Offering compassion to gays and lesbians, Moon points out, affects the roles they are allowed to play in the church, restricting them to the status of victims. The common paradox of these purportedly progay strategies is this: while they may offer some sort of support to lesbian and gay members of the church, they ultimately prevent real social change from happening.

I do have a number of criticisms. First, from a methodological standpoint, Moon's study suffers from the same shortfall as Arlene Stein's brilliant book on a similar topic, *The Stranger Next Door* (Beacon Press, 2002): it is limited to a post hoc investigation of an important event. Two

years prior to Moon's entrance into City Church, the church had experienced a significant controversy over homosexuality. It is simply unfortunate that Moon was unable to study this event as it occurred and witness the subsequent fallout, as I am certain her keen ethnographic eye would have found much of interest. A second methodological criticism concerns the fact that Moon studied one congregation twice as long as the other. This on its own may not be problematic, but I sometimes felt she gave short shrift to the complexities of the meanings circulating through Missionary Church.

Another criticism I have is theoretical. As my own work has done, Moon makes the everyday central to sociological analysis. She develops the concept of everyday theologies. She argues that much sociology of religion makes "the assumption that church doctrine unproblematically represents what members believe" (p. 12) and that "people develop everyday theologies not just when they worship and read Scripture but as they reflect on a wide range of inspirational texts, conversations, personal experiences, and understandings of their God" (pp. 13–14). However, as with many new concepts, everyday theology soon starts to stand for too much, to the point that Moon implies that antigay preacher Fred Phelps's claiming "God hates fags" is an example of everyday theology.

A final criticism is an admittedly overused one, but it is warranted: the solutions Moon suggests at the very end of the book are rather simplistic and incomplete. For example, she rightfully argues that "gay people and their advocates need to not stereotype those people who disagree with them, nor avoid dealing with the issues they bring up by changing the subject" (p. 240). But Moon does not suggest specific strategies to accomplish this difficult task.

However, these minor criticisms pale in comparison to the book's major accomplishments. *God, Sex, and Politics* is a must read for anyone—sociologist or not—who wants abundant insight into why homosexuality has become (and shall remain) an issue with the potential to rip apart religious communities on local, national, and even international levels.

Bounded Choice: True Believers and Charismatic Cults By Jana Lalich
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. Pp.
xxiv+329. \$21.95.

Lorne L. Dawson
University of Waterloo

This is a fascinating and yet frustrating book. It does two things admirably: it offers a comparative analysis of two American "cults," and it offers a constructive alternative to the polarized explanatory frameworks presented by the anticult movement and scholars intent on refuting the propaganda of the anticult movement. The two cults compared are

Heaven's Gate and the Democratic Workers Party Readers will recognize the former group, a small UFO cult that achieved notoriety when its members committed collective suicide in March 1997. The latter group was a radical left-wing political group that flourished in San Francisco in the 1970s and 1980s. Lalich examines the history, beliefs, and organizational structure of these disparate groups to demonstrate that the extreme commitments of their members cannot be explained adequately by either the vague brainwashing scenario typically promoted by the anticult movement or the loose rational choice theory employed by many sociologists of religion. Alternatively, she offers the concept of "bounded choice," extending Herbert Simon's well-known discussion of "bounded rationality." Simon argued the necessity of modeling human behavior on the partial rationality realistically present in the conditions of limited knowledge and capability most characteristic of human activity. Human action is about "satisficing," more than "optimizing." In the highly structured and controlled context of the two cults, Lalich argues, the rational choices available to members became congruent with the ideological worldviews of the groups. Members lived in "self-sealing groups" that prevented them from entertaining alternative courses of action to the extreme demands of their charismatic leaders. The members were not brainwashed in the crude sense of being deprived of free will or even reasonable control over their behavior. Through their intensive "resocialization," however, they had come to accept a highly limited conception of their choices as natural.

Lalich presents her information in terms of four interlocking structural dimensions of the social dynamics of cults: charismatic authority, a transcendent belief system, systems of control, and systems of influence. In part 1 she sets the social context of Heaven's Gate through a brief analysis of the spirit of religious experimentation of the 1960s and 1970s that gave rise to the New Age movement from which the "cult" emerged. She then traces the history of the group in terms of the progressive development of the four structural dimensions, emphasizing how a core membership was drawn into an ever-more-complete identification of the self with the collective agenda of the group. Lalich's interviews with ex-members and her careful analysis of the cult's literature and videos provide rewarding new insights into the nature and leadership of the group. In part 2, the same format is followed for the Democratic Workers Party, which emerged out of the "New Communism" movement of the same era. In this instance her analysis is informed by her own leadership role in the group.

Heaven's Gate either failed or succeeded, depending on one's perspective, when its members killed themselves (in accordance with their teachings). The Democratic Workers Party was dissolved in an act of rebellion against the authoritarian and increasingly dysfunctional leadership of its charismatic founder, Marlene Dixon (an ex-sociology professor). In each case Lalich's discussion of the four structural dimensions is thoughtful and revealing, if a bit repetitive. The approach provides an

effective framework for the kind of comparative analyses lacking in the study of new religious movements, though the differentiation of the systems of control and influence is insufficient. In the process Lalich makes some important observations on the role of stylistic differences in the management of charismatic authority in determining the ultimate fate of these two groups. Marshall Applewhite, one of the cofounders of Heaven's Gate, wielded a more complete commitment from his followers through the "softer" exercise of his authority.

Bounded Choice makes an important contribution to our understanding of extreme commitments in general and should be read by all scholars of new religious movements in particular. But it is apparent that the author is at odds with herself throughout the text. In principle the concept of bounded choice offers a neutral analytical model of some utility. Lalich's analysis is often vitiated, however, by an evaluative bias that casts the activities of these groups in an exclusively negative light. Her approach is influenced strongly by the ideas of Robert Jay Lifton (*Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* [Norton, 1961]) and Benjamin Zablocki (*Alienation and Charisma* [Free Press, 1980]), while ignoring more recent and widely recognized studies of both Heaven's Gate (e.g., Winston Davis, "Heaven's Gate: A Study of Religious Obedience," *Nova Religio* 3 (3), 2000: 241–67) and the problems of charismatic authority (e.g., Lorne Dawson, "Crises in Charismatic Legitimacy and Violent Behavior in New Religious Movements," in *Cults, Religion and Violence*, edited by D. G. Bromley and J. G. Melton [Cambridge University Press, 2002]).

Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Central American Solidarity Movement. By Sharon Erickson Nepstad. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 199+x1.

David Smilde
University of Georgia

In *Convictions of the Soul* Sharon Erickson Nepstad argues that social movement research has neglected the human component of mobilization and protest. The meaning of protest for people, the role of conviction, identity, and creative agency, have all been sidelined by the analysis of structural conditions and organizational mechanisms. The author addresses these lacunae by looking at the U.S. movement for peace in Central America. She focuses on the interaction between symbolic elements within Christianity, socialization, and certain key biographical experiences that spurred a moral engagement with the plight of Central Americans. She reviews the dramatic assassinations of religious figures in El Salvador—three North American nuns and a lay missionary in 1980 and six Jesuit priests in 1989—and looks at how this kindled a special interest among religious progressives in North America. This interest and focus was main-

tained through transnational contact via educational trips of North Americans traveling to Central America and by Central American refugees sharing their experiences in the United States. The last substantive chapter looks at the factors that carried the energy of this movement through the 1990s and up to the present in the School of the Americas Watch—a protest movement focused on the U.S. facility at Fort Benning, Georgia, that has reportedly trained generations of human rights violators.

Scholars looking for a causal account that will determine which variables, in the last analysis, really caused the mobilization of the U.S. Central America movement might be disappointed with this book. Since Erickson Nepstad's sample is selected on the dependent variable without a comparison group, it is hard to assess the causal significance of the factors she is examining. One could legitimately ask whether these moral convictions were not much more widespread than actual recruitment to the movement, perhaps the element that made the difference came from the structural factors that she deemphasizes. However, that would miss the point. This book does what qualitative research does best. It provides us with "hows" for some "whats" we already know. We already have a convincing causal account in Christian Smith's *Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement* (University of Chicago Press, 1996). Erickson Nepstad builds on Smith's work with detailed portraits of how activists related ideas and experiences to each other and how they turned both into stimuli for action. Through presentation of some terrific data the book slowly builds up plausibility to a degree that the reader, by the end, gains a convincing understanding of the mindset of participants. In the chapter on martyrs, for example, Erickson Nepstad argues that these murders did not simply have the unintended impact of rallying Christians from beyond Central America. Rather, from letters and statements made by Archbishop Oscar Romero and the four North American religious women before their deaths, she shows that they were consciously reflecting on their own probable murders, how God was asking them not to flee, and what their deaths would mean for the fight against injustice. Also, in the chapter entitled "Making Politics Personal," the author reviews the case of "Carolyn," who told how her commitment was consolidated when she transported a Guatemalan family as part of the sanctuary movement. "So here I am, driving this van as I'm hearing this family's story repeated for miles and miles and thousands of miles on this trip. It was those kinds of experiences that really cemented my conviction, hearing those stories on a very personal level and having faces that will never be erased from my memory" (pp. 134–35).

The author makes no claim to political neutrality or diplomatic compromise. Herself having been involved in the movement, Erickson Nepstad never wavers from presenting the U.S. government's actions in Central America as the unjust and immoral source of death and destruction for hundreds of thousands of innocent lives. She courageously avoids the fashionable ritual of stating one's "bias" (which presumably neutralizes

it) by appealing to feminist authors who regard politically engaged perspectives as analytic resources. Indeed, portraying the author or any of the political activists in this book as biased or lacking objectivity would feel strange given some of the information provided here. Among the striking facts the author reviews, for example, are the conclusions of U N investigative teams that the Salvadoran military, not the FMLN, was responsible for 95% of all documented human rights violations in that country's civil war, in Guatemala the military was responsible for 93% of such violence. Such facts leave me wondering if we social movement scholars do not need to change our questions when studying U S foreign policy. Rather than trying to explain why some people become outraged enough to resist, perhaps we need to focus, following Nina Eliasoph, on the mechanisms through which people are able to avoid outrage enough to remain passive. How does such lopsided culpability become a lamentable conflict of equals in the public consciousness? How do so many sincere and moral people believe their country could never arm assassins or teach torture? In terms of mobilization, these are the real success stories.

Adolescent Lives in Transition: How Social Class Influences the Adjustment to Middle School. By Donna Marie San Antonio. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.

Ellen Brantlinger
Indiana University

Adolescent Lives in Transition reports a study of student adjustment during the transition from sixth grade to middle school. It includes 14 boys and girls from the district's lower-income rural communities and 16 from the more affluent town where the middle school is located. San Antonio's study is ambitious, involving community advisory group meetings, home visits, classroom and school bus observation, attendance at school events, and personal and focus group interviews. The author worked with area family and youth agencies for 25 years, so she brought an informed perspective that enriched the book. This study mainly used ethnographic methods, however, participants completed surveys, and relevant local economic and achievement statistics are included.

In the author's discussions of school and community life, there are no villains or victims, and the complexities of class relationships are portrayed with balance and empathy for all. She does paint a telling picture of inequities and is critical of adults who create or ignore situations that contribute to students' feelings of inadequacy. San Antonio's ability to maintain supportive relations with these young people over the two-year period is admirable. She had "perfect attendance" for focus group sessions. The vignettes of various interactions with participants reveal her warm sense of humor, her general caring, and her sensitivity to students' feelings.

Some researchers maintain they do not influence subjects or settings. While San Antonio never referred to her study as action research, she admits to being a supportive presence at a crucial time in these young adolescents' lives. An intriguing aspect of her study was how students from rural and town areas were brought together for focus group sessions. Other researchers report that students from different social classes rarely have contact with each other. I wish she had written more about the effects of these sessions on subsequent relations at school.

San Antonio provides descriptive narratives of the region's current and historic economic and social circumstances. Accounts of her own reactions during observations provide readers with her own philosophical and ethical positions. I loved the vivid details about her interactions with students on the long winter bus rides. She reports an incident in which ninth-grade boys at the back of the bus chanted "You are gay" at a seventh grader in the front. San Antonio got up, went back to the taunting offenders, and told them to stop harassing the student. Her position as an adult with moral authority took precedence over researcher noninterference and objectivity. She also observed that the bus driver, who had reprimanded students for eating, ignored this greater offense.

San Antonio offers a wealth of astute ideas about social class relations and schooling. There is a tendency among critical theorists to portray high-income adolescents as winners and low-income students as losers. This is undeniably true when looking at track assignment, grading, and punishment. Yet, San Antonio illustrates that all is not rosy for affluent adolescents, who face pressures from adults and who worry about their appearance and their friendships. Fifty percent of the parents of both groups were divorced, so high- as well as lower-income students suffered from family and financial difficulties.

Adolescent Lives in Transition enhances our understanding of early adolescence, the transition to middle school, tracking and extracurricular participation, family relations, and social class influences on schooling. I highly recommend the book. That said, it is necessary to address certain flaws. The choppy section organization, each with its own introduction and conclusion, is distracting. Literature reviews interspersed throughout the text interfere with the flow of stories. The participants' names in the introduction led me to believe their personal stories would be central, however, most quotations seem to be from surveys and are given in lists. Even with longer quotations, the names of participants were not included, so readers never get a sense of any of them as real people. Relatedly, San Antonio offers general conclusions as she summarizes perspectives without providing sufficient quotations or field notes to convince readers of their credibility. She relies too heavily on literature rather than on the narratives that must have been generated in her thorough study. Although San Antonio writes some engaging stories, citations reveal she may be more influenced by research traditions that rely on hypothesis development and verification rather than ethnographic research.

Another problem is that the methods chapter covers only her work with students, although information from interviews with and observations of adults are included in subsequent chapters. Her elaborate participant selection process is puzzling. Despite a desire for a representative sample, she excludes children with low grades, disability classification, and frequent disciplinary infractions, while admitting that more of these were lower-income children. The perspectives of these students should be of concern. Although San Antonio was proud of the enthusiastic participation, I worried that her participants might have received attention and privileges envied by those not included in her study in the small middle school.

Another concern is that San Antonio laments the dearth of studies about social class influences on middle school adjustment. Indeed, the abundance of studies conducted over the past two decades on this topic do not appear in her references. People most interested in her book may be bothered that their findings have been ignored. Without underestimating the importance of these problems, the book is informative and contributes to a general understanding of social class and schooling.

In the Flesh: The Cultural Politics of Body Modification. By Victoria Pitts. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2003. Pp. vi+239. \$19.95 (paper).

R. Danielle Egan
St. Lawrence University

In this ethnography, Victoria Pitts examines the vanguard of the early body modification movement (i.e., cyberpunks, modern primitives, and radical queers) to explore the shared meanings and themes individuals bring to body art practices, which range from earlobe stretching to subdermal silicone implants. In so doing, Pitts illuminates the various discourses at play in the broader cultural understanding of body modification practices (i.e., pathologization, deviance, and ultimately depoliticization via capitalist appropriation). She also shows how individuals who engage in these practices both employ and contest various dominant discourses. This is exemplified in her interviews with body artists who negotiate the complex intersections of culture, individualism, reinscription, and appropriation. Pitts's ethnography should be viewed as a powerful example of how the practices of everyday life are most often situated between the poles of structure and agency.

The central question guiding her inquiry is how "nonmainstream body practices reflect, and contest, contemporary norms and values about the body" (p. 14). In this endeavor, Pitts incorporates several theoretical paradigms—continental philosophy, poststructuralism, queer theory, postcolonial theory, cyber feminism, and political economic theories—to aid in her inquiry. Her analysis neither romanticizes nor pathologizes the 20

people she interviewed. In every chapter she analyzes both the subversive "promise of body alteration" as well as its limits in the stories provided by the people that she interviewed (p. 14). Pitts deconstructs the ways in which body modification practices move beyond the discourse of pathology or self-mutilation to show how "the body is a space for self-expression" (p. 32). She further inquires how individuals who are engaged in body art practices threaten the social order in their "celebration of grotesque" and their "refusal of orderliness and social control" (p. 41).


Pitts illuminates these points in her exploration of the links between body modification and identity formation. Her analysis in chapters 2 and 3 of both straight women and radical queers who are active body modifiers shows how these individuals actively contest patriarchy and heteronormativity. Both groups argue that body modification allows for a radical rewriting of the body on their terms, and, as such, the body itself becomes "politicized as a speech act" (p. 91). Both groups stated that this form of protest is radically individualistic and a form of reclamation and conscientious "self exile" (p. 104). However, as Pitts rightly points out, these forms of protest are limited in the sense that one can only take body modification so far before physical harm can occur (there are, after all, only so many places one can brand, scar, or pierce). Concomitantly, its locus of change remains squarely within the individual, so structural change becomes impossible.

An important issue which Pitts examines in chapter 4 of the book is the appropriation of non-Western cultural practices (i.e., the Native American O-Kee-Pa ritual of flesh hanging) by white Western individuals. Modern primitivists confound and "play on historically produced borders between so called primitives and civilized bodies" (p. 124). Pitts criticizes modern primitivism's unwitting affirmation of the fetishization of the Other, showing how "the representation of indigenous people deployed in modern primitivism are not free of the historical problems of racism and ethnocentrism" (p. 136). At base, modern primitivists use "tribal" not as a way of celebrating difference or diversity, but as a form of contestation and radical individualism that reaffirms the practitioners' position as white Western individuals. In chapter 5, Pitts examines the other side of the body modification spectrum, cyberpunk, composed of individuals who view body modification as a "post human experiment" (p. 153). Unlike modern primitivism, cyberpunk "transcends the body" and views body modification as a highly individualistic and rational project (p. 155). Pitts problematizes this form of "liberal postmodernism" as it does not account for the ways in which the experiences of body modification are squarely situated within these practitioners' own sociohistorical biography (p. 186).

Although a powerful and provocative text, there are a few ways this book could have been made a bit stronger. For example, Pitts's argument on modern primitivism would have been stronger had she incorporated bell hooks's essay "Eating the Other" (*Black Looks: Race and Representation* [South End Press, 1992]). Moreover, although Pitts problematizes

postmodern liberalism in her work, she could have attended to the fact that many of the discourses employed by body modifiers (i.e., self-fashioning) can be found in Renaissance literature, Locke's philosophy, and other classical humanist texts. As such, these may in fact be definitively modern arguments with a postmodern twist. I also think Pitts's work could have benefited from updating the bibliography, as there were only five texts (and only two on body modification) that were published after 2000. These, however, are minor suggestions and should not overshadow the strength of Pitts's analysis. This is a good book for those interested in the body, gender, deviance, social control, and cultural studies.

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
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
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
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



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
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
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
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Labor Transnationalism and Global Governance—Kay

How Networks Matter—Smilde

Denomination, Religious Context, and Suicide—van Tubergen,
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
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CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT J. SAMPSON is Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences and chair of the Department of Sociology at Harvard University. His current research examines the prediction paradigm in life-course studies of crime, durable forms of urban inequality, the network structure of community power, and theories of civil society.

DOUG MCADAM is professor of sociology at Stanford University and outgoing director of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He is author, coauthor, or coeditor of nine books and more than 50 articles, primarily on the dynamics of social movements and contentious politics, or the long-term impact of intensive civic or activist experiences.

HEATHER MACINDOE is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at the University of Chicago. Her research focuses on organizations and inequality in urban contexts. Her dissertation examines two ways in which nonprofit organizations produce public goods in the modern city: through philanthropic foundation funding of service-providing nonprofit organizations and through collective action by nonprofit organizations and voluntary associations on behalf of their constituents.

SIMÓN WEAFFER-ELIZONDO is a National Science Foundation postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Sociology at Harvard University. He is currently working on projects that examine the relation between neighborhood disadvantage and protest, neighborhood collective action and voting, and comparing protest in Chicago and Boston.

TAMARA KAY is a postdoctoral scholar at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego. In July 2006, she will join the faculty at Harvard University as assistant professor in the Sociology Department. Her work centers on the political and legal implications of regional economic integration, transnationalism, and global governance. She is currently writing a book on NAFTA's effects on labor transnationalism in North America.

DAVID SMILDE is assistant professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. He writes on religion, culture, and social movements in Latin America. His book *'Works of the Flesh, Fruit of the Spirit': Imaginative Rationality in Venezuelan Evangelicalism* is under review. He is now researching religion and political polarization in Venezuela during the presidency of Hugo Chávez.

FRANK VAN TUBERGEN is assistant professor at the Sociology Department at Utrecht University. His research focuses on comparative studies of immigrants' language proficiency, religion, intermarriage, and socioeconomic status in Western countries.

MANFRED TE GROTENHUIS is assistant professor of methodology at Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and an affiliate of the Interuniversity Centre for Social Science Theory and Methodology. His main interests are longitudinal data analysis, simulation techniques, and age-period-cohort models.

WOUT ULTEE holds a chair of general sociology at Nijmegen University. He has published a Dutch textbook, commented on rational choice and other theoretical developments, and done quantitative research on educational homogamy, Jewish-Gentile intermarriage, and losing one's religion.

PAUL INGRAM is professor of management at Columbia University. His research focuses on the interdependence between social structure and institutions. Current projects examine the founding, failure, and growth of intergovernmental organizations and the transition from kinship capitalism to corporate capitalism in the Clyde River shipbuilding industry.

JEFFREY A. ROBINSON is assistant professor of management at the Stern School of Business, New York University. He holds a B.S. in civil engineering and a B.A. in urban studies from Rutgers University, an M.S. in civil engineering management from Georgia Institute of Technology, and a Ph.D. from Columbia University's Graduate School of Business. He is currently working on manuscripts related to his work on inner-city business development, entrepreneurial churches, and social and institutional barriers to markets.

MARC L. BUSCH is Karl F. Landegger Professor of International Business Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His research focuses on trade politics and law. He is currently writing on the experience of developing countries in dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization.

ROBERTO M. FERNANDEZ is the William F. Pounds Professor of Organization Studies at MIT's Sloan School of Management. His research is focused on the areas of organizations, social networks, and human resources. He has done extensive field research in organizations, including an exhaustive five-year case study of a plant's retooling and relocation, and studies of the hiring process of entry-level jobs across several organizational settings.

M. LOURDES SOSA is a Ph.D. candidate at the MIT Sloan School of Management. She is mainly interested in organizational theory and social network analysis and the application of these fields to the study of large, established firms. Currently, she is investigating differences in research productivity across firms competing in the market for cancer drugs as this market is disrupted by the biotechnology revolution.

Civil Society Reconsidered: The Durable Nature and Community Structure of Collective Civic Action¹

Robert J. Sampson
Harvard University

Doug McAdam
Stanford University

Heather MacIndoe
University of Chicago

Simón Weffer-Elizondo
Harvard University

This article develops a conceptual framework on civil society that shifts the dominant focus on individuals to collective action events—civic and protest alike—that bring people together in public to realize a common purpose. Analyzing over 4,000 events in the Chicago area from 1970 to 2000, the authors find that while civic engagement is durable overall, “sixties-style” protest declines, and hybrid events that combine public claims making with civic forms of behavior—what they call “blended social action”—increase. Furthermore, dense social ties, group memberships, and neighborly exchange do not predict community variations in collective action. The density of nonprofit organizations matters instead, suggesting that declines in traditional social capital may not be as consequential for civic capacity as commonly thought.

The reigning image of American civic life in both the popular and scholarly press is largely bleak. Across a wide spectrum of commentators, the dominant view is that participation in collective aspects of civic life has plummeted dramatically over the last three decades. Indeed, whether the indicator is decline in voting, reduced trust in government, lower mem-

¹ We thank the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) and NSF grant no. 0312211 for support. We acknowledge, in particular, our colleagues on the CASBS 2002–3 Special Project on Community-Level Processes and Dynamics—Steve Levitt, Tony Bryk, and Per-Olof Wikström. We also thank Jason Kaufman, Theda Skocpol, Nicole Marwell, Mary Katzenstein, Ruud Koopmans, Robert Putnam, and the *AJS* reviewers for providing critical feedback. Direct correspondence to Robert Sampson, Department of Sociology, Harvard University, William James Hall, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138. E-mail: rsampson@wjh.harvard.edu.

bership in the parent-teacher association, or slipping attendance at public meetings, Americans have been famously said to be “bowling alone” more than ever (Putnam 1995, 2000)

Of course, not all hold to this view. The most common dissent from the narrative of civic decline turns on a quarrel with the numbers. Using one of the same national surveys as Putnam does (2000, esp. chaps. 3, 4, 6, and the appendix), some observers have argued that individuals have not, in fact, declined in certain forms of institutional trust and traditional organizational memberships (Paxton 1999, Rotolo 1999). Others have argued that the organizational locus of civic engagement is what has changed—that Americans have turned to looser but still effective associations in the form of social support or self-help organizations (Wuthnow 1998, Ray 2002). Still other critics contend that American civic life, which was formerly organized around traditional membership-based voluntary associations, has been restructured around membership in advocacy organizations and other professional civic groups (Skocpol 2003, 2004).

The positions of Putnam and his critics each have merit but tend to reinforce the way in which the debate on civil society has unfolded. Most of the data in dispute turn on trends in the individual-level backdrop to civic society—especially declines in group membership and social-psychological states of trust—rather than collective political action or public civic events. Why should we care about the prevalence of membership in the Elks Club, PTA, or any other group, unless it translates into collective civic action? Is it important that fewer people trust “generalized others” or attend regular meetings? Does this tell us about the capacity of collectivities to act?² The alarm bells that Putnam (1995) set off had little to do with bowling club memberships per se or the local Order of the Moose. Relying on Tocqueville’s classic insights from the 1800s, political theorists and social critics have been most concerned with the negative consequences of civic disengagement for democratic capacity and the health of the American polity.³ From this concern, it follows that the civil society debate has been waged on the potentially misleading per-

² The typical assumption is that higher levels of general mistrust lead to greater disengagement, e.g., as measured by voting turnout. As events such as the 2003 gubernatorial recall in California reveal, however, it may be the case that a distrustful citizenry is more, not less, likely to become involved in civic affairs.

³ For Tocqueville (2000), the other reason to care about civic participation is because it presumably increases the tendency of individuals to be other-regarding. That is, civic participation was thought to increase identification with collective interests and the common good. Whether or not this is true, we set aside the more social-psychological interpretation of the role of civic participation. For excellent recent reviews of studies of individual participation, see Putnam (2000), Oliver (2001), and Ray (2002); for trust, see Paxton (1999).

ceptions, memberships, and behaviors of individuals as opposed to truly social, or collective, action

In an attempt to address this theoretical disconnect, our project turns its attention to robust civic action in the form of collective public events. Drawing on insights and lessons learned in the social movements literature, we gathered a sample of over 4,000 collective action events in the Chicago metropolitan area—both civic participation *and* protests—for selected years from 1970 to 2000. Through detailed coding of these events we constructed what we believe is a novel database that allows us to chart the variable nature and community structure of collective action in a major urban area during the period of rising concern over American civic decline. In shifting the focus from individuals to public events that bring two or more people together to realize a common purpose or specific claim, we find considerable temporal continuity in civic engagement. Namely, the volume of collective civic events is remarkably stable from 1970 to 2000, as are the rank orderings of public claims and forms of events. At the same time, we discover the growth of a previously overlooked phenomenon that combines protest with traditional civic behavior—what we call “blended social action.” Our analysis also provides evidence that interindividual social ties and membership in traditional civic groups are not good predictors of collective action. This article thus reframes the civil society debate in terms of collective, rather than individual, action *we specifically argue that collective civic engagement appears to have changed rather than declined, with sources that are organizational rather than interpersonal in nature*

FROM PROTEST TO COLLECTIVE CIVIC PARTICIPATION

There are discernible biases in the literature on social movements that have undercut its contribution to the civil society debate. From our perspective, movement scholars have tended to privilege a rather narrow, stylized form of contention—featuring disruptive protest linked to broad national struggles waged by disadvantaged minorities—over far more numerous, if less visible, kinds of collective engagement (McAdam et al 2005). One of the goals of this article is to grant greater empirical attention to “mundane” but no less important forms of collective civic action.

Fortunately, social movement scholarship offers important building blocks that can be used to transcend its traditional focus. One of the strengths of research in social movements is the decisive empirical shift from individual civic participation to a focus on *collective action events*, which logically, we argue, is essential to the underlying phenomenon at the heart of the civil society debate. A second contribution concerns the

honing of a methodology consistent with an event-based focus, a point we elaborate further below. A third contribution, more theoretical in nature, concerns the central importance assigned by movement analysts to an understanding of the social processes that give rise to and help sustain collective mobilization and action (e.g., Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982, Gould 1995, Tarrow 1998, McAdam [1982] 1999, 2003, Mische 2003), an intellectual move that rejects the idea that collective action results simply from the aggregation of individual civic behavior.

Recent work on the differential social organization of urban communities also bears on our theoretical understanding of the conditions under which collective capacity emerges and is built. Focusing on neighborhood residents, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) argue that the linkage of a working trust with shared expectations for intervening on behalf of the common good defines the spatial context of what they term *collective efficacy*. Just as self-efficacy is situated rather than global—one has self-efficacy relative to a particular task—a neighborhood's efficacy exists relative to specific tasks such as maintaining public order and providing local services. Whether garbage removal, the siting of a fire station, school improvements, or police response, a continuous stream of challenges faces residents of modern communities. No longer can such challenges be met by relying on strong ties among neighbors, for the evidence is clear that friends and social support networks are decreasingly organized in a parochial, local fashion (e.g., Fischer 1982). Moving away from a narrow focus on private ties and personal memberships, the concept of collective efficacy is meant to signify an emphasis on conjoint capability for action to achieve an intended effect, and hence an active sense of collective engagement on the part of residents to solve problems. Collective efficacy is best observed under conditions of challenge, reinforcing the idea that resolving conflict is an important part of civic engagement.

Social movements and collective efficacy theory thus share a common orienting framework—a focus on the mobilization of action for an intended purpose. We draw on this framework to argue for a direct focus on civic events that are collective in nature and that bring together members of the community. Events such as blood drives, community festivals, fund-raisers, and community watches against crime go straight to the heart of civic capacity. Like protest events, such civic events may seek to procure resources. However, civic events expressing community-oriented or collective interests typically do not represent a challenge to the existing system. Rather, many such events can be said to “celebrate community”—whether pancake breakfasts at the local fire hall, fund-raisers for cultural causes, ethnic festivals, or neighborhood block parties.

The collective and spatial nature of such phenomena has been sur-

prisingly overlooked in prior research. The social capital debate has turned on national trends in things like group membership, social ties, trust, leisure, voting, routine meeting attendance, giving, and television viewing (e.g., Putnam 2000, pp. 426–39), rather than directly on collective civic events in community context. The collective efficacy literature is sensitive to neighborhood context and the idea of collective events, but it, too, omits events and relies on survey questions about trust and expectations (Sampson et al. 1997, pp. 919–20). The social movements literature focuses on nonroutine events but eschews much concern for neighborhood variation and concentrates on explicit “protest” agendas such as the antiwar, civil rights, labor, and environmental movements. Although these agendas are each important in their own right, we seek to leverage a more general conception of collective civic action. We do so by borrowing different elements of each theoretical approach, first by replacing the individual-level focus of most social capital arguments with an event-based approach to examining collective civic behavior. Next, we adopt the task-oriented and geographically bounded framework of collective efficacy. Finally, we expand the protest agenda of traditional social movement research by including an explicit focus on collective *civic* events.

We accomplish these objectives by examining temporal and community-level variations in both collective civic action and protest in a major metropolitan region. Because this is the first such effort of which we are aware to directly measure collective civic action events and situate them simultaneously in time and space along with protest, our empirical assessment highlights basic trends, patterns, and predictors. We ask three broad sets of questions to orient our analysis:

1. What is the nature of collective civic behavior over time? Is it declining, stable, or possibly even increasing? What is the relationship of protest to civic engagement?
2. What are the claims or purposes of collective civic action and protest? Are they aimed at producing public goods? Have collective claims changed over time, and if so, how?
3. Perhaps most important, what are the predictors of collective civic action at the community level? Does membership in traditional social capital organizations predict civic action events, or is institutional structure more important?

SOCIAL APPROPRIATION AND ITS ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS

So far we have not made an explicit theoretical link between the social organization of communities and political action, but neither has much

past work. Social capital theory, in particular, tends to gloss over the mechanisms by which bowling leagues and group membership lead to generalized civic capacity. Reasonable stories can be told about how social exchange within groups leads to political awareness, building community capacity, and political mobilization, but inferences are usually indirect, and the evidence sometimes negative (Kaufman 2003). By combining one strand of social movement research with recent work on collective efficacy, we derive testable hypotheses about the conditions that facilitate collective civic action. We propose that these conditions go beyond the kinds of social participation stressed to date.

We start with one consistent finding from the social movement literature: episodes of contention tend to develop within established institutions or organizations (for a summary of this literature, see McCarthy 1996). Besides well-known studies that helped establish the fact (e.g., Orum 1972, Curtis and Zurcher 1973, Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975, Morris 1984, McAdam 1999), a host of more recent works have confirmed it in new and creative ways. For example, in his work on the 1989 Chinese student movement, Zhao (1998) shows how the dense ecology of college campuses in Beijing served as the locus of initial mobilization. Glenn (2001), among others, documents the role that a network of independent theater companies played in the origins of the Civic Forum Movement in Czechoslovakia. Osa (1997) highlights the central structural importance of the Catholic Church to Solidarity and the larger dissident movement in Poland.

Consistent with these studies, proponents of the political process model of social movement emergence have long emphasized the role of established institutions or organizations in the onset of contention. "Absent any such 'mobilizing structure,' incipient movements [are] thought to lack the capacity to act even if afforded the opportunity to do so" (McAdam 2003, p. 289). As straightforward and seemingly self-evident as this proposition is, it is worth reiterating that the emphasis is conceptually different from claims that turn on rates of individual participation in voluntary associations and related civic activities as emphasized in the social capital literature. The main difference of note is that movements and related protest events are not just aggregations of individual participants; rather, they are social products born of complex interactive dynamics played out within established social settings. Recently, movement theorists have sought to soften the structurally determinist tone of the earliest work in this tradition and to move instead to identify the contingent social and cultural processes that serve to transform established institutions into sites of emergent contention (McAdam 1999, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Termed "social appropriation" by movement theorists, this transformative process is thought to depend on, among other factors, "attri-

butions of threat or opportunity,” the adoption of innovative action forms, and/or a shared sense of efficacy among group members. The last factor speaks directly to collective efficacy theory and, more generally, to recent work on community-level processes and dynamics (Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon 2002).

Drawing on these different strands of work, we hypothesize that collective action events in the modern city are highly concentrated geographically and explained by systematic variations in community-level characteristics. Wuthnow (1998, p. 112), like Wilson (1987), argues that the new urban poverty is defined increasingly in terms of its geographic concentration, and therefore that “the character of civic involvement must be understood in terms of the social ecology of entire neighborhoods, rather than as an attribute of individuals or families alone.” We agree, but note that restricting the focus to poor neighborhoods and concentrated poverty as the main contributor to declining mobilization is an analytically narrow approach. As noted, the dominant counterperspective on civic decline poses a different kind of thesis, whereby the density of local ties and memberships in local voluntary associations and organized groups constitute the main force generating civic action, a force that has systematically declined (e.g., Putnam 2000). In many ways, this idea harkens back to classic themes in the literature on urban voluntary associations and personal networks (e.g., Komarovsky 1946, Fischer 1982) as a source of collective capacity.

Rather than poverty or civic memberships, we emphasize the proposition that the capacity for sustained collective action is conditioned mainly by the presence of established institutions and organizations that may be appropriated in the service of emergent action. High rates of individual participation and dense personal ties may well be related to this kind of infrastructure, but conceptually, they are not the same thing. Imagine, for example, an “urban village” with intense participation by its residents in only one local organization, compared to another community with a lower prevalence of memberships spread across a multiplicity of institutions. Moreover, when membership and institutional density are coincident, it would seem that high rates of individual participation are an outgrowth of the existing organizational structure, not the reverse. In the same way, we see emergent collective action more as a product of extant institutions and organizations (or, more accurately, specified processes that take place within them) than of the levels of individual participation that attach to these structures. Adjusting for key confounders that may also bear on mobilization capacity, such as the concentration of economic resources and racial composition, we therefore compare the predictive power of aggregated civic memberships with a more institu-

tionally based explanation rooted in the density of local organizational structures

Emergence of Blended Forms of Action

Our integration of the social movements and urban community literature suggests a further twist to the social capital–civic society debate. The insight we glean is to view forms of protest not as inherently problematic, but as potentially part of building community. Protest, after all, is a form of collective action that Tocqueville (2000) himself might have admired for its democratic underpinnings. Putnam seems to agree: “Whether among gays marching in San Francisco or evangelicals praying on the Mall or, in an earlier era, autoworkers downing tools in Flint, the act of collective protest itself creates enduring bonds of solidarity” (2000, p. 153).⁴ Along these lines, a recent analysis of democracy by the political scientist Eric Oliver claims that social conflict and civic engagement have a symbiotic relationship in a well-functioning democracy (2001, p. 202).

We thus take the step of conceptualizing a largely unrecognized but potentially transformative type of activity. Quite simply, we marry the metaphorical bowling league to civic action by examining events that combine traditional community “togetherness” (e.g., community festivals) with claims for social change. Consider, for example, an event reported in the *Chicago Tribune* under the headline “Spearheads Playground Battle: Community Group Demands Playground Facilities for Youth at Park District.” This article describes a collective event in which a community action group called Let’s All Get Together and Work attended a meeting of the Park District to demand that a vacant lot be converted to a playground for neighborhood children. Or consider another event reported under the headline “Neighbors’ Library Plea Is Granted: Community Residents and Students Lobby for Temporary Library Facility.” In this event, community residents and a group of middle-school students attended a board meeting of the public library to request that a temporary library site be found to service the community during the two years it would take to restore the neighborhood library destroyed by fire.

These two hybrid events represent examples of what we call “blended social action.” This form of collective action blurs traditional boundaries by combining common types of civic participation, such as festivals or neighborhood association meetings, with a stated claim and an organized

⁴ Putnam (2000) disagrees, however, that “checkbook” membership in groups like Greenpeace or the Sierra Club achieves the same ends. Here we side with Putnam by looking at types of collective acts he acknowledges as theoretically relevant but does not study empirically.

public event that seeks change. In other words, hybrid collective events typically combine protestlike “claims” for change with civil society “forms.”⁵ Consider that the successful library protest noted above originated in the context of a neighborhood association. Rather than assuming that membership in such a neighborhood form of organization triggers social action, we look instead to concrete public claims and collective action itself. Such blended events, neither wholly civic nor wholly protest in nature, provide a potential key to understanding the seeming paradox of decline in traditional civic memberships amidst durability in collective civic engagement.

Our hypothesis that blended forms of social action constitute an increasing form of collective civic action in the United States is further motivated by the fact that community-based nonprofit organizations have grown over time and have become increasingly embedded in the political process through the mediation of publicly funded services (Marwell 2004). An intriguing body of research also suggests the potential of local nonprofit organizations to foster collective action (Small 2004, Warren 2004) and to correct for market or government “failures” in the production of public goods (Hansmann 1987, Weisbrod 1988, Berry 2003).⁶

In short, a focus on community-based organizational structures, especially nonprofit organizations, unifies our dual concern with temporal trends and cross-community variations. Temporal change is seen from the lens of a changing organizational form, and the concentration of the events themselves is theorized as rooted in the density of organizational infrastructures.

THE CHICAGO COLLECTIVE CIVIC PARTICIPATION STUDY (CCCP)

Our data consists of detailed information collected over four years on collective events occurring in the Chicago metropolitan area between 1970 and 2000. Chicago was chosen not only because of its status as a large

⁵ Maney and Oliver (2001, p. 148) argue something similar with respect to form: “Some protest messages are delivered through nonprotest forms such as ceremonies. As the standard protest forms become legal and normative, they can carry nonprotest educational and awareness content.” At the national level, Skocpol’s (2004) recent work also points to the increasingly hybridized form of social action that stems from the professionalization of large-scale voluntary, nonprofit, and interest group organizations (see also Berry 2003).

⁶ Marwell (2004) further argues that nonprofit community-based organizations are embedded in a network of political and economic exchange that can leverage the interests and voting power of their clients. Although she focuses on individual voting, from our perspective, this networking process in principle has the capacity to generate a variety of collective events, creating an “externality” of collective civic engagement.

and important metropolis, but also because it afforded a unique opportunity to leverage an ongoing study of the city's neighborhoods (described below). We collected event data by extending a well-established methodology of social movement research—gathering and coding reports of protest events from newspaper archives (Earl et al. 2004). We selected the *Chicago Tribune* as the main newspaper of record because it has the largest circulation and is by consensus accounts the most influential newspaper in the Chicago area (see also Suttles 1990).

Collection of newspaper data has typically relied on keyword searches of newspaper indices (e.g., Lieberman and Silverman 1965, Gurr 1968, Olzak 1989). Another approach to event identification involves reading the entire newspaper, page by page, searching for candidate events (e.g., McAdam and Su 2002). Although more time consuming, we chose the latter approach because we sought to collect *all* forms of collective civic action, not just the highly visible protest events. Pretesting suggested that selecting events through a keyword search of the newspaper index failed to yield the broad types of collective action events of theoretical interest. To maximize resources and cover as long a temporal frame as possible, we sampled every third day of a given year rather than reading the newspaper every day of the week (see also Kriesi et al. 1995). With this strategy, no one day is privileged, and we were able to cover three decades' worth of events.⁷ The event identification process was identical for each day that events were collected. For example, there was no sampling within newspaper sections across days. This identical process ensured that data were collected from a representative sample of newspaper sections, days of the week, and days of the month across all the years of our study.

Collective Public Events

Our event identification relied on five primary criteria to distinguish articles that reported collective action events from other news stories, articles, and listings. First, prospective events had to be public. Second, they had to involve two or more individuals (though usually more). Third, we only collected events with a discrete time occurrence that could be identified within a two-week time window on either side of the newspaper

⁷ Sampling was continuous over the period of study. Thus data collection did not necessarily begin with the first calendar day of the year but rather with the date that was three days after the last date coded in the previous year.

date.⁸ Fourth, we excluded routine political activity initiated by the state or formal political parties (e.g., political party dinners, speeches, and rallies). Such regular or ongoing political activity does not arise from emergent claims making or civic capacity of citizens, but develops instead from the initiative of political actors and professionals. Typical examples would be a speech by a mayoral candidate, a regular city council meeting, or a party-sponsored rally held for a state senator.⁹ Furthermore, routine political lobbying by groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving or the Sierra Club, while important, is continuous in nature and does not fit with our definition of discrete events of civic participation. Finally, we excluded profit-oriented events and regularly scheduled gatherings that are typical fare in any large city, such as professional sports games, live entertainment (e.g., rock concerts, theater), school swim meets, church services, university classes, and meetings of self-help groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous or weight-loss groups.¹⁰ Self-help groups, classes, and regular public meetings initiated by professionals or as part of an organization's mandate—like routine political activity—do not provide what we argue is a direct indicator of collective civic action or capacity.¹¹

Event Coding

Trained project personnel systematically read each page of the *Tribune*, collecting all articles for coding that contained a collective public event per the above criteria. Once event identification was completed, the articles were examined to exclude “double counting” of the same event. In addition, the articles were scanned to determine if there were multiple events reported in one article. We systematically coded each event within

⁸ The event time frame could be as specific as “3 p.m. Wednesday,” or more general, such as “last week.” We did not, however, collect prospective protest events, such as a march or sit-in that is “planned for next week,” because such events may or may not (and often do not) transpire. Additionally, we did not collect labor strike events, which are not discrete occurrences but tend to be part of an ongoing cycle of protest.

⁹ A protest event, such as a sit-in at a Chicago City Council meeting, *would*, however, be included. Although the regular meeting of the council is state initiated, such a protest event is neither state sponsored nor state initiated.

¹⁰ They may be announced like civic events, but self-help gatherings, unlike a community festival or church pancake breakfast, focus on the individual and are typically not open for public display and consumption.

¹¹ Again, however, while regularly scheduled meetings (e.g., weekly church services) are excluded, our theoretical scheme incorporates a wide range of nonroutine events that might emerge from but are nonetheless logically independent of regular meetings, such as a church fund-raiser for AIDS victims, the public claim “PTA Seeks Ouster of Principal,” a school's fiftieth-year celebration, and special events like “PTA Dads' Night.” These public events might be thought of as expressing “robust” mechanisms of collective engagement not captured by meeting attendance.

an article based on a coding scheme that was pretested on independent years of data¹² Interrater reliability was established at both stages of the data collection process: event identification and event coding. Across persons and sites, interrater reliability averaged 90%.¹³ We coded nine distinct categories of information:

1. documentary information (e.g., date of article, event date),
2. event type (e.g., protest event, civic, or hybrid type),
3. frame of reference (e.g., national, state, city, neighborhood issue),
4. claims/purpose (specific nature and intent of event),
5. forms (e.g., a sit-in, march, community breakfast, fund-raiser),
6. location of event (by address, neighborhood, and/or municipality),
7. intensity (e.g., no. of participants, size, arrests, injuries, damages, deaths),
8. event initiator information (e.g., community location and organizational type), and
9. event target information

Classification Rules

Based on our theoretical framework we classified each event as *protest*, *civic*, or *hybrid*. This classification was accomplished by examining in detail the claims/purpose of events, as well as their functional forms. We define claims, for this project, as *a demand for either a change in society or an avowed desire to resist a proposed change*. Forms, for this study, are defined as *the manner in which action is undertaken by event initiators* (e.g., rally, sit-in).

We defined protest events as any event "in which individuals collectively make a claim or express a grievance on behalf of a social movement organization or social category" (Uhrig and Van Dyke 1996). A protest event explicitly states a claim that includes a desire to bring about or prevent a change in policy or services (e.g., civil rights and gender equality). Protest events often take forms that are disruptive and contentious in nature, but they are not limited to these forms. Examples of protest forms include rallies, sit-ins, and marches, as well as petitioning, letter-writing campaigns, and class-action lawsuits. Protest events present a

¹² One article could contain multiple events. For example, an article could report on an antidrug march by teachers and parents and also report on parents/citizens disrupting a school board meeting.

¹³ Reliability checks were performed at the beginning and middle of the article collection and coding process, as well as any time a new person was added to the project team. Interrater reliability ranged from 89% to 93%.

challenge to the existing social order and could entail violence (by protestors or responding civil authorities) However, protests can also be orderly and peaceful, as in symbolic displays or civil disobedience

We draw the distinction between protest and civic events by noting differences in their forms and claims/purposes Examples of civic forms include a rummage sale for a local church, a community breakfast, a local cleanup day, or a charity ball These are the more traditional forms of civic life that Putnam claims have decreased in recent decades Civic events, in contrast to protest, do not have claims as much as purposes to celebrate the community (e g , festivals), to procure resources (e g , fundraisers), or to accomplish collective goals (e g , cleanups, preservation) Civic events neither desire to bring about (or prevent) a change in policy, nor are they the expression of a specific grievance, as is often the case of protest events We can also think of the difference between protest and civic claims/purposes as follows protest events have explicit claims while civic events have implicit (or latent) purposes

Perhaps most interesting to us theoretically are the *hybrid* events, which represent a blend of civic and protest forms of action More precisely, such events typically combine civic forms with protest claims They do so by exhibiting a clear protest claim and/or grievance, however, instead of a protest form (such as a march or rally), hybrid events exhibit a form that is typically associated with civic action An example of this sort of event is a neighborhood art fair that doubles as a protest regarding current AIDS policy In other words, claims of this sort grow out of traditional forms of civic participation, not from social movement organizations or from other organizations defined in terms of their claims Figure 1 depicts our theoretical typology, or protest—civic—hybrid event framework, along with summary definitions and concrete examples

Event Methodology and Issues Unique to Our Study

A large literature examines the methodological challenges of using newspaper event data, and many studies have investigated the reliability of such data Several rules of thumb have emerged with respect to protest events (1) national newspapers (e g , the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*) have a geographical bias toward coverage of national versus local events, (2) newspapers are more likely to report events with greater size, duration, or conflict, and (3) compared to official records such as protest permits, newspapers underreport the number of events, but do report larger events in which conflict occurred in central locations or that enjoyed business sponsorship (see Snyder and Kelly 1977, McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996, Oliver and Myers 1999, Myers and Camiglia 2004, Earl et al 2004) Some researchers have attempted to model explicitly and




FIG 1 —Theoretical classification and examples of three types of nonroutine collective action events

subsequently “correct” for any perceived bias in newspaper data (Hug and Wisler 1998, Meuller 1997). Others have countered that a formal equation of sample selection bias cannot be estimated (Franzosi 1987, p. 8).

Our study addresses the challenges associated with the collection of newspaper data by using the local newspaper of widest coverage as our main source for events, employing a uniform sampling method across the time period of the study, and following a strict protocol for event identification and coding of information. Our study nonetheless introduces at least two new issues to the methodology of newspaper event coding. The first, anticipated by Oliver and Maney (2000), is that we expand event analyses to include not only less standard forms of protest but civic forms such as fund-raisers, petition drives, and celebrations—exactly the type of events that are systematically excluded from research on traditional social movements. By including both civic and hybrid events we are able to capture more fully the range of collective civic action.

A second issue raised by our study is that portions of the analysis rely on coding the location of events in geographic space. Although scholars have begun to champion the understudied spatial aspects of protest (e.g., Pile and Keith 1997, Miller 2000, Sewell 2001), previous research has not explicitly modeled community-level variations in collective action coded from newspapers. The question of geographical bias is related to the more traditional issue of temporal consistency in coverage. Does the *Tribune* cover certain neighborhoods more than others? Does the newspaper consistently report events over time? There is evidence that newspapers choose stories about protest based on their “newsworthiness” (McCarthy et al. 1996, Oliver and Maney 2000, Oliver and Myers 1999, Myers and Caniglia 2004), but many civic events are not that newsworthy in the traditional sense, and so the role of temporal and geographic bias is unknown. Based on interviews with *Tribune* staff, along with an extensive search for changes in newspaper policies toward civic reporting, we found no evidence or reason to believe that particular times or particular neighborhoods were systematically favored over others.¹⁴ Because of the importance of these issues, however, we devote a separate section of this article to independent validation, especially the question of differential

¹⁴ For example, there is no evidence that the *Tribune* was systematically influenced by what has been dubbed the “civic journalism” initiative funded by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism from 1994 to 2002. This is a small, foundation-funded initiative begun in the early 1990s and aimed primarily at low-circulation newspapers. Had it influenced the reporting of civic events, we would expect to see a dramatic rise of civic events between 1990 and 2000. This is not the case. There was only a 1.4% increase in civic events between 1990 (before the foundation initiative) and 2000. Perhaps more important, the *Tribune* was not funded by the Pew Trust under this initiative.

coverage by the racial composition of readership and community. Our claim is not that our systematic sampling and coding scheme produced an exact count, without error, but rather that we have achieved a credible sample and representative picture of collective civic and protest events for metropolitan Chicago during the period in question.

TRENDS AND PATTERNS

Figure 2 displays basic trends in collective action events in metropolitan Chicago for the decade years of our study (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000), disaggregated into the three broad categories of events. These categories—the definition and measurement of which we described in the previous section—are *protest*, *civic*, and *hybrid* collective events.

The first pattern worthy of note is that the general trend in protest and civic action does not accord with claims regarding the monotonic decline of social capital and civic life in the United States over the past three decades. While there appears to have been a sharp decline in protest and civic activity between 1970 and 1980, overall the picture for 1990 and 2000 is higher than in 1970, at or near the height of the New Left “protest cycle,” suggesting a continuing vitality to civic/political life in metropolitan Chicago that is at odds with the sobering account of many social capital theorists.¹⁵

The second general observation we wish to make concerns the distribution of activity across our three event categories. Perhaps to the surprise of many steeped in the social movement tradition, protest—the “classic” type of collective action—comprises but a small segment in our data. *In fact, civic events comprise nearly 80% of all events in Chicago over the years in question, and protest comprises just 15%.* Located between the highly visible worlds of electoral politics (studied primarily by political scientists) and sociological studies of social movements, the vibrant arena of collective civic life lies largely invisible and yet accounts for the vast majority of our events.

A third pattern concerns the increase in hybrid forms of social action that combine traditional civic pursuits with claims making. Although the

¹⁵ Interestingly, the curvilinear pattern reflected in our event data is mirrored as well in Rotolo’s (1999) analysis of trends in Putnam-style civic participation in voluntary associations between 1974 and 1994. Although there is considerable variation across types of associations, the modal trend looks a lot like ours, with a significant dip in participation in the 1970s and early 1980s and substantial recovery after that. In another article we disaggregate protest trends by suburban and city locations, finding a similar pattern (McAdam et al. 2005). Also, while the count of civic city events declines in 2000, suburban events increase, with a net stability for the metro region 1970–2000.




FIG 2 —Collective event trends across decades, by type Chicago metropolitan area, 1970–2000 ($N = 4,667$)

base prevalence of such events is low, it is notable that the percentage of hybrid events increased from under 4% of the total counts in 1970 to over 12% in 2000, a more than threefold increase. Figure 2 clearly shows that protest and hybrid are virtually dead even in 2000, whereas in 1970, protests were relatively much higher.

Finally, it is important to our argument that the basic pattern in these trends is not explained by variations in population change. Using census data on population size for metropolitan Chicago by decade, we calculated the rate of civic engagement per 100,000 to be 13, 10, 14, and 12 in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, again a pattern of recovering stability by century's end. And the event rate of hybrid action more than doubled from one per 100,000 persons in 1970 to over two in 2000. The data thus seem reasonably clear that while the total volume and rate of collective civic action events is more or less stable from 1970 to 1990–2000, the proportion *and* rate of events that combine civic engagement with movementlike claims has increased. We have no way of knowing, but this merging or “blurring” of protest and traditional civic activity may portend a new kind of social action that will become increasingly important.

In table 1, we turn to the question of continuity and change in the claims that inform collective action events and the forms they take. Whereas figure 2 shows evidence of both continuity and change in the overall structure of action, a careful disaggregation by specific claims will allow us to take stock of changes in the extent to which claims are predominantly other regarding and aimed at the collective good. We are also able to assess whether there have been shifts over time in forms of collective action—for example, are community festivals and public meetings relatively less common now than they were 30 years ago?

Overall, the claims data in table 1 paint a picture of considerable continuity in collective action events for ostensibly public-goods purposes. The Spearman's rank-order correlation from 1970 to 2000 is extraordinarily high, at .994. Across the decades, the predominant focus is charity, which never drops lower than fifth in the claim rankings. Education also ranks consistently high, as do claims related to children, youth, and the arts. Interestingly, the kinds of claims traditionally associated with social movements, such as the environment, women's rights, civil rights, and housing, are not necessarily the top-ranked issues. With the exception of the environment, these movement-type claims do not even rank in the top ten.

What about forms of action? Although protest marches and rallies dominate our image of collective action, the social capital narrative of decline bemoans the loss of the simple public meeting. The data on forms in table 1 demonstrate that the public meeting is alive and well. Ranked

Collective Civic Action

TABLE 1
STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE RANKING OF TOP 15 CLAIMS AND FORMS BY DECADE
COLLECTIVE ACTION EVENTS IN CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA, 1970–2000

	All Years	1970	1980	1990	2000
Claims					
Charity-nonmedical research	1	2	5	1	1
Education (local)	2	1	4	2	3
Culture/arts	3	5	1	4	4
Youth/children	4	3	3	6	7
Environment	5	4	14	5	5
Local/city government policy	6	10	8	3	6
Ethnic culture	7	9	2	12	9
Recreation/athletics	8	NA	6	13	2
Religion	9	8	9	7	10
Women	10	12	11	8	NA
Community preservation	11	NA	12	9	12
Housing	12	7	NA	NA	NA
Transportation	13	NA	NA	15	8
Civil rights—African-American	14	11	13	14	NA
National government policy	15	NA	7	NA	14
% claims within year*	59.7	58.9	61.1	64.6	64.8
Forms					
Charity event	1	1	2	1	2
Public meeting	2	2	3	2	1
Community festival	3	9	4	3	3
Recreational activity	4	8	1	7	7
Lecture/talk/workshop/seminar	5	6	6	6	4
Ceremony	6	3	10	5	5
Conference	7	4	5	8	8
Public hearing	8	13	12	4	11
Volunteer effort	9	10	NA	12	6
Rally/demonstration	10	12	9	9	10
Awards/recognition dinners	11	7	7	14	15
Ethnic celebration	12	NA	8	11	12
Lawsuit, legal maneuver	13	14	13	13	9
March	14	5	15	NA	NA
Petition	15	NA	NA	10	13
% forms within year*	78.4	71.9	77.7	81.8	84.5

NOTE —NA means this form was not in the top 15 for the given year

* One event can involve multiple claims/forms this table is for first reported claim/form, excluding unclassified claims/forms

second in 1970 and first in 2000, the public meeting as a form of collective action consistently rises to the top along with charity events. Overall the continuity in type of event form is considerable, with the Spearman rank-order correlation coming in at .987.

The community festival is an interesting standout, however, climbing steadily from ninth place in 1970 to the third-most-common form of col-

lective action in 2000. In reading the many narratives of the events on which we collected data, it became clear that the community festival is a broad-based form that allows a plethora of activities to flourish—including protest. One example of the versatility of the community festival form was a Fourth of July community celebration that included a special time set aside for a “human chain” composed of residents displaying signs, t-shirts, buttons, and the like, advertising the causes they support. This event would presumably raise awareness of the different issues supported by members of the community and perhaps attract others to support the same issues. Our data suggest that the community festival embodies many of the other-regarding qualities that Putnam (2000) argues are foundational.

COMMUNITY-LEVEL SOURCES OF COLLECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

We now shift gears and consider the second of our key motivating questions: What predicts variation in collective action events across communities? We juxtapose competing perspectives on the social-organizational drivers of collective action events by capitalizing on a community survey in Chicago that allows us to construct direct measures of local social ties, organizational density, and membership in voluntary associations, which we then integrate with our newspaper event data. The Community Survey of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) was conducted in 1995, when 8,782 Chicago residents were personally interviewed in their homes. The basic design for the survey had three stages: at stage 1, city blocks were sampled within neighborhood clusters; at stage 2, dwelling units were sampled within blocks; and at stage 3, one adult resident (18 years of age or older) was sampled within each selected dwelling unit. Abt Associates carried out the screening and data collection in cooperation with PHDCN, achieving an overall response rate of 75% (see Sampson et al. 1997).

For the purposes of this study we link survey responses to one of the 77 community areas in Chicago, which each average about 38,000 in population. Community areas are well known (e.g., the Loop, Lincoln Park, the Near North Side, Hyde Park), widely recognized politically, and often serve as boundaries for service delivery and allocation of resources (Taub, Taylor, and Dunham 1987, Suttles 1990). Theoretically, then, community areas are more appropriate as sites of collective action than census tracts that are much smaller and often characterized by arbitrarily defined boundaries. The mean sample sizes within community areas are also large (> 100), which yields the crucial advantage of our being able to reliably

tap parameter variance between communities in institutional and social interactional processes. More specifically, the community-level reliabilities of all survey-based measures described below are .70 or higher.¹⁶

Organizations is a multi-item index that taps the total number of survey-reported local organizations and programs in the neighborhood—community newspaper, neighborhood watch, block group or tenant association, crime prevention program, alcohol/drug treatment program, family planning clinic, mental health center, youth center, after-school recreational programs for youth, counseling or mentoring services (e.g., Big Brothers), crisis intervention center, and mental health clinics for children. Although a single survey errs on the conservative side in capturing the volume of organizations, we believe that the systematic survey methodology, coupled with its broad range of coverage of community-based organizations that are typical in large cities (e.g., Warren 2004, Marwell 2004), produces a reliable and valid measure of *between-community* variations in the density of institutional structures that are available for social appropriation.¹⁷

Civic membership in organizations was also recorded in the survey, allowing us to create a scale of community-level associations and memberships. Residents were asked whether they or a household member belonged to (1) religious organizations, (2) neighborhood watch programs, (3) block groups, tenant associations, or community councils, (4) business or civic groups such as the Masons, the Elks, or the Rotary Club, (5) ethnic or nationality clubs, and (6) political organizations such as a neighborhood ward group. These are just the sorts of voluntary associations and memberships emphasized by Putnam (2000); interestingly, they correlate positively but very modestly ($r = .17$, not significant) with orga-

¹⁶ Community-level reliability is defined as $\Sigma[\tau_{00}/(\tau_{00} + \sigma^2/nj)]/J$, calibrating the precision of measures, averaged across the set of J areas, as a function of (1) the sample size (n) in each of the j communities and (2) the proportion of the total variance that is between communities (τ_{00}) relative to the amount that is within communities (σ^2). For further discussion of “ecometric” measurement strategies see Raudenbush and Sampson (1999).

¹⁷ Our measure also comports with external evidence and independent “local knowledge” of the social organization of Chicago communities. On the latter, e.g., Hyde Park, the neighborhood surrounding the University of Chicago, is usually considered one of the most, if not the most, organizationally rich areas in the city. In our data, Hyde Park is in the ninety-ninth percentile of the organizations scale. Only one community—Beverly—scores (slightly) higher, and it, too, is known for its strong organizational base (see Taub et al. 1987, pp. 184–85).

nizational density, permitting us to assess their independent contributions to predicting collective action events¹⁸

We use the survey to assess two other key dimensions typically posited as sources of local social capital—density of friend/kinship networks and reciprocated exchange among neighbors. The measure of *friend/kin ties* is based on the combined average of two measures capturing the number of friends and relatives (each coded 0, 1–2, 3–5, 6–9, 10 or more) that respondents reported living in their neighborhood. *Reciprocated exchange* is measured by a five-item scale tapping the relative frequency of social exchange within the neighborhood. The items used were “About how often do you and people in your neighborhood do favors for each other? By favors we mean such things as watching each other’s children, helping with shopping, lending garden or house tools, and other small acts of kindness” (never, rarely, sometimes, or often) “How often do you and other people in this neighborhood visit in each other’s homes or on the street?” “How often do you and people in this neighborhood have parties or other get-togethers where other people in the neighborhood are invited?” “When a neighbor is not at home, how often do you and other neighbors watch over their property?” “How often do you and other people in the neighborhood ask each other advice about personal things such as child rearing or job openings?” Taken together, these items tap the sorts of personal networks and exchanges traditionally thought to underlie mobilization capacity.

As control variables, we include predictive (1995) survey measures of community-level socioeconomic status (SES, or scale of income, education, and occupational prestige), racial composition (% non-Hispanic black), and the aggregate level of violent victimization in the community. Population density (persons per kilometer) and population size from the 2000 census are also accounted for when modeling 2000 events. In assessing social-organizational sources of collective action events we thus adjust for key aspects of exposure (population), place stratification, resources, and social problems (see also Cohen and Dawson 1993). In separate validation analysis we examined a number of other specifications (e.g., % Hispanic,

¹⁸ We believe the systematic methodology provides a good barometer of relative between-community variations in the intensity of membership in civic/voluntary associations. To provide the broadest test of social-capital theory, our main results do not restrict membership to groups located in, or holding meetings in, the immediate neighborhood of the respondent because we are interested in variations at the larger community-area level (on average there are about 10 census tracts per community area). Nevertheless, total memberships correlated with the more restricted measure of local neighborhood memberships at $r = .83$ ($P < .001$) across the 77 communities, suggesting both measures tap the same propensity for civic membership. Not surprisingly, both measures produced identical results.

measures of police-recorded crime, and both poverty and racial composition measured from the 2000 census), but the results were virtually identical, in large part because the 1995 survey accurately forecasts census 2000 demographics. For example, in evidence of the survey's representative design, the measure of % black in 1995 correlates with the independent 2000 census measure at $r = .97$ ($P < .001$). Because of the relatively small sample size ($N = 77$) and lack of statistical power in the ratio of cases to predictors in multivariate analysis, we prefer a parsimonious model that is motivated by a small set of theoretically salient constructs.

Statistical Model for Event Counts

Three features of collective engagement in Chicago influenced our choice of an appropriate statistical model: (1) the phenomenon is a count of rare events, (2) we tested a Poisson model and found significant heterogeneity between communities in the latent event rates, and (3) the events are spatially clustered by community areas. Although we cannot identify the source of heterogeneity in our count data, we control for its presence through an overdispersed Poisson (or a negative binomial) model (Barron 1992, p. 189). Specifically, we model the event count Y_i for a given community as sampled from an overdispersed Poisson distribution with mean $n_i \lambda_i$, where n_i is the population size in 100,000s of community i , and λ_i is the latent or "true" collective action rate for community i per 100,000 people. We view the log-event rates as normally distributed across neighborhoods, using a hierarchical generalized linear model approach to set the natural log link $\eta_i = \log(\lambda_i)$ equal to a mixed linear model that includes relevant community covariates and a random effect for each community to reflect unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, we account for the spatial clustering or nonindependence of events within communities by estimating robust (Huber-White estimator) standard errors. Our approach thus conforms to the features of the data through estimation of the log-event rate by a negative binomial count model (King 1988, Barron 1992) with adjustments for spatial clustering.

COMMUNITY-LEVEL RESULTS

We begin in table 2 with results for community-level variations in the location of collective action events. We examine two sets of predictors in a panel framework, with event counts in the year 2000 modeled as described above. One set of predictors includes background structural features in the form of SES, population density, race, and the violent crime rate in the community (the latter of which is highly correlated with a

TABLE 2
EVENT-COUNT PREDICTION MODELS OF CHICAGO COLLECTIVE CIVIC AND
1995 PHDCN SURVEY OF 77 CHICAGO COMMUNITY AREAS AND CCCP E

PREDICTORS	COLLECTIVE CIVIC EVENTS				C
	Model 1		Model 2		
	Coefficient (SE)	t-Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	t-Ratio	
Structural controls					
% black	− 85 (68)	−1.25	− 47 (54)	− 87	
SES	1.23 (37)	3.33**	− 20 (59)	− 34	
Violence	14.45 (5.87)	2.46*	5.36 (9.10)	59	
Population density	− 27 (10)	−2.54*	− 16 (12)	−1.30	
Social-organizational factors					
Friend/kin ties	− 87 (84)	−1.03	− 84 (74)	−1.15	
Reciprocated exchange	−5.30 (1.63)	−3.24**	−1.99 (1.31)	−1.52	
Memberships	− 34 (98)	−.35	34 (1.19)	29	
Organizations	2.38 (50)	4.78**	1.97 (39)	5.06**	
Lagged 1990 events			05 (01)	4.32**	
Model χ^2	76.55**		91.27**		
df	8		9		

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

number of other compositional factors), all measured in 1995 and temporally prior to collective action events. The second set of predictors derives from our main theoretical model and includes friend/kin ties, reciprocated exchange, civic memberships, and organizational density, also measured in 1995 in the PHDCN community survey. The event counts are normalized by population size.

We proceed by estimating models for the event counts that conform to our theoretical categories of interest—collective civic engagement and hybrid or blended social action. The results in model 1 of table 2 show that organizational infrastructure, SES, low population density, and higher rates of violent crime predict increased rates of both traditional civic engagement and blended social action. Interestingly, however, the indicator of friend/kinship ties is associated with *lower* rates of blended social action, and reciprocated exchange is associated with lower collective civic engagement. Social and demographic features of communities, which are explicitly controlled in the analyses, cannot explain these patterns.

Our panel model resolves temporal order, but there remains a concern that we have left out important determinants of collective action correlated with organizational infrastructure and the other significant predictors in model 1 (i.e., spuriousness). To assess this concern, we control in model 2 for the volume of collective action events in 1990, a conservative procedure when assessing the estimated effects of social-organizational predictors measured at a later point in time. The reason is that the lagged outcome may partial out previous effects of the predictors, and, hence, a reduction of associations does not necessarily imply a lack of causal salience.

The results of this rather strict control are nonetheless revealing on two counts. First, the pattern of stability in collective action is surprisingly robust across types of events—a consistent and significant predictor of collective engagement intensity in 2000 is the intensity of engagement in 1990, whether traditional civic or the newer hybrid form. This finding serves as an indicator of the predictive validity of our data and as further evidence of the continuity in collective civic engagement. Second, some results change substantially after controlling for the baseline intensity of collective action, for example, in both cases the role of socioeconomic resources and population density diminishes completely, and neither violent crime nor reciprocated exchange now predict the most common event type, collective civic engagement. Once prior activity is adjusted, the only predictor of both traditional civic and hybrid social action is organizational density.¹⁹ These results support the idea that organizational

¹⁹ In addition to statistical significance, the results confirm the substantial magnitude of association. A one-standard-deviation increase in organizational density is estimated

infrastructure is the largest and most proximate community-level factor predicting the intensity of collective engagement of diverse types²⁰

A critic might wonder whether we adequately tested our main thesis when the outcome, as in table 2, reflects the location of collective action events. Many of these events occurred in the Loop or downtown area and may not reflect the social capital or collective efficacy of the communities that actually initiated the events. For example, a group on the Far North Side of Chicago might regularly initiate protests or civic events in the Loop, and we would be remiss not to reflect on such initiating or generative capacity. We therefore collected additional data on the community location of the *initiating* organization or group responsible for each event, regardless of where the event itself took place. We were able to identify and geocode the initiating organization in approximately half of all events given the descriptions in the newspaper, compared to an 87% location rate for the events themselves. Assuming that the availability of initiator address information was distributed more or less randomly across areas—which we examined, finding no evidence to the contrary—we can subject our main results to a test of robustness.

We do so in table 3 by predicting events coded according to the community location of the initiating organization rather than by where the events took place (as in table 2). Because of the much lower number of initiator locations that could be geographically coded, and also the potential differential reporting of organization locations by type of event, we focus on the sum of hybrid, protest, and civic events. The model results are crisp—collective engagement is predicted to increase threefold with a one-standard-deviation increase in organizational density, controlling the 1990 rate (t -ratio of 5.80, $P < .01$, model 2). By contrast, SES, population density, and violent crime fail to predict the intensity of initiating activity once the prior rate of collective engagement is accounted for. Friend/kin ties are irrelevant as well, and reciprocated exchange is associated with a modestly *lower* prevalence of initiating activity. Local ties may promote the social control of crime (see Sampson et al. 1997) but not

to increase civic and hybrid rates of collective action by a factor of 2.7 and 4.07, respectively, controlling for the lagged outcome and all other factors.

²⁰ For comparative purposes we also estimated count models of protest. The main predictor of 2000 protest events was lagged 1990 protest—in the full model none of the social-organizational or demographic/compositional predictors were significant at $P < .05$. In a trimmed model focusing on memberships versus organizations and holding constant lagged protest, organizational density was significant at $P < .10$, but membership was not. Although this evidence weighs in favor of our theoretical interpretation, we are not inclined to place much weight on community variations in pure protest. From a civic society perspective the main action is elsewhere, or at least to be found in newer forms of hybrid action that draw on the protest narrative in creative but heretofore unappreciated ways.

TABLE 3
EVENT-COUNT PREDICTION MODELS OF CHICAGO COLLECTIVE ACTION IN 2000 BY
LOCATION OF INITIATING ORGANIZATION 1995 PHDCN SURVEY OF 77 CHICAGO
COMMUNITY AREAS AND CCCP INITIATOR LOCATIONS, 1990 AND 2000

PREDICTORS	COLLECTIVE ENGAGEMENT EVENTS			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (SE)	<i>t</i> -Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	<i>t</i> -Ratio
Structural controls				
% black	07 (77)	09	71 (67)	1 06
SES	1 38 (37)	3 72**	01 (45)	02
Violence	12 55 (4 09)	3 07**	4 18 (3 90)	1 07
Population density	- 29 (07)	-3 91**	- 12 (08)	-1 50
Social-organizational factors				
Friend/kin ties	- 13 (88)	- 15	10 (82)	12
Reciprocated exchange	-7 10 (1 79)	-3 97**	-4 00 (1 79)	-2 23*
Memberships	- 27 (1 07)	- 25	35 (96)	36
Organizations	2 49 (44)	5 67**	2 20 (38)	5 80**
Lagged 1990 events			03 (01)	4 31**
Model χ^2	73 18**		135 29**	
<i>df</i>	8		9	

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

necessarily wider participation in collective events or an institutional readiness to address political problems. Wilson's (1987) concept of social isolation is consistent with this interpretation, where dense local ties and exchange foster a more parochial sense of community and attenuation of collective or larger community-based initiatives.²¹

An implication of our results is that protest and traditional civic participation, although typically considered separately and by different scholarly fields, share similar correlates. We probe this intriguing finding more directly by mapping the community location of collective action events according to our threefold typology. Are blended protest/civic events lo-

²¹ None of these results are sensitive to the statistical specification of the overdispersed Poisson model, confirmed by substituting the logged event rate and estimating an ordinary least squares regression for all models. We also checked for influential observations using standard regression diagnostics. Using logged rates, only model 2 in table 4 produced a large outlier—the Loop—which was eliminated and the model reestimated for this one case. The key results were replicated, and no major discrepancies were obtained—the *t*-ratios for the estimated effects of organizations in model 2 of table 3 (with log-1990 rate controlled) were 3.23 for collective civic events and 2.45 for hybrid events. For table 4, model 2, the *t*-ratio was 3.34. In no case was civic membership significant.

cated in the *same* geographic areas as collective civic engagement? It is not obvious that this should be the case, even given our results thus far. To aid in further understanding, we map the density of collective action events in 2000 against the backdrop of the organizational infrastructure of communities, which our analysis has uncovered as an important independent predictor.

The results in figure 3 show a consistent and durable structural form to events, whether they are rare protests or more common civic engagements. Collective action events of all kinds, even hybrid action, tend to occur in a relatively narrow band of communities characterized by a dense organizational profile. Communities such as Hyde Park, Lakeview, and the Near North Side (not just the Loop), for example, are rich in organizational life *and* generate many of the social action events. That the organizational infrastructure of these areas matters above and beyond their population composition, SES, and density of personal ties was revealed in tables 2 and 3. The pattern in figure 3 therefore confirms not only the spatial overlap and concentration of diverse collective action events, but also their common origins in institutional infrastructure.

It is also of interest that communities such as Hyde Park and Uptown, while at or near the top in organizational infrastructure, sit much lower on the scale of traditional civic memberships, further supporting our contention that the prevalence of membership is distinct from the breadth or density of organizations. In fact, Uptown is in the *bottom* one-third of the civic membership distribution. Other communities (e.g., Avondale) are in or near the middle of the civic membership distribution but near the very bottom of organizational density. The lowest-scoring "civic" neighborhood in membership—Oakland—nonetheless fares rather well in the organizational representation picture (seventy-second percentile). These two dimensions of community social organization are conceptually distinct, and Chicago communities vary considerably in their joint profiles of civic memberships and organizational density. Apparently, some communities are able to achieve an active organizational life absent the dense civic memberships of yesteryear. One of the reasons may be that membership in groups such as the Elks, the Rotary Club, and neighborhood tenant groups are more aimed at instrumental goals tied to self-interest than to the promotion of social goods (see also Kaufman 2003). Another, perhaps more likely, reason is tied to the fact that corporate actors often provide the economic underpinnings of local organizations, a pathway distinct from civic membership (Taub et al. 1987, p. 184).

Year 2000 CIVIC Events

Year 2000 PROTEST Events

Year 2000 HYBRID Events




FIG 3 —Spatial distribution of organizational density and collective action events, by type Chicago, 2000

Frames of Engagement

Another critic might be concerned about our broad conceptualization of collective civic engagement, in the sense that so far we have not limited our attention to strictly neighborhood-specific frames of social action. The idea is that “many instances of protest are not rooted in either the neighborhoods where they occur or in the neighborhood where the sponsoring organization happens to be located. A peace vigil, an anti-nuclear demonstration, many sorts of protests at city hall over a wide range of issues are not meaningfully treated as neighborhood events.”²² This is true, as by design we coded many events that imply a geographic and/or jurisdictional orientation that transcends the neighborhood in which they occur or even in which the initiating organization is located. Although our focus in this manuscript is not primarily protest, the general point can be logically extended to hybrid and traditional civic engagement. What is the frame of the event, and does it matter to our theoretical approach?

Our response is twofold. First, we are interested at the most fundamental level not in the nature of, or changes in, the geographic/jurisdictional orientation of events but in *the variable capacity of neighborhoods to mobilize collective action*. In this sense, all events are created equal. That is, regardless of their implied geographic orientation, our events speak to the capacity of local actors to generate emergent action—precisely the lacunae of the social movements field. Whether the goals are primarily local, citywide, national, or even international is less relevant to us than the local time, energy, and effort that must be expended in organizing and carrying out the event. Our data reveal the sources that help produce this social action.

Second, the question is ultimately an empirical one that we can address because of the nature of our coding scheme. For each event, we categorized the “frame” or purpose of the event that in most cases could be classified in terms of its geographical or substantive reach. This analysis revealed that “local neighborhood” frames (e.g., a street cleanup, a fund-raiser for a local school playground) and “city” frames of reference (e.g., a meeting to debate policy on deconcentrating poverty in the city’s public housing system, a rally to protest distribution of city services) constitute 25% and 46% of the Chicago events, respectively.²³ To gain further insight into the sources of these more local issues, we disaggregate model 2 in table 2 by neighborhood and city frames. Because of the markedly reduced sample

²² As quoted from an anonymous *AJS* reviewer, whom we thank for his or her insight.

²³ The other categories are state (5%), national (16%), and international (7%). For example, a march against apartheid in South Africa would have been coded as international in framing.

size of events, we analyze the sum of hybrid and collective engagement events. Given the more localized framing of city and neighborhood events, we also examine civic memberships specific to local neighborhood associations (see n. 18).

The results in table 4 show remarkable similarity with the overall pattern obtained previously. Whether neighborhood-specific or a citywide framing of events, the density of local and interpersonally produced social capital, in the form of friend/kin ties, neighborly exchange, and civic memberships, proves ineffective (substituting total civic membership produced equivalent results). The structural controls are inconsistent and again largely insignificant, with the exception of a negative association of SES with neighborhood, but not citywide, events. By contrast, other than lagged 1990 events, the density of community-based organizations is the only consistent predictor of collective civic engagement in events with local *or* citywide frames.

CIVIC ACTION AND THE RACIAL DIVIDE

There are, of course, limitations to our analytic approach. We have addressed methodological challenges the best we could at each step along the way, but acknowledge that the uncharted territory of our data brings with it the potential for error. Franzosi (1987) has argued that researchers assessing newspaper data focus too narrowly on reliability, which we agree is often not the problem. Like Franzosi (1987, p. 5), we believe the bigger issue concerns validity—in our case, potential bias in what the newspaper measures tap across time and neighborhood. In particular, are better-off white neighborhoods more likely to be covered by the *Tribune* than inner-city, disadvantaged areas? Were the trends we discovered driven by changes in *Tribune* editorial policy rather than by real change? To address these questions and the limitations of our main set of data, we undertook an additional research project with two goals in mind. One was to verify the broad temporal trend in collective civic events found in our *Tribune*-based analysis, and the second was to examine an independent source of neighborhood collective action events that is sensitive to the racial divides that seem so salient in Chicago. The latter is critical, as we are attempting to address nonspurious variations between communities in collective action.

Our analytic strategy was to maximize differences in newspaper structural organization, ideology, and editorial policies, all while maintaining a focus on coverage across multiple communities in the Chicago metropolitan area. Neighborhood newspapers were thus ruled out, as were purely suburban newspapers. The largest-circulation newspapers in Chi-

TABLE 4
LAGGED EVENT-COUNT PREDICTION MODELS OF CHICAGO COLLECTIVE CIVIC AND
HYBRID SOCIAL ACTION IN 2000 BY EVENT FRAME 1995 PHDCN SURVEY OF 77
CHICAGO COMMUNITY AREAS AND CCCP EVENT-COUNT LOCATIONS, 1990 AND 2000

PREDICTORS	EVENTS WITH A NEIGHBORHOOD FRAME		EVENTS WITH A CITY FRAME	
	Coefficient (SE)	t-Ratio	Coefficient (SE)	t-Ratio
Structural controls				
% black	76 (61)	1.25	-13 (90)	-14
SES	-1.14 (47)	-2.43*	.54 (67)	.82
Violence	7.07 (3.67)	1.93	-2.49 (6.51)	-38
Population density	23 (10)	2.35*	-25 (14)	-1.84
Social-organizational factors				
Friend/kin ties	51 (53)	.96	-1.09 (86)	-1.26
Reciprocated ex- change	3.49 (2.03)	1.72	-3.27 (2.05)	-1.59
Memberships*	-27 (1.21)	-22	-1.33 (1.23)	-1.08
Organizations	78 (33)	2.36*	2.62 (54)	4.82**
Lagged 1990 events	.04 (01)	4.72**	.03 (01)	2.64**
Model χ^2	113.21		71.68	
df	9		9	

* Memberships specific to groups in respondent's local neighborhood

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

Chicago other than the *Tribune* are the *Chicago Sun-Times* and the *Chicago Defender*. The *Sun-Times* is in many respects a smaller, more tabloidlike version of the *Tribune*, whereas the *Defender* is the nation's oldest African-American newspaper, not just a venerable and well-known institution in Chicago, but "the most important black metropolitan newspaper in America" (Grossman, Keating, and Reif 2004, p. 134). The *Defender* is explicitly designed to serve the needs of an African-American readership, but its coverage is still metropolitan-wide, giving us leverage to see if a different picture emerges of collective action events than in the *Tribune*. Chicago is a racially divided city in many ways, and in some quarters, the *Tribune* is seen as a conservative newspaper that reinforces this divide by pandering to elite interests. Yet in principle, all African-American communities (as distinct from events) should be covered in the *Tribune*, so the *Defender* offers a strategic advantage over the *Sun-Times* for examining biased coverage of collective action in the large and predominantly black communities of Chicago's West and South Sides. The key question is whether both newspapers are capturing the common capacity of communities to generate collective action events, initiating organizations, or both—even if contaminated by a racialized lens of reporting.

To ascertain if our main conclusions hold up to this kind of external validation we collected additional data from the *Defender* using the same basic criteria as we did for the *Tribune*, but with necessary differences in sampling and temporal coverage. The *Daily Defender* was not universally available on microfilm for all days and years in our libraries, so rather than sampling every third day we collected each weekend edition. To make the validation project manageable we also collected two types of data. One was a simple aggregate total of *Defender*-reported events in metro Chicago for 1970, 1980, and 1990 for all 12 months of each year. Second, we selected a sample of four months (January, March, July, and October) from the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 to be read in detail and coded. Because of the much smaller number of events examined in the *Defender* compared to the *Tribune*, along with the shorter four-month window for city events, we focus on total collective action (hybrid, protest, and civic) for both event and initiator location.

The first question is straightforward: What is the trend in collective action events over time? The number of collective action events as recorded by the *Defender* is remarkably consistent with the *Tribune* pattern over the three-decade period. The total number of *Defender* events in the Chicago metropolitan area in 1970, 1980, and 1990 are 548, 342, and 532, respectively. Thus we see a dip from 1970 to 1980, followed by a recovery in 1990. In fact, the overall tally is approximately the same in 1970 and 1990, very similar to the pattern for the *Tribune* (cf. fig. 2). Because of its larger black readership base, the city of Chicago is the more critical test, however. Yet the patterns are identical for both raw counts and rates. Notably, the *Defender* event rate in Chicago per 100,000 residents is 5.06, 3.46, 4.96, and 5.97 in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively. Despite the very different nature of the two newspapers, then, the data are consistent and paint a picture of the relative stability of collective civic engagement when we compare 1970 and 1990/2000, with 1980 the aberrant "down" year.

The second and perhaps more important issue addressed in this study is the distribution of collective action events across communities. To achieve consistency with our *Tribune*-based analysis, we geocoded all *Defender* events in Chicago to the city's 77 community areas. As expected, the *Defender* reports more events in African-American communities than does the *Tribune*. For example, traditional black communities like Douglas, Grand Boulevard, and Englewood rank in the top 10 communities for the *Defender* but not the *Tribune*. Communities like the Near West Side, the Loop, and the Near North Side nonetheless rank highly across both newspapers, indicating some continuity in geographic perspective. To measure this more precisely, we calculated Pearson correlation coefficients of association across communities for each decade. The correla-

tions of *Tribune* and *Defender* counts were 84, 79, 85, and 67 for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively (all $P < .01$), revealing a high level of overall agreement, the per capita rates were also all significantly positive. We learned earlier that event counts are highly skewed, however, with a handful of communities like the Loop dominating the overall count, and most communities recording no events. We thus calculated nonparametric Spearman correlations to detect rank-order agreement for each decade and for the aggregate total. Each was significant, with the aggregate coefficient (ρ) across the three decades at .40 ($P < .01$). We conclude that while the *Defender* reports more events in the black community, more or less by its charge, the overall level of concurrent agreement with the *Tribune* is surprisingly consistent across time and space.

The question remains, however, as to how well the two newspapers match up at the event level. It could be the case that the correlations are positive because each newspaper is reporting more or less the same pool of events. Or, perhaps more interesting, it could be that the newspapers are tapping into the same *capacity* of neighborhoods to generate social action, but with a different mix of actual events underlying the pattern. To gain leverage on this issue we matched specific events, with the results confirming both scenarios but with a definite leaning toward the second. In particular, the *Defender* was much more likely than the *Tribune* to cover collective civic events in smaller African-American churches on the South and West Sides, whereas the *Tribune*'s coverage in the black community ran more to larger middle-class churches and larger, politically visible events. Still, 18% of *Defender* events from 1970–2000 were matched exactly in the *Tribune*.²⁴

We then examined a model in which variations in *Defender*-based collective events in 2000 were predicted by a function of % black, % poverty, and population density in 1990, along with the rate of total collective engagement as recorded in the *Tribune*. If racial or economic composition accounts for significant bias in reporting, this model should reveal a weak or insignificant predictive role for the *Tribune*. By contrast, if the two data sources tap common variance in the rate of collective action, then even when controlling for racial and economic composition of community (and hence readership), the *Defender* and *Tribune* should converge. In the resulting equation the coefficient for the 1990 *Tribune* yielded a t -ratio of 6.52 ($P < .01$), specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in the *Trib-*

²⁴ Examples of event overlap include Martin Luther King Day celebrations in January (four matches in 1970 and three in 1980), Operation PUSH events, fund-raisers for UNICEF, a protest over the Contract Buyers League, the Chicago Consular Ball, Hyde Park's Fourth of July Picnic, and an art fair in Lawndale.

une rate is associated with nearly half a standardized unit increase in the *Defender* event rate, adjusting for poverty and % black

For a final set of critical tests we turn to this article's main hypothesis on the organizational sources of collective civic engagement. To assess the generality of findings we estimated an exact replication of the statistical model and variable specification in table 2, model 2, but with the *Defender* count of collective civic events in 2000 as the outcome. As expected, % black had a significant effect on predicting the event rate as reported in the *Defender*, whereas it did not for the *Tribune*. However, in all other substantive respects the results were replicated. The key result was that civic memberships, dense ties, and reciprocal exchange *all* failed to predict black civil society as measured by the *Defender* reports of collective action, whereas the estimate for organizational density was positive and significant (t -ratio = 3.49 and 2.19 for initiator and event location rates, respectively). Taking another perspective, we estimated a principal components analysis of the initiator and event location rates for both the *Tribune* and the *Defender*. Only one component was extracted from the data, and all loadings were over .80, yet another indicator that the two newspapers are tapping common variance in an underlying dimension of collective action capacity—whether initiator based *or* event location based. When we then estimated the predictors of this principal component, the now basic result obtained in the replication of model 2 in table 2, the three traditional social capital measures were null. Organizational density, by contrast, directly predicted the common variance in collective civic action (coefficient = .59, SE = .26, $P < .05$).

In short, there is broad relative agreement on the ecological concentration and organizational sources of collective civic action when comparing the *Tribune* and *Defender* even when the manifest events differ. Given the divergent nature and organization of the two newspapers, we believe this is a sociologically interesting point, one that lends validity to our earlier results and the underlying argument. Note that our analytic strategy was divided into two fundamentally different questions—trends over time for the entire Chicago metropolitan area, and predictors of collective action events across communities of Chicago in 2000. The differential error structures in the design mean that the results taken as a whole are unlikely to have been generated by a common flaw, potential bias in counts over time (1970–2000) is very different than potential biases across communities at the same time (2000), and, moreover, the *Defender* is very different in nature than the *Tribune*. We now consider the general implications of these results, which although different in constituent respects, yield a consistent and, we believe, important picture.

IMPLICATIONS

The study of politics has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. In the 1960s and 70s, studies of voting and other forms of traditional civic participation were common, whereas research on social movements was a blip on the radar screen. Today the reverse is true. The study of social movements is a large and thriving subfield in the social sciences, the study of voting—with important exceptions like Brooks and Manza (1997) and Manza and Brooks (1997)—has waned, as has research on “low-visibility” civic events. Yet our data show that only 15% of collective action in Chicago during the study period is of the social movement—or protest—variety. Our results thus support a renewed emphasis on the civic sector in the United States, perhaps especially the nexus of voluntary and non-voluntary organizations (e.g., Ayala 2000).

An even more direct challenge to social movement scholars would appear to come from the changing nature of movement activity itself. Although the literature tends to equate movement activity with disruptive protest in the context of loosely coordinated national movements waged by disadvantaged minorities, our study fails to confirm this stylized picture. Protest and collective civic engagement events tend to be overwhelmingly mundane, local, initiated by relatively advantaged segments of society, and devoid of major conflict. Conditioned to view movements as highly contentious and disruptive national struggles on behalf of the disadvantaged, it appears movement analysts have largely missed this interesting, mostly local, and far more moderate form of social action (see also McAdam et al. 2005).

Of further interest is the trend in our data toward ever-greater numbers of hybrid events, or what we call “blended social action.” These are events that essentially combine traditional civic *forms* of action with movement-style *claims*. Indeed, most of the overall rise in events since 1980 appears to be associated with this type of social action. Steeped in studies of the sixties—or “sixties-style”—struggles, movement scholars will need to do a better job of studying all manner of contemporary forms of action if they are to understand the changing face of contention in the United States. This conclusion accords well with the recent—although largely speculative—writings on the growing institutionalization of protest that has created a “movement society” in America (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, Tarrow 1998). To some observers (McAdam 2003), this changing form of protest has simultaneously routinized and tamed the social movement as a form of social change advocacy. Our findings on the sharp rise in “hybrid events,” along with the nondisruptive nature of protest more generally (McAdam et al. 2005), are consistent with this view.

From Bowling to Social Action

Finally, what do our results suggest about Putnam's (1995, 2000) work and, more generally, about the limits of the empirical and conceptual terrain on which much of the social capital–civil society debate has been waged? Most obviously, the trend in Chicago-area collective action over the past 30 years does not mirror the pattern adduced by Putnam and others from mostly individual-level trends. Instead of a steady decline over the period, we see a marked drop in collective action events between 1970 and 1980, followed by an impressive “recovery” in 1990, a pattern revealed in both the *Chicago Tribune* and the very different *Defender*. The *Tribune* totals in 1990 and 2000 also exceed those for 1970, which is all the more impressive given the high levels of protest activity—antiwar, women's movement, environment—we associate with 1970. We recognize that our research is limited to metro Chicago and thus cannot strictly bear on national trends (but see Rotolo 1999). Still, the question lingers: Why do the trends not match?

Our answer is clear: these trends don't have to match, and in some respects, the expectation that they should betrays a certain theoretical predilection. Indeed, to infer the health of civic society from group membership, regular meetings, and dense social ties builds on the proposition that collective action is aggregated out of large reservoirs of individuals who are predisposed to social and civic participation. We offer instead a conceptual framework grounded in the institutional origins of movement activity—the prospects for collective action are powerfully conditioned by the presence of established social settings within which emergent mobilization can occur. From this view collective civic action does not, in any simple sense, emerge or grow directly from individual memberships and dense social ties. Our results confirm that in accounting for community-level variations in both civic and hybrid collective action events, the organizational infrastructure of the neighborhood matters a great deal, and civic membership much less, if at all.

Our takeaway on Putnam (2000) is thus that we are looking at a different phenomenon that need not have the same correlates or trends, and that may even be more consequential for civil society than traditional forms of civic membership.²⁵ There is hope in this perspective, for it suggests new organizational forms and strategies that can draw in indi-

²⁵ A further implication, one that we plan to explore in future work, is that membership activity is important insofar as it is mediated through specific organizational routes or institutional settings. We also plan to examine in more depth how participation in different kinds of public meetings, which Putnam (2000, e.g., p. 43) measured with survey data, is in fact related to variations in stated claims and hybrid forms of collective civic action.

viduals for collective pursuits. In fact, Putnam's new work (Putnam and Feldstein 2003) might be read in this context, for we find it notable that his examples of successful community building all revolve around institutional or organizational structures, from a community newspaper in Mississippi, to branch libraries in Chicago, to a neighborhood organization in Boston, to a church in Southern California.

Another example is seen in Skogan and Hartnett's (1997) and Fung's (2004) descriptions of community policing in Chicago, where "beat meetings" bring together residents and the police to address local problems. Residents did not spontaneously begin attending beat meetings as a result of local social ties, rather the meetings had their origin in a structural initiative—by organizing, hosting, and supporting beat meetings, the police created an equal opportunity for involvement across the city. In disadvantaged neighborhoods with few indigenous secular organizations, residents typically have fewer opportunities for involvement in anticrime efforts (Skogan 1988), but *when* they do, residents are at least as likely to be involved as residents of better-endowed neighborhoods. In an interesting way, Chicago's policing program has evened the playing field with regard to opportunities to participate in community governance, with the greatest increase in collective participation seen by African-Americans. As Fung (2004) argues, designed institutions of "participatory democratic governance" such as these can spark citizen involvement that in turn generates innovative problem solving and public action.

On a general level, our interpretation also shares an affinity with Skocpol's (2003, 2004) macrohistorical argument that American democracy has undergone a civic reorganization rather than simple decline. Paraphrasing Skocpol (2004, p. 4) for our case, community-based organizations concentrate resources, voice, and clout in collective civic engagement—so we should care as much about the organizational as we do about the individual level of memberships and politics. This argument further implies that local initiatives will falter absent state or organizational backing, consistent with our results on the community-based organizational sources of collective action.

CONCLUSION

We believe we have identified a fruitful new theoretical approach and novel empirical strategy for tackling fundamental questions about the nature and changing structure of civic life in the modern city. Our results on collective action in Chicago over the past 30 years justify confidence in an event-focused approach that gives priority to variations across time and space in civic actions that bring people together for a common and

specific purpose. In essence we are proposing an “extra-civic” or robust mechanism of collective engagement in the form of nonroutine events that are not initiated by the state or by political professionals, but by collectivities motivated by a particular issue to act together in public (i.e., civic) space. Our demonstration of the ecological concentration and organizational sources of these collective events, along with the related discovery of increasingly blended social action, further suggest not only that robust civic engagement is inadequately explained by individual-level processes, but that it may be unfolding differently than in earlier eras. From this view, collective civic action has not declined, rather, what we have looked to as the traditional indicators of civic participation have declined while the nature of participation in collective events has changed. One might think of this as “changing continuity” in collective civic engagement. Combining civic forms with stated claims for social change may be a harbinger of the future, especially in an increasingly organizational society where time constraints on traditional social ties and individual memberships are severe.

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Labor Transnationalism and Global Governance: The Impact of NAFTA on Transnational Labor Relationships in North America¹

Tamara Kay
University of California, San Diego

This article examines how the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) catalyzed cross-border labor cooperation and collaboration (i.e., labor transnationalism), by creating a new political opportunity structure at the transnational level. Because there are differences in the way power is constituted at the transnational and national levels, theories of national political opportunity structures cannot be directly mapped onto the transnational level. The author describes three primary dimensions of political opportunity structure at the transnational level that explain how power is established: (1) the constitution of transnational actors and interests, (2) the definition and recognition of transnational rights, and (3) adjudication at the transnational level. The case of NAFTA suggests that while the emergence of national social movements requires nation-states, global governance institutions can play a pivotal role in the development of transnational social movements.

INTRODUCTION

The 1993 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) institutionalized processes of globalization that had been occurring since

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the 19th century into North American policy, better enabling transnational companies to traverse the planet in search of new markets, untapped natural resources, and cheap labor.² NAFTA embodied an emergent “multilateral regime,”³ that is, a particular kind of global governance institution that many predicted would intensify animosity among North American unions by forcing them to compete for a diminishing number of manufacturing jobs.⁴ An examination of the aftermath of the struggle against free trade in North America, however, reveals that far from polarizing workers, NAFTA had the unanticipated consequence of stimulating labor cooperation and collaboration among many North American unions.

In this article, I will examine the emergence of labor transnationalism (i.e., ongoing cooperation and collaboration across national borders on substantive issues) in North America and its relationship to a new global governance institution, NAFTA.⁵ To measure labor transnationalism, I employ as my unit of analysis the emergence of transnational *relationships* among unions,⁶ and focus on one trilateral relationship that developed in the 1990s among the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), the Authentic Labor Front (Frente Auténtico del Trabajo, or FAT), and the Canadian Steelworkers of America (CUSWA).⁷ These were not the only unions to engage in transnationalism as a result of NAFTA, however, I focus on this triad because the relationship was the earliest to emerge and is the most developed.⁸ I argue that NAFTA

² NAFTA was passed by the U.S. Congress in September 1993, it entered into force on January 1, 1994.

³ For a discussion of multilateral regimes see Krasner (1983) and Ruggie (1993).

⁴ NAFTA is more accurately a regional governance institution, but for simplicity and consistency with the term used in the literature, I will refer to it as a global governance institution.

⁵ The practices of labor transnationalism can include grassroots and labor organizing, political lobbying and mobilization, strategic planning, campaign organizing, invoking legal bodies, creating new institutions, etc.

⁶ Scholars distinguish among several types of transnational contention or political activity, including cross-border diffusion and political exchange, transnational social movements, and transnational advocacy networks (see Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow 2005, 1998b, chap. 11). Here I add the term “transnational relationship,” defined as ongoing interactions based on equality, long-term goals, and mutual interest, with rank-and-file involvement.

⁷ The Canadian steelworkers are known by USWA, but to distinguish them from their U.S. counterpart, I use CUSWA in this discussion.

⁸ Other relationships include the largest unions in the telecommunications industries in each country: the Communication Workers of America (CWA, U.S.), the Communications, Energy, and Paperworkers Union (CEP, Canada), and the Mexican Telephone Workers' Union (STRM), and among North American labor federations: the AFL-CIO, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), and independent Mexican union federations (those not controlled by the ruling party), including the FAT and National

and its labor side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), stimulated the relationship among these unions by constituting a new transnational political opportunity structure through which labor activists could engage each other.⁹ Using this case, I will reveal the process by which NAFTA created a new political opportunity structure at the transnational level that facilitated the creation of a nascent transnational political action field.¹⁰

While North American unions had contact with each other for years prior to NAFTA through various institutions and organizations (e.g., the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, and international trade secretariats, among others), these interactions did not rise to the level of transnational relationships according to my definition because in general they were not equitable, were not based on efforts to create and nurture long-term programs based on mutual interests, and usually only involved union leaders and elites.¹¹ Moreover the anticommunist activities (particularly in Latin America) of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO), and the tendency of the U.S. labor movement to employ racist rhetoric and policies to scapegoat foreign workers and immigrants for job losses in the United States, tainted relations among North

Union of Workers (UNT). For a discussion see Boswell and Stevis (1997), Cohen and Early (1998), Kay (2004b).

⁹ Here I utilize political opportunity structure as a set of independent variables that facilitates the *emergence* of labor transnationalism, not its success and failure (see Gamson and Meyer 1996). I adopt Tarrow's definition of political opportunity structure as "consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national—signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements" (Tarrow 1996, p. 54). I use the term political opportunities to identify those opportunities that emanate from a political opportunity structure. Thus, in the transnational arena, a transnational political opportunity structure would emerge first, allowing for the creation of a transnational political action field.

¹⁰ Fligstein defines fields as "local social orders" in which "actors gather and frame their actions vis-à-vis one another" (Fligstein 1998, pp. 2, 6). See also DiMaggio (1986), Scott (1995), DiMaggio and Powell (1991), and Fligstein (2001). For a discussion of political action fields, see Evans (2002). For a discussion of the related concept "transnational social fields," see Khagram (2004), and Levitt and Schiller (2003). Here I define a transnational political action field as an arena that crosses national boundaries in which social actors and their organizations frame issues, mobilize, and contest or advocate particular policies or practices.

¹¹ For a discussion of the history and limitations of international labor organizations, see Stevis (1998) and Boswell and Stevis (1997). I characterize union relations in the pre-NAFTA era as similar to what Tarrow (1998a) terms "contingent political alliances," which are based on ephemeral transnational "relays" or exchanges between social activists.

American unions¹² When asked about the AFL-CIO's involvement in transnationalism prior to NAFTA, a leader in the federation's international department explained "Basically there was nothing, or very little before NAFTA The AFL was involved with the CTM and worked mostly through the International Labor Organization on issues not related to the U S or Mexico, but on other Latin American countries, problems The transnational activities that existed prior to 1990 were not really linked to national unions, but rather were carried out by progressive locals, or dissident northern movements, and did not involve long-term relationships usually"¹³ The relationships among unions and federations that emerged in NAFTA's wake were new and unique in North America¹⁴ This presents a compelling puzzle How did NAFTA, the concrete manifestation of globalization processes in North America, help deepen labor solidarity on the continent?

I argue that NAFTA catalyzed labor transnationalism in two ways First, it stimulated political mobilization Labor unions in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, which for years had been isolated and estranged from each other, came together to try to kill the free trade agreement and what they deemed a weak and ineffectual labor side agreement They created and nurtured new ties of cooperation and networks of protest during the NAFTA negotiations

Second, NAFTA created nascent institutions through which labor activists could build transnational relationships The NAALC established new rules, procedures, and venues to adjudicate complaints of labor rights violations in North America It established National Administrative Offices (NAOs) in each of the three NAFTA countries to handle complaints of labor rights violations (called public submissions or communications) The NAALC stipulates that complaints may be filed against the government of any NAFTA country through an NAO in a country other than the one in which the alleged labor violation occurred Because it requires submitters to file complaints outside their home countries, the NAALC forces labor unions to search for allies in other NAFTA countries with

¹² For more on the anticommunist activities of U S labor, see Cantor and Schor (1987), Spalding (1992), Morris (1967), and Herod (1997) U S labor's xenophobic tendencies are discussed by Bustamante (1972) and Frank (1999) I have examined how NAFTA helped facilitate the process of rupturing racist rhetoric and policies among North American labor unions (Kay 2003*b*, 2004*a*, 2004*b*)

¹³ The Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) is the major Mexican union federation with historic ties to the ruling party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI) The quote comes from a personal interview with an AFL-CIO representative, February 29, 2000, in Washington, D C

¹⁴ For discussions of changes in the landscape of union relations in response to NAFTA, see Kay (2000), Stillerman (2003), Robinson (2002), Kidder (2002), and Hinojosa-Ojeda (2002)

whom to collaborate on submissions. By facilitating cooperation and collaboration through its procedural rules, the NAALC catalyzed transnational relationships that had not previously existed.

An examination of NAFTA not only offers empirical insights into the nature of global governance institutions and labor transnationalism, but also provides rich theoretical contributions to the social movements literature. Substantively, this analysis illuminates the process by which global governance institutions constitute transnational political opportunity structures. It shows that changes in transnational rather than national political systems and institutions stimulated the alliance among the UE, FAT, and CUSWA. This is not to suggest that nation-states become irrelevant as a transnational political action field emerges. To the contrary, national labor movements continue to be oriented to and gain leverage through nation-states while simultaneously exploring the strategic possibilities of the transnational arena. To the extent that transnational relationships emerged in North America, however, they did so in response to a nascent transnational political opportunity structure, which is the focus of this article.¹⁵

An analysis of NAFTA also enables us to expand our theoretical understanding of national political opportunity structures to the transnational arena in order to explain how power is constituted at the transnational level. Moreover, it contributes to our theoretical understanding of transnational social movement emergence.¹⁶ That is, it demonstrates how global governance institutions stimulate the emergence of transnational social movements by creating new political opportunity structures, which together with the social actors that engage them, constitute an emergent political action field. If, as Tilly (1984) argues, the development of national social movements can only take place in the context of the nation-state, the case of NAFTA implies that statelike entities in the

¹⁵ The relevance of the nation-state to labor movements is unique among social movements because their tactical options are constrained by labor laws that force them to engage the nation-state and employers through institutionalized processes (see Kay 2003a, Stillerman 2003). Unlike other social movements that can focus primarily or solely on disruptive politics (such as the antiglobalization movement), the labor movement must invoke legal mechanisms as part of its tactical repertoire, or risk legal sanction. Of course, the labor movement also benefits from institutional access to power, and guarantees of particular kinds of state protection. It is therefore highly unlikely that, in an international system composed of nation-states, labor movement activists would embrace transnational strategies to the full exclusion of national or local strategies. Elsewhere, I discuss how national labor movements' continued orientation toward their nation-states presents significant obstacles to labor transnationalism (Kay 2004b).

¹⁶ Here I examine one transnational relationship that emerged among many in the struggle against NAFTA that together constituted a transnational social movement; elsewhere I provide a more detailed discussion (Kay 2004b).

international arena can play a pivotal role in the development of transnational social movements¹⁷ Thus, the creation of new global governance institutions like the NAALC should help stimulate the growth of transnational social movements

NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

The nature and salience of the political process theory of social movements has been widely debated during the last decade (see Tilly 1995, Tarrow 1994, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, Gamson and Meyer 1996, Goodwin and Jasper 1999, and responses in *Sociological Forum* 1999, Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003) The intellectual debate centers on how well the key concepts of political opportunity and political opportunity structure explain the emergence, strategic repertoires and trajectories, and success of social movements¹⁸ But despite the intellectual skirmishes, political process theory remains part of the holy trinity of social movement theory (along with resource mobilization and framing), and has given birth to numerous analyses of national social movements

Political process theory, however, developed almost exclusively in relationship to national social movements and nation-states While scholars have dissected the nuances of national power structures, international or transnational power structures and their relationship to political opportunities have not been examined in the same depth Thus with the rapid progression of globalization processes, a new debate surfaces about how well political process theory explains the emergence and strategic nuances of transnational social movements (see Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow 2005, 1998b, chap 11, Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002) In particular, can theories of national political opportunity structures simply be applied whole cloth to regional, transnational, or international political opportunity structures, or do those theories need refinement to account for the particularities of transnational social movements and their unique relationship to nation-states and global governance institutions?

Khagram et al point out that some social movement theorists acknowledge the existence of “multilayered” opportunity structures and “multilevel

¹⁷ My argument is not that North American labor activists should applaud the passage of NAFTA and the NAALC The free trade agreement undermined labor’s bargaining power and stimulated capital flight in North America (see Scott et al 2001, Bronfenbrenner 1997) The argument I make here is that despite the negative effects of free trade, NAFTA provided new political openings that, if exploited, could be used strategically to improve workers’ lives and working conditions in North America

¹⁸ In this article I am concerned with how political opportunity structures explain the emergence, not the success or failure, of social movements

polities" (2002, p. 18). But, they suggest that scholars tend to dismiss the idea of transnational political opportunity structures because social movement actors target institutionalized power (as embodied by and leveraged through nation-states), which is rare in transnational contexts (2002, p. 18). While other scholars articulate the importance of transnational political opportunity structures (Stillerman 2003), few studies examine and theorize the nature of transnational political opportunity structures.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide the primary exception in their nuanced analysis of the relationship between global governance institutions, nation-states, and transnational social movements (other work includes Ayres 1998, Dreiling 2001, and Khagram 2004). They describe how globalization processes create political openings that enable social activists to leverage states and provoke changes in state policies and practices. While Keck and Sikkink's work is an important contribution to our understanding of the relationship between social movements and global governance institutions, they do not articulate a theory of the *emergence* of transnational labor movements in relationship to global governance institutions. And because they do not analyze networks of labor activists, they cannot illuminate the processes by which transnational labor movements develop in response to globalization processes and how and why they coalesce transnationally.¹⁹

Here I argue that global governance institutions constitute transnational power structures that provide new political opportunity structures for emergent transnational social movements. Although there are some similarities between national and transnational political opportunity structures, I argue that there are critical differences in the way power is constituted at the transnational and national levels. Thus the model of national political opportunity structures cannot simply be mapped onto a transnational political action field.

Synthesizing key scholars' conceptualization of the term, McAdam (1996, p. 27) highlights four primary dimensions of political opportunity at the national level: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institu-

¹⁹ The burgeoning literature on labor transnationalism tends to focus on the history of labor transnationalism (Sikkink and Smith 2002, Herod 1997, Stevis 1998, Howard 1995), and the causes of success and failure of particular transnational campaigns (see Armbruster 1995, 1998a, 1998b, Cohen and Early 1998, Jessup and Gordon 2002, Kidder 2002, Zinn 2002, Anner 2002, Wilson 2002). See Evans (2000, 2005), Tarrow (2005), Waterman (1991, 1998) for theoretical analyses of labor transnationalism. Some scholars have suggested that NAFTA's labor side agreement facilitates labor transnationalism (Alexander 1999, Bouzas 1999, Carr 1999, Damgaard 1999a, 1999b, de Buen 1999, Compa 1999, Cook 1997, Kay 2000, Kidder 2002, Luján 1999, Stillerman 2003, Thorup 1993). Here I extend these analyses by introducing new empirical data and providing a theoretical analysis of the process by which NAFTA and the NAALC constituted regional actors, interests, and rights.

tionalized political system, (2) the stability or instability of elite political alignments, (3) the presence or absence of elite allies, and (4) the state's capacity and propensity for repression. While these variables allow for a rich analysis of national social movements, they lack explanatory power when applied to the transnational arena. Unlike nation-states, global governance institutions have neither democratic electoral accountability nor repressive capacity. A polity's relative accessibility is therefore largely irrelevant at the transnational level. Electoral politics, which Tilly (1984) cites as the primary engine behind national social movements' engagement with the nation-state, also lacks relevance in the transnational arena. Transnational elites are not elected, nor do they belong to transnational parties subject to voter sanction. At this stage of labor transnationalism in North America, the effects of transnational elites are therefore minimal.²⁰

And finally, while power at the national level can be constituted through repression, global governance institutions lack repressive powers. NAFTA and the NAALC, for example, have no military power and little ability to impose severe sanctions. Moreover all four dimensions of political opportunity structure at the national level presume the existence of one nation-state. But what if the political opportunity structure involves three nation-states (in North America) and one nascent global governance institution (e.g., NAFTA)?

Here I offer three primary dimensions of political opportunity structure at the transnational level that explain how power is established at the transnational level: (1) the constitution of transnational actors and interests, (2) the definition and recognition of transnational rights, and (3) adjudication of rights at the transnational level. The first dimension of transnational political opportunity structures highlights the importance of constituting regional or North American actors with North American interests (as opposed to national actors with national interests).²¹ Actors in the transnational arena often have opposed interests that stem from varied geographical, cultural, economic, and political experiences and positionings. Some scholars suggest that these differences are particularly difficult for labor movements to overcome because the interests of labor unions in developed and developing countries are antagonistic (Bhagwati 2000). That is, the global economy forces workers in different countries to compete for jobs.

²⁰ National elites were critical to the passage and structure of NAFTA and the NAALC (see Evans 2002).

²¹ I do not mean to imply that social movement actors no longer retain national identities and interests, but that these exist simultaneously and are compatible with their nascent transnational identities and interests.

In this article I show how global governance institutions facilitate a process that constitutes transnational actors and interests. NAFTA forced labor unions in all three countries to recognize the common threat to North American workers if the free trade agreement stimulated a reduction in jobs and wages and in health, safety, and environmental standards. Although it is commonly thought that NAFTA only created a common market, my data suggest that it also created a transnational political opportunity structure through which national unions in North America could identify their common interests as *North American unions* and advocate for them by developing a transnational political action field.

The second dimension of transnational political opportunity structures expands upon the first by emphasizing the importance of defining and recognizing transnational actors' and social movements' rights in the transnational arena. This dimension is similar to Tilly's (1984) assertion that national social movements target nation-states because they have the power to grant or deny legitimacy. In the transnational arena, global governance institutions have the same power. That is, they make and enforce rules that, however weak, establish transnational rights, standards, and norms. By laying out 11 North American labor principles and recognizing transnational social movements' right of standing through the NAO submission process, the NAALC creates a set of *North American labor rights* that must be protected in all three countries. Moreover their violation allows for redress by any North American "citizen."²² Thus the NAALC grants a legitimacy to North American labor unions and their grievances that did not exist before NAFTA's passage.²³

The third dimension of transnational political opportunity structures emphasizes the importance of adjudicating grievances at the transnational level. The NAALC, for example, not only defines and recognizes transnational rights, but also adjudicates complaints of labor rights violations at the transnational level. And its procedural rules facilitate cooperation among North American labor unions in that adjudicative process. While national political opportunity structures have both electoral and adjudicative dimensions, transnational political opportunity structures lack the former. At the transnational level, political opportunity structures are embedded in rules and bureaucratic processes rather than electoral processes. This is another reason for the minimal role of the polity and elite alignments at the transnational level.

²² The NAALC actually allows any party, regardless of national origin, to file public submissions. As of this printing, no party outside North America has filed a public submission.

²³ A more detailed discussion of the NAALC, its 11 labor principles, and its procedural rules are given in app. B.

Figure 1 presents my schematic model of the ways in which NAFTA helped catalyze labor transnationalism by forging a new transnational political opportunity structure. As figure 1 shows, NAFTA catalyzed labor transnationalism in two ways. First, between 1989 and 1993, it stimulated unions to mobilize politically in order to prevent its passage. In so doing, it constituted North American unions as transnational actors with common interests (the first dimension of transnational political opportunity structures). I call this NAFTA's *political mobilization effect*. Second, between 1994 and 2001, NAFTA had an institutional effect because it created new institutions through which labor activists could nurture transnational relationships. These new institutions define and recognize transnational rights, and adjudicate violations of these rights at the transnational level (the second and third dimensions of transnational political opportunity structures). It is important to emphasize that both effects serve a constitutive function, during the political mobilization period, because new interests are created, and during the period of institutionalization, because actors are legitimized. Thus power is constituted at the transnational level during both periods, but in different ways.²⁴

By examining NAFTA as a case of a global governance institution that spurred three unions to collaborate across North American borders, we can develop a more rigorous model of the relationship between global governance institutions, the emergence of labor transnationalism, and the development and idiosyncrasies of a transnational political opportunity structure.

²⁴ The period when NAFTA was introduced and was being negotiated was critical to unions because the trade and labor side agreement architectures would be crucial components of the transnational power structure. That unions and other civil society organizations (e.g., environmental, fair trade, farmers, indigenous rights groups, etc.) contested them so vehemently at local, national, and transnational levels shows how much they believed was at stake with the passage of these multilateral accords (see Evans 2002). Thus, power was constituted during this period despite the lack of institutional mechanisms, as unions participated across borders in the process of determining the nature of the transnational mechanisms and institutions that would emerge. And they did so because they began to see themselves as transnational actors with regional interests. Unions' collective demand that the trade agreement include labor protections helped ensure that a labor side agreement was passed, although North American unions had little influence on the structure of the NAALC and the level of labor protections it would provide (Evans 2002). Theoretically, this case suggests that transnational political mobilization can precede transnational institutionalization and can occur without institutionalization. Indeed, many unions began to organize transnationally during this mobilization period (see Evans 2002, Carr 1999, Compa 1999, Cook 1997, Kidder 2002). But, the two institutional effects help reinforce the political mobilization effect by underlining the constituted interests and offering a remedy based on those interests.

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


FIG 1 —NAFTA's effects on labor transnationalism

RESEARCH DESIGN

Using the transnational relationship as my unit of analysis enables me to illuminate labor transnationalism not only as an outcome, but also as a process of relationship and institution building. That is, it is a process of creating a transnational union culture based on cooperative complementary identities, defined as a shared recognition of mutual interest coupled with a commitment to joint action. I identify five stages in this process: (1) contact, (2) interaction and the coalescing of interests, (3) growth of confidence and trust, (4) action (e.g., joint activities and actions to address mutual needs and interests), and (5) identification (e.g., recognizing mutual interests).

My analysis centers on one set of North American unions that developed a relationship after 1989 in response to NAFTA—the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), the Authentic Labor Front (Frente Auténtico del Trabajo, or FAT), and the Canadian Steelworkers of America (CUSWA). This case emerged out of a larger sample of unions that developed transnational relationships in the post-NAFTA (1989–2001) period.²⁵ I focus on this case because it has achieved all five stages in the process and is therefore the most robust.

The FAT was formed in 1960 as an independent federation of Mexican labor unions, worker-owned cooperatives, farm workers, and community organizations. It is a progressive organization, promulgating gender equity and democratic values in each of its affiliates. The UE was born in 1936 and was the first union chartered by the CIO. In 1949 it broke with the

²⁵ Although NAFTA was formally passed in 1994, I consider the period during which it was debated and negotiated part of the post-NAFTA period because NAFTA had an effect on union mobilization during this prepassage period. Also, see app. A for a detailed discussion of my case selection.

CIO to protest red baiting and has maintained its focus on democratic unionism ever since. The CUSWA formed in 1942. Though part of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), it remains extremely independent and autonomous. In 2000, the CUSWA had 190,000 members. That year the UE had 35,000 members, and the FAT claimed approximately 30,000 members.

In order to determine the catalyst of the relationship among these three unions and to evaluate the relationship's nature and quality, I employed a qualitative approach that included in-depth interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and the analysis of a variety of secondary sources and archival materials. I interviewed key informants at each of the unions, including the UE's director of organization, political action director, and director of international labor affairs, a founding director and executive director of the CUSWA Humanity Fund, and four (current and former) national coordinators of the FAT. In addition, I interviewed one former and two current attorneys for the FAT, and two FAT organizers. Interviews lasted between one and four hours.

I conducted interviews with UE and CUSWA officials between May 2000 and March 2001 in Washington, D C, Pittsburgh, Toronto, and Ottawa. I completed interviews with FAT officials in Mexico City between June 1999 and August 2000. All FAT interviews were conducted in Spanish. In addition to interviews, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the FAT offices in Mexico City between February and July 2000. While working as a volunteer with the FAT,²⁶ I observed various meetings, conferences, protests, strategy sessions, and rank-and-file union exchanges (including one held jointly with the UE). I was also given access to FAT archives.

In addition to conducting in-depth interviews and fieldwork, I examined the union newspapers/magazines of the FAT, UE, and CUSWA. I examined all available issues of the *UE News* published between 1987 and 1999, *Steelabour* (Canadian version) published between 1986 and 1999, and the FAT's *Resistencia Obrera*, published between 1978 and 2000. I also examined archived documents from each union, including press releases, internal memoranda, educational materials, newsletters, position papers, policy statements, and correspondence. And finally, I reviewed the 23 NAO public submissions filed between 1994 and May 2001 and legal documents associated with them.

²⁶ As a volunteer, I assisted with translations and helped organize FAT archives.

FINDINGS

Constituting Transnational Actors and Interests

Despite all they had in common, the FAT, UE, and CUSWA did not have a relationship before 1991. Bertha Luján, formerly a FAT national coordinator, explained that before NAFTA, the FAT did not have transnational relationships with other North American unions.²⁷ “I think there was little interest on the part of American unions and also on our part to establish relations . . . the United States was not a priority, it was not in our strategy, nor on the part of American unions was there interest in Mexico” (Bertha Luján, FAT, 8/29/00). During this period few unions had transnational contacts, and those that existed were transient and inequitable (as between the AFL-CIO and official Mexican unions). There were no ongoing programs of action, nor coordinated efforts of solidarity. Permanent transnational relationships based on mutual support through actions and assistance did not exist before NAFTA.

But the trade agreement presented a “shock” to the landscape of international union relations that forced unions to reevaluate their previous strategies. Suddenly, with NAFTA’s introduction, the priorities of North American unions shifted. Institutional scholars have long recognized that severe shocks to stable organizational fields in the form of legal or policy shifts can force organizations to change their own policies and strategies (see Fligstein 1985, 1991). Labor scholars have recently examined how shocks impact organizational transformations within labor unions (Voss and Sherman 2000).

Social movement scholars also recognize that social movements often emerge in response to threats (Berejikian 1992, Goldstone and Tilly 2001, Jenkins et al. 2003).²⁸ Here I will argue that NAFTA presented a shock or a threat that helped constitute a transnational political opportunity structure by mobilizing labor unions in two ways. First, it constituted transnational actors and interests by making economic globalization processes tangible, and forcing labor activists to recognize their common plight in the face of regional economic integration. While processes of regional economic integration had been occurring for over a decade, NAFTA embodied them in a way that was concrete and transparent. UE members, for example, knew that a significant amount of their work had been transferred to Mexico in the 1980s. Mexican labor activists realized

²⁷ With the exception of the Quebec-based National Union Confederation (CSN) that, like the FAT, was affiliated with the World Federation of Labor and had links to the Catholic Church.

²⁸ Although their origins vary, threats and political opportunities often generate similar responses. Both can force social movement actors to decide what is worth fighting for and to mobilize.

the plethora of well-paid jobs promised by freer trade and border factories (called *maquiladoras*) had not materialized. And Canadian activists witnessed free-trade inspired downward harmonization that they had predicted and fought against during negotiations over the Canada-U S Free Trade Agreement in the mid-1980s.

According to Luján, NAFTA had profound effects on Mexican unionists. She explained that the trade agreement helped to change the consciousness of Mexican activists, that is, it altered the way they viewed their northern neighbors and the process of economic integration. "NAFTA permitted us to understand that we were all a part of the same strategy and process of economic integration. It helped us to see that we have the same problems. Globalization has provoked the fall of labor standards and salaries in the three countries. The consequences have been for us to realize that the same labor and economic policies apply in the three countries, and that we're facing the same enemies" (Bertha Luján FAT, 8/3/99).

Second, NAFTA brought labor activists into contact with each other and helped coalesce their interests as North American unions. Labor leaders realized that it would be difficult to combat the forces of global capital as individual and isolated labor unions. The struggle against NAFTA would have to be a collaborative one, a uniquely North American one. Before NAFTA, North American unions saw their struggles as isolated and particular to their own nations. But NAFTA's negotiation and subsequent passage created a transnational political opportunity structure that helped them constitute a transnational political action field in North America. In this field, labor unions struggled to defeat the free trade agreement and came to see their interests and futures as inextricably linked. The surfeit of joint meetings, conferences, and strategy sessions during the NAFTA battle reflects NAFTA's ability to constitute North American actors and interests.²⁹

The first contact between the UE and FAT occurred in 1991. Canadian organizations (which organized their own struggle in the mid-1980s against the Canada-U S Free Trade Agreement)³⁰ approached U S and Mexican organizations to join their efforts against NAFTA (Arroyo and Monroy 1996). In October 1991, the trade ministers of the three North American countries met in Zacatecas, Mexico, to negotiate the free trade agreement. A trinational group opposed to free trade convened a forum in the same city, they dubbed their meeting "Public Opinion and the NAFTA Negotiations: Citizen Alternatives." It was through participation

²⁹ For a discussion of these early collaborations see Evans (2002).

³⁰ See Ayres (1998) for an excellent discussion of Canadian social movements' struggles against free trade.

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in this forum that FAT and UE representatives first met. Thus NAFTA provided the political impetus for labor activists to begin to mobilize transnationally. According to Luján, "In reality the majority of relationships with unions in the United States began with NAFTA, and our activities against NAFTA" (Bertha Luján FAT, 8/29/00). NAFTA therefore provided the three unions an opportunity to solidify their positions and push common agendas. Gerry Barr, formerly of the CUSWA explained, "because of the context created by NAFTA there were lots of opportunities for relevant discussions and sort of common policy discussions and so on. I mean someone once said about NAFTA that one of its best byproducts was the sort of solidarity platform it created for social movement actors and trade unionists and I think there is some truth in that. And one of the important pieces of that theory is that the FAT is a great believer in it, they themselves think that" (Gerry Barr CUSWA, 3/1/01).

The UE viewed the Zacatecas forum as an opportunity to create more solidary relationships with Mexican unions. Bob Kingsley, the UE's director of organization, explained that in the months leading up to the forum UE leaders worried that a free trade agreement would intensify the flight of UE jobs to Mexico. In order to deal with the loss of UE jobs, which had been decreasing since the 1980s, the UE hoped to begin a dialogue with the FAT.

I had come down after discussions with the leadership of our union to try to figure out what else we could do to try to make a link to the FAT that would be more than just the cordial distant relationship that existed at that time. We knew of them, we had perhaps corresponded with them but we hadn't done much with them. So during the course of it I was able to get together with Bertha Luján and a couple of other leaders of the FAT.

To sit down and talk about what is possible in terms of a relationship between the UE and FAT that takes our unions forward, that takes international solidarity work forward. (Bob Kingsley UE, 1/23/01)

One of FAT's three national coordinators confirmed this account of how the FAT-UE relationship began. "Before NAFTA certain unions in the United States suggested we start to work together in the face of the negotiations that were going on over NAFTA. The UE was one of them. So we started to create alliances and solidary mechanisms with the idea of creating them by sector. So through events in both countries, support for our organizations, we have developed relationships that are more tight and solid, beginning with our compañeros from the UE" (Alfredo Domínguez FAT, 4/3/00). Another FAT leader explained that the UE distinguished itself from other North American unions during the NAFTA struggle by not promulgating a nationalistic, protectionist rhetoric. "Orig-

inally, during the initial fight over NAFTA negotiations, the attitude of American and Canadian unions was protectionistic. They wanted to prevent American companies from leaving the U.S. After NAFTA there was a difference. We wanted to create real collaboration and solidarity and the great majority of U.S. unions were very protectionistic. The UE was an exception" (Alfredo Domínguez, FAT, 4/3/00).

The UE's stance on NAFTA, then, facilitated its relationship with the FAT. Its view that NAFTA was a threat to North American unions, not simply to U.S. unions, helped build a common agenda and trust with the FAT. The two unions embarked on a historic relationship. They created a Strategic Organizing Alliance that survived despite NAFTA's ultimate passage. As the UE proclaims on its Web site, "UE works to give new meaning to *international solidarity* through its 'Strategic Organizing Alliance' with Mexico's independent Authentic Labor Front (FAT). The first-of-its-kind cross-border approach to organizing developed out of the two organizations' opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)." ³¹

The first project the two unions undertook through their alliance was to attempt to organize a General Electric (GE) plant in Juárez, Mexico. They chose GE because the company had relocated plants with UE membership to Mexico. But the goal of the campaign was not to keep jobs in the United States; rather, it was to maintain decent labor rights and standards in North America. The UE's Bob Kingsley explained, "The idea that we could form an organizing alliance with the idea that rather than just publicly condemn what was going on, we would try to fight it by identifying locations where our jobs had moved and targeting them for organization. And undertaking actual campaigns to improve wages and conditions in those locations, knowing that the result would not be that the work would return to the United States but trying to take the edge of exploitation out of what's going on here by raising wages and conditions for workers in the Mexican facilities" (Bob Kingsley, UE, 1/23/01).

Although the GE organizing campaign was not successful (due to the strength of employer and Mexican government opposition), it was instrumental in strengthening the bonds between the FAT and the UE. The failure provided activists from both unions an opportunity to reevaluate the project together and ultimately to change the project's strategy. As the director of international affairs for the UE explained, the UE and FAT realized that their failure stemmed, in part, from a lack of worker education and knowledge in northern Mexico. To remedy this problem, they opened a workers' center, the Education Center and Labor Workshop

³¹ <http://www.ranknfile-ue.org/uewho4.html>

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(CETLAC by its Spanish acronym) in Ciudad Juárez in 1996 Robin Alexander, the UE's director of international labor affairs explained "The response to that [failure] was that we needed to take a few steps back and do some of the basic education in a way that would begin to educate workers and prepare them for a different kind of struggle where they weren't just seeking some quick bucks and moving on, but really seeking to gain some control within a plant" (Robin Alexander UE, 12/21/00)

Since 1992, the FAT and UE's joint actions have included organizing multiple worker and organizer exchanges, opening additional worker education centers, implementing an adopt-an-organizer program, and completing mural projects in both countries In addition, some UE locals support FAT through a voluntary supplementary dues checkoff and monthly contributions The UE and FAT also collaborate on an online bimonthly periodical titled "Mexican Labor News and Analysis," created on January 1, 1996 The FAT and UE are in weekly, and often daily, contact

Activists have definitely achieved the fifth and final stage in the process of labor transnationalism, identification They see themselves as connected and have a strong sense of mutual interest Arturo Alcalde, one of the FAT's lawyers, was forceful in his defense of labor transnationalism based on mutual interest and concrete action, "After this process of identification, which brings information and confidence, trust, it is very important to work on common agendas" (Arturo Alcalde FAT, 3/29/00) A former FAT national coordinator explained that while differences persist between the unions, the two organizations focus on building upon common problems and concerns "So I think there are differences and areas of convergence And it is those areas of convergence which are common interests, there is where we must find and construct things in common" (Bertha Luján FAT, 8/3/99)

This commitment is made manifest in the symmetry of the relationships That is, they are not one-sided (with northern unions simply offering money and "expert" advice to Mexican unions), as many contacts between U S , Canadian, and Mexican unions have historically been FAT's Alcalde explained

And international solidarity isn't just about the United States and Canada helping us, the poorer less developed country, because the United States is not a haven of labor freedom There are many obstacles there And here is the double sidedness of international solidarity, the old international solidarity which people criticized as being protectionist We can't judge Americans in general, we committed many errors in the past because we lacked information The Americans also committed an error because they assumed all Mexican unions were corrupt They lacked information So information is a central point in creating specific common programs and collaborating,

the exchanging of realities in a more simple manner is a good path to follow
(Arturo Alcalde FAT, 3/29/00)

In 1994, the two unions' theoretical commitment to mutualism was put into practice when the UE requested assistance from FAT to organize Latino workers as part of its organizing drive in a Wisconsin plant. The UE's political action director, Chris Townsend, explained the reasons for the UE's decision to request a FAT organizer: "But it is an interesting tactic. To me, it was a little bit of turnabout. I was talking earlier about U.S. labor people running all over the planet giving out free advice and this was an example of where we had some turnabout and invite somebody to come here. But it came out of a practical necessity" (Chris Townsend UE, 12/18/00).

With FAT's assistance, the UE won the election by 12 votes. Townsend suggested that the collaborative strategy was more important than the victory itself because it reflected an historic shift in the direction of aid across the continent. A FAT national coordinator agreed that the strategy was significant because it marked a change in attitude and method for North American unions.

We need to create organizations that look beyond their borders and have respect for the idiosyncrasies of each country. I can't tell labor leaders in the U.S. what they need and they can't come here and teach me what I need. Labor leaders used to come here and try to tell us what we needed. We need to give each other support. We sent some organizers from here to go and help organize a plant in [Wisconsin] because they needed help organizing Latino workers, some were undocumented. This organizer went and they won the election. We need to say where do you need our help and what kind of help do you need. (Benedicto Martínez FAT, 7/27/99)

The alliance between the UE and FAT is strengthened by regular exchanges among their members. The UE's Robin Alexander explained the importance of the exchanges for institutionalizing labor transnationalism within her union:

I think the time and effort that we put into the worker-to-worker exchanges are really important, too. Part of the thinking behind them was we need to understand each other and each other's realities and it's not just a question of doing support for organizing work, but there has to be a deeper understanding within our organizations of what's going on and what the realities are. Because otherwise we're not really able to talk to each other.

But it's a wonderful thing to watch because you really visibly see people's mindsets shift within a 10-day period, and it's pretty extraordinary. And it happens on both sides of the border. (Robin Alexander UE, 12/21/00)

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When asked the most significant lessons workers on both sides of the border learn from the exchanges, Alexander replied

I think people on both sides are just astounded by the similarities, that they expect things to be very different and yet they find that the details may be different, but in the broad strokes it's sort of the same. It's that organizing is hard in both places. I think people here tend to kind of assume that folks in Mexico probably don't really know what they're doing and they get down there and it's like, ah, these people are really good, they work really hard, they're very dedicated and they run into problems that are not all that dissimilar to what we confront, that workers are afraid to organize because they're afraid they're going to lose their jobs. That bosses are nasty. It's very familiar stuff. (Robin Alexander UE, 12/21/00)

Alexander's description suggests that the UE and FAT's joint participation in a transnational political action field solidified the process of constituting regional actors and interests, and helped undermine racial stereotypes and assumptions.³²

Although the CUSWA developed a relationship with the FAT after NAFTA's passage, the union's decision to seek out a Mexican partner was a direct result of the free trade agreement. The Canadian Steelworkers' Humanity Fund, created to assist with the African food crisis in the mid-1980s, began to devote attention to labor solidarity work in the early 1990s. One of its founders described how regional economic integration made relationships with Mexican unions more relevant and how the fund's directors identified the FAT as a partner in this new context

A number of the people who were working in the Humanity Fund had long histories in solidarity work, and it was because of that that we were aware of the FAT and as we thought our way through the question of involvement in Mexico, and Mexico was increasingly relevant particularly with the arrival of NAFTA, it seemed to us that—I mean you talk about tricky labor terrains in which to work Mexico was a classic example of that—and we needed I think a kind of relatively secure sort of anteroom to the world of labor and labor politics in Mexico, we needed a sort of safe place from which to a relatively safe place in developmental terms I mean in terms of integrity in programming. And the FAT was an obvious candidate for that, they were solid, they had survived, they were thoughtful, they had careful analysis, they believed a lot in solidarity so it was just sort of a no-brainer for us. (Gerry Barr CUSWA, 3/1/01)

Like the UE, the CUSWA strengthened their relationship with the FAT in the wake of NAFTA. The CUSWA and FAT regularly hold joint

³² In other work, I give a detailed discussion of how NAFTA helped undermine racial stereotypes (Kay 2004a, 2004b, 2003b)

meetings and exchanges. The two unions have also devoted significant resources to collaborations on health and safety issues. In 1994, the unions embarked on an innovative project to build a strike fund for the FAT, which previously had no access to emergency funds. David Mackenzie, who administered the Humanity Fund, explained the project, known by its Spanish acronym, FOSAM:

What's unique about our relationship with the FAT, the Canadian Steelworkers, is that we have built through the Humanity Fund a specific mutual support fund with them which they can access as a kind of emergency strike fund or emergency organizing relief fund in situations that are, well, emergency situations basically or extremely stressful ones. They needed long term support mechanisms to support people at strikes like the Morelos print shop that's been going on for four years. So that's been a concrete way we can help them and we've been working with them to build this assistance fund. And we've funded it up front, and we're funding it for a five year period, it will end in a couple of years. And the FAT meanwhile have assigned people to work full time getting the FAT locals and co-ops and other organizing members paying into the Fund at their end so that after a while when we stop paying into it will be self sustaining, it will feel like part of joining the FAT is joining this mutual support fund. (David Mackenzie, CUSWA, 2/16/01)

In addition to the FOSAM project, the CUSWA also began to fund a project to support FAT's expansion and consolidation efforts. As the Steelworkers Humanity Fund Programme describes, "This is a two-year project meant to increase membership in iron, steel, metal-mechanic and textile sectors in the Valle de Mexico. It is carrying out organising campaigns and offering educational, legal and technical support for groups of workers in non-union workplaces or workplaces with 'official,' government-linked unions" ("Steelworkers Humanity Fund's Programme," *nd*, p. 8).

Like the UE, the CUSWA also institutionalized its ties to FAT by educating members about the value of labor transnationalism. CUSWA's Mackenzie described the development of the union's "Thinking North-South" project:

Over time, as people got increasingly proud of [the Humanity Fund], it compelled us to do a couple of things. One of the things was to ramp up our international solidarity program education internally. We basically created a new one. We used to have a kind of half-assed course that we borrowed bits and pieces from other people, but we started using our Humanity Fund assisting our Education Department developing a program we called "Thinking North-South," a week long program that was very popular. And we find that it's very useful to have local union people in that who then go back to their locals all charged up who want to bargain the Fund and get involved. So we've created a network through the Fund

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and through the Education Department, a network of international solidarity activists right in our local unions who are on top of these issues and extremely knowledgeable and constantly pressuring the union to do things. Like all unions have networks of health and safety activists, and we've got this really good group of international solidarity activists (David Mackenzie CUSWA, 2/16/01)

CUSWA's Barr explained that the relationship between his union and the FAT, and the UE and the FAT, ultimately led to interactions between CUSWA and the UE. He described how, through their engagement in a North American political action field on labor rights, the three unions' relationship began to coalesce transnationally.

So the FAT was keenly interested in and valued the international tie and as a result of that interest as well, I mean I think that moved us forward to a much more mature kind of level of participation with each other's work. And then of course there were—simultaneously and preceding our sort of formal connection with the FAT—there had been other ties of course that the FAT had created with unions in the United States and elsewhere but certainly in the United States. And one of the most obvious points of connection is their relationship with the small but very valiant United Electrical Workers. And so they had created a very high quality point of contact and very thoughtful, very careful, very long-term. And naturally we became involved in three-way discussions between sort of Canada—the Steelworkers in Canada—the UE and the FAT (Gerry Barr CUSWA, 3/1/01)

As will be discussed below, the relationship among the three unions became transnational through their joint participation in a significant NAO submission. But the construction of a nascent transnational political action field enabled these unions to build trust, collaborate, and lay the groundwork for a robust transnational relationship.

The data clearly demonstrate that NAFTA provided a new transnational political opportunity structure for FAT, UE, and CUSWA. The free trade agreement had a significant political mobilization effect—it made manifest processes of regional economic integration and brought the unions into contact for the first time. It also allowed them to interact and exchange information as they came together to fight NAFTA. The plethora of joint meetings, conferences, and strategy sessions during the NAFTA battle attests to the substantive nature of their interaction. NAFTA, then, catalyzed a new kind of North American labor struggle by constituting transnational actors whose complementary interests transcended physical and cultural borders. A FAT official explained: "I would say that one of the great benefits of NAFTA is that it obligates us—unions and organizations—to seek out relations and strengthen them, and to create alliances. Now relations do not result from mere circumstance, but

from a recognition of mutual interests I think that before NAFTA there was not an understanding of the reality and the phenomenon of globalization" (Benedicto Martínez FAT, 7/27/99) After they failed to prevent the ratification of NAFTA, the three unions did not abandon their relationships, rather they continued to nurture and develop them

Defining, Recognizing, and Adjudicating Transnational Rights

While the fight over NAFTA constituted transnational actors and interests and provided a foundation for transnational relationships between the FAT and its U S and Canadian counterparts, the NAALC created a new institutional context for transnational collaboration and cooperation The NAALC laid out 11 labor principles that defined and recognized the key labor rights of North American "citizens" It also established new adjudicatory venues and procedures for filing complaints of labor violations in each of the three signatory countries, based on the 11 labor principles The NAO process therefore enables us to gauge the effects of a nascent global governance institution on the development of a transnational political opportunity structure

I argue that the NAO process allowed activists to deepen their relationships and increase their activities in two ways First, it legitimized labor activists and their grievances through the joint filing of NAO submissions And second, the NAO process allowed them to collaborate in concrete and meaningful ways The FAT's attorney explained that being able to engage an international venue was particularly important for independent Mexican unions such as FAT³³

Now when we have a submission someone in the Mexican government will call and want to know why this, why that They don't ignore it anymore, and this didn't exist before We spoke but they didn't listen, we existed but they didn't see us I think now that they listen, and they listen because what we do hurts them And what we do is within the law So there's a balance, in general terms things have been very positive, educational And I am confident that the government will have to change its labor policies Not of their own volition, but because of the pressure we've been putting on them Because more and more the governments of the U S and Canada question the labor policies of the Mexican government (Benedicto Martínez FAT, 7/27/99)

A former UE attorney who worked on numerous NAO submissions concurred that the NAO process legitimized and strengthened the hand of

³³ Independent Mexican unions are those not officially linked to the government or ruling party Historically, the organizing efforts of independent Mexican unions such as the FAT have been thwarted by government authorities

independent Mexican unionists “And in Mexico I think it went a long way to overcome the isolation of the independent union forces, I mean they became real players because they had this They were able to invoke this international mechanism In the last year of the PRI government Bertha Luján was a regular visitor at the secretary of labor’s office, he would consult her because she was now a player” (Lance Compa, 12/19/00)

In describing her participation in one of the first NAO cases, the UE’s director of international labor affairs explained how an international platform to address labor rights violations was important for U S and Mexican activists “But at the point where we first filed the NAO cases, there was no official platform that independent lawyers or trade unionists could use to talk about what was going on” (Robin Alexander UE, 12/21/00)

In addition to legitimizing labor activists and their grievances, the NAO process also provided them with a new institutional arena in which the rules of regional economic integration and by extension, those of the global economy, could be contested The NAALC provides a tangible institution to engage Labor activists and lawyers told consistent and compelling stories about how the NAALC’s procedural rules facilitate labor transnationalism These procedural rules make it extremely difficult for a union to file a submission with a “foreign” NAO without the assistance of “foreign” unions/organizations The NAALC stipulates submissions may be filed against the government (not individual employers or corporations) of any NAFTA country through an NAO established in each country Public submissions may be filed with an NAO other than the one in which the alleged labor violation occurred The FAT’s lawyer explained how this procedural rule generates labor transnationalism “I think the side agreement facilitates relations among unions, there is an intimate relation between these submissions and international relations In our experience one of the most important sources of relations has precisely been this type of submission because above all else you must present them in another country If you don’t have contacts you can’t submit complaints” (Arturo Alcalde FAT, 3/29/00)

Steve Herzenberg, assistant to the U S chief negotiator of the NAALC, concurred that the NAO process resulted in increased labor transnationalism “The side agreement contributed to that increase because it created new venues through which you could act in solidarity and support one another” (Steve Herzenberg U S Department of Labor, fall 2000) FAT’s Luján argued that the NAO process also stimulated labor transnationalism by forcing unions to recognize the problems workers face in other countries “Does the NAO process stimulate transnational labor solidarity? Yes, obviously yes The submission process has increased the solidarity between unions because it obliges unions to recognize the violations that

occur in the other countries and obliges them to mobilize themselves This is a form of solidarity and support that is very concrete between unions It's a concrete way of establishing a relationship It's not theory, it's something very concrete" (Bertha Luján FAT, 8/3/99)

Luján suggested that labor activists could no longer dismiss or claim to be ignorant about the problems of their NAFTA counterparts The NAO process forced interaction and the dissemination of information about conditions in other countries Luján made this claim more specific by arguing that the NAO process helped unions make achieving labor freedom a "unifying goal" in North America

In general our participation in submissions has been very interesting It's allowed us to construct stronger relationships with unions in the U S and Canada It means that to file submissions, U S and Canadian unions must learn more about the situation in Mexico, and we must learn more about what is going on in those countries, for example the forms of labor repression and discrimination that exist in those countries It's allowed us to construct an agenda in common Through the submissions, for example, labor freedom has become a unifying goal among unions in the three countries We realize that the only way to rectify violations of union liberty which occur in the three countries is through unity The side agreements have helped us strengthen our efforts toward this goal (Bertha Luján FAT, 8/3/99)

Labor lawyer Lance Compa suggested that the process by which the NAO grants legitimacy and generates concrete collaboration is inextricably linked

And what the NAALC has created is this kind of framework for a lot of rich interaction between union activists in the countries like when the flight attendants came up from Taesa [a Mexican airline] to testify at the public hearing in Washington, D C , they were just—ecstatic might be overstating it—but they thought it was great because until this forum was available, this would have been just some a silent suffering in Mexico, and nobody would have ever heard of it Even in Mexico it would be, kind of a few people on the left would know about it, but it would be totally ignored otherwise And here they've got high level officials from the U S government sitting in a public hearing listening to them tell the story of what happened to them, and what Taesa did to them and what the government did to them And they said, this is great it's just great that somebody will take us seriously and hear our story And for the two unions—the flight attendants in the United States, and ASSA, the union in Mexico—the people from those unions also told me, this is great, it's given us a chance to really work together and get to know each other better What they did before was send each other resolutions of support, or telegrams of support, and that was it And now they've got something very concrete to work on And in the long run that's going to pay off, even if it doesn't pay off in some magical judgment under the NAALC to rehire the workers that got fired (Lance Compa, 12/19/00)

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For the UE, FAT, and CUSWA, the NAO process not only gave them legitimacy, it also catalyzed their relationship into a trinational one. In 1997, a group of six U.S. and Canadian unions (including the UE and CUSWA), and FAT, formed the Echlin Workers Alliance. These unions had previously worked together in various coalitions to defeat NAFTA. The alliance was created to support workers employed by the Echlin Corporation (which later became Dana), a U.S.-based transnational auto parts manufacturer. Member unions represent workers in Echlin/Dana plants in all three NAFTA countries.

One of the primary objectives of the Echlin alliance was to support Mexican workers in their struggle to improve the working conditions in Echlin plants. A statement adopted at its founding meeting read, "We will make a special effort to support Echlin workers in Mexico who suffer the lowest wages and worst conditions and who face the worst repression when they stand up for their rights" (Hathaway 2000, p. 191). The Echlin alliance, then, was created because the unions viewed protecting workers' rights in plants in all three NAFTA countries as their common interest and goal. Soon after the alliance's founding, STIMAHCS, a FAT-affiliated independent metal workers union, requested assistance for an organizing drive at a Dana-owned plant called ITAPSA in Mexico City. The alliance pledged its mutual support for STIMAHCS's organizing campaign at ITAPSA. Bob Kingsley of the UE described how unions from the three NAFTA countries came together to support the ITAPSA struggle:

Before very long even though the initial organizational vision was sort of a broader one about how we were going to go out and cooperatively by comparing notes and joining forces—Canada, Mexico, and the United States—attempt organization throughout this chain, the thing became focused on ITAPSA because the Mexicans were first out of the gate. They went to the factory, they tried to organize it, [and] you know they faced horrible repression, of course this new organization then closed ranks behind the workers involved in that struggle and made that the prime piece of our work. And that work took a number of forms, from activities we tried to organize in the various organized shops to protest the company's actions, our first instinct being to involve the rank-and-file Echlin workers to take on this company. And we were able to undertake activities in Canada, in the United States, in support of what was going on at ITAPSA in Mexico (Bob Kingsley UE, 1/23/01).

Echlin did not relent and in December, 1997, the Echlin Workers Alliance filed a public submission with the U.S. NAO office that accused the corporation of labor rights violations in Mexico and demanded that the Mexican government remedy the situation. Over 50 organizations from all three NAFTA countries, including seven unions that represent Echlin workers in the United States and Canada, signed the submission. The

UE, FAT, and CUSWA were among the submitters. The submission was reinforced by concrete actions, including demonstrations in front of the company's headquarters and actions at their shareholders meeting. At the shareholder's meeting, the alliance demanded that the company sign a code of conduct which would apply in Echlin's plants in Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The UE's director of organization described the action at the shareholder's meeting this way:

And it was just right. It was the scene that ought to be. Here's their corporate headquarters, this palatial setup overlooking this beautiful lake, comfortable location used by these overpaid executives that run this outfit. And here we are, a nasty bunch of skunks attending their garden party and bust up this meeting by raising the Echlin issue and demanding that they respond to us on this topic, that they contemplate adopting a corporate code of conduct, that justice be done for these people who've been done wrong. And it was a good day for us, was a good day for us when we were able to do that. (Bob Kingsley, UE, 1/23/01)

Despite the alliance's efforts, the U.S. NAO submission and joint actions failed to remedy the problem at ITAPSA. Thus, a year later the CUSWA spearheaded another NAO submission against Echlin and submitted it to the Canadian NAO in April 1998. Gerry Barr, formerly of the CUSWA, explained that although Canadian unions were hesitant to use the NAO submission process, his union decided to participate in the case in order to support the FAT:

In Canada this turned out to be the first time that a union aimed at using the side agreement. The view with respect to the NAFTA side agreement had been very very harshly negative and we thought and to some extent still think that this is a procedure designed to not work and designed to be inaccessible and designed for inefficacy not efficacy and to some extent we still think that. But it does remain true that it was a venue, right? It was a place to engage and so because the FAT was interested in that we became interested in it. And because they valued it we suspended some of the critique with respect to the nonutility of the platform and were prepared to accompany them, their interest and to sort of give some weight to their interest in having it aired in Canada and we became the lead agency as it were. (Gerry Barr, CUSWA, 3/1/01)

Barr's comments reflect how his union came to see its interests as linked to those of the FAT. The CUSWA therefore supported (and helped fund) the NAO complaint even though the case did not involve Canadian workers.

It was through this process, with the FAT as an intermediary, that the CUWSA developed a relationship with the UE. When asked to describe the benefits of the NAO case, the UE's Robin Alexander responded, "I

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think that one benefit for us is we really did get to know the Canadian Steelworkers much better as a result of all of this” (Robin Alexander UE, 12/21/00) Alexander described how the relationship with the CUSWA developed through participation in the case

There had been no NAO cases filed in Canada And so the [Canadian] Steelworkers agreed to really be the point people on that case, because of their relationship with the FAT, and the FAT had through the Echlin Workers Alliance asked for assistance, and so a decision was made to file cases both here and in Canada and so the Canadian Steelworkers agreed to really coordinate that work I wound up working very very closely with people in their Humanity Fund and with their lawyers and got to know them (Robin Alexander UE, 12/21/00)

The Echlin NAO case demonstrates that through the NAO submission process, the NAALC provided a concrete mechanism to stimulate new relationships and direct and galvanize established relationships in the wake of NAFTA’s passage It also shows how the NAALC helped constitute transnational actors with uniquely North American interests The unions that formed the Echlin alliance were those that had worked together to defeat NAFTA, and through this process they came to see their fates as intertwined The UE-FAT-CUSWA relationship served as a model and signaled a significant shift in the way many unions deal with shocks such as free trade Instead of relying on protectionistic and nationalistic strategies to deal with the crisis, these three unions decided to fight against the threat together by creating a relationship that was beneficial to all participants One FAT leader explained that although the relationship requires constant negotiation to ensure that the needs of all are being met, it is a step in the right direction

This is not a relation of agreements and declarations, of good intentions This is a relation based on action and from here we have to work very hard But for good reason because these are new experiences, and each side has distinct needs Therefore the process goes slowly But we are on this path And we need to do the same thing with unions in Europe And it takes a lot of work due to differences in culture, standards of living, etc But we have confidence in this path and that like capital, we will create global unionism That we will not have to be an individual union confronting capital where it appears in our country (Benedicto Martínez FAT, 7/27/99)

NAFTA’s effects transcend the specific case of the FAT, UE, and CUSWA An analysis of the NAO submissions filed during the period under (1994–2001) study reveals a general trend toward increased joint participation on submission cases While only the one or two submitting unions participated in joint actions to support the first few NAO cases,

over 50 unions and NGOs participated in the NAO Echlin/ITAPSA submission. Many of these unions had no previous contact.³⁴

CONCLUSION

An examination of NAFTA and the emergence of labor transnationalism suggests that the dimensions of political opportunity structure articulated by social movement theorists cannot adequately explain how political opportunity structures operate at the transnational level. Because political process theory developed almost exclusively in relationship to nation-states and national political processes and institutions, the processes by which power is constituted at the transnational level have not been fully theorized. I show that just as the nation-state constitutes a national power structure that provides political opportunities for national social movements, transnational global governance institutions (such as NAFTA and the NAALC) constitute transnational power structures that provide new political opportunities for emergent transnational social movements. I therefore identify a relationship between the development of a transnational power structure and the *emergence* of transnational social movements.

But an analysis of NAFTA as a *case* of a new global governance institution enables us to do more than simply illuminate the link between it and the emergence of labor transnationalism; it also allows us to unearth the process by which this reaction occurred. Here I illuminate the *process* by which global governance institutions create new transnational political opportunity structures for transnational social movements. I offer three dimensions of transnational political opportunity structures that global governance institutions affect in order to constitute power transnationally.

First, global governance institutions constitute transnational actors and interests in the transnational arena. NAFTA forced labor unions in North America to see the common threat NAFTA posed to the continent's living and working conditions. Through their common struggle to define and defeat the threat of regional economic integration, national unions in North America came to identify and organize around their collective interests as *North American unions*. Second, in the transnational arena global governance institutions have the power to define and recognize transnational rights and grant legitimacy to transnational actors and their claims. While nation-states have the power to define and grant the rights of national "citizens," global governance institutions define and recognize the rights of transnational or regional social actors and their organizations.

³⁴ I discuss this in detail elsewhere (Kay 2004b).

That is, global governance institutions constitute them as “citizens of standing” in transnational adjudicative arenas. They do so by making and enforcing rules that establish transnational rights, standards, and norms. The NAALC, for example, codifies North American labor principles.

And finally, global governance institutions provide a formal political-institutional structure that makes rules and provides mechanisms for expressing and adjudicating grievances when rules are violated at the transnational level. Although the NAALC’s enforcement mechanisms are weak, the creation of transnational standards and norms is useful to labor activists whose grievances are legitimized at the transnational level. Moreover, by engaging the NAO process and collaborating on submissions, North American labor unions solidify their common interests. NAFTA’s stimulation of transnational labor relationships demonstrates that global governance institutions catalyze labor transnationalism by both galvanizing resistance to and providing venues for contesting the rules governing the global economy.

These findings have several implications for the study of transnational social movement emergence. First, they suggest that the literature on social movements and state building needs to be refined and extended to the transnational level. At the center of this analysis should be global governance institutions that create shifts in national and transnational political opportunity structures. As the FAT-UE-CUSWA case demonstrates, it was not changes in national political systems and institutions that stimulated this trilateral alliance, but rather, changes in the transnational arena. Moreover, it was not a change in an existing *national* political institution that created a shift in the North American political opportunity structure, but rather the introduction of new global governance institutions—NAFTA, the NAALC, the NAOs—that opened new political possibilities in the transnational sphere.³⁵

Second, this analysis demonstrates that processes of globalization need not undermine labor movements.³⁶ While leaders of the FAT, UE, and CUWSA unanimously criticize the NAALC for failing to provide sufficient remedies for labor rights violations in North America, they agree that by providing a new transnational political arena, the NAALC is quite valuable. That is, although they do not see the NAALC as an effective mechanism to eliminate labor abuses, they do see it as useful.

³⁵ It is plausible that labor transnationalism could also emerge as a result of significant changes in existing global governance institutions (such as the International Labour Organization) that encourage transnational collaboration and cooperation.

³⁶ For discussions of counterhegemonic globalization, see Carr (1999) and Evans (2000, 2005).

insofar as it gives them standing and legitimacy in a transnational arena and facilitates their continued cooperation. Thus, it is possible that as the transnational political opportunity structure develops, labor activists can build their capacity to take advantage of it, to amend their strategic repertoires, and to begin to shape how the rules governing the regional economy are made. This possibility may not have existed were it not for the initial contacts and relationships stimulated by NAFTA.

Finally, a case analysis of NAFTA and its transnational progeny offers much needed insight into the obstacles to labor transnationalism. A dearth of global governance institutions that have meaningful participatory mechanisms could explain a corresponding lack of transnational social movements, while the existence of the NAALC, a statelike global governance regime, explains transnational emergence. Excavating the mechanisms by which NAFTA and the NAALC stimulated labor transnationalism suggests that global governance institutions that grant legitimacy and provide mechanisms for expressing and redressing grievances when rules are violated, are critical to the development of transnational social movements. NAFTA serves these functions in North America, thus it galvanizes resistance to globalization processes in different ways than global governance institutions that lack these functions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and World Bank (WB). For example, popular resistance to WTO and WB policies is usually manifested in large transnational demonstrations precisely because these institutions have no public adjudicative processes that activists can engage. Activists cannot file complaints of labor rights violations with the WTO or WB, there is no transnational legal rights mechanism to engage. Indeed, activists' primary criticism of these institutions is their lack of transparency and democratic participatory processes.

This study indicates that future research that pursues negative and positive cases of labor transnationalism would be invaluable to our understanding of transnational social movement emergence. In addition, it would be useful to compare the effects of global governance institutions of long standing (such as the International Labour Organization, or ILO), with emergent transnational institutions (such as the NAALC) on transnational social movement development. The dimensions of transnational political opportunity structures and global governance institutions I identify as being the most salient to labor transnationalism provide a useful yardstick by which to measure other global governance institutions and their potential to serve as catalysts for various types of transnational social movements. It is probable that the role of transnational social movements poised to contest inequalities wrought by processes of globalization will only become more important as these processes proceed.

APPENDIX A

Methodology

Gauging the extent of the shift to labor transnationalism is extremely difficult because there exists no aggregate data on transnational labor relationships. Unions do not maintain records of their every contact and interaction with unions in other countries, and only large events and campaigns appear in union publications and documents. Moreover, because many unions do not have departments dedicated to managing international work, the reporting of that work in formal archived sources is not routinized and tends to be sporadic. And finally, international work is usually conducted by key actors in unions through informal mechanisms—there is little institutional memory regarding how relations emerged and developed. Determining the universe of unions involved in transnational relationships is therefore extremely problematic.

Building a sample of unions to examine required culling from a variety of sources and utilizing multiple methodologies. To build my sample, I first examined the newspapers of 15 key U.S. and Canadian union federations and industrial unions during a 15-year period (1985–99) to determine if articles that discussed labor transnationalism appeared.³⁷ Until 1992, no articles appeared in any of these union newspapers that revealed the existence of transnational relationships. Articles appeared that mentioned transnational contacts, usually meetings of high-level union leaders through international trade secretariats or other international bodies.³⁸ Articles also discussed various unions' support for Solidarity workers in Poland and for the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. After 1992, published articles mentioned transnational relationships among North American unions. These articles appeared in the newspapers of the UE, the CUSWA, the Communication Workers of America (CWA), and the Communications, Energy, and Paperworkers Union (CEP, Canada) detailing their nascent transnational relationships with Mexican unions.

To test this population of unions involved in transnational relationships, I compared it to a population of unions that participated in Mexico-U.S. Dialogos, convened in 1988 by David Brooks to bring together U.S. and

³⁷ This included 24 publications (due to changes in publication names over time, union mergers, and distinct series published in Canada). The publications were collected at Princeton University, the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Toronto, and at the archives of various unions and federations. While some issues were missing, the collections were relatively complete.

³⁸ Such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), etc.

Mexican activists (later, Canadians became involved)³⁹ to discuss the process of regional economic integration. Compared to the larger universe of North American unions, the unions that participated in Mexico-U S Dialogos meetings were directly affected by trade.⁴⁰ Meetings were held annually, beginning in Chicago in September 1988. From the roster of participants of all Mexico-U S Dialogos meetings, I compiled a list of national industrial unions that had transnational relationships prior to 1989. There were none. I then compiled a list of industrial unions from the roster that developed transnational relationships after 1989. The list included six unions. Combining the lists of unions culled from union newspapers and Mexico-U S Dialogos meetings created a population of eight unions/federations with transnational relationships after 1989: the AFL-CIO, CLC, UE, FAT, CUSWA, CWA, CEP, and STRM.

To further test this population, I consulted a variety of labor activists to identify unions that were engaged in transnational relationships after 1989. A small population emerged, and it matched the group that I had already identified by culling from union newspapers and rosters of Mexico-U S Dialogos meetings. It also included transnational relationships among the United Auto Workers, Canadian Auto Workers (CAW), and a FAT-affiliated auto union (STIMAHCS), and between the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE) in the United States and Canada, and a FAT-affiliated garment union.

The transnational relationships that emerged vary in their intensity. I therefore distinguish them as either fully or partially developed based on whether or not they meet the following six criteria: (1) a commitment to work together (usually in the form of a statement of cooperation), (2) the intention that the relationship be permanent and equitable, (3) participation of rank-and-file members, (4) ongoing contact and interaction (at least once every two months), (5) institutionalization, that is, permanent staff positions that facilitate the relationship between the organization and its members, (6) joint actions, for example, joint activities and actions to address mutual needs and interests. I categorize unions that meet at least three of these criteria as having a partially developed relationship. Unions that meet two or fewer criteria I categorize as having transnational contacts.

³⁹ In addition to unions, participants included NGOs (environmental, human rights, etc.), policy institutes, farmers' organizations, scholars, religious and advocacy organizations.

⁴⁰ Although industrial unions constituted the majority of union participants, unions representing public employees and service workers attended.

APPENDIX B

NAFTA and the NAALC

NAFTA's passage in 1993 culminated after a long and difficult battle among government representatives and advocacy groups in all three NAFTA countries.⁴¹ The fight to kill the free trade agreement not only brought together advocates of "ethical trade" within each nation, but also across North America (Evans 2002). These included transnational coalitions and networks of advocacy groups that had previously not cooperated, such as labor unions, farmers' groups, and environmental NGOs.

The coalitions succeeded in pressuring presidential candidate Bill Clinton to support and push for environmental and labor side agreements. These agreements were not incorporated into the text of NAFTA, but rather negotiated as supplemental parallel agreements. Convinced that NAFTA's passage by the U.S. Congress depended on the successful negotiation of side agreements, President Clinton and his trade representative Mickey Kantor began to negotiate with Mexican and Canadian representatives (Evans 2002). The U.S. and Canadian negotiators agreed that trade sanctions should be included in the labor side agreement. Mexican negotiators, however, refused to allow trade sanctions for all types of labor rights violations. Thus the agreement only allows trade sanctions in cases of child labor, minimum wage, and health and safety violations.

The final agreement, embodied in the NAALC, committed each of the three signatory countries to "*protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights*" while advancing regional market integration, enhancing North American firms, and creating new employment opportunities.⁴² But the NAALC emphatically states that the goal of protecting workers' rights and promoting improved working conditions will *not* be achieved by creating a supranational labor law. Article 42 specifically states that one party (i.e., signatory nation) may not enforce labor laws in another's territory.

The NAALC is a supplemental labor side agreement entered into force by three autonomous nation-states. It attempts to maintain each nation's sovereignty and autonomy by basing labor rights on national labor legislation rather than a supranational labor code. Under the NAALC, each nation must enforce its own domestic labor laws. This stipulation was created in order to deal with concerns over national sovereignty. Mexican officials worried that the U.S. government would dominate and dictate legal proceedings to their country's detriment. While the Canadian federal

⁴¹ See Evans (2002) for a discussion of NAFTA and "ethical trade advocacy."

⁴² "North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation." 1993. Text of the agreement. September 13. Found at <http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml>

government signed the NAALC, each province decided whether or not to sign onto the labor side agreement. Thus workers under the jurisdiction of the federal government (approximately 10% of the workforce)⁴³ and those in the four provinces that have ratified it—Alberta, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and Manitoba—are covered by the NAALC. Workers in Canada's other provinces are not.⁴⁴ The NAALC allows each nation discretion as to how its labor laws should be interpreted, enforced, and adjudicated. Thus, nation-states remain critical to the NAALC process and to the development of a transnational political action field on labor rights in North America.

Although the NAALC did not create a transnational labor law, it is transnational in scope because it established 11 "guiding principles" each signatory country agreed to promote: (1) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, (2) the right to bargain collectively, (3) the right to strike, (4) prohibition of forced labor, (5) labor protections for children and young persons, (6) minimum employment standards, (7) elimination of employment discrimination, (8) equal pay for women and men, (9) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, (10) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses, (11) protection of migrant workers. Complaints of labor rights violations are filed against a NAFTA country for failing to enforce its labor laws. They cannot be filed against an employer, company, or individual.

The NAALC created new adjudicatory venues and procedures for filing complaints alleging a signatory country failed to effectively enforce its labor laws related to one or more of the 11 labor principles. The Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC), is composed of a ministerial council (Council), and a secretariat. The Council serves as the governing body of the CLC and has ties to each party's federal government, specifically the department that handles labor matters.⁴⁵ The NAALC required each country's labor department (or its equivalent) to set up a national administrative office (NAO) to handle initial complaints of labor rights violations (referred to as submissions or public communications). The following organizational chart (fig. B1) illustrates the structure of the CLC.

⁴³ *Labor Relations Law in North America* (2000), p. 33.

⁴⁴ British Columbia, Ontario, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan declined. See Grayson (1995).

⁴⁵ The United States Department of Labor, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social).

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


FIG B1 —Organizational chart of the Commission for Labor Cooperation

There are three primary levels in the adjudicative process, and not all types of complaints can reach the highest level (1) ministerial consultations, which can be initiated based on an alleged failure to enforce labor laws associated with any of the eleven labor principles, (2) an evaluation committee of experts (ECE) can be convened if the alleged violation pertains to eight labor principles (excluding freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to strike), and (3) an arbitral panel can be invoked if the submission deals with labor protections for children and young persons, minimum wages, and/or prevention of occupational injuries or illnesses. Trade sanctions can only be levied at this level. In order for an ECE or an arbitral panel to be established, the matter must be both trade related and covered by mutually recognized labor laws. Table B1 details the 11 principles and their different levels of treatment in the NAALC process.

The NAALC does not specifically require that a submitter be a citizen or resident of the NAFTA country in which the submission is filed. The NAALC only states that a submission must be filed in a country other than the one in which the alleged labor law violation occurred. A guide prepared by the U.S. NAO states “Any person may file a submission with the U.S. NAO regarding labor law matters arising in the territory of another Party.”⁴⁶ Thus, for example, a citizen or group in any country may file a submission with the U.S. NAO. The only requirement is that

⁴⁶ “The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: A Guide.” U.S. National Administrative Office, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, U.S. Department of Labor. Accessed April 1998 (available at <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/naalcgd.htm#NAO>)

TABLE B1
NAALC LABOR PRINCIPLES AND LEVELS OF TREATMENT

Ministerial Consultations	Evaluation Committee of Experts	Arbitral Panel
Freedom of association and the right to organize		
The right to bargain collectively		
The right to strike		
Prohibition of forced labor	Prohibition of forced labor	
Labor protections for chil- dren and young persons	Labor protections for chil- dren and young persons	Labor protection for chil- dren and young persons
Minimum employment standards	Minimum employment standards	Minimum wages
Elimination of employment discrimination	Elimination of employment discrimination	
Equal pay for women and men	Equal pay for women and men	
Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses	Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses	Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses
Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses	Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses	
Protection of migrant workers	Protection of migrant workers	

the submission addresses labor law violations by Mexico or Canada. Moreover, a submitter need not be party to a particular case. As a NAALC publication clarifies, "Individuals, unions, employers, non-governmental organizations or other private parties may file submissions seeking NAO reviews in accordance with the domestic procedures established by the country's NAO."⁴⁷ Although the NAALC process does not require transnational cooperation on submissions, its procedural rule that requires submissions to be filed through an NAO in a country other than the one in which a labor violation occurred facilitates cooperation among North American labor unions. This procedural rule makes it extremely difficult for a union to file with a "foreign" NAO without the assistance of a "foreign" union.

Nation-States and Transnationalism

Although the role of the three nation-states is important to the adjudication of NAO public submissions, the three levels of treatment involve

⁴⁷ http://www.naalc.org/english/info/broch_7.htm

transnational adjudication (i.e., ministerial consultations, ECEs, and arbitral panels involve participants from each country). The primary power each NAO has in the public submission process is whether or not to accept a public submission, and whether it merits ministerial consultations. There is a high rate in both the acceptance of submissions and ministerial consultations. Of the 23 NAO submissions filed between 1994 and May 2001,⁴⁸ 18 were accepted for review, and 13 resulted in ministerial consultations. Once a submission is accepted and goes to ministerial consultations, the adjudicatory process becomes transnational. Ministerial consultations involve deliberations by the U.S. and Mexican Secretary of Labor and the Canadian Minister of Labour. ECE and arbitral panels include experts chosen by consensus by the three countries. Moreover, an arbitral panel must include experts from each country involved in a dispute. While the NAO process is not independent of North American nation-states, it would more accurately be described as embedded in a transnational process dependent on the collective and consensual will of three nations. Because the NAO process depends on the collective action of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican representatives, it is not subject to the individual whim of one nation. Thus, the politics of a particular country would have little effect on unions' choice of where to file an NAO submission. That decision would be driven primarily by the NAALC's procedural rules, which prohibit submitters from submitting a complaint to the NAO in the country in which the alleged labor rights violation occurred, but allow them to file multiple submissions. That is, submitters may file two submissions, one in each "foreign" NAO (as occurred with the Echlin case). The ability to file multiple submissions provides unions additional protection from political or other factors that could bias the adjudicatory process. Indeed, interview data reveal that unions' preference for filing submissions is primarily driven by transnational factors, in particular the existence of a viable counterpart in the "foreign" country to assist in the submission process.

NAFTA's negotiation and the NAALC process marked a significant shift in the institutional landscape governing trade and labor rights in North America. While the three nation-states maintained their sovereignty, they ceded some autonomy to a transnational process of labor rights adjudication. It is to this shift that labor unions responded by creating viable transnational relationships that spanned the continent for the first time in North American history.

⁴⁸ This is the period under study.

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A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Conversion to Venezuelan Evangelicalism: How Networks Matter¹

David Smilde
University of Georgia

While the influence of networks in conversion is among the most established findings in the sociology of religion, relatively little is known about how and why they have their influence. In this study the author finds the social conformity theorization most often used in network analysis important but incomplete. Network ties are frequently influential despite little or no direct contact between ego and alter and little or no motivation to conform. Similarly, "structural availability" works not only by freeing an actor from conformity-inducing constraints but also by indicating a relative absence of social and cultural support. This absence motivates individuals for religious innovation. Finally, while network location strongly determines who converts, the individual experience of life problems remains a causal factor, and, in a small but irreducible number of cases, actors clearly exercise agency over their network locations.

Why do people join new religious movements? Are they pushed by their problems or pulled by their social contacts? While conventional wisdom

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usually speaks in terms of the former, sociologists of religion have decisively opted for the latter. Indeed, recruitment through network ties is one of the most established findings in the sociology of religion (Lofland and Stark 1965, Stark and Bainbridge 1980, Stark 1996, Stark and Iannaccone 1997, Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980, Snow and Phillips 1980, Sherkat and Wilson 1995, Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1995, Mears and Ellison 2000, Nepstad and Smith 2001, Becker and Dhingra 2001). But what do networks do? The theory generally used by sociologists of religion is that of social psychological conformity (Marsden and Friedkin 1994, Festinger 1962). In this view, all humans have a fundamental need for social relationships, and they cultivate and conserve those relationships. Thus individuals adopt new cultural meanings and practices, such as those provided by new religious movements, not because of any inherent characteristics of the latter, but rather to the degree that they reduce dissonance in important relationships. "Conversion is not about seeking or embracing an ideology, it is about bringing one's religious behavior into alignment with that of one's friends and family members" (Stark 1996, pp. 16–17). Networks, then, are the real causes of conversion, and any "deprivations" addressed by the new religious beliefs and practices are better seen as emergent, *ex post* rationalizations, or, at best, general limiting conditions not very useful in causal explanation (see Stark and Finke 2000).

Religious conversion is a subset of recruitment to social movements, and similar formulations have been influential in studies of how persons join movements. Rather than looking at social psychological dispositions or individual motivations, scholars look at ties to movement members that mean an individual is more likely to be contacted and recruited (see Snow et al. [1980] for the seminal statement). But social movement scholars have increasingly taken issue with existing network approaches and are pushing toward reformulation. Critics have argued that it is unclear how or even why networks function. The late Roger Gould wrote that unless we have information to the contrary there is no reason to think a network tie between a social movement participator and a nonparticipator would lead to participation by the latter rather than nonparticipation by the former. "Unless they are strongly asymmetric, friendships, like marriages, are bilateral monopolies" such that any threat to the relationship would be felt equally by ego and alter and therefore be neutral in effect. Gould argued that we need to know more before attributing any causal significance to a network tie (Gould 2003, p. 244). Second, critics accuse network analysts of repeating errors past in portraying an "oversocialized" human being. Empirically driven, network research typically rests on a default conceptualization of human beings acted upon by networks rather than acting on them and through them. "Network analysis all too often

denies in practice the crucial notion that social structure, culture, and human agency presuppose one another, it either neglects or inadequately conceptualizes the crucial dimension of subjective meaning and motivation—including the normative commitments of actors—and thereby fails to show exactly how it is that intentional, creative human action serves in part to constitute those very social networks that so powerfully constrain actors in turn” (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, p. 1413, see also McAdam 2003, Gould 2003, McAdam and Paulsen 1993, Cook and Whitmeyer 1992)

Much of this criticism suggests that different research methods might advance our conceptual understanding. First, samples need to actually vary on the independent and dependent variables. Typically recruits are studied, they are seen to have networks, and these networks are accorded causal status. The possibility that there are others with the same network ties that did not participate or that the existence of conflicting ties could work against mobilization is not generally considered. “No doubt there are also many non-activists with ties to someone in the movement who did not participate, perhaps because salient others outside the movement put pressure on them to remain uninvolved” (McAdam 2003, p. 286). To actually establish the causal importance of network effects, participants and nonparticipants, as well as the existence of multiple networks need to be taken into account. Second, qualitative studies are needed to examine how network ties actually work. We know *that* networks matter, now it is time to understand *how* they matter (Diani 2003, pp. 2–3, see also Diani 2002, Mische 2003, McAdam 2003, Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Wellman 1988)

This article addresses these issues through a study of evangelical conversion in Venezuela. Using a sample of converts and nonconverts and a diversity-oriented methodology that combines the thick description of qualitative methods with the data reduction of quantitative methods, I find the social conformity theorization most often used in network analysis to be important but incomplete. Network ties frequently influence despite little or no direct contact between ego and alter and little or no motivation to conform. Similarly, “structural availability” works not only by freeing an actor from conformity-inducing constraints. It also indicates a relative absence of social and cultural support, which motivates individuals for religious innovation. Finally, while network location strongly determines who converts, the individual experience of life problems remains a causal factor, and, in a small but irreducible number of cases, actors clearly exercise agency over their network locations.

EVANGELICALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Evangelical Protestantism is the fastest growing religion in Latin America and arguably its most dynamic form of civil society.² Approximately 10% of the region's 400 million people are now evangelical Protestants (Freston 2001). Given the large role attributed to Protestantism in the historical rise of capitalism and democracy in the West (Weber 1958, Halévy 1924, Eisenstadt 1968) this growth has attracted considerable attention from social scientists (Martin 1990, Bastian 1994, Freston 2001). Venezuela was long an exception to this growth. But this has changed in the past 15 years with the dramatic decline of its petroleum-fed economy and state institutions as well as the diversification of its civil society (Smilde 2004). Approximately 5% of Venezuela's population is evangelical. However, this small percentage surprises many Venezuelans, as their social presence, in the form of street preaching and door-to-door evangelization, is much greater than their actual numbers would suggest.

The empirical material in this article comes from three years of participant observation with two evangelical churches whose membership draws primarily from the poor barrios that surround the Venezuelan capital of Caracas. Evangelicalism has developed in Venezuela primarily since World War II through a process of indigenization whereby members of churches founded by Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian missionaries branched off to create churches tending more toward Pentecostal theology and forms of worship (see Steigenga 2001, and Smith 1998). Evangelical churches generally have some sort of service every day of the week, and membership is considered an all-encompassing identity that should sharply distinguish the adherent from "the world." The defining characteristics of evangelical theology are beliefs in spirit possession and divine healing. However, these are not necessarily the most important characteristics of every church. Indeed in the churches I studied, more attention is paid to "perfectionism" the ability of believers to fulfill God's dictates and live a life of sainthood.

In the evangelical meaning system, one is either "in the way of the

² There is no easy solution to the terminological difficulties of studying non-Catholic Christianity in Latin America. At least two-thirds of Protestantism in Latin America is what in North America would be called Pentecostal. Latin American Pentecostals themselves do not dislike the term Pentecostal but generally refer to themselves as *Evangélicos*, to denote their professed prioritization of the Gospels, i.e., the first four books of the New Testament telling the story of Jesus, or *Cristianos* to denote their christocentrism and to imply that Catholics are not true Christians. Baptists and other historic Protestant denominations usually refer to themselves as evangelical as well. To complicate matters further, Catholic Latin Americans generally refer to all new religious movements as "evangelicals," while Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh Day Adventists do not use the term to refer to themselves. Here I will favor their self-definition.

Lord" (*en el camino del Señor*) or "in the world" (*en el mundo*) Being "in the world" one lives "in the flesh," freely engaging in sin, and preoccupies oneself with "worldly concerns", that is, material and status interests, rather than spiritual concerns, resulting in alienation from God Being "in the world" results in a spiritual void where God should be that is promptly filled by Satan "The Enemy" takes control of the unbeliever's life and uses that person to do evil, this Satan-driven existence leads to conflict, suffering, and pain for others and the sinner In addition, those outside God's path may be directly harmed by Satan or subjected to God's wrath if He decides to "claim His proper place " Being "in the way of the Lord," on the other hand, the believer lives "in the spirit," avoiding "sins" such as marital infidelity, smoking, gambling, conflict, cheating, and, most important, alcohol The believer must congregate with other Christians to praise the Lord and read the Bible, bring the word to those who "don't know the Lord," and engage in activities that continually renew and maintain the connection to God, such as prayer, vigil, and fasting When the Christian engages in these practices, God protects him or her from the devil, controls his or her life (either directly or by communicating his will to the individual), and blesses him or her, resulting in well-being, peace, and happiness (Smilde 1998)

As a sociological phenomena, the growth of Latin American evangelicalism is ripe for network analysis since existing explanations generally use "deprivation-congruence" explanations in which individuals convert because they seek to overcome problems Conversion is seen as a "cultural strategy" with which poor Latin Americans address the "pathogens of poverty" (Mariz 1994, Chestnut 1997, Burdick 1993, Martin 1990) Nevertheless, the problems that Latin American evangelicalism purportedly addresses—addictive behavior, violence, gender conflict, and unemployment—are much more widespread among Latin America's poor than among its evangelical membership, and as causal variables do not, therefore, successfully distinguish between those who convert and those who do not (see Stark and Bainbridge 1980)

Life History Interviews

I began my research by interviewing 55 men from the two churches I studied.³ My interviews aimed to understand the conditions that precip-

³ These interviews frequently led to discussion of intimate subjects Among these people in this context, this intimacy made my carrying them out with women a practical impossibility I therefore restricted my sample to men Only further study would reveal whether the dynamics revealed here function in the same way with women

itated conversion in each individual case.⁴ The central methodological challenge in working with life histories, of course, is to find a way to get at “the facts” in order to construct a causal account. Life history is not only a data collection method for social scientists, it is a medium through which social actors construct the self, and their narratives are necessarily partial and embellished. This leads many researchers to argue that you simply cannot use life histories to obtain objective facts, and can only treat them as cultural objects (see, e.g., Irvine 1999, Blee 2002). And the problem can only be worse in the case of religious conversion, since this experience often accentuates narrative reconstruction of biographies (Csordas 1994, Smilde 2003). In the case of Pentecostalism, for example, the “once was lost, but now am found” narrative structure could well lead to an exaggeration or even fabrication of problems in the respondent’s past, leading to an overestimation of their causal importance.

Nevertheless, while they are reinterpreted, reconstructed, and overlaid with meaning, biographical facts such as addiction, divorce, and household composition do exist, and causal accounts can be constructed if they are painstakingly uncovered. Furthermore, in most field settings, there are cultural tendencies that, if comprehended, can facilitate the sociologists’ task. Among the respondents studied here, there were two such characteristics. First, while these evangelicals indeed exert much energy reconstructing and reconfiguring their past, they also place a high premium on honesty in the sense that an exposed, outright lie would result in a tremendous loss of esteem. Distortions of the past, therefore, are usually produced through abstract scripted narratives that selectively omit specific facts, or strategically obfuscate sequences of events. My interview strategy focused on making this difficult by getting as concrete as possible. I did not ask them what caused them to convert, to tell me their life history, or what their life was like before their conversion. Rather, I guided respondents through the time period under study using a month-by-month event-history calendar to track 21 variables from three years before their conversion (or seven years before our interview in the case of nonconverts): religious participation, residence, education, employment, wife’s employ-

⁴ I agree with criticisms of the term “conversion” that say it generates expectations of a rapid and radical transformation that is rarely the case in individual religious change (Stark and Bainbridge 1987, Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). However, alternatives also stack the conceptual deck. “Affiliation” directs our attention away from belief and personal experience and toward organizational membership. “Recruitment” places agency with the organization or movement rather than the person who joins. The term “commitment” directs our attention to personal assent to the meaning system. Here I will simply use the term “conversion” (see operational definition in app. B) and rely on my substantive descriptions to make clear that radical change is not necessarily involved.

ment, nonreligious participatory organization, relationship, personal health, family health, death of friends or family, family evangelical contact, nonfamily evangelical contact, victim of crime, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, gambling, problems with police/law, betrayal by or loss of friends, financial problems, fear for safety, family problems (Freedman et al 1988) We would start with those aspects of life, such as residence and conjugal relationships, about which memory was most likely to be accurate Where memory faltered, I used temporal landmarks common to all, such as the riots in February 1989, the two coup attempts in 1992, the World Cup soccer tournaments of 1990 and 1994, or life events such as the birth of a child The clearing up of temporal ambiguity was the source of many modifications of personal history⁵

There was a second characteristic of cultural context that facilitated my task I found that the “once was lost” narrative had a competitor In what I call the “chosen by God” narrative, a respondent cultivates an image of having converted beyond any self-interest or intention when he was abruptly chosen by God This is a source of spiritual legitimacy just as powerful as the “once was lost” narrative As a result, I found no systematic bias It was just as common for me to find, by getting concrete, that a respondent had failed to mention an important life problem preceding conversion as it was to find that a respondent had exaggerated the role of a life problem

After collecting the evangelical life histories, I collected a control sample with 29 nonevangelical men from similar socioeconomic circumstances (see the appendix for sample characteristics)

Qualitative Comparative Analysis

To analyze this data I used “qualitative comparative analysis” (QCA) as developed by Charles Ragin (1987, 2000) QCA uses Boolean algebra to penetrate bodies of data that are not large enough for multivariate statistical analyses, yet are too large for simple eyeballing Yet it also facilitates the dialogue between ideas and evidence that is the strength of qualitative data analysis It works by presenting every possible combination of dichotomous independent variables in a truth table to see how these combinations line up with the dependent variable Independent

⁵ This methodological strategy closely resembles “objective hermeneutics” (Reichertz 2002) I disagree with Denzin’s (1989) view that such an approach necessarily conflates data, sociological texts, and subjects’ lives Misplaced concreteness is not the weakness of any one methodological approach, but a general pitfall that all sociological thinking needs to avoid I also disagree that it implies a linear view of biography As I will show in this article, it is precisely biographical facts that often help us demonstrate contingency despite respondents’ efforts to construct linear narratives

variables are tried and discarded, defined and redefined to increase fit. Focusing on contradictory cases, QCA amounts to a multi-iterated process of inference and updating. Its sensitivity to multiple causality well suits it to the task of this article. Rather than trying to find which variable wins the battle of main effects, QCA can portray multiple causal combinations including minority effects.

Not surprisingly, looking at the evangelical life histories in isolation seems to corroborate views of their conversions as caused by the experience of life problems.⁶ Fully 85% of the conversions to evangelicalism among my respondents were preceded by addictive behavior, involvement in violence, relationship problems, or problems of personal adjustment. These life problems and how they are addressed by evangelical practice and belief are briefly summarized in table 1.⁷ But the fact that these respondents appear to convert in order to address life problems does not mean these problems *explain* conversion. Other men with similar problems may address them in different ways or not address them at all. To figure out what factors can provide a causal account we need to include the sample of nonconverts.

To work with this life-history data in QCA, I segmented it into “spells” as used in event-history analysis (Allison 1984). A spell is a time segment whose duration is determined by unique combinations of the independent variables under review. In other words when any one of the independent variables changes, the old spell ends and the new spell begins. Of course, the duration of spells varies—in this study anywhere from one month to several years—and the total number of spells depends on which and how many independent variables you work with.

As QCA is a multi-iterated process of causal discovery that I can only partially present in an article of this length, I will briefly narrate the first several stages of this analysis and then pick it up in full.⁸ Since problem-solving behavior is the most commonly used explanation of conversion to evangelicalism in Latin America, I began by looking into cases in which conversion took place in the absence of problems. In all of these cases

⁶ I use “problems” instead of alternative terms often used in studies of conversion or social movement mobilization. “Deprivations” only makes sense from a structural functional perspective in which one can make sense of a baseline equilibrium of need fulfillment. This is rarely feasible and even less so in a cross-cultural study. Instead I view problems as a persisting sense of “dis-ease” in an individual’s experience (Chesnut 1997, see appendix for coding rules). “Complaints” makes most sense when there is an adversary that has authority over or responsibility for the problem in question. That is rarely the case with the problems described here.

⁷ For reasons of space, I cannot elaborate the pragmatist view of culture as a “strategy for dealing with situations,” that I use in this article (see Smilde 2003, in press).

⁸ I give a fuller quantitative account of these stages elsewhere (Smilde, in press, app C).

TABLE 1
PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY EVANGELICAL PRACTICE AND BELIEF

Problem	Description
Addictive behavior	Approximately 40% of evangelical respondents reported experiencing serious difficulties with addictive behavior—either alcohol, drugs, or gambling—when they became evangelical. Problems with addiction are resolved in a very direct way since drinking, taking drugs, and gambling are explicitly anathema to the evangelical lifestyle. Abstinence from them is seen as both a cause and an effect of being evangelical and tantamount to maintaining communion with God. And when one is in communion with God, evangelicals believe, God “takes control” of the person and keeps dangerous influences at bay. Beyond ideas, the substance abuser or gambler participates in a social group in which many people have had similar problems, in which there is a discourse of caring, and in which the meaning system is continually reaffirmed through discourse and ritual.
Violence	Approximately one-third of the evangelical respondents reported having experienced serious problems with violence, either as victim or victimizer, immediately before their conversion. Evangelicalism provides a socially recognized means of stepping out of the logic of violent conflict, a sense of protection to those who daily have to navigate violence-ridden contexts, as well as a vocabulary through which to implicitly or explicitly engage potential aggressors.
Social problems	A significant number of evangelical respondents had experienced important problems of a social nature immediately before their conversion, either in terms of male-female relationships, family relationships, or peer social life. Evangelicalism provides a vocabulary and discourse that can help resolve interpersonal problems related to questions of authority and trust. It can provide victims of the highly aggressive interpersonal atmosphere of Caracas’s popular sectors with an atmosphere of acceptance and support. And for individuals involved in problematic relationships, it can provide them with a vocabulary and sense of legitimacy in their interactions with their partners or family, regardless of whether these latter are themselves evangelical.
Personal development	A significant number of evangelical respondents had experienced economic difficulties, frustrated desires for personal growth, or recurring emotional difficulties immediately before their conversions. People in these situations find in evangelical discourse and the alternative social network it provides, a means to facilitate the personal change and development they seek.

the person lived with another evangelical I then combined these two explanatory variables and followed up the contradictions among those cases in which the respondent was experiencing a problem but did not live with an evangelical Looking at a number of different variables, I found here that whether or not the person was living with family of origin at the time was the one condition that distinguished, at a statistically significant level, between those who committed and those who did not It is with this three-variable model that I will pick up the analysis for more detailed presentation

Table 2 is a truth table of every combination of the three independent variables, the total number of cases in each combination, the number of conversions among these, the proportion this represents, and a judgment on the output value Comparing the proportion of conversions that occur in each causal combination to the overall proportion of .431, we get clear, statistically significant tendencies in all but one combination \sim PFE (men who are not experiencing life problems, live with their family of origin, live with an evangelical)

If, for the time being, we disregard the ambiguous row (Ragin 1987, pp 116–17) and reduce the truth table asking which combinations constitute *clear* causes of conversion, we get three causal combinations that can be used to guide qualitative analysis

Combination 1 \sim P \sim FE and P \sim FE can be reduced to \sim FE

Combination 2 P \sim F \sim E and P \sim FE can be reduced to P \sim F

Combination 3 P \sim FE and PFE can be reduced to PE

$$C = \sim FE + P \sim F + PE$$

Put substantively, conversion (C) results from spells in which men (1) do not live with family of origin and live with an evangelical (\sim FE) or (2) are experiencing life problems and do not live with family of origin (P \sim F) or (3) are experiencing life problems and live with an evangelical (PE) Preliminary analysis, then, shows that the experience of life problems is part of the story, but is neither sufficient nor necessary for conversion Rather, two variables fill out the picture by pointing toward a respondent's network position

In what follows, I will first look at the two network variables to try to gain a glimpse of how they function Then I will return to the issues surrounding the impact of life problems The goal is not to figure out which variable individually explains the most, but rather to see how they work together

TABLE 2
TRUTH TABLE OF COMBINATIONS OF LIFE PROBLEMS, LIVING WITH FAMILY OF ORIGIN,
AND LIVING WITH AN EVANGELICAL

P	F	E	Total	~C	C	Proportion of C	Output
~P	~F	~E	10	10	0	000**	~C
~P	~F	E	7	1	6	857*	C
~P	F	~E	30	30	0	000**	~C
~P	F	E	6	3	3	500	?
P	~F	~E	40	10	30	750**	C
P	~F	E	10	1	9	900**	C
P	F	~E	30	25	5	167**	~C
P	F	E	11	2	9	818**	C
			144	82	62	431	

NOTE —P = life problems, F = living with at least one member of family of origin, E = spatially present evangelical, C = conversion

* Binomial probability < .05

** Binomial probability < .01

THE MECHANICS OF INFLUENCE

Explanations resting on network influence are generally treated as *alternatives* to cultural explanations that focus on individual-level motivations. In their study of conversion to Mormonism, for example, Stark and Bainbridge (1980, p. 1378) use their network results to show that “rather than being drawn to the group because of the appeal of its ideology, people were drawn to the ideology because of their ties to the group.” Emirbayer and Goodwin argue that such views transform “the important theoretical distinction between a structure of social relations, on the one hand, and cultural formations, on the other, into an ontological dualism” (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, p. 1427). Here I will offer an interpretation in which networks as social structures and evangelical meanings and practices as cultural structures are analytically distinct yet frequently interrelated.

Conformity Effects

As mentioned above, the simple conformity model of network influence has been increasingly criticized. Clearly network influence happens. But we need more information to establish why it works in one direction rather than another (Gould 2003). We can begin by refraining from viewing network ties as direct transmitters of influence but rather as culturally constituted, frequently contested, sites of interaction (McAdam 2003, p. 290; Mische 2003; see also Sherkat and Wilson 1995). Within these sites of interaction, we will see situations in which network influence leads in the direction of evangelical participation because there is a clear asym-

metry of power or number, or because aspects of the evangelical meaning system interact with features of the interactions that take place

In a number of cases of conversion, network influence clearly occurred in an asymmetric social context. Teodoro returned to his family in the interior from military service to find that the majority of them had converted to evangelicalism and attended the evangelical church across the road from their home. They no longer would go to parties and social occasions with him. So when they invited him to attend a young adults' program at their church, he gladly went and ended up converting as well. When Pedro split up with his wife, the two members of his family that still lived in Caracas and on whom he had to rely were evangelical—having converted some time before. First he lived with his sister, then with his brother. In the latter setting, Pedro suffered a bout of depression that eventually led to his own conversion. He said this depression was caused in large part because of the fact that his brother would no longer drink and wrestle with him—a form of male bonding not uncommon in Venezuela. When he converted, his relationship with his sister and brother improved. When Gregorio moved to Caracas after losing his job in the interior, he moved in with four evangelicals he had previously met. They brought him to church with them, and his conversion process began. Finally, four of the conversions under network influence happened while the respondent was in jail. Venezuela's prisons are internationally infamous for violence, and these respondents quickly converted when they were assigned to a cell block that was predominantly evangelical. Jose Gregorio went through three cycles of converting and then discontinuing his practice as he was transferred between evangelical and nonevangelical cell blocks.⁹ While specific aspects of evangelical meanings or practices may have been important in any of these cases, the asymmetric social context was probably more important. In most of these cases one could imagine almost any subcultural meaning system functioning in a largely similar way.

A number of cases of network influence, however, present precisely the situation of bilateral monopoly that Gould problematizes. In five cases a respondent converted through spatial ties to a romantic interest. Juan Miguel came to Caracas after his life had fallen apart in his hometown in the interior. He soon met an evangelical woman whom he married. "I was unconverted when I married her and the Lord, through her, ministered to me. He 'tamed the lamb' as they say." Henry converted the very

⁹ While this makes it tempting to conclude that Jose Gregorio's conversions were expedient and therefore superficial, he continued with his evangelical participation after being released from jail, married an evangelical woman, and, several years later, became the youth pastor of one of the churches in which I conducted fieldwork.

same day that he began to live with the woman he would eventually marry. They had developed a friendship at the lunch counter where she worked. When she invited him to rent a room from her in her house—a common practice given the lack of affordable housing in Caracas—he immediately took her up on it. That same afternoon she invited him to a plaza service. “And that same Saturday there was a revival in the metro [subway station plaza] and she invited me ‘come on, let’s go so that you can see how nice it is.’ So I went and that’s where—She also invited me

to go up [to the altar call] she said ‘let’s go up front so that you can see how beautiful it is, let’s go see!’ She was the one who invited me to go up when they made the altar call.” Here we can ask Gould’s question: Why did the network tie lead the man to convert instead of the woman to discontinue her participation? Gould argues that, frequently, social movement participation in itself can provide additional value to the relationship, thereby outweighing the alternative of nonparticipation. In each of these five cases either the relationship was new or the couple was experiencing relationship problems. Given evangelicalism’s strong association with family and conjugal relationships among adherents (Brusco 1995, Smilde 1997), participation likely added value to these new or troubled ties.

There is another possibility for understanding how network influence occurs in cases of bilateral monopoly. Events and contingencies can revalue existing discourses and determine the direction they take and the symbolic elements that dominate (Ellingson 1995, Sahlins 1985). When an evangelical and a nonevangelical share living space, there is a continual potential for “interanimation”—the forced recognition of alternative, competing discourses (Mische and White 1998, Bakhtin 1981).¹⁰ In my fieldwork, evangelicals who lived with nonevangelicals tend to engage the latter in a low-intensity but persistent way by continually providing evangelical conceptualizations of the situations and dilemmas the nonevangelical confronts. This requires response from the nonevangelical, who develops a repertoire of ways to deflect the confrontation. The equilibrium is often broken when a moment of sickness, mishap, or misfortune arises that tips the interpretive balance of power toward the evangelizer, who inevitably provides an evangelical analysis of the nonevangelical’s misfortune. The meaning system gains life for the evangelized, and he assents to adopting that system (Brusco 1995).

Seven years after Juan Santiago and his wife married, they began at-

¹⁰ This is essentially the same process as “frame alignment” as developed by Snow and others (see, e.g., Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). Here I use the more general and flexible term “interanimation” as it seems more appropriate to this type of everyday interaction.

tending together one of the churches I studied. But while his wife went through indoctrination classes and baptism, his interest flagged. "She would say to me 'C'mon let's take this more seriously!' You can't take God lightly," Juan recounted. When, in the span of one month, he twice spent a couple of nights in jail for disputes with neighbors, he made a deal with God and became a participating member. "God calls us with love. But when we don't pay attention, he calls us in other ways. What happened was that I was implicated in a robbery and went to jail. After three days I spoke to the Lord and said 'If you get me out of here, it will be different.' That's what it took for me to actually accept Christ. He let me out under oath." In this case Juan's going to jail broke the standoff with his wife, and he indeed decided to "take God seriously."

The case of Darton and his wife's conversion while living with the latter's evangelical mother provides an even more striking example. Darton's mother-in-law continually tried to get them to convert to evangelicalism, and they would occasionally go to church with her. However, they never attended regularly until their child almost died from a respiratory problem. When he was revived after he stopped breathing, they viewed it as a miracle. And Darton's mother-in-law did not miss the opportunity to interpret the occurrence as a message from God.

- Q So after that happened, what did your mother-in-law say about it?
- A She wasn't surprised because she knows that God truly is a God of miracles. But she deplored us. [She said] it had happened to us because we were disobedient before God. Because we knew, We would always go and ask for prayers when she was pregnant [but] we didn't serve him. So she said that God did that so that we would understand that he really is a living God and that we weren't serving him—that perhaps he was calling us through our child since we weren't going [to church] on our own accord. He started calling us through our child.

The case of Eric is ostensibly similar, but differs in a way that will lead us into the next section. In it we will see direct interaction that only indirectly leads to conversion. Eric's years of conflict with his female partner peaked when her pregnancy ended in a stillbirth. This produced a tremendous amount of resentment toward Eric on her part, and guilt in Eric since, while she was pregnant, his wife had wanted to see a shamanistic healer to protect the child, and Eric had balked at the hefty fee. They both became evangelical shortly afterward and "learned" that he was not guilty of any misdeed since the healer represented a "false" religion. However, in the following we can see how this interpretation had already been transmitted to him from his Adventist sister.

- Q In the years from 1989 [beginning point for the life history], did you have contact with any family member who was evangelical, someone who would talk to you about the Gospel?
- A Yes, my sister
- Q Did she live in the same house as you?
- A She still lives in the same house as me!
- Q Has she been evangelical for a long time?
- A Oh yeah, since 1985 or so
- Q And what types of things did she say to you What types of things would you [two] talk about?
- A Well she would give me magazines, because she was [Seventh Day] Adventist Magazines about tobacco addiction, alcoholism, sexual diseases, she would give me magazines and would always invite me to her church I went with her once on a Saturday when they have their day of rest I went with her
- Q And when your child died, did she talk to you about that?
- A My sister? She wouldn't say anything because it had happened and that was that It died because the Lord We would always talk and we believed that if God had permitted it, it was because it [the baby] wasn't meant to be born

Eric's sister clearly had an important role in his conversion Nevertheless, it would be a stretch to represent this as Eric's attempt to achieve conformity with her Eric had lived with his sister for years before he became evangelical His parents were not evangelical, nor was his female partner Furthermore, he converts not to Adventism with his sister, but to Pentecostalism with a friend It seems clear that he was under no social pressure to convert in order to be on the same wavelength as a family member Eric's sister had transmitted religious meanings to him—including a reinterpretation of his child's death—that at a key crisis moment in his life brought him to think of religious innovation as a possible solution

Theoretically such contingencies can work with any cultural practice or discourse, however, Venezuelan evangelicalism seems especially adept at building on them Evangelicalism specializes in predicating precisely the types of misfortune lower-class Venezuelans are most likely to experience, and this fact, combined with the relative inattention by the mass media and popular culture, means that when such a misfortune occurs, it constitutes *prima facie* evidence for the validity of evangelical discourse Furthermore, while we know that actors frequently use highly general and ambiguous meanings to avoid an interanimation of competing or contradictory discourses that might undermine their network (Mische 2003, Ansell 1997, Padgett and Ansell 1993, McLean 1998), here we see the opposite In the cases of Juan Santiago, Darton, and Eric, the clear and unambiguous meanings of Venezuelan evangelicalism turn misfortune into an interanimation of conversion and foot-dragging discourses This

interanimation effectively highlights the opposition between spiritual choices to a degree that a decision becomes necessary

Vector Effects

Portraying network explanations as alternatives to cultural explanations leads to an overemphasis on conformity effects. In many of my cases, network influence either worked through direct interaction in which conformity was irrelevant, or it came through unilateral observation in which conformity was not at issue. Kenneth Burke (1989) wrote that the primary attribute of symbols is precisely that they provided an intersubjective vehicle in which sentiments, ideas, and discoveries could find a life beyond the experience or intentions of a single "genius." A spatially copresent evangelical provides a living bearer of meanings and practices that can be observed, considered, and tried on by a nonevangelical, regardless of whether there is direct interaction between ego and alter. In my data, such indirect effects fit into two general categories: modeling and ecological influence.

Modeling—In a number of cases the respondent became evangelical not through any apparent attempt to achieve network harmony, but through intimate spatial exposure to meanings and practices that came to make sense for his or her life at a critical juncture. This is frequently referred to as "behavioral contagion" (Marsden and Friedkin 1994). I refer to it as "modeling" because the idea of providing a good "witness" is an explicit part of evangelical thought. Evangelicals are enjoined to evangelize not only through direct interaction, but by behaving in exemplary ways and overtly "wearing their faith on their sleeve."

Bartolo, who converted in the midst of a crisis deriving from his life of violence and drugs, had one evangelical brother. When I asked him whether his brother had talked to him about evangelicalism before his conversion, he said he gave him Bible tracts once in a while but not much else. When I asked him why not, he said that not everybody was close with everybody else in his large family. He could count on this evangelical brother in times of necessity. "But in sharing and confiding with each other we weren't close. I was close with one brother, and he was with another. But we weren't close with each other like 'hey, try this.' No, that was rare. Lack of communication, I guess that's why." Nevertheless, when Bartolo reached a crisis point in his life, he had a rudimentary knowledge of evangelicalism that made it a possible solution.

An even more striking case is that of Ugeth. He converted as a result of a crack addiction that was undermining his relationship with his wife and children. During his problem period he lived in the same house with two brothers who had already converted a couple of years before because

of a similar drug problem. However, so problematic was his sibling relationship with them that he said they never once tried to evangelize him.

No, they didn't talk to me [about the Gospel]. One time I remember, I was consuming [drugs] in my room alone, they came in and instead of talking to me [about the Gospel] they started mocking me, throwing barbs at me. They would say "Are you going to keep on [consuming drugs]?" They didn't say "Christ loves you" or preach to me. They never called out to me.

Nevertheless, when he actually did convert, his brothers' example was important for him.

The Lord had manifested himself in them and pulled them out of where they were. Because they were terrible. One would rob in the street. The other would steal at home. But the Lord, I mean, Glory to God, I'll give their testimony. I involve them here in this interview because they were an inspiration for me, seeing how the Lord had rescued them from the things they would do. . . . and inspired, seeing everything that the Gospel was doing in the lives of those who were close to me, I realized that it was something supernatural, that it wasn't normal. And I said "Hey, I have to try this."

I noted with interest that while his conversion did get Ugeth over his crack addiction, it seemed to have little effect on his distant relationship with his brothers. While I knew the three of them, his brothers came to church and even sat together with their respective families in the pews. Ugeth had an entirely different circle of friends and sat elsewhere in the church. Ugeth clearly did not convert in order to conserve a relationship. Rather, his brothers' spatially present religious practice presented him with the chance to consider closely its appropriateness for his life.

Ecological effects —There are other mechanisms through which network influence can occur beyond social conformity. Alter's practice may change the conditions to which ego responds (Marsden and Friedkin 1994). Winklenman converted at age 18. Being a quiet, intellectual boy in one of the toughest, most violent neighborhoods in Caracas, he suffered severe problems of personal and social adjustment. As a boy, his mother separated from his father and began a new family. Because of acute conflict between his mother and stepfather, Winklenman frequently moved between his "more-or-less" evangelical mother's house and his evangelical grandmother's house. In his description his mother was engrossed in her new family and small children and paid little attention to him. Winklenman had no friends and would spend hours drawing or watching action movies on television. However his mother and grandmother would both put Christian radio on at home. Once he started to listen, Winklenman

was hooked. He would spend hours listening and even calling in to radio talk programs until he finally decided that becoming evangelical would solve his problems. He went to church with his grandmother a few times and then started to go to evangelical concerts and events that were advertised on the radio programs he listened to. In this case, Winklenman reports no attempts at evangelization by his mother or grandmother—indeed he eventually joined not his grandmother's church but the one he found with the most active youth program. Rather he worked through the possibility of religious innovation in engagement with his radio. "It's the Holy Spirit that ministers to you through the radio. So I would listen to the church programs that were on at 9 p.m. and that talked about Venezuela's problems, people's problems, and Christ's solutions, how glorious the Lord is, this and that about the Lord. With the testimonies I heard, I found that Christ was the solution."

Roberto Alfonzo lives in his own house built as an addition to his mother's house—a common arrangement in Venezuela's densely populated barrios. His brother and sister-in-law, who lived with Roberto Alfonzo's mother, converted to evangelicalism before he did. When I asked Roberto Alfonzo if his brother talked to him about the Gospel he said "Yeah, he talked to me about the Gospel. But not much. We come from a family where we respect each other a lot. When he'd go too far I'd say—in 'worldly' terms—'get lost' and he would stop immediately because there was personal respect in our family." Nevertheless, his brother and sister-in-law would have services in their home, and Roberto Alfonzo would listen. "They would have services in my Mother's house and my house is below hers. So when they had their services, I would listen. They would have the [sound] equipment turned on and you could hear it since there is just one wall that separates us."¹¹ These services piqued his interest and led him to buy a Bible to study. He "surrendered" in a plaza service that he visited by himself one day on his way home from work.

The point of the cases of Bartolo, Ugeth, Winklenman, and Roberto Alfonzo is not that spatially present evangelical family members were irrelevant, but rather *how* they were relevant. In these cases, as well as others, describing the mechanism as social conformity seems false to the phenomena. In none of these cases did the person appear preoccupied by coming into line with the beliefs of their spatially present evangelicals. Rather, either through modeling or by changing ecological conditions, spatially present evangelicals exposed these respondents to evangelical meanings and practices that came to make sense to them in their lives.

¹¹ It is customary for Venezuelan evangelicals to use sound amplification even when doing a service with only a handful of people in a small space precisely to get their message to others who might be interested but not attending the service.

In these data, such cases of indirect influence constitute a substantial minority of 11 of the 27 (40.7%) of cases of network influence

COUNTERVAILING NETWORKS AND STRUCTURAL AVAILABILITY

It is not entirely accurate to indict sociologists with ignoring countervailing networks (Diani 2002, McAdam 2003, McAdam and Paulsen 1993), as their *absence* has received significant attention virtually since the discipline's classic statements: Hobbes's (1652) "masterless men," Machiavelli's (1513) "adventurer-prince," Simmel's (1908) "stranger," and Durkheim's (1893) state of anomie all underlined the sociological importance of *freedom from* some or all network ties. Current social movements research addresses the absence of countervailing networks through the concept of "structural availability." In their seminal study Snow et al. (1980, p. 794) argued that individuals who are structurally available "can follow their interests and/or engage in exploratory behavior to a greater extent than individuals who are bound to existing lines of action" by their network obligations. Rodney Stark (1996) says that recruitment to a new religious movement occurs when the potential recruit has more significant ties to members of the movement than to nonmembers. This is a variant of the "control theory" of deviant behavior, which says that people generally do not deviate because they have "stakes in conformity." "Most of us conform in order to retain the good opinion of our friends and family. But some people lack such attachments. Their rates of deviance are much higher than are those of people with an abundance of attachments" (Stark and Finke 2000, pp. 117–18). In essence, the existing concept of structural availability amounts to a logical transposition of the conformity model of network influence. However, here as well, we will find important substantive aspects of structural availability that move us beyond the conformity model. In the first section of what follows I will use negative examples—cases in which network influence did not work as it normally does—to infer how spatially present family of origin enforces conformity and thereby prevents religious innovation. In the second section I will look at more substantive functions of networks by comparing the experience of men who confront life problems without spatially present family of origin, to men who confront problems with them.

Conformity

According to McAdam and Paulsen (1993), the most relevant network ties in studying social movement recruitment are those that an individual uses to sustain his or her identity. In Venezuela, these ties are most often

family ties While the Venezuelan family nucleus is often fatherless, people communicate, associate, collaborate, and simply spend time with members of their family of origin to a degree that citizens of the industrialized West would find difficult to imagine Children usually live with their parents until they form their own family or need to move for reasons of work or study If none of these occur, it is common for individuals to live with their parents well into their thirties or forties Furthermore, housing costs lead many to stay at home well after their first union is formed A parent's home is often considered the main inheritance for offspring, and it is common, after parents have died, for several brothers and sisters to live together in the home with their own families In Venezuelan society there is a moral expectation that individuals will support and defend their family of origin above and beyond any other social group or ideology In sum, family ties in Venezuela provide identity, belonging, and a web of social support

Venezuelans of the popular classes rarely object to evangelicalism as a threat to their Catholicism Rather, they object to the way evangelical practice breaks with the pragmatic, flexible, context-dependent, and personalistic morality characteristic of Venezuelan culture Fervent religious beliefs and rigorous adherence to ethical standards are occasionally admired as manifestations of a principled character But more commonly they are distrusted, viewed as antisocial, or seen as a signs of personal maladjustment A family member's becoming evangelical may be considered an embarrassment, a rebuke, or simply a loss For example, when Juan Betancourt returned to his hometown after converting in Caracas, his father broke down and cried because Juan would no longer drink with him Above we saw that one cause of the depression that preceded Pablo's conversion was the fact that his newly evangelical brother would no longer drink and wrestle with him

Such distancing is a powerful reason not to convert if there is valued and frequent rapport with nonevangelical family members Nevertheless, such processes are not easily uncovered In my life histories, converts rarely discussed the absence of pressures to conform during their conversion, and nonconverts rarely discussed pressure to conform as a reason not to convert Where these quiet and subtle effects are most visible is in the anomalous cases in which they did not work in their usual way and therefore broke to the surface of conscious interaction

Of the 60 cases in which young men lived with their nonevangelical families (rows PF~E and ~PF~E combined), there were only five conversions In four of them the respondent reported considerable conflict created by converting in such a context I had the following exchange with Henry

- Q* Since you became evangelical, has your relationship with your family changed?
- A* Yeah it's changed, but for the worse I mean there are more differences now because there is conflict because they want to separate me from my ideals
- Q* For example, what do they do?
- A* Yeah they always talk to me and say that the Gospel is for people with problems, who are crazy or whatever, that feel unsatisfied with themselves

Ernesto converted after his mother and father both died, leaving him to enter adulthood while living with his older brothers and sisters. When he converted they tried to prohibit him from participating "[They would tell me] that I was going to go crazy, that they were going to call the police and have them put me in the military. They would pressure me a lot to stop [participating]. One time they burned my Bible."

In these cases, instead of staying in the background, conformity-inducing pressures were exposed because conversion happened. But why did these pressures not prevent it in the first place? Upon examination, in four of the five cases, either one of the respondent's major problems was *with* family authority figures or the respondent was in some sense alienated from his family. Henry, for example, lived with his family and became evangelical after the rock-and-roll band he led and had heavily invested in broke up, and after he met an evangelical woman whom he found attractive. The context of all these issues was long-term family problems.

- Q* And how was your relationship with your family from the time you finished high school [the starting point for our interview] I mean did you get along well with them? Did you have conflicts with them?
- A* Yeah, the same conflicts continued
- Q* Yeah? Why? I mean, what were the "same conflicts"?
- A* I mean it was a sort of—I was sealed off in everything. I stayed in my shell and didn't give my family any space to enter. What I would do outside of the house my family knew nothing about. I was completely closed off.
- Q* Was that when you were in high school?
- A* Yes, I mean it was always that way.

The conflict with Henry's family stemmed not only from his late-night activity in rock-and-roll clubs, but also, as he put it, from his mother's continual "enmity" toward any girlfriend he might have. He described his usual reaction to his mother's rejection as greater attraction to the girl in question. We can assume then, that Henry's coexistence with his family was not an impediment to becoming evangelical when his new romantic relationship presented the opportunity.

Juan Zerpa's life began to fall apart when he quit his good job as a waiter in hopes of using his severance pay to go into business for himself. He never got around to launching his new endeavor, and before he knew it he was broke and unable to secure another good job. These economic problems undermined his identity as an efficacious male upon which his relationship with his girlfriend seemed to have been based, as well as his economic contribution to his impoverished family. When I followed up on his mention of conflict with his family, I was struck by the lack of rapport he felt.

- Q So did you already have family problems before you surrendered to the Gospel?
- A I did, but they didn't really come out since I would close myself off. They hadn't come out since I would come go to my room and shut the door, leave, come back and do the same. I don't have my own room, I share it with my brothers. But they didn't spend much time there. So I would come home and shut myself in my room. At that time I wasn't a Christian. I was unemployed but I had the Bible that the Lord had given me and from the beginning when all this began, from the beginning of my being unemployed, I began to read it.

What is clear in the cases of both Henry and Juan is that they did not have the type of rapport with their families that could have prevented their conversions.

Such a lack of rapport works the same way in evangelical households. The ambiguous row we previously set aside, ~PFE, appears to contradict what we would expect from everything that has been said so far regarding networks. If living with an evangelical (E), and living with family of origin (F), each constitute causally important sources of conformity, one would think that living with an evangelical family of origin would be doubly effective. Indeed in the three cases of conversion, the respondent converted shortly after family members converted. What happened in the other three cases? Venezuela is no different than the rest of the world insofar as young people frequently are at odds with their family or for some reason feel the need to individuate away from its influence. Two cases of nonconversion, Manuel and Pablo, demonstrate precisely this. Each of them grew up in evangelical homes and stopped participating in church in their teens. Each expressed that they had rebelled against something that had been forced upon them. Pablo, for example, grew up in an evangelical household and was forced to attend church with his mother. "It got to the point that I couldn't stand church anymore and the small part that I did like about it—the prayers—started to disgust me. So when I started high school it was like a liberation. The girls would say things like 'that's nerdy,' 'that's for adults, for old people,' 'that's boring.' So

they put those ideas in my head when I was already disliking it because of my mom's pressure. So I decided not to go anymore. I disobeyed my mother's orders and I stopped going."

It is extremely common for children in evangelical families to stop participating as young adults as a form of rebellion against their parents. Besides the cases of Manuel and Pablo, three more of the evangelical respondents in the sample were socialized in evangelical families, rejected it during adolescence or young adulthood, and then came back to it when confronted by serious life problems.¹² Certainly many such individuals never return to evangelical practice. Others do, especially when they confront life problems and recall meanings imparted to them in their religious socialization.

In sum, a spatially present family of origin exercises a strong conservative impact that works against cultural innovation. Men who live with nonevangelical families rarely convert even when they experience life problems, unless those problems are with the family or they lack rapport with family members. Similarly, men who live with evangelical families strongly tend toward conversion unless they have a lack of rapport with family members, most commonly their parents. This supports the view that men who did not live with their nonevangelical family members were left open to explore religious options.

Social and Cultural Support

Existing conceptualizations of structural availability rarely move beyond logical transposition of the conformity view of network influence. In this section I will show that spatially present families of origin not only enforce conformity, they provide important social and cultural support to their members that can help them navigate the problem situations they encounter. Conversely, those men who face problem situations without spatially present family of origin do not receive this support and are more likely to seek religious innovation. First I will relate some stories of the way young men not living with their families of origin experienced the problems that preceded their conversion. Then I will look at some young men who experienced problems while living with their family of origin. Both through absence and presence, we will see that family of origin helps young men confront problem situations by providing social support as well as helping them make meaning regarding these situations.

Whether a young man separates from his family of origin out of desire or necessity, being autonomous and self-sufficient can be an important

¹² Each of these respondents had already moved away from home and so converted from combination P~F~E.

aspect of self-esteem After Henrique finished his military service he did not return to the family home in the interior but stayed in Caracas working and living on his own After tiring of his job because of low salary and demanding working conditions, he quit before finding another He subsequently spent a year unemployed and ended up selling many of his possessions to get by He converted to evangelicalism at the tail end of his economic crisis as he went through a training program for a job at a bank I asked him if any friends or family would lend him money, and his answer demonstrated how he experienced financial independence “Well, family, I had one uncle here but I never went to him and told him about the situation because he lives in a place here in Caracas that is hard to get to I didn’t go frequently But sometimes I did go to, say, spend a weekend But I didn’t tell him about the problem openly I would just sort of swallow it and try to solve my problem some other way so that they wouldn’t see that I was in such a critical situation ” What is interesting about Henrique’s case is not only that he suffers problems of subsistence, but that he does not feel it appropriate to ask extended family for help, and does not even mention the possibility of asking friends or his spatially distant family of origin

Willian is an example of one of those who lives apart from his family of origin for economic necessity He lucidly describes the impact of this isolation in terms surely experienced by others He had explained to me that when he converted, he was “loaded with problems,” and I asked him what type He responded as follows

I had personal afflictions, moments of loneliness Those were tough times Being here [in Caracas] without your family is tough You tend to have economic problems I also had problems with sickness, moments of loneliness And sometimes you feel that there isn’t anyone who can talk to you to raise your spirits Because when you look at them [people you don’t know very well], they have more problems than you do So I couldn’t trust them, their advice I was always taught that my family was God, that my family would solve my problems And I got close to some people where I would have lunch I would eat lunch at an evangelical kiosk and was able to place my trust in them

Of course, it’s unlikely that Willian thought his “family was God” before he converted This is clearly an evangelical reconceptualization of what he did think before he converted that his family was his main resource for solving his problems What is interesting in Willian’s case is not just that he experienced the normal problems of a young man living on his own for the first time, but the emphasis he puts on not having anyone to talk to In effect, Willian did not have trusted interlocutors who could, through dialogue, help him make meaning of the situations he was going

through. When he came across such a satisfying interactive space in the form of an evangelical kiosk where he would eat lunch, he cultivated this network.

We can further circumscribe the phenomenon by looking at the support family provides to an individual facing life problems. These examples will be taken from cases in which a respondent experienced life problems, but was living with family of origin (PF~E). Two years prior to our interview, some neighborhood thugs shot Jose Luis. He was taking a spin on a friend's new motorcycle and rode past a group of guys gathered by the side of the road. One, whom he had met before, called him over. He stopped but, perceiving that their intentions were not good, took off again on the motorcycle. The one who called out to him pulled out a gun and opened fire. One bullet entered his thigh, another his buttock. However, he managed to stay on the motorcycle and get back home and then to a hospital. Recovering from his wounds, he was not out of danger. For in the institutional vacuum of Caracas's lower-class barrios, justice functions through the logic of vendetta. Having been shot by someone meant that others, including the victimizer, expected Jose Luis to seek revenge. And this in turn meant that Jose Luis was a prime target for a preemptive strike (Hardin 1995, Nisbett and Cohen 1996). This was the exact situation in which several of my evangelical respondents had converted. For example, an evangelical respondent named Ramiro was involved in a months' long vendetta chain in the same neighborhood which left seven people dead and several others in jail. "The situation got so bad that I converted to the Gospel," he told me. Jose Luis, however, was able to resist involvement in vendetta. In the following exchange, we can get a sense of the role played by his strong family life.

After I was shot, I was afraid that he [his assailant] would—I thought he was going to think that I was going to do something bad to him, I mean seek revenge. And I never at any time thought about revenge because I'm not part of that malicious environment.

Q So you thought that he thought that?

A Yeah, I mean the day after I was shot, I was sitting in the door [of my house] and he walked by and had his gun on him.

Q How did you know he had his gun on him?

A Because he had it hanging out of his back pocket and he stared at me. My Dad was there next to me.

Q And you were in your house?

A Yeah, I was right in the door. We had the door open.

Q Oh, okay, and nobody said to you that you had to fix things, that you had to seek revenge or anything like that?

A Well my brother thought about doing something to the guy. The [brother] who is away.

Q The one who is Mormon now?

A Yeah, exactly. With Frank, you know Frank [a neighbor also inter-

viewed for this study] They thought about doing something and I said no, to leave it at that, that people would think it was me since the only one who had problems with him in that sector was me

Q And what about people in the barrio Didn't they laugh at you I mean saying that you didn't make him pay?

A Yeah, a lot of people said, "Man, you're a loser You should have done something to him You should have done something " But I thought no, that that would just put more wood on the fire

Q And what did your family say?

A No, my Moth what they did was advise me to leave it at that, let it die out

In the case of Jose Luis, the avenues open to him were (1) seek revenge at risk of continuing the vendetta, (2) opt out of the logic by becoming evangelical as Ramiro did, or (3) let it peter out at the risk of falling to a preemptive strike and with the assurance of a loss of esteem among others in the barrio As Jose Luis tells the story, he took the last option If this is true, it is clear that the influence of his family encouraged this solution But it is interesting that he mentions that his brother wanted to seek revenge Previously in the interview he mentioned both that his victimizer was no longer around and that his brother had become Mormon and moved to Utah It could well be that his brother sought revenge and then converted to Mormonism in the aftermath of guilt and fear But in either case, Jose Luis's story provides a nice example of how the material and cultural support of a spatially present family of origin helps individuals navigate problem situations and how that support precludes the need for network innovation Had Jose Luis lived without his family of origin, he most likely would have taken a more open role in the vendetta or become evangelical

Aurelio is a 40-year-old man living in his parents' house Two years before our interview, he began to organize residents to close off their sector of the barrio with locked gates to which only the residents would have keys This is one of a number of ways that residents of Venezuela's barrios have found to reduce crime and violence However, the prospect of gates often causes conflict with those who—usually involved in the drug economy—benefit from disorganization And neighborhood organizers are frequently the targets of violence Indeed in Aurelio's barrio just three years earlier, a neighborhood activist had been brutally murdered in the middle of the night by hooded gunmen With this in mind, Aurelio was reluctant about the leadership role he had taken in this tense process He expressed resentment at his neighbors for what happened when some of his opponents tried to intimidate him through violence The story reveals the strength of familial versus extrafamilial ties "Because it's happened to me! I put the gates up and I had a problem with one of the

families So they brought a *malandro* [gangbanger] to fuck me up and I ended up letting *him* have it because I have a lot of family too! Who defended me? My family What everyone else did was wash their hands [of the problem] Everyone ran into their houses to hide and watch the fight ”

In the data presented here, “stakes in conformity” work against religious innovation not only because of the desire to correspond with significant others and maintain their good opinion These significant others also provide important social support as well as help in making meaning regarding a problem situation Those young men who do not live with their family of origin not only have more freedom to innovate, they are more likely to have more motivation to innovate, since they are left to their own devices when confronting a problem situation None of this should surprise, as a large part of the literature on the positive effects of religious practice on psychological and physical health focuses on social support networks (Fraser 2002, Foley, McCarthy, and Chaves 2001, Ebaugh and Pipes 2001, Ellison 1997, Bankston and Zhou 1996, Haines, Hurlbert, and Beggs 1996), as does an important tradition in community studies (Walker, Wasserman, and Wellman 1994, Wellman 1982, Silveira and Allebeck 2001, Warren, Thompson, and Saegert 2001) However, this support function rarely figures in studies of conversion because of a lack of sustained attention to countervailing networks

PROBLEMS, AGENCY, AND PURPOSES

The strong program in network analysis seeks to explain sociological phenomena by focusing on patterns of social relations—that is, social structure—and regards attributes of individuals such as their problems, agency, and purposes as spuriously significant (see Emirbayer and Goodwin [1994] for a review of this position) Nevertheless, as argued in the introduction, scholars have persuasively argued that this tendency reifies the structure—agency dyad, ignoring more dynamic conceptualizations of social structure by Giddens (1979), Bourdieu (1977), and others (e.g., Sewell 1992, Emirbayer and Mische 1998) There are a couple of overlapping but distinct issues involved in the desire to bring actors back into network explanations In this section I will look at the roles of problems, agency, and purposes

Problems —In the data analyzed here, the significance of the two network variables just reviewed provides strong support for structural approaches Nevertheless, the individual experience of life problems (P) stubbornly stays in the equation (see table 2) Even if we were to code the output of ambiguous combination ~PFE as conversion, the causal sig-

nificance of life problems would remain. While "living with an evangelical" (E) would become a sufficient condition, "not living with family of origin" ($\sim F$) would still need to combine with P to cause conversion.

But it is still possible to question the causal importance of problems. QCA is oriented toward diversity and counts all causal relationships with the same output as equal no matter their numeric frequency. Thus the reason P does not drop out of the equation describing conversion is the very clear, but not terribly common, tendency for combination $\sim P \sim F \sim E$ not to lead to conversion, $\sim P \sim F \sim E$ describes only 10 cases. Of the 50 total cases in which a man does not live with family of origin and does not live with an evangelical ($\sim F \sim E$), 40 experience problems. Indeed combination $P \sim F \sim E$ accounts for close to half of the conversions in the entire sample. We could hypothesize that while $\sim F$ is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause of P, there could well be a *strong tendency* for $\sim F$ to cause P. If this were the case, problems would still not be spurious, for without them $\sim F$ does not lead to conversion. But P would look more like a mediating variable. From this perspective, problems could be seen as a function of structural availability and therefore not as causally important as we previously thought. A simple cross-tabulation of all cases according to whether they were living with family of origin and whether they experienced life problems indeed shows a statistically significant relationship (see table 3).

But, of course, correlation does not establish direction of causation, and there is another possibility. It is normally assumed that structural availability is the product of happenstance or at least issues irrelevant to the outcome of interest. So, for example, Snow et al. (1980) use the example of a 25-year-old male whose luggage was lost on his flight to Los Angeles and who wound up living on the streets. This contingent misfortune left him open and receptive to recruitment to a religious movement. In most of my cases, structural availability was indeed caused by life course characteristics or contingencies. However, it should come as no surprise that, frequently, structural availability was *itself* caused by a problem involved in the conversion project. Below we will see how Lenin moved away from his family of origin because of inconformity and conflict. Alberto, Jhonny, and Melvin all lived on the street as a result of their involvement in drugs and crime. In other cases, the respondent had been thrown out of the family home. Martín's mother forced him and his wife to leave because of their incessant, frequently violent fighting. Ernesto's mother threw him out of the house when she believed neighbors who implicated him in a murder, rather than his proclamations of innocence. Jose Gregorio became structurally available when going to jail meant he was forced to be away from his mother's home. In 15 of the 50 cases of $P \sim F$, it was the problem that would eventually lead to conversion that itself caused structural

TABLE 3
CROSS-TABULATION OF THE EXPERIENCE OF LIFE
PROBLEMS WHILE NOT LIVING WITH FAMILY OF
ORIGIN

	F	~F	Total
P	41	50	91
~P	36	17	53
Total	77	67	144

NOTE $-\chi^2 = 7.04$ ($P \leq .01$), P = experience of life problems,
F = living with family of origin

availability. If I exclude these cases from the sample in order to simply compare cases in which life problems clearly arise and are experienced while living *with* family of origin with cases in which life problems clearly arise and are experienced while living *apart from* family of origin,¹³ I can demonstrate that the connection does not meet generally accepted standards of significance for a sample of this size (see table 4). This finding leads to the conclusion that ~F is causally important not because it causes P but because of what happens when P occurs. It also provides some sociological content to the common belief that an individual must “hit bottom” before getting serious about overcoming an addiction or other problem of the self (Irvine 1999, pp. 56–57). In these data “hitting bottom” often amounted to an individual losing his or her most valued social relationships, which in turn simultaneously left them to their own problem-solving devices and freed them up for innovation.

Agency and purposes—The most fundamental difference between structural and voluntaristic approaches to social action is precisely that the former takes into account the unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action (Giddens 1979, p. 59). Structural explanations focus on the notion that actors do not usually know why they do what they do and do not fully understand the consequences their action will produce. So trying to demonstrate agency by focusing on William’s case (he found some evangelicals to talk to at a lunch kiosk and cultivated the network) or the case of Juan Zerpa (he was too broke to take the bus, so he walked miles from his home to a plaza where he knew evangelicals were preaching), would miss the mark. Structural approaches do not deny that actors experience agency in what they do, nor that they can provide agentive stories about what agents have done. Rather these approaches argue that these “vocabularies of motive” are spurious because the real

¹³ An alternative strategy would be to recode these cases as living with family of origin which would reduce the significance even further. However this would become substantively unintelligible in cases like that of Jose Angel, who was in jail.

TABLE 4
CROSS-TABULATION OF THE EXPERIENCE OF LIFE
PROBLEMS WHILE NOT LIVING WITH FAMILY OF
ORIGIN, EXCLUDING CASES IN WHICH P CAUSED ~F

	F	~F	Total
P	41	35	76
~P	36	17	52
Total	77	52	129

NOTE — $\chi^2 = 2.54$, P = experience of life problems, F = living with family of origin. For all coefficients, $P \leq .20$.

causes work behind actors' backs (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Burt 1986). It is understandable from this perspective, then, that the desire to bring agency into network explanations looks like wanting to have your cake and eat it too.

However, there are two possible responses to this view. First, in contemporary theorizations, agency does not imply an integral relationship between intentions and consequences. Anthony Giddens defines agency as "the stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world," which is not confined to the intended consequences of an actor's action (Giddens 1976, p. 77, see also Sewell 1992, Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Defined in these terms, the data show that in 61% of cases of conversion in which either E or $\sim F$ was causally effective, we can see respondents' agency in the construction of their network location (see table 5). In the great majority of the cases of $\sim F$, the respondent had intentionally moved away from his family due to life course considerations: either he had gotten married and was able to move out, or he had moved from the interior for employment reasons. In contrast, most cases of E were not intentionally brought about—the respondent lived with a spatially copresent evangelical not by choice but because that was his family of origin or because the evangelical in question converted after the respondent had joined the household. However, there were 10 cases in which the person intentionally moved into a household with an evangelical resident. Agency, thus defined, is quite compatible with the traditional network program. For networks to be key causal characteristics of social phenomena, it is not necessary that they be uncaused, or even that they be uncaused by the actors that eventually are constrained by them. Rather, the core claim is that they have important effects that function beyond (even contrary to) the conscious interests and intentions of actors. In effect, an actor switches on the light to illuminate the room and unintentionally alerts the prowler (Giddens 1976, p. 77).

A second, more direct challenge to the exclusion of agency in network

TABLE 5
AGENCY IN CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORK LOCATIONS

	Intentional	Not Intentional	Total
Not living with family of origin (~F)	34	11	45
Living with an evangelical (E)	10	17	27
Total	44	28	72

explanations would be a purposive account in which there *is* an integral relationship between intentions and consequences—the actor switches on the light to illuminate the room *in order to* alert the prowler. In other words, a more direct challenge would be an empirical demonstration of action in which agents not only intentionally create network locations, they do so because they perceive potential network effects. To inquire into this possibility, I looked at the 44 cases in which the respondent intentionally created the network location to see if this agency was an integral part of the same project of change that resulted in conversion. In seven cases I found evidence of such a process (see table 6).

Gregorio converted while living away from family of origin and with a group of evangelical men (~FE). However, he actively sought these conditions as part of a project of change. Two problems were affecting his life before his conversion. First he had long suffered bouts of depression, and second he had just lost his job. While living at home with his family he became familiar with evangelicalism through a revival and even had a religious experience. Nevertheless, while he was interested, he did not participate in a church. He did meet a number of evangelicals from Caracas, and they invited him to stay with them if he ever came their way. Indeed he was already considering moving to the capital to launch a music career. When he did, he looked up his evangelical friends, and they found him a place to stay with several other evangelicals. He immediately began to attend church with them. When his music career sputtered, he put all of his energies into this evangelical church. In this case, moving away from family of origin to Caracas to live with some evangelicals and pursue a music career were all part of a project of change, a new start that eventually led to religious conversion.

When Jose Gregorio went to prison for a cocaine binge that involved a car theft and a shoot-out with police, he was assigned, beyond any intention of his own, to an evangelical-controlled cell block. There he converted within several weeks of arriving. However, some months later he developed an attraction to a woman who frequently visited another inmate on weekends. When that inmate changed to a nonevangelical cell

TABLE 6
PURPOSIVE ACTION IN CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORK LOCATIONS

	INTENTIONAL		TOTAL
	Not Integral	Integral	
Not living with family of origin (~F)	31	3	34
Living with an evangelical (E)	6	4	10
Total	37	7	44

block, Jose Gregorio changed along with him and promptly discontinued his religious practice. However, when the relationship with the woman did not lead anywhere, he intentionally moved back to the evangelical cell block in order to recover his evangelical participation. "The Devil tricked me and that girl got me to leave. She trapped me—I mean she captured me and I decided to change cellblocks, in order to maintain contact with her. And when I changed cellblocks and left the Gospel, she didn't visit the jail anymore. So she was an instrument intended to derail me. But I understood, and I went back."

Lenin speaks, dresses, and carries himself with moderation and care. His manner and appearance belie his humble origins and tough upbringing. While he has always been close to his mother, he has experienced serious problems with his two younger brothers. When Lenin and I discussed the nature of this conflict, he emphasized that, like his father, his brothers would drink at home, did not respect him or his mother, and behaved violently. He finally moved out in August 1995 because of his frustration at not being able to deal with them effectively. "The situation got so bad that I decided to just leave and not have to see it. My anger would consume me." During the three months he was away from his mother's house he lived in three different locations. At the end of the first month, Lenin "surrendered" to the Lord and began indoctrination classes in one of the churches I participated in. As he studied the Bible he focused on verses that said he should not harbor anger toward others. This led him to visit home in September and converse with his brothers to resolve his issues with them. In October he returned to his mother's house as an evangelical, continuing his participation until he was baptized in December. In Lenin's case, acute family conflict and the ire it produced in him led him to leave home. Being away from home gave Lenin the opportunity to reflect and to address this issue, among others. By the time he returned home he had been able to gain a familiarity with and confidence in the new meaning system and use it to confront his problem.

These are cases in which network location ends up looking like a mediating variable between individual motivations and conversion. It clearly

has a causal impact, but the respondents themselves created that impact as part of a conscious project of change. The respondents did not necessarily see that a change in network location would lead to conversion in particular. But they did correctly perceive that, in more general terms, it would facilitate a project of change. While this is a clear challenge to structural approaches that oppose the network project to voluntaristic explanations, it should be underlined that this happened in less than 10% of conversions (7 of 72) related to networks. In more than 90% of cases there was no integral relationship between actors' intentions and network effects.

CONCLUSION

As this article uses a diversity-oriented methodology designed to probe beyond main effects, the findings have been multiple. Therefore they merit brief recapitulation.

Problems —In contrast to dominant portrayals of conversion to evangelicalism in Latin America, and consistent with contemporary sociological explanations of conversion, the life problems experienced by respondents were neither necessary nor sufficient causes of religious conversion.

Network influence —(a) Direct effects functioning through social conformity are central in this data analysis. In most cases, such conformity works because of an asymmetric relational context. In other cases it appears to work because it adds value to new or troubled romantic relationships, or because a contingent misfortune tips the interpretive equilibrium between ego and alter. (b) However, there is a significant minority of cases of network influence that did not fit this portrayal. These indirect effects worked through modeling or ecological influences, which in turn underline the autonomy and mobility of meaning and practices.

Structural availability —(a) The data reveal that young men who live with their family of origin face significant conflict when they convert. Such countervailing networks, then, likely play an important conformity-inducing role. (b) However, there are important substantive aspects of structural availability that move us beyond the conformity model. Comparing the experience of men who confront life problems without spatially present families of origin to men who confront problems with them, we saw the important social and cultural support that likely reduces motivation for religious innovation.

Problems, agency, and purposes —(a) While problems are neither necessary nor sufficient causes of conversion, their causal role does not disappear. They are not a simple function of structural availability. Indeed they are highly correlated with structural availability precisely because

they often *result in* structural availability when addiction, violence, or inconformity creates conflict in the home (b) Agency in the broadest sense is evident in the majority of cases of conversion in which network locations were in play In most cases, actors had a hand in creating the network locations that then constrained their action (c) Agency in the more narrow sense of purposive action integrally related to the eventual effect of the network location was also evident in a small minority of cases

This analysis, of course, is confined to understanding conversion to Pentecostalism among Venezuelan men, as the substantive dynamics I describe will likely vary according to social, cultural, gender, or religious contexts However, the theoretical and methodological directions taken can provide orientation for future study Existing biases in network explanations are not without foundation In most cases, social conformity is indeed the mechanism that underlies network influence as well as structural availability, and in general, structural determination trumps actors' purposive behavior Nevertheless, moving beyond main effects to a focus on causal diversity demonstrates irreducible divergences from these emphases Networks work not only through conformity, they work through the transportability of meaning Lack of networks not only creates freedom, it creates needs that make religious innovation more appealing Finally, while in most cases networks constrain actors, actors actively create network positions and, in a small number of cases, clearly perceive the same consequences sociologists do This portrait does not muddy the waters of the network project, it puts it on footing more consistent with contemporary theorizations of social structure These grant structure causal primacy but simply see it as the crystallization of human actions which, at any subsequent moment, can constrain or be affected by further human action (Bourdieu 1977, Giddens 1979, Sewell 1992, Emirbayer and Mische 1998)

APPENDIX A

Characteristics of the Sample

The evangelical sample ($N = 55$) represents a complete sample of men between the ages of 18 and 45 from two churches (see table A1) Response rate was greater than 90% The nonevangelical interviewees ($N = 29$) came from a door-to-door sample of men living in residential sectors selected to be comparable to the evangelical sample in terms of social class These four sectors were selected using a map created by the Centro de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales that zones Caracas into over 700 sectors defined by social class Response rate was better than 65%

TABLE A1
MEANS AND SDs OF SOCIAL CLASS SCORE FOR EVANGELICAL
AND NONEVANGELICAL SAMPLES

Variable	Mean	SD	Cases
Entire sample	6.84	1.97	75
Nonevangelical	6.78	1.97	27
Evangelical	6.88	1.99	48

NOTE.—Total cases = 84, missing cases = 9 (10.7%)

APPENDIX B

Coding Rules

I coded each of the 84 life-history interviews according to three causal conditions—life problems, whether or not they lived with an evangelical, and whether or not they lived with family of origin—as well as the outcome variable of conversion. In the following I provide the coding rules I used.

Life problems—I coded as problematic those extensions of time during which the respondent told of having one or more problems that threatened valued aspects of the person's existence (such as family relationships, work or financial stability, or personal safety) or that impeded aspects of his existence that the person considered basic and important (such as coming to form a family or basic social interaction with peers). For example, a respondent that told of occasionally or frequently drinking more than he would like in a certain period but who did not tell convincing stories of how this jeopardized his health, marriage, work, or other important aspect of life, was not coded as having a problem. If, on the other hand, the person told of the ramifications this had in, say, jeopardizing his marriage or his work, I coded it as a problem.

Living with an evangelical—I coded a period in the respondent's life history as living with an evangelical when he lived with one or more individuals who were participating evangelicals at the time. In two of the 34 cases this was a religion other than evangelicalism. I felt justified in this coding decision because they clearly functioned as equivalents. In the case of Eric, his sister was a member of a Seventh Day Adventist church. While this religion is rejected as "erroneous" by some evangelicals, others accept them because they do not reject the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. In the case of Eric, his sister provided a key stimulus to his conversion by giving religious meaning to the stillbirth of his child that relieved him from guilt. Eric converted to evangelicalism but carried this same meaning with him. Agustín lived for a period of time with his mother and his sister, who were members of *Sana Doctrina*, a religion similar to evan-

gelicalism in its emphasis on perfectionism and millennialism and its belief in the Holy Spirit, but which simply does not emphasize spirit possession like evangelicalism. When Agustín converted again, it was during a home service that his mother had organized with members of her church. Nevertheless, he reinitiated his participation in the evangelical church where he previously was a member. It is worth pointing out that this analytical move provides a case that contradicts the analysis provided here (Agustín) as well as a case that supports it (Eric).

Living with family of origin — I coded a period of time as “living with family of origin” when the respondent lived with one or more members of the family nucleus with which he grew up. I expanded this criterion by including those who lived within 50 feet of their family of origin. Among the popular classes in Venezuela, it is very common for parents to help their children by permitting them to build on top of or next to their home. As a result of this expansion five cases were recoded (three had built on top of or adjacent to their parents’ homes, and two lived in homes within 50 feet of their parents’ homes). Each of these cases increase fit with the model provided here. But I think the modification clearly fits with the substantive dynamics described. In one case the family of origin was other than the person’s biological nuclear family. Teodoro converted while living with his aunt and cousins with whom he had grown up. Indeed, he talked of this period as “living at home.” Only later did it come out that they were not his biological family of origin. In any case, this does not effect the conclusions provided here since he was living with an evangelical. I coded as not living with family of origin the four cases provided by Jhonny and Melvin despite their “officially” living at home. Three of these cases support the analysis (the two from Jhonny and one of Melvin’s), while one contradicts it (one from Melvin). This analytic decision is justified insofar as each of them were heavily involved in drugs and petty crime and slept in the street, in flophouses, or in friends’ places, only coming home occasionally to “crash,” get some sleep, and clean up. Each of them described these periods of their lives as living “in the street.”

Conversion — I coded a respondent as having converted to evangelicalism if he not only “accepted the Lord” but also followed that action with sustained participation in an evangelical church. Thus I did not count as conversion those often-repeated cases in which the person “accepted the Lord” in a service or as a result of evangelization but did not follow it up with participation. I did not require the person to have been baptized since it often takes months or even years for the person to complete the indoctrination classes and reach the point at which the pastor decides he or she is ready.

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Denomination, Religious Context, and Suicide: Neo-Durkheimian Multilevel Explanations Tested with Individual and Contextual Data¹

Frank van Tubergen
Utrecht University

Manfred te Grotenhuis and Wout Ultee
Nijmegen University

In *Suicide*, Durkheim found that involvement in religious communities is inversely related to suicide risk. In this article, two explanations for this relationship are examined. One is that religious networks provide support. The other is that religious communities prohibit suicide. To examine these hypotheses, individual-level data on suicide in the Netherlands from 1936 to 1973 are used. The results show that with an increase in the proportion of religious persons in a municipality, the chances of committing suicide decrease for every denomination in that municipality, as well as among nonchurch members. Furthermore, along with the secularization of Dutch society, the impact of religious composition on suicide wanes. These results contradict the network-support mechanism and confirm the notion that religious communities have a general protective effect against suicide.

One of the best-known studies in sociology is Durkheim's *Suicide* ([1897] 1951), and perhaps the most famous proposition that came out of this study is that Protestants are more likely to commit suicide than Catholics. The Protestant-Catholic difference was confirmed both in Durkheim's

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research and in that of others (e.g., Dublin 1963, Halbwachs [1930] 1978), and subsequent work designated it as sociology's "one law" (see Pope and Danigelis 1981). Durkheim's classic study received praise for both its methods and its logical approach (e.g., Selvin 1958). In fact, some have called Durkheim's study the most influential work in sociology (Merton 1967).

Since the 1970s, however, *Suicide* has been questioned on several grounds. Theoretically, it has been argued that Durkheim formulated propositions on macrolevel units, such as groups and regions, and failed to develop a more informative theory at the microlevel (Thorlindsson and Bjarnason 1998). Methodologically, it has been argued that Durkheim formulated propositions at the microlevel, but failed to test them with individual-level data. Empirically, there is some indication that the difference between Protestants and Catholics could be attributed to systematic undercounting of Catholic suicides (Van Poppel and Day 1996). Pope (1976) argued that the Protestant-Catholic difference does not even have an empirical basis in *Suicide*, and subsequent aggregate-level studies have continued to raise questions about the validity of the "one law" (Bankston, Allen, and Cunningham 1983, Faupel, Kowalski, and Starr 1987, Pope and Danigelis 1981).

A century after *Suicide*'s publication, several studies evaluated the state of the art, two of these were *Émile Durkheim "Le Suicide," One Hundred Years Later* (Lester 1994) and its European counterpart, *"Le suicide" Un siècle après Durkheim* (Borlandi and Cherkaoui 2000). In these and other metastudies (Stack 2000), the work of Pescosolido (1990, 1994, Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989) has been acknowledged as a promising answer to the theoretical critiques of *Suicide*. Instead of viewing the Protestant-Catholic difference from either a micro- or a macrolevel, Pescosolido reframed the ideas advanced in *Suicide* within a micro-macro approach, suggesting that the religious context affects the relationship between religion and suicide at the individual level. More specifically, she argued that a higher level of religious involvement lowers the chance of suicide because of the community support people receive from co-religionists. This explanation was tested and confirmed in several studies conducted on data from the United States (Ellison, Burr, and McGall 1997, Pescosolido 1990).

In this article, after reviewing the criticisms of *Suicide* more extensively, we contribute to the ongoing debate over the religion-suicide link in three ways. First, we suggest a second explanation for the inverse relationship between religious involvement and suicide risk. We argue that not only might religious communities provide support, they may also have stronger prohibitions against suicide than secular communities. Starting from this idea, we formulate new hypotheses on the effect of individual denomi-

nation and religious context on suicide. Second, we make methodological progress by using a unique data set, which contains individual-level data on suicide in the Netherlands between 1936 and 1973 and contextual data on the religious composition of residential areas. We are thereby able to avoid the problems associated with aggregate-level data (Breault 1994) that have been used to examine the religion-suicide link (Bankston et al 1983, Ellison et al 1997, Faupel et al 1987, Pescosolido 1990, Pope and Danigelis 1981). Third, using individual-level data on suicide in the Netherlands between 1905 and 1910, we examine the idea that Catholic suicides are systematically underreported and that this is the reason for the observed difference in suicide rates between Catholics and Protestants (Van Poppel and Day 1996).

DURKHEIM ON SUICIDE: REVIEW AND APPRAISAL

In view of the criticisms of Durkheim's theory of religion and suicide, it appears that since the 1970s, the theoretical, methodological, and empirical underpinnings of the religion-suicide link have been seriously questioned. However, we argue that this was done on the basis of a number of faulty assumptions, and that Pescosolido (1990, 1994) has provided fresh theoretical impetus.

The first assumption is that the empirical regularity associated with Protestants being more likely to commit suicide than Catholics is one of sociology's "laws" (Bankston et al 1983, Breault 1986, Faupel et al 1987, Pope and Danigelis 1981). In fact, *Suicide* (Durkheim 1951, p. 208) puts forward a more general hypothesis, stating that "the more strongly people are integrated in a religious community, the lower their chances to commit suicide." Sociology's "one law" therefore only applies if Catholics are integrated within the church community more strongly than Protestants. Durkheim (1951, p. 161) remarked that the relatively low number of religious leaders in Protestant countries made this assumption plausible for the period he was examining. However, later researchers investigating the religion-suicide link simply assumed Protestants to be *always* less integrated than Catholics. Without providing support for this additional assumption, a finding that Catholics are more likely to commit suicide than Protestants need not run counter to Durkheim's general theory. In accordance with this more general hypothesis, it was found that in the Netherlands between 1937 and 1976, Rereformed (orthodox) Protestants had lower suicide rates than Catholics, who, in turn, had lower suicide rates than Reformed (liberal) Protestants, with orthodox Protestants being

the most frequent churchgoers and liberal Protestants the least likely to attend church (Ultee, Arts, and Flap 1996)²

A second faulty assumption is that Durkheim's theory can be interpreted solely in holistic terms. Critics of Durkheim's "social realism" (Jones 1999) or "collectivism" (O'Neill 1973) argue that *Suicide* provides a theory of collective entities but fails to formulate a more informative individual-level theory. Although *Suicide* indeed contains macrolevel propositions, it also provides hypotheses at the individual level. More important, however, is that the distinction between individuals and society is more or less artificial. Besides hypotheses on individuals and hypotheses on societies, there are also "macro-micro" or "relational" hypotheses on the influence of societies on individuals (Huber 1991, Lazarsfeld and Menzel 1961). The Protestant-Catholic pattern lacked exactly this multilevel or relational interpretation, for it was formulated with absolute properties of individuals at the microlevel (to be Protestant, to be Catholic) or absolute properties of groups at the macrolevel (Protestant countries, Catholic countries). Durkheim's more general idea, however, relates the properties of individuals with those of groups (Catholics and Protestants being more or less integrated in a religious community). Pescosolido (1990, 1994) reformulated *Suicide* in a multilevel approach which we develop here into two full-fledged competing explanations.

A third problem in the literature is the frequent use of aggregate data. This is because of the lack of individual-level data on suicides and possibly also because of the macrolevel interpretation of *Suicide*. Pope and Danigelis (1981) tested the Protestant-Catholic difference in suicide using countries as their unit of analysis, others have used smaller geographical units, such as counties in the United States (Bankston et al. 1983, Breault 1986, Faupel et al. 1987). More recent research conducted in the United States to examine multilevel effects on the religion-suicide link used counties (Pescosolido 1990) or standard metropolitan statistical areas (Ellison et al. 1997) as lower-level units, and larger regions (e.g., the Northeast, the West, the Midwest, the South) as contextual units. One of the problems of aggregate-level studies is their neglect of the possibility of contextual effects. This substantive point is often presented as a methodological one,

² In the Netherlands, there are two main Protestant (both Calvinist) denominations: Reformed Protestant (*Nederlands Hervormd*), which is the main Protestant denomination in the Netherlands, and Rereformed Protestant (*Gereformeerd*), which refers to all smaller denominations and churches that seceded from the Reformed Protestant Church from the year 1834 onward. Reformed Protestants are more liberal than the Rereformed Protestants.

the so-called “ecological fallacy” (Robinson 1950)³ If we agree that Durkheim’s theory must be modeled at the individual level, aggregate-level research findings on the religion-suicide link could be seriously biased. Several researchers have therefore pleaded for individual-level studies (Breault 1994, Burr, McCall, and Powell-Griner 1994, Ellison et al 1997, Stack 1990, Van Poppel and Day 1996, Wasserman 1984). In addition, current attempts to build macro-micro linkages in sociology (Huber 1991) have made the exploitation of data linking the macrolevel to the mesolevel (Ellison et al 1997, Pescosolido 1990) somewhat off the mark.

A fourth argument against *Suicide* is the suggestion that Catholics and Protestants have the same suicide rate, but that Catholics hide suicide as a cause of death more often than Protestants do (Atkinson 1978, Day 1987, Douglas 1967). Van Poppel and Day (1996) examined this idea, using a unique individual-level data set on suicides and other causes of death in the Netherlands from 1905 to 1910. They concluded that the Protestant-Catholic differential in suicide rates resulted from an undercounting of Catholic suicides. However, Simpson (1998) pointed to several methodological omissions in this study. One criticism was that the ratio of the Protestant-to-Catholic suicide rates and the ratios of rates for other causes of death, as presented by Van Poppel and Day, did not provide adequate estimates of suicide undercounting. The calculation of absolute suicide numbers is to be preferred. Using Van Poppel and Day’s data set, we applied this method and found that in seven out of ten age-gender groups, the higher number of suicides among the Protestant groups could not be attributed to systematic undercounting (app. A). Therefore, the idea of the undercounting of Catholic suicides, at least for the Netherlands about a century ago, is not supported.

NEO-DURKHEIMIAN MULTILEVEL EXPLANATIONS OF SUICIDE

Religious Context, Denomination, and Suicide: Community Support or Community Norms?

In this article, we hold that Durkheim’s *Suicide* can be augmented in a fruitful way. Instead of relying on the Protestant-Catholic difference, much is to be gained from a micro-macro approach to the religion-suicide link.

³ Durkheim himself was criticized for having committed the ecological fallacy (Van Poppel and Day 1996). However, a closer inspection of *Suicide* reveals that Durkheim (1951, pp. 152–54) tested his individual-level hypothesis on Protestants and Catholics by disaggregating data (Besnard 2000). Initially he compared the suicide rates of different countries according to their religious composition. He then made the same comparison between regions within countries and finally examined individual-level data for Protestants and Catholics.

(Pescosolido 1994) From this perspective, the religious context is crucial for understanding the impact of denomination at the individual level. We argue that two different explanations can be advanced for the protective effect of religious communities. The first is that religious communities, or social networks in general, provide social and emotional support to their members, which prevents people from committing suicide. The other is that suicide is more strongly prohibited by churches than it is in other settings, and that the role of religious communities goes beyond that of protecting their own members. Both ideas can be traced in *Suicide*, but their development into multilevel explanations is neo-Durkheimian.

The role of community support on the denomination-suicide link was most explicitly stated by Pescosolido (1990, 1994, Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989). In an attempt to reframe Durkheim's ideas from a more contemporary network perspective, Pescosolido suggested that religious context affects the relationship between denomination and suicide. She argued that "having fewer co-religionists or weaker infrastructural base in a city, rural area, or particular region of the country often makes it hard to sustain churches and to form a resilient community that provides integrative protection from suicide" (Pescosolido 1990, p. 340). In addition, "one potential function of social networks is integration or the ability to provide social and emotional support" (Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989, p. 43). According to Pescosolido, therefore, one potential mechanism behind the denomination-suicide link is the support people receive from co-religionists or, more generally, homogeneous others. More formally stated, this idea predicts that the more co-religionists there are in an individual's direct environment, the more strongly that individual will be involved in his or her religious community, which will, in turn, provide more support, lowering the probability of committing suicide. We call this the *community-support mechanism* underlying the denomination-suicide link.

The community-support explanation has received ample empirical confirmation. Pescosolido (1990) examined aggregate suicide rates in 404 counties in five regions of the United States in 1970. Her findings indicate that the overall protective effect of Catholicism, Judaism, and evangelical Protestantism tends to be weaker in regions with fewer co-religionists. For example, she found that in general, a higher proportion of Catholics in a county lowers the suicide rate in that county, in the South of the United States, where Catholics are not strongly represented, there is a positive association between the proportion of Catholics in a county and suicide rates. Contrary to what might be expected, Pescosolido's analyses show that the presence of liberal Protestantism increases the suicide rate in counties in the Northeast, where Protestantism has traditionally been

strong⁴ Ellison et al (1997) examined suicide rates in 296 standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in the United States in 1980. In accordance with the community-support mechanism, they found that religious homogeneity in SMSAs, or the extent to which people in a certain area adhere to a single religion, is negatively associated with suicide rates in those SMSAs.

A second explanation that brings religious context into denomination and suicide at the individual level is the notion that churches, and religious communities more generally, prohibit suicide. In *Suicide*, Durkheim (1951, p. 209) stated that Protestant and Catholic churches are equally strong in their prohibitions against suicide, but because of their greater involvement in the religious community, Catholics have a lower risk of suicide than Protestants. Durkheim (1951, p. 219) then mentioned the possibility of altruistic suicide, itself consisting of three varieties: obligatory, optional, and acute. Durkheim argued that "when a person kills himself, in all these cases, it is not because he assumes he has the right to do so but, on the contrary, *because it is his duty*. If he fails in this obligation, he is dishonored and also punished, usually, by religious sanctions." Durkheim (1951, p. 228) then stated that some intermediate groups, such as the army, allow people to commit suicide in certain circumstances. Accordingly, Durkheim (1951, pp. 232–37) found that people who are strongly integrated in the army (e.g., officers) have higher suicide rates than people who are less integrated (e.g., soldiers). Taken together, these notions suggest that the impact of the level of integration on suicide risk is *conditional* in intermediate groups and depends on the norms that either prohibit or allow people to commit suicide (see Ultee 1975). If integration in groups forbidding suicide lowers it, integration in groups allowing it increases suicide.

This suggestion can be generalized into a hypothesis about norm-regulated behavior in general: the more strongly people are integrated into a group, the more strongly they comply with *any* norm of that group (Stark 1994, p. 82; Ultee et al. 1996, p. 85). This hypothesis has been used with considerable success to explain voting as conformity to group opinion (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944), juvenile delinquency as a consequence of having good or bad friends (Hirschi 1969), and individual religious belief as a result of parental socialization and a nation's religious environment (Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Here, we examine this hypothesis with respect to suicide and refer to it as the *community-norms notion*.

⁴ Pescosolido (1990) remarks that this finding could be consistent with a social network idea, in which a certain network structure predisposes its members to commit suicide. Note that this suggestion comes close to the second mechanism behind the religion-suicide link.

The Dutch Religious Setting

The Dutch setting is particularly interesting for studying the relationship between religion and suicide. First, and most important, individual-level data on religion and suicide are available for multiple years and multiple regions. We examined a Dutch population of no fewer than 10 million persons living in more than 850 municipalities, looking at the yearly occurrence of suicide in the period 1936–73. Municipalities in the Netherlands are small geographical units that coincide with cities or towns and their surrounding environment. This multilevel data set has a major advantage over information in other countries where only aggregate data on suicide are available.

The Dutch setting is also interesting to study because it is made up of a large proportion of Catholics and various Protestant denominations. Findings on religious endogamy in the Netherlands in the period 1938–83 show that Catholics marry outside their group less often than Reformed (liberal) Protestants, and religious homogamy tends to be highest among Rereformed (orthodox) Protestants (Hendrickx, Lammers, and Ultee 1991). Of these three major groups, religious involvement is agreed to be highest among the Rereformed Protestants, second highest among Catholics, and lowest among Reformed Protestants (Ultee et al. 1996).

Furthermore, the geographic clustering of these three groups differs considerably across municipalities in the Netherlands. An average municipality in the 1936–73 period consists of 43% Catholics, 35% Reformed Protestants, and 11% Rereformed Protestants (Statistics Netherlands 1930, 1947, 1960, 1971). The southern part of the Netherlands is predominantly Catholic, including municipalities made up almost entirely of Catholics, whereas the North is mainly Protestant. Because the religious composition differs between regions, multilevel hypotheses can be tested more convincingly.

Another reason to study the Dutch scene is that the religious profile of the Netherlands has changed dramatically over time. In the 1950s, the Netherlands was highly segmented into religious and secular “pillars” which were the basis of the social and economic life of their members (Dekker and Ester 1996). However, since the 1950s, the Netherlands has experienced a process of rapid secularization, with the result that it is now one of the most secular nations in the world. For example, in the 1960s about 76% of the population was affiliated with a church, in 1980, this was down to 50% (te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001). Also, the percentage of people attending church at least once a week dropped from 50% in 1966 to 31% in 1979 (Dekker, De Hart, and Peters 1997). In addition to the three major religious denominations (Catholics, Reformed Protestants, and Rereformed Protestants), the Dutch setting is therefore

made up of a large group of persons who identified no religious affiliation in the census. An average municipality in the 1936–73 period consists of about 10% nonchurch members. The suicide pattern of this group provides a pivotal opportunity to test the community-support mechanism and the community-norms notion against each another.

Hypotheses on Religion and Suicide in the Netherlands

We used the community-support mechanism and the community-norms notion to formulate new multilevel hypotheses on the effect of an individual's denomination and the religious composition of residential areas on suicide in the Netherlands over the period 1936–73. We focus on four major "religious" groups: Catholics, Reformed Protestants, Rereformed Protestants, and nonchurch members.

The first contextual factor that could affect the denomination-suicide link is the proportion of church members in a person's direct environment. From the standpoint of the community-support mechanism, it could be argued that the presence of church members in the community has a protective impact on church members but an aggravating effect on nonchurch members. The community-support explanation assumes that people interact more often with persons having the same characteristics, such as religion, and that they correspondingly receive more support through homogeneous relationships. To provide a strong, supportive community to church members, religious groups therefore need to be sufficiently large. In contrast, social networks among nonmembers would tend to be less cohesive as their numbers in the direct environment decrease. Accordingly, nonmembers would receive less social support in strong religious regions.

HYPOTHESIS 1—According to the community-support mechanism, an overall increase in the proportion of church members in a residential area should diminish the suicide risk of church members and increase the suicide risk of nonmembers in that area.

In contrast, the community-norms notion predicts that both members and nonmembers are at lower risk of committing suicide in highly religious areas. This is because it assumes that churches strongly prohibit suicide. To examine whether community norms affect suicide risk, we further assume that nonchurch members in a residential area will be exposed to church norms in proportion to the number of church members in that area. Nonmembers interact with church members at the neighborhood level, in formal and informal settings, and can therefore be assumed to have some degree of exposure to the norms of the religious groups in their environment.

HYPOTHESIS 2—According to the community-norms notion, the pro-

portion of church members making up a residential area will be inversely related to the suicide risk of both members and nonmembers in that area

We examine a more severe test of the community-support explanation as well, one that takes differences between denominations into account. The community-support mechanism assumes that people interact more often with homogeneous others and, correspondingly, that people receive more social support from those belonging to the same denomination. For example, Catholics should gain more support from Catholics than from Protestants and certainly more than from nonchurch members. The same line of reasoning applies to other denominations.

HYPOTHESIS 3 —*The community-support mechanism suggests that the chance of suicide among members of a certain denomination is more strongly diminished if a higher proportion of that same denomination lives in the same area than if other religious denominations are more prominent in that area.*

We also put the community-norms notion to a more severe test, examining suicide rates over time. We assume that the trend toward greater secularization in the Netherlands since the 1950s means that churches have had less and less influence on their members. This assumption is supported by earlier research that showed that the suicide rate increased in the period 1954–76 in the Netherlands (Ultee et al. 1996). This rise in the suicide rate was highest among Catholics (from 4.0 in 1954–56 to 9.6 in 1974–76), who experienced the strongest level of secularization. We assume that the contextual effect of religious composition on the risk of suicide should also show a decrease over this period.

HYPOTHESIS 4 —*The community-norms notion predicts that the influence of the religious composition of a residential area on the chance to commit suicide among church members as well as among nonchurch members in that area will have decreased after the 1950s.*

DATA AND METHODS

To construct our data set, we used all digitally registered data on Catholics, Rereformed Protestants, Reformed Protestants, and nonchurch members who committed suicide in the Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands 1999).⁵ This information was taken from the official Dutch registry of causes of death. Data were available in digital form for several years between 1936 and 1973, namely 1936–39, 1947–52, 1955, 1957, 1962, 1965, 1967, and 1969–73. Unfortunately, we could not use the data after 1973 because

⁵ Two small categories of persons who committed suicide were omitted from the data set, namely, suicides where denomination was unknown and for denominations other than Rereformed Protestant, Catholic, Reformed Protestant, and nonchurch member.

most government administrations stopped recording the religious denomination of suicides after this date. Despite this limitation, a total of 14,744 digitally registered suicides were available for analysis.

As suicide is a rather rare event, parameter estimates would be sensitive to small random fluctuations of suicide rates if the data from each year were analyzed separately. Therefore, we grouped all suicides together into four distinct periods: the prewar period 1936–39 and the postwar periods 1947–52, 1955–67, and 1969–73, during which the influence of religion gradually decreased.

The data set contains information on suicides by denomination, name of municipality, and period. A potential limitation is the lack of individual controls, such as age and sex. Figures for age, gender, and additional characteristics combined with denomination for the population at risk are unavailable at the level of the municipality. Therefore, we could not estimate the probability of committing suicide within each combined category of municipality, period, denomination, and age, gender, or other variable. We used census data to estimate population figures by denomination, municipality, and period (Statistics Netherlands 1930, 1947, 1960, 1971), and we applied linear interpolation to estimate population numbers for the four periods. Before doing this, however, we had to deal with an additional problem: the number of municipalities changed between 1936 and 1973. In 1936 there were well over 1,100 municipalities, but this fell to around 870 in 1973 (Statistics Netherlands 1991). As we did not want our parameter estimates to depend on these changes, we took the situation in 1973 as given and imposed it on the entire data set. The inhabitants of municipalities that ceased to exist before 1973 (which were predominantly small and rural) were thus added to the number of inhabitants of the (larger) municipalities that took over. This resulted in a longitudinal data set containing a total population of over 10 million Dutch people living in 870 different municipalities during the period 1936–73, which constitutes a unique set of individual and contextual data on suicide, suitable for a severe test of our hypotheses.

As contextual variables, we used the percentage of church members in a municipality: Catholics, Rereformed Protestants, and Reformed Protestants. We refrained from calculating the so-called “Herfindahl index” to indicate religious homogeneity (e.g., Ellison et al. 1997) because such an index is “blind” to the hypotheses at issue. For example, the Herfindahl index is exactly the same for municipalities with 40% nonmembers and 60% Catholics and municipalities with 60% nonmembers and 40% Catholics, whereas we hypothesize that these municipalities would have different contextual effects on the probability of committing suicide.

Because our data consist of two distinct levels, that is, an individual level and a contextual level, we applied multilevel regression analyses

(Snijders and Bosker 1999) In these analyses, the probability of committing suicide is made log-linearly dependent on the individual's denomination, contextual variables, and their interactions For practical reasons, we present the estimated odds and odds ratios instead of the logit parameters Because of the nature of our dependent variable, the probability of not committing suicide is very close to one The odds ratios for all contextual variables (measured in percentages) can therefore be read as the number of times the probability of committing suicide increases (odds ratio > 1) or decreases (odds ratio < 1) The odds for each of the four denominations can be read as the individual's probability of committing suicide Because this probability is extremely low, it is turned into a standard suicide rate (no. of suicides per 100,000 individuals) Because the estimated parameters are based on information from the entire Dutch population, we do not present confidence intervals or *P*-values

RESULTS

To test our four hypotheses, we applied multilevel models in which we estimated both the effect of the individual's denomination and the contextual effect of the percentage of church members in that individual's municipality Because this contextual effect was expected to differ across denominations, we included cross-level interactions between denomination and the percentage of church members We made separate estimates for each of the four periods and for the overall period 1936–73 The results are shown in table 1

The upper part of table 1 presents the estimated suicide rate for each of the four denominations within an average municipality (i.e., where 90.6% of the inhabitants are church members) For example, in such a municipality, the suicide rate among Catholics was 5.2 in the 1936–73 period The lower part of table 1 shows the estimated contextual effects for each of the four denominations These effects were parameterized to express the relative change in the suicide rate that would occur if the percentage of church members within the municipality changed by 10 percentage points For instance, if Catholics lived in a municipality that consisted of 80.6% church members (i.e., 10 percentage points below average), the estimated suicide rate in the 1936–73 period would be $5.20/0.86 = 6.04$ Note that the suicide rates at the individual level in the three religious groups studied vary indirectly with the degree of religious involvement In an average municipality over the period 1936–73, we predict that the lowest suicide rate will be among Reformed (orthodox) Protestants (3.8), and the highest among Reformed (liberal) Protestants (8.8), while Catholics fall in between at 5.2 The fact that nonmembers

TABLE 1
ESTIMATED SUICIDE RATES AMONG DENOMINATIONS (Individual Level) AND THE
EFFECT OF CHANGING PERCENTAGES OF CHURCH MEMBERS (Contextual Level) IN THE
NETHERLANDS, 1936-73

	1936-73	1936-39	1947-52	1955-67	1969-73
Individual level					
Denomination *					
Rereformed Protestants	3.8	4.9	3.2	3.8	3.9
Reformed Protestants	8.8	12.2	7.7	8.1	7.7
Catholics	5.2	5.2	4.2	4.8	6.8
Nonchurch members	5.9	7.2	5.8	6.6	4.7
Contextual level (municipalities)					
Effect of % church members on the suicide rates of †					
Rereformed Protestants	89	90	83	88	91
Reformed Protestants	85	80	76	84	88
Catholics	86	84	77	84	94
Nonchurch members	90	1.09	91	95	84

* Effects for each denomination denote the estimated suicide rate per 100,000 in an average municipality (i.e., with 90.6% church members)

† The effect of the percentage church members denotes the no. of times the estimated suicide rate within each denomination decreases (odds ratio < 1) or increases (odds ratio > 1) with every 10-percentage-point increase of the percentage church members in a municipality

rank only second highest (5.9) could be because of the fact that on average, they are younger than Reformed Protestants

Hypothesis 1, derived from the community-support mechanism, states that the higher the percentage of church members in a municipality, the lower the probability of church members committing suicide, but the higher the probability for nonchurch members. Alternatively, the community-norms notion implies that the higher the percentage of church members in a municipality, the lower the probability of committing suicide for both church members and nonmembers (hypothesis 2). According to the lower part of table 1, all effects are below one, indicating that *all* suicide rates decrease as the percentage of church members in the community increases, with only one exception (for nonmembers, the effect amounts to 1.09 in the 1936-39 period). These findings contradict the community-support mechanism, which suggests that in strong religious communities, church members have strong social networks that provide social and emotional support, whereas nonchurch members are more excluded from community life and would not have this protective network. Instead, our analyses confirm the community-norms notion, arguing that in strong religious communities, suicide is strongly prohibited for all members of the community. Through interactions within neighborhoods, social

circles, and work settings, this norm affects even the behavior of those not involved in churches

Another, more severe, test of the community-support mechanism is to estimate the contextual influence of each of the denominations instead of the contextual influence of church membership in general. According to community-support hypothesis 3, the probability of committing suicide would be most strongly influenced by the contextual effect of the denomination to which the individual belongs. According to community-norms hypothesis 2, denomination makes no difference: the contextual influence of all denominations should be roughly equal because suicide is forbidden in all religious communities. We therefore applied a multilevel analysis that measured the contextual effect of a religious community using the percentages of Reformed Protestants, Rereformed Protestants, and Catholics in the community. Results are shown in table 2.

The lower part of table 2 shows that for all three religious denominations, the contextual effects of Rereformed Protestants, Reformed Protestants, and Catholics on suicide rates are all below 1.00. The third hypothesis predicts that this contextual effect is strongest (i.e., closest to zero) where the individual's denomination matches the denomination prevalent at the contextual level. For instance, among Rereformed Protestants, the contextual effect of Rereformed Protestants should be stronger than the contextual effects of Reformed Protestants and Catholics. However, these predictions run counter to almost every finding in table 2, except in the period 1947–52, when the contextual effect of Rereformed Protestants (0.82) among Rereformed Protestants was indeed stronger than the contextual effect of Reformed Protestants (0.90) and Catholics (0.90). Thus, our findings do not confirm hypothesis 3 and again favor hypothesis 2. This suggests that the presence of a strong religious community that prohibits suicide is more important in reducing suicide rates than having co-religionists who supposedly provide social and emotional support.

We also tested the community-norms notion in a more rigorous way. Hypothesis 4 predicts that the contextual effects shown in table 2 should decrease from the period 1947–52 onward, as the influence of religion waned as part of broad secularization in the Netherlands. As table 2 shows, in most cases, the effects did indeed decrease. For example, the contextual effect of Catholics among Rereformed Protestants was at its highest (0.79) in 1947–52 and decreased to none (1.00) in 1969–73. Exceptions to this rule are the increasing contextual effects of Catholics and Reformed Protestants among nonchurch members. All in all, we think there is enough empirical evidence to corroborate hypothesis 4. This suggests that by prohibiting suicide, religious communities have a protective effect, but because of lower religious participation over time, these community norms have correspondingly lost much of their impact.

TABLE 2
ESTIMATED SUICIDE RATES AMONG DENOMINATIONS (Individual Level) AND THE
EFFECT OF CHANGING PERCENTAGES OF DENOMINATIONS (Contextual Level) IN THE
NETHERLANDS, 1936-73

	1936-73	1936-39	1947-52	1955-67	1969-73
Individual level					
Denomination *					
Rereformed Protestants	3.5	3.1	3.6	3.1	4.0
Reformed Protestants	12.0	20.8	13.6	10.9	8.6
Catholics	6.5	7.9	7.3	6.3	6.8
Nonchurch members	5.5	7.5	4.8	6.3	4.5
Contextual level (municipalities)					
Effect of % Rereformed Protestants on the suicide rates of [†]					
Rereformed Protestants	89	87	82	92	93
Reformed Protestants	81	78	74	83	90
Catholics	89	89	79	76	100
Nonchurch members	108	129	122	105	98
Effect of % Reformed Protestants on the suicide rates of [†]					
Rereformed Protestants	90	93	90	86	96
Reformed Protestants	88	85	82	87	89
Catholics	88	90	91	84	94
Nonchurch members	89	101	90	92	83
Effect of % Catholics on the suicide rates of [†]					94
Rereformed Protestants	87	79	90	83	90
Reformed Protestants	87	85	82	87	95
Catholics	88	88	84	84	84
Nonchurch members	89	109	87	93	

* Effects for each denomination denote the estimated suicide rates in an average municipality (i.e., with 34.5% Reformed, 10.8% Rereformed, and 43.1% Catholic)

[†] The effect of % Rereformed Protestants, % Reformed Protestants, and % Catholic denotes the no. of times the suicide rate within each denomination decreases (odds ratio < 1) or increases (odds ratio > 1) with every 10-percentage-point increase of the religious group's percentage in a municipality

CONCLUSIONS

This article addressed theoretical, methodological, and empirical criticisms of the Durkheimian link between religion and suicide. We have shown that much of this criticism is misplaced and that the ideas advanced in *Suicide* can be elaborated in a profitable way.

To begin, this link should not be restricted to the differences between Protestant and Catholic suicide rates, because *Suicide* provides a more general hypothesis that specifies conditions under which this presumed regularity does or does not occur. This hypothesis states that "the more strongly people are integrated in religious communities, the lower their chances to commit suicide." It also implies predictions about differences

between liberal and conservative Protestants, and between persons with a certain denomination and those without a religion

Furthermore, *Suicide* suggests two mechanisms behind this hypothesis. First, religious communities, and social networks more generally, provide social and emotional support, which restrain suicidal tendencies. We refer to this as the *community-support mechanism*. Second, religious communities prohibit suicide, implying that greater involvement in religious life is inversely related to suicide risk. We call this the *community-norms notion*.

Because both hypotheses specify contextual effects, we applied multilevel techniques to individual-level data on suicide and contextual-level data on the religious composition of municipalities in the Netherlands over the period 1936–73. In so doing, we improved on studies of suicide that have contained information on either the individual or the contextual level, but not on both. This approach also helped avoid the risk of ecological fallacies, so frequently associated with *Suicide* and subsequent research.

Our findings support the community-norms notion and question the community-support mechanism: the proportion of religious members in a municipality is inversely related to the chance of suicide for both church members and nonchurch members. Furthermore, we found that the probability of members of a denomination committing suicide is not influenced more strongly by the presence of that denomination (or other denominations) in the community. For example, Catholics in an overwhelmingly Catholic municipality are not at a lower risk of committing suicide than Catholics in a predominantly Protestant municipality. Instead, our findings suggest that religious communities exert an overall protective effect on all the members of a community, irrespective of their individual denomination, and including nonchurch members. Thus, it is not social support from homogeneous others that prevents people from suicide, but rather a shared religious norm prohibiting suicide, which extends to those who are not affiliated with any denomination. We assumed that this norm had become less widespread in the Netherlands after World War II. Our analyses indeed showed a diminishing impact of religious context on suicide over time, thereby reinforcing the idea of community norms.

In sum, the multilevel neo-Durkheimian approach advanced in this article is promising if Durkheim's theory is interpreted in a general way, specifying the relationship between individuals and social settings, and if it is tested with a multilevel design, containing information on both levels. In understanding the protective effect of religious communities, our analyses are more in favor of a community-norms explanation than a community-support explanation, at least for the Netherlands between 1936 and 1973.

DISCUSSION

How strong is our evidence in favor of the community-norms notion as opposed to the social-support argument? Here, we discuss our findings for the Netherlands and previous U S studies in terms of data quality and suggest possible theoretical elaborations and implications

This study used individual-level data on suicide, whereas studies conducted in the United States have relied on aggregate statistics. We argue that aggregate studies carry the risk of ecological fallacies and do not examine micro-macro effects. Statistical problems arise in multilevel studies, too. When using aggregate data at the macro- (e.g., regional) and mesolevels (e.g., county), the number of cases at the highest (contextual) level is quite small. Ellison et al. (1997) and Pescosolido (1990) used four or five regions as contextual cases, which does not provide a strong test of contextual effects (Lieberson 1991). Furthermore, predictors in aggregate analyses (such as the divorce rate and percentage of church members) are often strongly correlated, making the results unstable. These arguments do not apply to population statistics for individuals and contexts, hence, research using such data is to be encouraged. European data, particularly prewar German statistics, provide a fruitful source.

However, a potential drawback of population statistics on suicide which does not apply to aggregate studies is the difficulty of obtaining individual controls. Although the records of people who committed suicide contain information on individual characteristics (e.g., marital status, age, sex), the statistics for the population at risk are often limited. It is possible that the variables for religious context in our analysis are associated with the composition of individual factors that affect suicide risk, and omitting relevant controls at the individual level could bias the interpretation of these effects (Blalock 1984, Hauser 1969).

We believe, however, that the limitations of our data set are not serious. We have no reason to suspect that religious context is strongly associated with possibly disturbing individual-level factors. Indeed, aggregate studies on the impact of religion on suicide in the United States show similar results for models with and without controls. Pescosolido and Georgianna (1989) include aggregated controls for income, education, sex, age, migration, divorce, and population density. They remark that the inclusion of these controls "did not change the influence of religion coefficients" (Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989, p. 37). Applying such controls would probably not make much of a difference in our study, either.

Moreover, the inclusion of individual controls sometimes obscures matters of causality. One factor for which we did not control was marital status. It is well known that divorced persons have a higher suicide rate than married people (Stack 1990). However, religious communities not

only prohibit suicide, but they also discourage divorce more strongly than secular communities (Bainbridge 1989). Including controls for marital status could therefore turn a significant effect of religion on suicide into an insignificant direct effect plus an (in)significant indirect effect, thereby concealing the total effect of religion. Burr et al. (1994) showed that in the United States, religion has a direct effect on suicide, and that it has indirect effects mediated through divorce. The situation in the Netherlands is probably not very different.

On a theoretical level, the evidence we present in favor of the community-norms notion could be questioned. We have assumed that religious communities prohibit suicide more strongly than secular communities, but we have not actually measured this. Pescosolido and Georgianna (1989) contacted representatives of 27 religious bodies and found that only two had an official position on suicide. Hence, they dismissed the community-norms argument.

However, Stark and Bainbridge (1997) present figures on attitudes toward suicide from the 1989, 1990, and 1991 U.S. General Social Surveys.⁶ They show that 8% of conservative Protestants maintain that a person has the right to end his or her own life, this belief is also held by 8% of Catholics, 16% of liberal Protestants, and 37% of nonchurch members. In the Netherlands, in the period 1979–2000, 12% of conservative Protestants maintained that people should have the right to end their own life, as did 17% of Catholics, 17% of liberal Protestants, and 38% of nonchurch members.⁷

These figures show, first, that in both countries, religious communities clearly prohibit suicide more strongly than secular communities. Second, they indicate that religious communities in the United States (especially conservative Protestants and Catholics) prohibit suicide more strongly than do those communities in the Netherlands, which is consistent with the stronger position of religion in the United States than in the Netherlands (Campbell and Curtis 1994). This provides an explanation for our finding that religious communities in the Netherlands do not have the normative constraint on suicide they once had, while religious communities continue to play a role in the United States. Finally, it seems that

⁶ The original question was stated as follows: "A person has the right to end their own life if the person is tired of living and ready to die?" Respondents could choose between (1) yes, (2) no, and (3) don't know. The last category was omitted to compute percentages.

⁷ This information is from Eisinga et al. (1992, 1999, 2002). The survey question (translated from Dutch) was "Do you think that people should have the right to end their own life if they want to, or do you think this should be prevented?" Respondents could choose among three response categories: (1) "They should have the right," (2) "Depends on circumstances," and (3) "This should be prevented."

in examining the role of the norms of religious communities on suicide, it is important to consider the religiosity of the entire nation. As an elaboration of the community-norms notion, we suggest that the norms of religious communities are reinforced by the wider social and institutional context. Here, we are pointing toward a more general research agenda for the neo-Durkheimian multilevel approach. In this perspective, suicide and other rule-guided forms of behavior (such as crime and divorce) are explained in terms of norms of communities and the broader social context.

How strong is our evidence against the social-support mechanism? We suggest several explanations and points of elaboration for the contradictions around this idea and our research findings. First of all, it might be questioned whether communities always provide positive social support. Just as community norms do not always prohibit suicide, religious communities, or social networks more generally, might not always provide positive support. The literature contains several instances of negative or "sour" social capital. Despite the positive effect of religion on well-being and health in general (Ellison et al. 2001), some studies have indicated that religion can have a negative impact. For the United States, it was found that the likelihood of a major depression was three times greater among Pentecostals than among persons without a religious affiliation (Meador et al. 1992). In addition, De Graaf and Flap (1988) showed that people who used nonpersonal methods to find a job obtained better jobs than people who used informal contacts. Moerbeek and Need (2003) showed that people could have "foes" in the workplace, who, in turn, reduced their labor-market opportunities. Finally, instrumental support at work can have negative effects on well-being (Deelstra et al. 2003). Thus, there is ample evidence for negative social support.

Second, one could ask to whom religious communities provide support. For the United States, it may be that religious communities are "selfishly protective," that they protect only their own local group (Friedman and McGarvie 2003). In contrast, it could be that in the Netherlands, higher levels of community religiosity are associated with more support for all members of the community, including members of other religions or individuals who belong to no religious group. This may account for our finding that in the Netherlands, religious communities, irrespective of denomination, lower the suicide rate, while studies in the United States have found that only the presence of one's *own* group lowers suicide risk. However, this explanation is less plausible in view of the strong religious segregation in Dutch society in the period we examined (Dekker and Ester 1996). While the norms of the religious community influence all members of a community, support was clearly restricted to one's own group.

A third, and probably more promising, way of elaborating the social-support argument is to consider the strength of support that religious

communities provide. Just as community norms could be absent or weak, community support could be substituted by other forms of support. Apart from being influenced by community ties, support for individuals and the resources available to them depend upon market exchange, institutional distribution, and coercive appropriation (Wellman and Wortley 1990). The extent to which alternatives are available therefore affects the amount of support provided by religious communities.

The role of the state as a source of social support is relevant in this respect. After World War II, the Dutch state provided extensive welfare facilities, while in the United States, expenditures on welfare were considerably lower (Esping-Andersen 1990). Perhaps, then, the Netherlands is a country where religious communities, and social networks more generally, provide less social support than do those in the United States, since more support is provided by the state of the Netherlands than by the government of the United States. Differences between these societies in the role of the state might therefore provide an alternative explanation for the fact that the impact of religious communities on suicide is diminishing in Dutch society, while it remains important in the U.S. setting.

Following our suggestion about community norms being influenced by the wider social context, we argue that the amount of social support provided by the community declines in relation to the support provided by the broader social setting. The literature shows some evidence for this suggestion. De Graaf and Flap (1988) showed that in the United States, there is more use of informal sources to find a job than there is in the Netherlands and West Germany. In addition, it was found that social capital—as measured in terms of contacts with family and friends—is lower in social-democratic welfare regimes and in societies with large social expenditures (Scheepers, te Grotenhuis, and Gelissen 2002). This suggests another potentially fruitful research agenda for the neo-Durkheimian multilevel approach, in which the support provided by social networks and by other actors (such as the state) are considered simultaneously.

APPENDIX A

Reliability of Official Suicide Statistics

Van Poppel and Day (1996) maintained that Catholics hide suicides more often than Protestants. If this is true, these hidden suicides should be buried in other death classifications. Therefore, one should calculate absolute numbers, as was done by Phillips (1974, 1979), instead of ratios, as was done by Van Poppel and Day. We reanalyzed the data set (Statistics Netherlands 1907) used by Van Poppel and Day and present the results

in table A1 Table A1 presents the number of deceased persons by gender, age, religion, and cause of death Under each cause of death, the observed number of Protestant deaths is presented first, followed by the observed number of Catholic deaths, then the expected number of Catholic deaths—assuming that Catholics would have the same death rate as Protestants—and, finally, the difference between observed and expected Catholic deaths

For example, from 1905 to 1910, Statistics Netherlands counted 155 male Protestant suicides in the group between 20 and 29 years of age At that time, this would give a suicide rate (no of suicides per 100,000 individuals) of 10.12 within that specific group If Catholics committed suicide at the same rate as Protestants in this category, the expected number of Catholic suicides would be 94 Table A1 shows that Statistics Netherlands recorded 52 suicides, leaving 42 cases that could have been incorrectly classified under other causes However, one can see that only “sudden death” lists more Catholics than expected (+4) If all causes of death are considered, it appears that among males 20–29 years old, 68 fewer Catholics than expected died

If these comparisons are made for females and other age groups as well, it turns out that younger age groups show no Catholic undercounting, but some older age groups do It appears that in seven out of the ten age-gender groups, the lower rate of suicide among Catholics cannot be attributed to systematic undercounting We conclude that some undercounting of Catholic suicides might exist (and did at the beginning of the 19th century in the Netherlands), but it is restricted to older age groups We see no reason to believe that this undercounting accounts for the Protestant-Catholic differential

TABLE A1
RELIGION AND CAUSE OF DEATH BY AGE AND GENDER IN THE NETHERLANDS, 1905-10 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBSERVED (O) AND EXPECTED
(E) NUMBER OF DECEASED PERSONS

CAUSE OF DEATH	AGE GROUP									
	20-29		30-39		40-49		50-64		65-79	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
All suicides										
Protestant (O)	155	60	154	54	238	80	429	128	241	67
Catholic (O)	52	16	52	10	69	20	117	32	63	13
Catholic (E)	94	35	94	32	142	46	260	75	150	39
Catholic (O-E)	-42	-19	-42	-22	-73	-26	-143	-43	-87	-26
Real accidents *										
Protestant (O)	12	19	20	15	17	31	30	32	23	41
Catholic (O)	7	10	7	5	3	10	11	17	10	27
Catholic (E)	7	11	12	9	10	18	18	19	14	24
Catholic (O-E)	0	-1	-5	-4	-7	-8	-7	-2	-4	3
Suspected accidents †										
Protestant (O)	592	138	462	91	391	104	590	189	448	213
Catholic (O)	332	55	253	38	236	27	343	72	210	100

Catholic (E)	358	80	282	53	233	60	358	111	278	125
Catholic (O-E)	-26	-25	-29	-15	3	-33	-15	-39	-68	-25
Sudden deaths										
Protestant (O)	13	15	17	21	45	32	128	96	173	154
Catholic (O)	12	15	19	22	41	44	103	87	164	130
Catholic (E)	8	9	10	12	27	18	78	56	107	90
Catholic (O-E)	4	6	9	10	14	26	25	31	57	40
Ill-defined or unspecified cause of death										
Protestant (O)	200	181	214	259	361	320	930	836	1,655	1,675
Catholic (O)	117	114	131	166	210	214	640	620	1,338	1,059
Catholic (E)	121	105	131	152	216	184	563	489	1,027	979
Catholic (O-E)	-4	9	0	14	-6	30	77	131	311	80
Deaths from all causes										
Protestant (O)	972	413	867	440	1,132	567	2,107	1,281	2,540	2,150
Catholic (O)	520	210	462	241	559	315	1,214	828	1,785	1,329
Catholic (E)	588	240	530	258	629	326	1,277	750	1,576	1,257
Catholic (O-E)	-68	-30	-68	-17	-70	-11	-63	78	209	72

* Accidental deaths that can reasonably be presumed to contain no "hidden" suicides

† Accidental deaths that can reasonably be presumed to contain "hidden" suicides

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The Intergovernmental Network of World Trade: IGO Connectedness, Governance, and Embeddedness¹

Paul Ingram
Columbia University

Jeffrey Robinson
New York University

Marc L. Busch
Georgetown University

Membership in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the World Trade Organization, has long been argued to stimulate trade. Yet, evidence linking IGOs to trade is mixed. The authors argue that identifying the influence of IGOs requires attention not only to the institutions IGOs enact, but also to the network through which they enact them. This approach allows them to demonstrate that trade between two countries increases by an average of 58% with every doubling of the *strength* of IGO connection between the countries. They also contribute to debates regarding the mechanisms through which structural relationships influence economic behavior by showing that substantial trade benefits occur not only through economic IGOs, but also through IGOs that were formed for social and cultural purposes, and that connections through IGOs that are organizationally strong have more impact than those through minimalist IGOs.

Institutions are the bedrock of commercial exchange. Defined as formal or informal sets of rules, norms, and decision-making principles, institutions help lower the uncertainty and risk inherent in transactions among

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traders. In this light, institutions are widely viewed as a pillar of economic growth, bolstering incentives for commerce. Recently, attention has turned from whether institutions matter to questions about how they matter. In this article, we consider the link between the social structures in which institutions are embedded and their efficacy. Institutions are associated with social units (groups, networks, organizations, nations) that determine which actors are subject to the institutions, with which other actors they may more effectively trade, and what happens when they violate the institution. We examine the link between institution and social structure in the context of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), a prominent institutional form aimed at promoting international trade and smoothing international interactions more generally.

The significance of social structure is readily apparent in international trade, where national and subnational borders can often act as substantial barriers, even when the social units they divide have comparable institutions (Frankel 2000). One of the most striking illustrations of the connection between social structure and institutional governance is the European Community (EC, now the European Union or EU), which is associated with an increase in intra-EC trade. The success of the EC is not so much a story of institutional innovation, at least with respect to the institutions that govern trade *per se*, but rather of the creation of an integrated, transnational society, which has helped to expand the set of actors that may effectively interact under the institutional umbrella (Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002).

Recent sociological analyses of the EC notwithstanding, most studies underemphasize the link between institutions and the social structures that host them. This is particularly clear in the literature on international institutions and trade, which has struggled to show a connection between IGOs and global commerce. IGOs are organizations that meet regularly, are formed by treaty, and have three or more states as members (Pevehouse et al. 2003). Prominent examples include the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN). More representative of the more than 300 current IGOs, however, are organizations like the Andean Development Corporation or the Universal Postal Union. Researchers have sought for decades to identify the economic impact of these increasingly pervasive organizations, but have produced little evidence of any positive effect (e.g., Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers 1986, Rose 2004). Consequently, IGOs have been attributed only a marginal role in increasing

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trade (Milner 1999) We contend that this mixed record is the result of a failure to account fully for the social structural implications of IGOs More specifically, IGOs create an intercountry network in which a large and interrelated set of trade-related institutions is embedded Accounting for this broader network enables us to paint a very different picture of the influence of IGOs on trade

The recognition that IGOs forge connections between countries makes relevant a large sociological literature that links interactor connections to exchange This literature has shown that a range of formal and informal connections between actors smoothes exchange between them (Granovetter 1985, Uzzi 1996, DiMaggio and Louch 1998), and that the pattern of connections is a key determinant of competition (Burt 1992) We apply these ideas to help understand the influence of connections through IGOs for bilateral trade and find support for both the idea that more connections increase trade, and that the broader network affects competition, such that trade between two countries is less if they have similar patterns of connections to others

Our context also allows us to make a fresh contribution to the network approach to economic sociology by taking up two criticisms of that literature The first criticism is that network theorists reify social structure and underattend to issues regarding the origin and change of networks (Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002) In our context it is clear that IGO connections are forged through IGOs themselves, and that these organizations form a link between trade-related institutions, on the one hand, and a broader network of countries, on the other Furthermore, by tracking IGOs over an extended period (1885–1992), we produce dynamic measures of the network these IGOs help create

With sufficient dynamism in our network variables, we are able to overcome a related limitation of static analyses of network influence namely, that they may confound network measures with persistent attributes of the nodes or the dyads We achieve this by including a variety of control variables and dyad fixed effects, which permit us to show that IGO connections influence trade *independent* of other notable factors, including physical distance, population and economy size, regime type, ethnic and colonial ties, and shared language Our specifications also include year fixed effects, which control for global trends and events that may affect trade and/or international relations

The second criticism is that network theorists have underemphasized the institutional content of connections, treating social structure as an end in itself and failing to account for the fact that similar social structures can house various and sometimes opposing institutions (Salancik 1995, Nee and Ingram 1998) Essentially, this is the opposite of the criticism of the institutions literature that motivated us to consider social structure in

the first place. In our reading, it is not that network theorists ignore institutions, but rather that they are catholic as to the mechanisms through which connections may influence exchange. This approach is empirically justifiable, as most connections contain a diverse set of influences on exchange. However, it would be theoretically useful to have more evidence that identifies specific mechanisms through which connections affect exchange, especially in light of arguments by economists that the influence of connections can be accounted for by nonsocial mechanisms (Gibbons 1999). We are able to produce such evidence by dividing IGO connections into those that arise through IGOs formed for economic purposes (EIGOs) and those formed for social and cultural purposes (SCIGOs). Consistent with a core principle of economic sociology, we find that SCIGO connections bring substantial increases in bilateral trade. Furthermore, we find that the magnitude of the effect of both EIGO and SCIGO connections depends on the *organizational capacity* of the IGOs that create them. This result sheds new light on the mechanisms of network influence by linking the benefits of association to more formal structures.

IGOS AND THE GOVERNANCE OF TRADE

The new institutional analysis of exchange relies on transaction costs, which arise because of the risk of malfeasance and uncertainty inherent in trading (Williamson 1975). In almost every exchange, there is a moment where one of the parties has control over all or most of the goods and must decide whether to follow through on the agreed-upon bargain, or make a grab for more. This problem is obvious in the simplest of exchanges, as where children swap toys on the playground. The risk of malfeasance increases substantially when the exchange is more complex, as in global commerce, where differences in law, physical distance, and language have all been found to impede trade (Frankel 2000).

The second source of transaction costs, uncertainty, may be a more important inhibitor of international trade. The risk of malfeasance aside, exchange is fraught with difficulties in recognizing opportunities for exchange, finding partners, measuring quantity and quality, and equating the value of goods that may be imperfectly divisible. Indeed, these factors are likely behind the so-called "border effects" (Helliwell 1998) that riddle trade, whereby commerce tends to flow more between subnational units of a country (i.e., provinces or states) than across national borders, controlling for physical distance and economy size. Here, political-cultural differences make communication and understanding more difficult, the upshot being that many opportunities for international exchange are doubtless missed (Evans 2003).

Institutions are widely thought to moderate these transaction costs. Laws that enforce contracts at the domestic level enable exchange partners to credibly commit to future actions and reduce the risk of malfeasance (North 1990). When legal sanctions are ineffective or inaccessible, reputation and normative sanctions can create similar benefits (Macaulay 1963, Greif 1994). An example of an IGO that promotes rules of "fair" exchange is the WTO, which sets out rights and obligations for trade based on the principles of nondiscrimination and reciprocity, and provides for a dispute resolution mechanism to adjudicate these rights and obligations (Busch and Reinhardt 2002). Other IGOs reduce uncertainty by promoting efforts at harmonization, like the International Organization for Standardization. Still others focus on specific issue areas, such as the World Intellectual Property Organisation, or on specific sectors, like the International Coffee Organization.

For all the theoretical interest in IGOs, the fact remains that empirical studies have turned up results that are far from impressive. In the case of international trade, in particular, one could be forgiven for questioning all the attention to IGOs. The reason for this skepticism is that, despite persistent research efforts, there is little hard evidence that IGOs promote trade. Why this disconnect between theory and evidence? We argue that the literature has not given sufficient attention to the role of IGOs in affecting connections *between* their members. The very earliest efforts to identify the influence of IGOs ignored membership—or at least the idea that membership brought specific countries under the umbrellas of IGOs—and simply correlated counts of IGOs with international outcomes (e.g., Singer and Wallace 1970). Later efforts have partly overcome this problem by correlating outcomes for a specific country (i.e., levels of trade, GDP growth, participation in war, etc.) with the number of IGOs to which it belongs. Representative of this approach, Jacobson et al. (1986) find mixed results regarding the link between IGO memberships and trade, noting that IGO memberships seem to matter only for developing countries and only in certain periods.

While the count of memberships recognizes that countries must typically be part of IGOs to benefit from their influence, this approach misses the fact that IGO influence often requires that *both* countries in a transaction be subject to the same IGOs. In other words, it is not just membership, but *joint membership*, that matters. This is most obvious with regard to the many IGOs that promote coordination. After all, what good is it to adopt a convention regarding measurement, data transmission, or accounting, when the parties one would like to transact with do not observe the same convention? The idea that IGO governance depends on connections created by joint membership has recently been applied in analyses of the likelihood of war and has reinvigorated that important

research tradition (Russett and Oneal 2001, Gartzke 2002) We propose that identifying the influence of IGOs on bilateral trade requires a similar shift to the connections among countries that IGOs create *and* to the broader network formed by those connections

Recent analyses of bilateral trade have considered these so-called “dyadic” connections formed by the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but have produced mixed results For example, Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000) conclude that a GATT/WTO connection promotes trade, while Rose (2004) concludes that it does not These analyses are a step in the right direction, but they do not go far enough By considering only one IGO, they miss important issues about the multiplexity of dyadic connections and the interdependence of overlapping institutions Network theorists emphasize that important interactor relationships are “thick,” with multiple dimensions of understanding and influence (Uzzi 1996) As for institutional interdependence, even a small international transaction might depend on the existence of dozens of IGOs that might help a buyer find a seller, coordinate transportation and communication between the seller and buyer, provide them with standardized measurements upon which to base negotiations, and, finally, convert currencies and clear a check

It is not that we think that all IGOs are of the same importance, for in fact we will show that different types of IGOs impact trade differently Rather, we subscribe to the view that issues of multiplexity and interdependence necessitate consideration of a broad set of IGOs, at least as a starting point Reflecting the web of institutional support that IGOs can yield, we look for an influence on bilateral trade of the overall IGO connectedness of two countries We define two countries as being connected through an IGO when they are simultaneously members of that IGO and are thereby subject to its governing rules As a first cut, then, the overall IGO connectedness between two countries is simply a count of all the IGOs in which they share membership

HYPOTHESIS 1 —*As the IGO connectedness between two countries increases, trade between them will increase*

INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE VERSUS SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS

Hypothesis 1 rests on a utilitarian analysis of IGO connectedness That treatment does not, however, exhaust the theoretical potential of the idea that relationships govern exchange Relationships may also produce non-utilitarian outcomes that are important for exchange, such as trust, empathy, and sympathy (Granovetter 1985) It is therefore worthwhile to distinguish the utilitarian and affective dimensions of relational gover-

nance, even though they co-occur in most relationships IGO connectedness presents a rare empirical opportunity to make this distinction, because while many IGOs pursue economic ends, others are formed for explicitly cultural and social purposes. Thus, a finding that SCIGOs, like the Nordic Children's Film Council or the World Health Organization, promoted bilateral trade could join results such as those presented by DiMaggio and Louch (1998) as evidence of the economic impact of relations with a (mainly) social origin.

Two arguments form the microfoundation of our assertion that SCIGOs affect trade: (1) SCIGOs increase awareness, sympathy, empathy, and even trust between the citizens of different countries, and (2) the resulting shift in cross-national relations and perceptions results in more trade. The first argument is the harder to establish, in the face of a shortage of systematic research on the effects of SCIGOs and of the determinants of cross-border relations and sentiments. Nevertheless, a number of arguments support the idea that SCIGOs produce positive interpersonal associations between citizens of different countries. Indeed, this is the espoused objective of many SCIGOs, as with the Department of Social Sciences of UNESCO, which aimed to "knit together social science scholars of the world with the expectation that this will increase international understanding" (Angell 1950, p. 282). One way SCIGOs may effect this end is by forging connections between citizens of different countries. Such contact may be a primary goal of an SCIGO, as with the Asia-Europe Foundation, whose mission is "to foster contacts and intercultural dialogue among people from all walks of life in Asia and Europe" (<http://www.asef.org>), or the Bureau International des Expositions, which promotes world fairs (<http://www.bie-paris.org>). SCIGOs may also forge bilateral contacts indirectly as they bring citizens of different nations together for meetings or other operational purposes. Contact with citizens of other nations has been shown to reduce antipathy and to promote more positive stereotypes (Reigrofski and Anderson 1959).

SCIGOs may promote bilateral sympathy and empathy by creating the perception of joint purpose between the citizens of states that pursue shared social, cultural, humanitarian, or other noneconomic ends. Almost all SCIGOs represent such joint purposes, examples include those that protect the environment (e.g., the International Coral Reef Initiative) and those that pursue social welfare (e.g., the Inter-American Children's Institute). There is plentiful evidence from social psychology that groupings produce affinity to group members, the ubiquitous in-group/out-group effect. In the specific context of associations forged through IGOs, Russett and Oneal (2001, p. 233) show that the "affinity" between two states increases as the number of IGO connections between them increases. Bilateral affinity, a variable created by Gartzke (2000), is "the rank order

correlation of states' voting in the United Nations General Assembly [As it] increases two states are thought to share more interests in common" (Russett and Oneal 2001, p. 231). Since Russett and Oneal's result was based on an aggregate measure of IGO connectedness, we performed an additional test of Gartzke's affinity variable on IGO connectedness, disaggregating this variable into its component parts, including those created by EIGOs and those created by SCIGOs. That analysis showed not only that SCIGOs were a positive influence on bilateral affinity, but also that they were more positive in that regard than EIGOs.

If SCIGOs do create bilateral sympathy, understanding and affinity, and interpersonal connections that span borders, the next question is whether these affect bilateral trade. It is well known in the literature on international business that exchange partners and products are less attractive to the extent that they seem foreign, so anything that increases familiarity between nations can be expected also to increase trade between them (Zaheer 1995, Bilkey and Nes 1982, Grosse and Trevino 1996). For example, the psychological trait "worldmindedness" has been shown to increase professional buyers' willingness to purchase foreign products (Crawford and Lamb 1982). Worldmindedness, which taps an orientation to "international sharing and welfare and reflects an empathy for the peoples of other countries" (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), is just the sentiment that many SCIGOs aim to create.

Trade may also be affected by the sense of shared purpose (affinity) that SCIGOs create. Again, there is experimental evidence to show that ingroup affinity facilitates economic cooperation (e.g., Erev, Bornstein, and Galili 1993). The oldest axiom regarding global commerce is that trade follows the flag, a truism that is supported by a number of studies that indicate that there is more trade between allies (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000, Oneal and Russett 2001). Even more closely related to our argument, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) analyze data on trust between nations obtained from the Euro-Barometer surveys and find that nations whose citizens feel more trust for each other experience more bilateral trade. Given the evidence that trust, familiarity, shared purpose, and contact between nations promote trade, and the likely possibility that SCIGOs promote those things, we predict that

HYPOTHESIS 2—As social/cultural IGO connectedness between two countries increases, trade between them will increase

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY OF IGOS

So far we have argued that IGOs influence trade by forging a network of bilateral connections that hosts transaction-smoothing rules *and* affects

intercountry sentiments. The next step in our theory development is to recognize that some IGOs have more impact than others beyond the structure they create and the institutions they overlay on that structure. This step is important substantively, because even casual observers of international organization realize that IGOs vary in their capacities to affect their members and achieve their goals, and that it would be a mistake to ignore the distinction between minimalist organizations (such as the International Wool Study Group) and more powerful ones (like the WTO). It also matters theoretically, as institutional arguments too often emphasize institutions of a given form (laws, organizational policies, social norms, etc.) while underattending to the interdependence between forms, which is so often fundamental to their impact (Nee and Ingram 1998). For example, the effectiveness of an organizational policy will depend on other institutions, such as the national law and culture within which the organization operates (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dobbin and Sutton 1998) and the social norms held by the organization's participants (e.g., Heckathorn 1990).

Our current claim is that the effectiveness of an IGO connection will depend on the organizational capacity of the IGO. The issue of whether an IGO has "teeth" is particularly salient, because the basis of IGO authority is voluntary association. IGOs bind their member countries through treaties, and if a country chooses to flout a treaty, the only real sanctions are those imposed by other members, as there is no "higher court" (or third-party enforcer) that can compel members to follow through on their commitments. Just as the norms of a well-structured social group (e.g., Jewish diamond traders) can be expected to have more bite than those of a loosely structured group (e.g., passengers on a subway), the policies of IGOs with effective mechanisms of communication, coordination, dispute resolution, and enforcement should have more impact than those of minimalist IGOs.

Gartzke (2002) demonstrates that the impact of IGOs depends on their organizational structures in an analysis of the determinants of war. As we do, he operationalizes connectedness between two countries as a function of the number of IGOs in which they share membership. He finds that connections through IGOs that were "structured" reduced the incidence of war, while connections through "minimalist" IGOs had no effect. According to Gartzke (p. 22), minimalist IGOs are "without an extensive bureaucracy beyond research, planning, and information gathering," while structured IGOs contain "structures of assembly, executive, and/or bureaucracy to implement policy, as well as formal procedures and rules." The emphasis here on a bureaucratic capacity to implement has a satisfying correspondence to arguments proffered by Weber (1946) and

Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) about the source of states' institutional strength

The example of the GATT/WTO illustrates both the nature of associative control of IGOs and the importance of organizational structure to empower them. Although it is among the most renowned economic IGOs, the GATT/WTO is often likened to a "court without a bailiff." Its influence to quell trade disputes is largely informal, more like a social norm than a law. "The basic force of the procedure [comes] from the normative force of the decisions themselves and from community pressure to observe them" (Hudec 1987, p. 214). As Busch and Reinhardt (2002) explain, the punch of the GATT/WTO comes from the potential to produce a clear normative statement embodied in a ruling, a potential which induces most disputants to settle before a ruling is rendered. But what is required to enable a "clear normative statement?" At a minimum, there must be an accepted standard of what constitutes a violation and a means of adjudicating this would-be violation. In a small social group, an informal consensus might be sufficient backing for a rule, but in a context as complicated as international trade, formal rules are typically necessary, as reflected in Gartzke's definition of a structured IGO, and as exemplified by the WTO's covered agreements. Beyond the standard of nondiscriminatory trade, it is necessary that WTO rulings are perceived as legitimate. Here, Weber's arguments regarding professional bureaucracy as a source of legitimacy are useful—the legitimacy and normative weight of WTO rulings depends on whether "justice" is seen as being rendered by objective and capable interpreters of its rules.

The significance of IGO structure seems equally likely for SCIGOs as it is for EIGOs like the WTO. SCIGOs may not have to enforce policies, but they will nevertheless depend on a bureaucracy to implement policies. The following prediction, therefore, applies for both EIGOs and SCIGOs.

HYPOTHESIS 3 —IGO connectedness through structured IGOs has a greater positive effect on bilateral trade than does connectedness through minimalist IGOs

COMPETITION IN THE IGO NETWORK

The broader pattern of IGO connectedness may influence bilateral trade between two countries through the mechanism of competition. In the literature on networks, it is well accepted that the potential for competition between two actors increases as a function of the similarity of their pattern of relationships to others (Burt 1992). Actors with more similar relationships have more similar capabilities, information, and other resources.

Modern structural sociologists have identified benefits, ranging from the promotion of managers to the innovativeness of laboratories and the profitability of industries, to actors who stand between disconnected—or weakly connected—others. In our context, two countries that had the same IGO connections to all other countries would have a similar set of import and export opportunities, at least to the extent that opportunities are a function of the institutions that contribute to surety, trust, communication, transportation, and other inputs to effective trade. In network parlance, these two countries would be labeled structurally equivalent in the IGO network. *Structural equivalence* is a familiar concept in the network literature, defined as a measure of the degree of similarity, in terms of the pattern of relationships to others, between two actors (Lorrain and White 1971).

But how does the level of trade between two countries depend on structural equivalence? The significance of relationships to others comes from the fact that international trade is an open system, in the sense that countries engage in trade not only to satisfy domestic interests, but also in response to opportunities and necessities that derive from trade itself. This is most apparent in what is called transshipment, which occurs when a country imports goods from one trading partner and exports them to another. Such flow-through trade, whether transparent or obfuscated, depends on a relatively weak connection between the original exporter and the ultimate importer. If those countries were well connected institutionally, politically, and geographically, then they presumably would not need the services of the country that stands between them to facilitate this flow-through trade.

In recent decades, the country that best represents the implication of *low* structural equivalence for trade is Hong Kong, which intermediated between China, with which it has strong intergovernmental ties, and other countries that were more weakly tied to China (Hanson and Feenstra 2001). For example, in the late 1990s, the United States objected to transshipments of textiles from China through Hong Kong as a means of circumventing quota restrictions. Interestingly, New Zealand, in turn, cited this example in raising questions about its own enthusiasm for negotiating an economic agreement with Hong Kong, fearing a flood of Chinese textiles in the wake of a crackdown by U.S. authorities on Hong Kong.² While Hong Kong is the textbook example for transshipment, the phenomenon happens elsewhere. Recently, Brussels requested that Poland more fully “secure” its borders on the eve of that country’s accession to

² Supplementary submission by the Central Districts Federated Clothing, Laundry and Allied Workers Union on the proposed Hong Kong free trade and investment agreement, at <http://www.canterbury.cyberplace.org.nz>

the EU, one fear being that Poland's relatively close relations with non-members could well inspire a surge of transshipment into the lucrative European market

Straight transshipment may be the most obvious form of brokering in international trade, but a country spanning weakly connected others may also import raw materials or low-value inputs from one, transform them, and send value-added exports to the other.³ Alternatively, assembly industries may develop in a country because of preferential access to an export market. Volkswagen, for example, set up shop in Mexico to service the local market, but with trade liberalization sweeping that country in the lead-up to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the completion of the Uruguay round of the GATT, Volkswagen's Mexico facility emerged as a key exporter to the United States and Canada, its two NAFTA partners.⁴

The bases of all of these opportunities for flow-through trade are differences (inequivalences) in the strength of connectedness in the IGO network. If, for example, other countries established the same strong connection to China that Hong Kong had—a development that would make them more structurally equivalent to Hong Kong—they could trade directly with China without relying on Hong Kong for transshipment. Trade between Hong Kong and its newly structurally equivalent alters would fall. Thus, we make the following prediction

HYPOTHESIS 4 —Trade between two countries will be negatively related to the structural equivalence between them in the IGO network

ANALYSES OF TRADE

Model

To test our hypotheses, we use the “gravity” model, which is the standard for analyses of bilateral trade. According to Rose (2004, p. 99), the gravity model is “a completely conventional device used to estimate the effects of a variety of phenomena on international trade.” The model uses a log-

³ We do not suggest that structural inequivalence in the IGO network is the only reason that countries occupy different positions in global production systems. Human capital, natural endowments, and industrial policy obviously affect which countries provide raw materials, labor, and technology in global production. Commodity-chain theory in sociology also highlights the importance of country power in determining the pattern of production (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). Our argument is consistent with these claims, and we would simply add to any of them that whatever determines which countries do what in globally distributed production, importing and exporting is required, and the IGO network smoothes those transactions.

⁴ See http://www.umich.edu/~cibe/case_pdf/97-12.pdf and <http://www.autonews.com/news/cms?newsId=2709>

log specification to explain trade between two countries as a function of their joint income, asserting trade flows will be proportional to the product of their GDPs.⁵ We use the bench-line specification of the gravity model described by Rose (2004, p. 100) with control variables suggested by Oneal and Russett (2001) and the variables we have created to represent the IGO network

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{Trade}_{ijt}) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(\text{GDP}_i \text{GDP}_j)_t + \beta_2 \ln(\text{GDP}_i \text{GDP}_j / \text{Pop}_i \text{Pop}_j)_t \\ & + \beta_3 \ln(\text{IGOCON}_{ijt}) + \beta_4 \text{StrucEquiv}_{ijt} + \beta_5 \text{Democ}_{ijt} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{Ally}_{ijt} + \sum_j \phi_j D_j + \sum_t \alpha_t Y_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \end{aligned}$$

where i and j are the countries in a dyad, t denotes time, and the variables are

- 1 Trade_{ijt} is the real value of bilateral trade between i and j in year t
- 2 GDP is real GDP
- 3 Pop is population
- 4 IGOCON_{ijt} , which tests hypothesis 1, is IGO connectedness, the number of IGOs that i and j are *simultaneously* members of in year t . IGOCON is replaced by subcomponents representing connectedness through economic and social/cultural IGOs to test hypothesis 2. Those variables are in turn replaced by their subcomponents representing connectedness through minimalist and structured IGOs to test hypothesis 3.
- 5 StrucEquiv_{ijt} tests hypothesis 4 and is the Pearson product-moment correlation between the vectors of i and j 's IGO connections to *other* countries in year t .
- 6 Democ_{ijt} is the minimum of the democracy/autocracy scores (taken from the Polity III Database) of i and j in year t . This control is included because democracies are expected both to trade more *and* join more IGOs with each other.
- 7 Ally_{ijt} is an indicator variable coded one if i and j have a military alliance in year t (taken from the Correlates of War Data Set). This control is included because allies are expected both to trade more *and* to join more IGOs with each other.
- 8 $\{D\}$ is a set of dyad-level fixed effects
- 9 $\{Y\}$ is a set of year fixed effects

⁵ The typical gravity model also includes the log of the distance between the two countries, which we cannot include because we use dyad fixed effects. We show below that our results are robust in a random-effects model that includes the log of distance.

The dyad and year fixed effects are important in this specification (Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001, Rose 2004). First, they account for the nonindependence of observations in our data. Second, they effectively control for all stable dyadic and time-varying global influences on trade. Examples of relevant dyad-level influences include the distance between the two countries, whether they share language, a border, religion, or colonial history. The dyad fixed effects take all of these stable influences out of the mix. Similarly, the year fixed effects account for historical influences that affect all dyads, including discrete events of global import such as the Great Depression, the world wars, and the fall of state socialism, as well as trends such as the legitimacy of international relations or international trade. In other words, the fixed effects control for all influences on trade except those that vary both within a dyad *and* across time. With the fixed effects in place, the coefficients indicate the expected change in bilateral trade of a one-unit change in an independent variable for a given dyad in a given year, not correlations between variables across dyads or time. This is the best way to test our hypotheses directly.

Data and Variable Construction

We take our trade, GDP, and population data directly from the data used in Oneal and Russett (2001). These data are particularly appealing for our purposes because they cover the period 1885 to 1992, whereas other data sets focus on the most recent 50 years, when trade data have been more readily accessible. The period before World War II represents substantial change in the network of IGO connections, so this longer time series is important for testing our hypotheses, though as we show below, our results are comparable when we restrict our analysis to the postwar period. Furthermore, given that some analyses of bilateral trade have shown sensitivity to certain key coding decisions—notably what to do about zero trade values before taking their natural logarithm—it is convenient to use Oneal and Russett's data, given that their codings are the result of a series of methodological debates (though here too, we show below that our results are robust to various popular treatments of the relevant variables).

Oneal and Russett obtained trade data from (a) the IMF for the post-World War II era, (b) the League of Nations for the interwar period, and (c) annual editions of *The Stateman's Yearbook* (e.g., Epstein 1913) for pre-World War I. They also relied on other archival sources in their effort to compile the data and check its reliability and robustness (Russett and Oneal 2001, pp. 139–40). They converted current values of trade and GDP to real U.S. dollars (1990 = 100), listed bilateral trade in millions of dollars and added \$100,000 before taking the log (to allow the logs of

dyads with zero trade), and listed real GDP in millions of dollars and population in thousands before logging. We take their data in these forms, so the basic data inputs to our gravity models, including the dependent variable, are the same as theirs. Table 1 lists the 135 countries in the data set and the time frame over which each country is observed.

The basis of our operationalizations of the IGO network is the time-varying listing of IGOs and their members, from 1816 to 2001, provided by Pevehouse et al. (2003). According to their definition, an IGO must

- 1 include three or more members of the Correlates of War–defined state system,
- 2 hold regular plenary sessions at least once every 10 years, and
- 3 possess a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters

IGOs may be formed directly by the states themselves or may be “emanations” formed by another IGO. Pevehouse et al. list all of the IGOs formed directly by states, but exclude emanations. This treatment is appropriate for our purposes because emanations are *not* independent from their parent IGOs and do not therefore represent independent sources of IGO connections. Pevehouse et al. identify 497 IGOs that existed at some point in history. In the first year of our analysis, 1885, there were 14 IGOs operating, 43 in 1914, 65 in 1938, and 314 in 1992, which is the last year of our analysis.

We used the IGO member listing to create a time-varying affiliation matrix of connectedness between two countries. The affiliation matrix is produced by multiplying X_t , a country by IGO matrix, with the cells indicating whether a country is a member of a given IGO at time t , by its transpose: $C_t = X_t X_t^T$. Thus, C_t is a symmetric country-by-country matrix where the cell c_{ijt} indicates the number of IGOs that country i and country j share joint membership in at time t . To test hypotheses 2 and 3 we followed the same procedure to create affiliation matrices of connections through EIGOs and SCIGOs, and the minimalist and structured representatives of each of those types. This required that we code IGOs as to their function and structure. We followed available coding schemes to do so and describe the process in the appendix. We take the natural logarithms of the IGO connectedness variables, both for consistency with the treatment of other variables in the gravity model, and because exploratory analysis indicated that this functional form best represented the impact of IGO connectedness in our models (our results are qualitatively similar when the IGO connectedness variables are not logged). We added 0.1 to all measures of IGO connectedness before taking the natural logarithms.

Structural equivalence, which tests hypothesis 4, is simply the Pearson product-moment correlation between the vectors that represent i and j 's

IGO connections to all other countries (Wasserman and Faust 1994, p 368) This measure captures the degree of similarity between two countries' IGO connections *to others*, to get at our argument that similarities in relations to others represent competition, while dissimilarities represent brokering opportunities Some readers have wondered why we use this continuous measure of structural equivalence rather than a measure based on pure structural holes (complete disconnects) in the IGO network The reason is that brokering opportunities in the IGO network arise from differences in the strength of IGO connections, not from complete disconnects which were relatively rare, especially in later years For example, currently, all countries have *some* connection to China in the IGO network (there are no complete disconnects), yet much trade to and from China flows through Hong Kong because its IGO connection to China is stronger than that of most other countries

Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in table 2 Generally, the correlations between variables that appear in the same models (e g, not comparing IGO connectedness to its economic and social/cultural components) are modest, although there are some correlations greater than 50 among the network variables We therefore conducted a number of investigations to insure that our estimations were not compromised by multicollinearity We estimated hierarchically nested regression models and used *F*-tests to indicate the joint significance of more highly correlated variables (Kmenta 1971, p 371) The nested models (presented below) showed that the coefficients of correlated variables were robust to various model specifications, and the results of the *F*-tests were consistent with the tests of individual significance, indicating that their standard errors were not inflated Additionally, we estimated our models on random subsamples of the data, obtaining results comparable in all ways to those we report below (Greene 1997) We also estimated models with the network variables entered singularly, and again, the results were consistent with those we report here Thus, there is no evidence that multicollinearity compromised our estimations

Results

Table 3 presents the results of fixed-effects gravity models Model 1 includes the control variables Model 2 adds structural equivalence and is a significant improvement over model 1 ($F_{1,143278} = 352.22$, $P < .001$) The coefficient on that variable indicates that there is less trade between two countries when they are more structurally equivalent, in support of hypothesis 4 Model 3 adds the aggregate IGO connectedness measure and improves on model 2 ($F_{1,143277} = 4231$, $P < .001$) The positive coefficient for IGO connectedness is as predicted by hypothesis 1 as two countries

TABLE 1
COUNTRIES ANALYZED

Country Name	Years of Observation*	Country Name	Years of Observation*	Country Name	Years of Observation*
Afghanistan	1925-38	Germany (West)	1955-88	Nicaragua	1925-90
Albania	1925-38	Germany	1885-1938	Niger	1960-89
Algeria	1963-92	Ghana	1960-90	Nigeria	1960-92
Angola	1975-89	Greece	1885-1992	Norway	1905-92
Argentina	1887-1990	Guatemala	1925-92	Oman	1971-89
Australia	1920-92	Guinea	1959-92	Pakistan	1950-92
Austria	1920-92	Guinea-Bissau	1974-92	Panama	1925-92
Austria-Hungary	1885-1913	Guyana	1966-90	Papua New Guinea	1976-92
Bahrain	1975-88	Haiti	1934-89	Paraguay	1920-92
Bangladesh	1973-92	Honduras	1925-92	Peru	1885-1992
Belgium	1885-1992	Hungary	1920-92	Philippines	1950-92
Benin	1960-92	Iceland	1950-92	Poland	1920-92
Bolivia	1925-92	India	1950-92	Portugal	1885-1990
Botswana	1966-89	Indonesia	1960-92	Romania	1885-1988
Brazil	1890-1992	Iran	1925-92	Russia	1885-1989
Bulgaria	1908-92	Iraq	1932-87	Rwanda	1962-92
Burkina Faso	1960-92	Ireland	1922-92	Saudi Arabia	1927-89
Burma	1950-89	Israel	1953-92	Senegal	1960-92
Burundi	1962-92	Italy	1885-1992	Sierra Leone	1961-92
Cameroon	1961-92	Ivory Coast	1960-92	Singapore	1965-92
Canada	1920-92	Jamaica	1962-92	Somalia	1960-89
Central Afr Rep	1962-92	Japan	1885-1992	South Africa	1920-92
Chad	1962-92	Jordan	1954-90	Spain	1885-1992
Chile	1895-1992	Kenya	1965-92	Sri Lanka	1950-92
China	1890-1992	Korea	1905	Sudan	1971-92

Colombia	1900–1992	Korea, South	1953–92	Swaziland	1968–89
Comoros	1975–92	Kuwait	1980–89	Sweden	1885–1992
Congo	1961–90	Laos	1984–92	Switzerland	1885–1992
Costa Rica	1925–92	Latvia	1920–38	Syria	1961–92
Cuba	1925–38	Lesotho	1972–92	Tanzania	1963–88
Cyprus	1960–92	Liberia	1925–86	Thailand	1890–1990
Czechoslovakia	1920–90	Lithuania	1920–38	Togo	1961–90
Denmark	1885–1992	Luxembourg	1920–92	Trinidad & Tobago	1962–92
Dominican Rep	1925–92	Malawi	1965–92	Tunisia	1960–92
Ecuador	1925–92	Malaysia	1960–92	Turkey	1885–1992
Egypt	1937–92	Mali	1960–90	Uganda	1962–92
El Salvador	1925–92	Mauritania	1961–92	United Arab Emir	1980–89
Estonia	1920–38	Mauritius	1968–92	United Kingdom	1885–1992
Ethiopia	1925–86	Mexico	1890–1992	U S A	1885–1992
Fiji	1970–90	Mongolia	1929–90	Uruguay	1925–92
Finland	1920–92	Morocco	1956–92	Venezuela	1900–1992
France	1885–1992	Mozambique	1976–92	Yugoslavia	1921–90
Gabon	1961–92	Nepal	1960–86	Zaire	1965–89
Gambia	1965–90	Netherlands	1885–1992	Zambia	1964–92
Germany (East)	1970–88	New Zealand	1920–92	Zimbabwe	1967–92

* Years of observation may not be inclusive because of data availability. There are no observations during the world wars, 1914–19 and 1939–45

TABLE 2
BASIC STATISTICS

	Mean	SD	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) $\ln(\text{trade})$	2.58	2.77	25	24	26	21	40	17	30	09	30	66	49	30	02
(2) $\ln(\text{IGO connectedness})$	2.81	1.09		92	90	84	50	78	63	75	63	36	36	17	15
(3) $\ln(\text{EIGO and SCIGO connectedness})$	2.59	1.00			97	98	54	84	70	83	58	37	40	18	18
(4) $\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness})$	2.14	1.04				83	56	87	63	76	55	39	41	18	16
(5) $\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness})$	1.53	.96					46	75	79	89	53	35	38	15	22
(6) $\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness}_{\text{minimal}})$.55	1.40						26	51	30	51	32	26	28	15
(7) $\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness}_{\text{structured}})$	1.66	1.37						55	72	43	39	40	06	16	16
(8) $\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness}_{\text{minimal}})$.52	1.35							51	53	40	32	14	21	21
(9) $\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness}_{\text{structured}})$.94	.90								38	23	35	10	21	21
(10) Structural equivalence	.61	.23									30	17	18	26	26
(11) $\ln(\text{GDP} \times \text{GDP})$	34.57	2.60										51	16	— 06	— 06
(12) $\ln(\text{GDP per cap}) \times [\text{GDP per cap}]$	16.13	1.45											37	— 08	— 08
(13) Min democracy in dyad	—3.26	6.65													02
(14) Military allies	.13	.34													

TABLE 3
FIXED-EFFECTS (Dyad and Year) GRAVITY MODELS OF BILATERAL TRADE, 1885–1992

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
$\ln(\text{IGO connectedness})$			656*** (011)			
$\ln(\text{EIGO and SCIGO connectedness})$				588*** (010)		
$\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness})$					470*** (009)	
$\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness})$					130*** (009)	
$\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness}_{\text{minimal}})$						109*** (004)
$\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness}_{\text{structured}})$						166*** (007)
$\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness}_{\text{minimal}})$						017*** (005)
$\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness}_{\text{structured}})$						258*** (008)
Structural equivalence		– 684*** (036)	– 1 831*** (040)	– 1 696*** (040)	– 1 694*** (040)	– 1 367*** (039)
$\ln(\text{GDP}_i \times \text{GDP}_j)$	151*** (013)	185*** (013)	083*** (013)	070*** (013)	057*** (013)	060*** (013)
$\ln([\text{GDP per cap}]_i \times [\text{GDP per cap}]_j)$	761*** (016)	731*** (016)	853*** (016)	859*** (016)	878*** (016)	865*** (016)
Min democracy in dyad	007*** (001)	008*** (001)	010*** (001)	010*** (001)	010*** (001)	011*** (001)
Military allies	159*** (019)	132*** (019)	127*** (019)	130*** (019)	112*** (019)	164*** (019)
Observations	149,102	149,102	149,102	149,102	149,102	149,102
Dyads	5,725	5,725	5,725	5,725	5,725	5,725
Within-dyad R^2	3372	3388	3578	3542	3562	3531

NOTE — Standard errors in parentheses

** $P < 01$

*** $P < 001$

become more connected to each other through joint membership in IGOs, the trade between them increases. When IGO connectedness between two countries doubles, the level of trade between them is expected to increase by 58% ($2^{0.656} - 1$). Since IGO connectedness is based on the full set of IGOs, this result indicates the average impact of IGO connections on trade. Model 4 replaces the aggregate IGO connectedness measure with one that reflects connections only through EIGOs and SCIGOs, excluding IGOs that had general or military/political functions.⁶ As expected, connectedness through EIGOs and SCIGOs (which make up more than 80% of all IGOs) brings a large increase in trade.

Model 5 breaks out the separate effects of EIGO and SCIGO connections. A test of joint significance indicates that the inclusion of these measures improves on model 2 ($F_{2,143276} = 1939, P < .001$, model 2 is the appropriate comparison because the logging of the IGO connectedness measures means that model 5 is not nested in models 3 or 4). Consistent with hypothesis 2, the positive coefficient of SCIGO connectedness indicates that affiliations through these social and cultural organizations do increase bilateral trade. The final model in table 3 breaks EIGO and SCIGO connectedness into that which comes from minimalist and structured IGOs. The four connectedness measures that result are jointly significant ($F_{4,143274} = 486.5, P < .001$). As hypothesis 3 predicted, connections through structured IGOs do more to increase trade than connections through minimalist IGOs. This is true for both EIGOs ($F_{1,143274} = 45.99, P < .001$) and SCIGOs ($F_{1,143274} = 615.65, P < .001$).

The coefficients in model 6 suggest that doubling the level of connection through minimalist and structured EIGOs is associated with increases in trade of 7.8% and 12.2%, respectively. Corresponding figures for SCIGOs are 1.1% for minimalist and 19.6% for structured. While we predicted that SCIGOs would increase trade, we were surprised by the magnitude of the effect of connections through structured SCIGOs, which is even larger than that of structured EIGOs ($F_{1,143274} = 65.13, P < .001$).

The control variables in all of the models in table 3 behave as expected. Richer countries, as indicated by GDP and GDP per capita, trade more. Trade is also higher as a function of the minimum level of democracy in

⁶ General and political/military IGOs accounted for 89 of the 497 total IGOs. We chose not to highlight specific effects for these "other" IGOs because they do not fit as cleanly into the mechanisms of transaction governance and awareness/affinity that we have highlighted. Presumably, general and political/military IGOs affect trade through both of these mechanisms, but operate also to affect the international balance of power in a way that is beyond the scope of this article. Supplementary models indicated that connections through general and political/military IGOs are associated with higher trade, although the inclusion of these additional connectedness measures does not affect the coefficients of EIGOs and SCIGOs that we interpret to test hypotheses 2 and 3.

the dyad, supporting the claim that democracy promotes trade (Oneal and Russett 2001). Military allies also trade more, consistent with the familiar “trade follows the flag” argument.

Robustness Checks

While the results in table 3 are consistently in support of our hypotheses, there remain alternative model specifications and functional forms of the variables to consider. Table 4 presents a battery of robustness checks of our results. The first alternative we consider is a theoretical one. IGOs may influence trade through the creation of legitimacy. Very briefly, the argument contains the following elements: countries are more legitimate to the extent that they employ familiar structures and engage in certain “statelike” activities, including participation in international organizations (Meyer et al. 1997), and are more attractive trading partners as a function of their legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977). These arguments suggest the total number of IGO memberships of the states in a dyad (as an indicator of their legitimacy) as a predictor of trade.⁷ In model 7, the natural logarithm of this variable is added to our full model. Consistent with the legitimacy argument, it has a positive effect on the level of bilateral trade, but importantly, its inclusion does not change the results concerning our main variables of interest.

We also reestimated our model using only dyads that exist for at least 20 years in the data, reported as model 8. The reason for doing this is that Oneal and Russett (2001) suggest that their results were more stable for longer-duration dyads. The results are essentially the same as those reported for all dyads. In model 9 we examined sensitivity to the process by which zero values of trade are logged by rescaling the dependent variable, listing trade in dollars and adding \$1 before taking the log (as opposed to listing in millions of dollars and adding \$100,000). This effort produces results that are comparable to those in model 6. Model 10 reestimates model 6 using only post–World War II observations. The results are still consistent with all of our hypotheses, except for structural equivalence, which has the expected negative effect on trade but is not statistically significant.

Model 11 respecifies the GDP and population variables to match the treatment in Oneal and Russett (2001), where the GDPs of both countries are first logged and then added, as are the countries’ populations. The

⁷ Trade may also increase as a function of the total number of IGOs in the world system, as they may legitimize international relations more broadly (Boli and Thomas 1999). In our models, such historical trends are completely controlled for by the year fixed effects.

TABLE 4
FIXED-EFFECTS (Dyad and Year) GRAVITY MODELS OF BILATERAL TRADE, 1885-1992 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

	Model 7 International Legitimacy	Model 8 Dyads That Last ≥ 20 Years	Model 9 Rescaling of Trade before Logging	Model 10 Post-World War II Observations	Model 11 Oneal and Russett (2001) Gravity Model	Model 12 Random- Effects Model with Distance	Model 13 Instrumental Variables
$\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness}_{\text{minimal}})$	109*** (014)	123*** (005)	253*** (014)	019*** (015)	109*** (004)	127** (004)	
$\ln(\text{EIGO connectedness}_{\text{structured}})$	165*** (007)	195*** (008)	861*** (022)	285*** (017)	166*** (007)	132*** (007)	
$\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness}_{\text{minimal}})$	016*** (005)	010*** (005)	261*** (016)	022*** (006)	017*** (005)	011*** (005)	
$\ln(\text{SCIGO connectedness}_{\text{structured}})$	235*** (008)	276*** (009)	864*** (026)	321*** (017)	258*** (008)	216*** (008)	
Structural equivalence	-1 454*** (040)	-1 456*** (044)	-3 410*** (040)	- 073 (070)	-1 367*** (039)	-1 338*** (037)	- 999*** (040)
$\ln(\text{GDP}_i \times \text{GDP}_j)$	069*** (014)	086*** (014)	2 027*** (044)	361*** (021)		503*** (007)	201*** (014)
$\ln[(\text{GDP per cap } i) \times (\text{GDP per cap } j)]$	862*** (016)	838*** (017)	- 824*** (053)	652*** (022)		564*** (010)	751*** (017)
Min democracy in dyad	011*** (001)	013*** (001)	001 (003)	006*** (001)	011*** (001)	012*** (001)	001 (002)

results for the variables that test our hypotheses are unaffected by this respecification. In model 12 we include the natural logarithm of the distance between i and j , a variable that is typically included in gravity models but which requires us to use random rather than fixed dyad-level effects, since it does not vary within dyads. As expected, trade is lower when distance is higher, and other results are comparable to those reported above.

The Direction of Causality and the Problem of Endogeneity

While our main models and robustness checks provide consistent evidence that an increase in IGO connectedness is associated with an increase in bilateral trade, they do not demonstrate the direction of causality. There are credible alternatives to our argument that IGO connections cause changes in trade. Below, we describe these alternatives and evaluate them in light of our analysis.

IGO connectedness and trade may be spuriously correlated through one or more other variables — Spurious correlation might occur because of global or local (dyadic) influences. Our models include year fixed effects to control for the possibility that IGO connectedness and trade are spuriously correlated because of some broad historical process. Further, the averages across all dyads in a year of IGO connectedness and trade are *negatively* correlated (-0.48) and follow very different time trends. Thus, there is no reason to believe that some global trend produces a spurious correlation in our data. In contrast, there are a number of dyad-level factors that are likely to affect both IGO connectedness and trade. Most of these, however, are accounted for by our dyad-level fixed effects, which absorb the influence of any persistent characteristic of the dyad, such as geographic distance, shared border, language, culture, religion, or colonial heritage. Our models also control for the most likely time-varying dyadic influences on IGO connectedness and trade: namely, the levels of democracy and economic productivity in the dyad and the presence of military alliances between its members.

Reverse causality: countries join IGOs because they trade with each other — It is hard to see how a reverse causality argument could account for the *full pattern* of the relationship between the IGO network and trade. Our theory predicts not only an association between economic IGO connections and trade, but also an effect for social/cultural IGO connections and differential effects for connections through minimalist and structured IGOs. We also make a prediction for structural equivalence, a measure that depends on the network beyond the dyad. At a minimum, any reverse causality argument would have to account for all of these effects. Reverse causality arguments must also detail the mechanisms through

which trade in a dyad leads to specific changes in the IGO network. A single IGO connection between two countries emerges through membership in an IGO that includes *at least* one other country-member, and usually many more, and is therefore coupled to IGO connections to *all of them*. A given country cannot target an IGO connection to another country in response to trade in the dyad, because any attempt to do so would have repercussions throughout the network.

IGO connectedness may be a signal of goodwill, not causally related to trade, but just something countries do to indicate that they are open to trade—This claim is inconsistent with the fact that structured IGOs matter more than minimalist IGOs. If IGO connections were merely a signal of goodwill or openness, then there is little reason why their impact should depend on the organizational capabilities of the IGOs.

If endogeneity does exist, coefficient estimates for IGO connectedness will be inconsistent—The above arguments lead us to believe that the causal relationship we specify is most consistent with the results of the analysis. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to deny that IGO connectedness and trade may have some reciprocal relationship. If they do, the consistency of our coefficient estimate for IGO connectedness would be compromised. Instrumental-variable estimation is an increasingly popular method for adjusting for endogeneity (Greene 1997, for recent sociological applications see Ingram and Roberts 2000, Burris 2004). This technique involves creating proxies for the endogenous variable by using variables other than the dependent variable of the regression. In other words, we need a model of IGO connectedness that does not rely on past levels of trade. To build this model, we relied on the literature on the causes of war, with the logic that peace and IGO connections are two types of bilateral relations that may be explained by similar factors (Russett and Oneal 2001).

Specifically, we used lagged values of the following variables to predict the IGO connectedness between two countries⁸ whether they share a border, the distance between them, whether they began a militarized dispute in either of the two previous years, the time since their last militarized dispute, whether either was a major power, whether they were military allies, the similarity of the countries' levels of democracy, the

⁸ We applied the instrumental variables procedure only for the aggregate IGO connectedness variable and not its social, economic, minimalist, and structured subcomponents. Applying instrumental variables to the subcomponents would result in the awkward specification of including in the same model two or more covariates that rely on substantially the same instruments. In supplementary analyses, we reestimated four versions of our full model, substituting instrumented versions of the four subcategories of IGO connectedness one at a time. Results of those regressions were comparable to those reported in model 13.

total number of IGOs existing in the world system, and an interaction of the distance between the countries, on the one hand, and the total number of IGOs, on the other, to reflect the fact that IGO connections tend to be regionalized. These variables are taken from the Correlates of War Data Sets. We used predicted values from that regression as a proxy for IGO connectedness in model 13 in table 4. Consistent with our theoretical arguments, the instrument for IGO connectedness had a positive and significant influence on bilateral trade, and the effects of other variables are largely unchanged. Thus, we conclude that endogeneity does not undermine our claim that increases in IGO connectedness effect increases in bilateral trade.

DISCUSSION

Why has the literature generally failed to turn up consistent evidence that IGOs promote trade? We argue that analysts have not captured the structure behind the efficacy of IGOs. The institutions that IGOs enact are not disembodied influences on international relations, but rather operate within a social structure formed by the simultaneous memberships of countries in IGOs. By identifying the network of bilateral connections that IGOs forge between countries, we discover substantial effects on trade. For example, a doubling of the level of connection between two countries across all IGOs is associated with a 58% increase in trade. The shift to the network of IGO connections also highlights the indirect influence of structural configurations that affect trading patterns, such as the disequivalencies that facilitate flow-through trade.

While the basis of our analysis of IGOs is an integration between network and institutional theories, our context also allows us to develop and test two ideas that are central to those theories, but have so far been the subject of more speculation than systematic analysis. The first concerns the distinctly social influence of relationships on economic exchange. The division of IGOs into economic and social/cultural categories allows us to separate features of ongoing economic relationships that are typically confounded, and thus gives us rare insight into this issue, which is critical to the relevance of economic sociology. Although we expected to find a trade benefit from SCIGO connections, the results are stark in their magnitude, with those connections (when braced by organizational structure) doing even more to promote trade than connections through EIGOs. This is a victory for arguments that the economic impact of relationships depends, to an important extent, on social mechanisms. The relevance of SCIGO connections is still more interesting in light of recent arguments that identify limitations of economic connections between states. Recent

work makes clear that preferential trade agreements, in particular, are struck by states looking to increase their bargaining power in multilateral trade rounds (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003). This “defensive” integration is likely to be more cyclical, and perhaps less robust, than integration realized through social/cultural IGOs, which may be more palatable domestically.

The second contribution to theory concerns the interdependence between different levels of institutions. Although few would dispute the idea that institutions operate through an interdependent hierarchy, it has fallen between the cracks of the division of labor between different schools of institutionalism in the social sciences. We hypothesized that the efficacy of the principles that IGOs infuse into their members’ relations depends on the structures of the IGOs themselves. We found that both economic and social/cultural IGO connections were more beneficial when they were made through IGOs with effective bureaucratic structures as opposed to through minimalist IGOs. The efficacy of bureaucracy in this context is suggestive of the basis of institutional authority in international relations and injects organization into discussions of “order without law,” which have so far emphasized interpersonal relations (Macaulay 1963, Ellickson 1991). And while we are confident that structured IGOs matter more for trade than minimalist ones, we realize that we have only scratched the surface of this issue. We would like to see more case studies examine the efficacy of specific IGOs (e.g., Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996, Busch and Reinhardt 2002), leading to a more comprehensive categorization of IGO structure than the one we use here.

Our focus on IGOs is not meant as a slight to other mechanisms of international connectivity, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). On the contrary, the influence of NGOs on world culture, for example, is the subject of an active research program in sociology (e.g., Boli and Thomas 1999, Guillen 2001). Evidence from that program indicates that NGOs may serve a purpose analogous to that we ascribe to SCIGOs, in terms of knitting together national cultures, creating empathy, sympathy, and trust at the seams. This observation suggests a second-order influence of the linkage between NGOs and world culture to trade. Strange (1996) suggests a direct symbiosis between IGOs and NGOs, where NGOs get funding, and IGOs (or IGO bureaucrats) get flexibility to pursue interests in ways their mandates may preclude. The possible interdependencies between IGOs and MNCs are likewise worthy of further study.

Despite the impressive gains in trade that can result from IGO membership, the decisions of states to join them may not be easy. There are costs associated with IGO membership, and these must be weighed against any expected gains. Most obviously, there are the direct costs of operating

IGOs, which are often assessed to members using various formulas (i.e., based on GDP). These direct costs may typically pale in comparison to the benefits of increased trade, but they are not always trivial, as evidenced by the ongoing battle between the United States and the UN over dues to that organization.

The second cost is the risk that IGOs may be diverted from their original purposes, or the will of their members, by powerful bureaucrats. Michel's "iron law" represents a threat not only to the effectiveness of IGOs, but also to the very autonomy of their member states (Strange 1996). Cox and Jacobson (1973) present case studies of decision making in eight IGOs. They identify a trend to bureaucratization, and citing UNESCO and the International Labor Organization as specific examples, claim, "The existence of a large organization is itself a potentiality and a pressure for the expansion of tasks" (p. 424). Indeed, goal displacement and unjustified budgetary growth were among the criticisms the United States made when withdrawing from UNESCO in 1984. Cox and Jacobson begin the process of identifying features of an IGO's structure and mandate that affect whether it is likely to be more subject to the influence of the individual participants (bureaucrats, consultants, member representatives) or of its member states. This distinction is an important one for extending our research and fully specifying its policy implications. A clear understanding of what preserves member influence in IGOs would be useful for (1) identifying which IGOs are most useful for promoting trade and other desired outcomes, (2) helping countries decide which IGOs to join, and (3) guiding the designers and managers of IGOs.

Another contributing factor to the U.S. decision to withdraw from UNESCO, that organization's perceived anti-Westernism and anti-Semitism, is useful for illustrating the third, and perhaps greatest, cost of IGO connections. The sociological literature on embeddedness makes clear that there is a dark side to relational constraints (Uzzi 1996). They bind related parties for better or for worse. To this point, we have concentrated on the advantages of relational constraints to smooth trade. In the IGO context, relational constraints may also subject states to unwanted economic, political, and ideological dictates. It is not possible to mitigate this risk fully through careful design of the structure and scope of IGOs—any relationship from which the parties derive benefit opens the door to normative influence on a range of issues (Homans 1950).

These potentialities suggest that a given IGO connection may be a panacea or a devil's compact, depending on the IGO's structure and mandate, and the cultures, histories, economies, and politics of the connected countries. At the same time, we do not want to slight the benefits to trade of IGO connectedness merely because they are only part of the equation of benefits and costs. The gains to trade from IGO membership

are substantial, and their pattern sheds important light on the interdependence between economy and society

APPENDIX

Coding of IGO Function and Structure

Information on the functions and structures of IGOs comes mainly from the listing for each IGO that appears in the *Yearbook of International Organization*, braced by various other sources. A research assistant who was unfamiliar with our hypotheses performed the coding. It was not practical to have multiple coders because the coding effort required extensive archival work, which involved a learning curve for finding information on IGOs that were sometimes obscure. For both function and structure, the coder initially applied a fine-grained coding scheme. We then collapsed fine-grained subcategories into the categories we used in the actual analysis. This process allowed us to be more precise about the exact nature of each IGO and therefore more confident in the aggregate categories that we use for our analyses. The coder also identified her confidence in each coding, based on the quality of the evidence that supported it. We used those confidence measures in supplementary analyses to insure our results were robust to the data quality supporting the coding.

IGO Function

IGOs have specific functions that are outlined in their mandates. We began with the four-category coding of IGO functions (general purpose, military, economic, and social/cultural) that Jacobson (1996) provides for IGOs in 1981 and 1992. By comparing Jacobson's coding to the available information on each IGO, we identified the criteria for each category. We then broke down the criteria for economic and social/cultural codings into subcategories to produce the nine-category scheme presented in appendix table A1, which we applied to all IGOs in our data. In the analysis, IGO connectedness is calculated using IGOs from all nine categories. EIGO connectedness is calculated using the 241 IGOs categorized under EIGO in table A1. SCIGO connectedness is calculated using the 167 IGOs categorized under SCIGO in table A1. We also examined in preliminary analysis the effects of the economic and social/cultural subcategories of IGOs. These were comparable to those using the aggregate categories, although IGO connectedness measures using the subcategories tended to be highly correlated.

TABLE A1
CODING SCHEME FOR IGO FUNCTION

Function	Description of Organizations
General purpose (59/497 IGOs)	Umbrella organizations that focus on communication between and the administration of governments, perform multiple functions of standardizing, harmonizing, monitoring, and administering international agreements
Military/political (30/497 IGOs)	Regional political or military alliances, any organization created for military alliance/defense/security purposes
EIGO	
Monitoring, surety, and general economic (105/497 IGOs)	Perform multiple trade-related functions, monitor and enforce international economic transactions, enforce international trade agreements, help process international transactions, protect property rights
Standardization and harmonization (36/497 IGOs)	Promote standards and conventions that smooth international communications and transportation
Cooperation and development (67/497 IGOs)	Promote development or manage international trade in goods
Industry specific (33/497 IGOs)	Address issues regarding the international structure and operation of specific industries
SCIGO	
Environmental (33/497 IGOs)	Engage in activities related to conservation/management of the environment
General (67/497 IGOs)	Address health, disease, disaster, also social welfare, cultural organizations, humanitarian organizations
Education and research (67/497 IGOs)	Educational, scientific, research, and technology organizations

IGO Structure

To identify IGOs as minimalist or structured, we began with the three-category coding of IGO structure that appears in Gartzke (2002, p. 22)

- 1 *Minimalist* —IGOs that contain plenary meetings, committees, and possibly a secretariat without an extensive bureaucracy beyond research, planning, and information gathering
- 2 *Structured* —IGOs that contain structures of assembly, executive (nonceremonial), and/or bureaucracy to implement policy, as well as formal procedures and rules
- 3 *Interventionist* —IGOs that contain mechanisms for mediation, arbitration, and adjudication, and/or other means to coerce state decisions (such as withholding loans or aid), as well as means of enforcement of organizational decisions and norms

We applied this categorization scheme using a “coding sheet” we obtained from Erik Gartzke and Charles Boehmer, which breaks down the above categories into specific roles, structures, and policies. We checked our categorizations against those that Gartzke (2002) supplies for IGOs up to 1970 and reconciled any differences.

In preliminary analysis, we used all three categories and broke up our connectedness measures into those through minimalist, structured, and interventionist IGOs. This worked well when applied to the full set of IGOs, with results showing a moderate impact on trade of connections through minimalist IGOs, a bigger impact for structured IGOs, and a still bigger impact for interventionist IGOs. When we applied the three categories of structures to the economic and social/cultural subcategories of IGOs, the results were not as clean. Particularly, results for connections through interventionist IGOs were unreliable. This is probably because relatively few EIGOs are interventionist, and even fewer SCIGOs are. When we include small categories in the analysis, the results are overly sensitive to what we add to zero connections before logging them. To avoid this methodological problem, we aggregated the second and third categories to create a single structured category, which we compare to the minimalist category to test hypothesis 3.

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Gendering the Job: Networks and Recruitment at a Call Center¹

Roberto M. Fernandez and M. Lourdes Sosa
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Understanding the mechanisms driving gender segregation has become a key focus in research on gender and labor markets. While the literature often invokes gender-sorting mechanisms that operate *prehire*, the data used to study these processes are usually collected on *posthire* populations. This article examines the workings of prehire mechanisms determining job sex segregation. Analyzing unique data on the recruitment and hiring process for customer service representatives at a telephone service center, all of the factors examined—preapplication choices, gender homophilous networks, and screeners' choices—play significant roles in the gender segregation of this job. The analyses also show that making inferences about prehire processes on the basis of posthire data can be misleading. The authors conclude by discussing the theoretical and methodological implications of these findings.

Gender segregation of jobs plays a central role in current research on gender and labor markets. Gender segregation of jobs is pervasive, and many studies have appeared documenting the patterns and trends of gender segregation across jobs (e.g., Jacobs 1989*a*, Jacobsen 1994, Tomaskovic-Devey 1993*b*, Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 1996). In addition, numerous studies have found that men earn more than women, even after

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controlling for human capital factors (e.g., England et al. 1994, Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a, Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 1996). This earnings gap, however, virtually disappears when men and women do the same job (Kilbourne et al. 1994, Petersen and Morgan 1995, Reskin and Padavic 1994, Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a, 1993b). For this reason, understanding the mechanisms driving gender segregation of jobs has become a key focus of research on gender inequality.

Virtually all research on gender segregation of jobs begins with data on job *incumbents*, that is, people who have already been hired into a job. Such posthire data, however, are limited in their ability to distinguish among various gender-sorting mechanisms that are alleged to work *prior* to being hired. For example, arguments that men and women pursue different types of jobs because of gender differences in socialization (Subich et al. 1989) or stereotypical cultural beliefs about gender (Correll 2001, 2004, Cjeka and Eagly 1999) both imply that men and women self-select into gender-typical jobs. Others emphasize the role of *employers'* preferences and biases during prehire screening as the reason that men and women work in sex-segregated jobs (e.g., Reskin and Roos [1990] on labor queues). Still other theories focus on gender differences in social networks that serve to direct men and women to different jobs (e.g., Drentea 1998). Despite the theoretical importance of these mechanisms, very little empirical evidence has ever been offered on the prehire stages of the hiring process.

In this article, we explore the workings of these prehire mechanisms that are alleged to sort men and women into different jobs. We study a research setting that is unusually well suited for identifying and empirically isolating these social processes. We analyze unique data on the recruitment and hiring process starting with the pool of applicants for an entry-level job at a telephone customer service center of a large bank. We focus attention on a single entry-level job title—customer service representative (CSR)—that has remained constant in this setting over the period of our study, 1995–96. While the duties and label of the CSR job remained constant, the gender distribution of job incumbents changed over this relatively short period. Although female dominated at the start of our study (65.7% of CSRs were women as of December 31, 1994), the CSR job became even more female over this two-year period: by the end of 1996, the percentage of women employed in the CSR job had increased to 72.5%. Indeed, as we discuss below, the composition of the set of new hires over this period is even more female, that is, 77.7%. Our goal in this article is to shed light on how various prehire processes contribute to the growing feminization of this job in this setting.

GENDER AND JOB SEGREGATION

At the most general level, accounts of gender segregation of jobs can be grouped into two sets: theories emphasizing labor supply factors, and theories stressing features of the demand side of the labor market. Supply-side accounts argue that for various reasons men and women have different preferences and consequently choose to work at different kinds of jobs (e.g., Polachek 1981). Some scholars have argued that men and women have different preferences for jobs because of gender differences in socialization (Betz and O'Connell 1989, Marini and Brinton 1984, Marini et al. 1996, O'Leary 1974, Subich et al. 1989, for a contrary view, see Jacobs 1989*b*) or stereotypical cultural beliefs about gender job roles (Correll 2001, 2004, Cejka and Eagly 1999). Others emphasize differential constraints because of gender differences in family roles. For example, Becker (1981, 1985) argues that the gendered division of household labor leads women to be less committed to working outside the home than are men, resulting in poorer relative labor market performance (but see Bielby and Bielby 1984, 1988). Mincer and Polachek (1974, also see Polachek 1975, 1979) argue that the intermittent participation of women in the labor force (because of duties such as child rearing) makes it rational for them to choose jobs whose skills do not atrophy over time. Zellner (1975) proposed that intermittent labor force participation leads women to choose jobs that allow them to earn better wages in the short run, although these jobs might offer worse prospects in the long term. England (1982, 1984) has challenged this line of reasoning. She showed empirical evidence that even in the short run, women would still be better-off in male-dominated jobs, thus, women's (alleged) needs for intermittent labor force participation could not explain job sex segregation.

Another set of supply-side theories attempting to explain the gender segregation of jobs emphasizes the role played by gender differences in social networks. A number of studies have appeared that show gender segregation of networks (e.g., Brass 1985, Campbell 1988, Ibarra 1992, Lincoln and Miller 1979, Marsden 1987, 1988, Moore 1990, Straits 1996). A number of scholars (e.g., Granovetter 1995) have argued that personal networks play an important role in job finding, so that gender homophily (i.e., the tendency for people to associate with same-sex others, see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, pp. 422–24) serves to channel men and women into different jobs during job search (Berger 1995, Corcoran et al. 1980, Dretna 1998, Hanson and Pratt 1991, 1995, Mencken and Winfield 1999, Reskin and Padavic 1994, Straits 1998, for contrary evidence, see Huffman and Torres 2001, 2002).

In addition to the supply-side approaches, several theories of gender segregation focus on the demand side of the labor market, specifically,

employers' actions during screening. In particular, some theories stress the gender-biasing effects of screeners' preferences. For example, Reskin and Roos's (1990) queuing theory posits that employers have definite preferences for men. Some have argued that discriminatory attitudes—whether conscious or unconscious—presumably affect employer screening and the gender composition of candidates as they pass through the stages of the hiring process (Glick et al. 1988, Graves 1999, Heilman 1980, 1984, Marini 1989).

Another demand-side mechanism focuses on how network factors affect screening. It is common for employers to use the networks of their current employees as part of their recruitment strategies, and many employers prefer to hire employee referrals (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997, Fernandez et al. 2000). To the extent that such networks are gender biased, the employers' preferences for employee referrals can also have gendering effects (e.g., Berger 1995, Reskin and Padavic 1994, Roos and Reskin 1984, Straits 1998). It is worth noting, however, that the most careful empirical study directed at this question (Petersen et al. 2000) found no evidence that their employers' preference for referrals affected the gender composition of candidates as they progress through the hiring process.

For our purposes, these theories of gender job segregation share one crucial feature: for all of them, the gender-sorting actions are taking place *prior* to hire. Theories that emphasize men and women's differential job choices—whether they be the result of gendered constraints or preferences—result in a self-selected pool of *applicants* for jobs. This is also true for supply-side network theories, where women and men are channeled to different jobs through job contacts during job search. Similarly, for demand-side theories of employers' preferences—whether the bias be for one gender over another or for networked candidates—the gender-sorting processes work during prehire screening. While all these theories are designed to explain the same outcome—the posthire gender segregation of jobs—research strategies based on posthire data alone cannot distinguish among these different gender-sorting mechanisms. However, virtually all of the empirical research to date on the causes of gender segregation of jobs is based on job incumbents, that is, people who have already found jobs.²

In this article, we take a fresh approach to the study of gender-based job segregation by studying a research setting that is unusually well suited

² Although rare, there are some studies of *posthire* gender job-sorting mechanisms. Skuratowicz and Hunter (2004) study the reassignment of men and women to jobs during a bank reorganization. There are also a few studies that examine gender-segregation processes occurring as organizational careers unfold (Yamagata et al. 1997, Barnett et al. 2000, Petersen and Saporta 2004). Our study is the first to address the prehire mechanisms of job sex segregation empirically (see below).

to identifying and empirically isolating key processes alleged to be at work in the gender sorting of jobs. We open up the “black box” of prehire gender-sorting mechanisms by examining unique data on recruitment and screening for an entry-level job at a telephone customer service center of a large bank. In order to control for the possibility that job titles are being defined on the basis of gender (e.g., Baron and Bielby 1986, Jacobs 1992), we focus attention on a single entry-level job title, the CSR.

Our strategy is to document the gender composition of the applicant pool and to examine how supply-side prehire network factors affect the gender composition of the pool. By tracing the connections between referral applicants and the people who referred them, we study how gender homophily contributes to the gendering of the pool of candidates. In order to address theories about the role of screeners in the job gendering process, we track how the gender mix of candidates changes as they progress through the hiring pipeline. In addition, we engage the supply-side network theory that employers’ bias in favor of referrals might account for job segregation by studying the ways in which screeners’ preferences for referrals affects the progression of men and women through the screening process. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and methodological implications of our findings.

DATA

We studied the hiring process for an entry-level position at a phone center, within a large, globally diversified financial service institution. The job we study is the CSR, which is a full-time, hourly position, paying a starting hourly wage of \$8.25, and whose duties consist of answering telephone inquiries about customers’ credit card accounts. New hires into this position are given two months of classroom and on-the-job training before being assigned to work on the phone. CSRs are trained in balancing the etiquette of customer service interactions with accuracy, speed, and efficiency while processing phone calls. CSRs handle up to 5,000 phone calls per month per person; these calls are often monitored by managers to insure that courtesy and accuracy goals are being met.

The phone center offers a number of practical advantages for this research. The human resources department keeps virtually complete databases on recruitment for CSR jobs, which has allowed us to track applicants’ movements through every phase of the hiring process. In addition to these computer databases, the human resources department keeps paper files on each applicant, including a standardized application form. From these paper files, we coded crucial data on applicants’ education, work history, and other human capital characteristics. Particularly important

for us is that because we had access to the name and the handwritten signature of the applicant on the form, we were able to code the gender of the applicant for virtually all (i.e., 99.3%) of the cases

We constructed a database of the hiring pipeline (i.e., application, interview, offer, and hire) for all 4,316 applications for the CSR job during 1995–96. From information gleaned from the paper application forms, we have grouped the applicants into three recruitment sources: external non-referral (e.g., newspaper advertisements), external applicants who were referred by employees (hereafter, employee referrals) and candidates for internal transfers. Although this latter category is relatively small in number ($N = 151$), internal applicants are an interesting comparison group since they are more likely than externals to be familiar with the CSR job. Note that the unit of analysis here is the *application*, and that some people applied multiple times during the period of our study. The maximum number of applications from individuals is three. Of the original 4,316 employment inquiries, 416 (9.6%) were from individuals who had applied twice, and only 15 (0.3%) applied three times. Of the 4,316 applications, 60.7% (i.e., 2,618) resulted in an interview with hiring managers, only 9.4% (406) of the applications led to the offer of a job, and 8.7% (376) of the original applications ended in a hire.

One of the most unique features of these data is the fact that we have been able to connect referrers with their referrals at the application phase. Unlike past research where data on the characteristics of the job contact are observed only among hires (e.g., Berger 1995, Corcoran et al. 1980), here referrers are linked to job applicants. Thus, for each external applicant, we are able to identify the presence or absence of a referral tie, as well as the gender of the referrer. There is a line on the employment application that explicitly asks the applicant to list the name of the referrer. Referring employees are paid \$10 if the people they refer are interviewed, and \$250 if the referral is hired and survives a 30-day probation period. This creates an important incentive for referring employees to ensure that applicants list them accurately as their referrer. This referral bonus also constitutes the firm's social capital investment in the social networks of their employees (Fernandez et al. 2000, Fernandez and Castilla 2001).

More than one-third of the applications (35.8% or 1,546) were external referrals, and slightly less than two-thirds were nonreferrals (63.6%, or 2,745), we could not identify the recruitment source for 25 applications. A total of 1,223 referrers produced 1,539 referrals, an additional seven applications indicated that they were referred, but did not name an individual referrer. From company data sources, we located employment records for 97.5% (1,192) of the referrers who were identified. It is from these records that we coded the gender of the referrer. There were no limits on the number of applicants a person could refer, and the number

of referrals per referrer varied between one and six (although 79.7% referred only one, and 15.8% referred two applicants)

Lastly, these data allow us to address gender differences in networking activities that lead people to apply. By comparing the gender distribution of those who refer applicants (i.e., the originators of network ties) to the gender distribution of the population of employees of the phone center (i.e., those at risk of referring), we can assess whether there are gender differences in the propensity to produce referral applications. We have assembled data on all workers employed at the site over the period of the study and identified whether they participated in the company's referral program for CSRs. We were successful in coding such background data for 96.4% (3,968 of 4,114) of the workers employed at the phone center.

Although it is our sense that the firm is not particularly distinctive in its hiring practices, in light of our decision to study only one firm, we can make no claims regarding generalizability. Our main goal in adopting this empirically grounded, case-study approach is to elucidate the workings of the prehire mechanisms that are alleged to sort men and women into different jobs. Thus, our strategy has been to trade broad data across many settings for very deep knowledge of this particular case. While we would expect that there will be some contingency in the ways the prehire processes contribute to gender segregation of jobs in different settings, it is impossible to distinguish among the different prehire mechanisms that might produce gender sorting without the unique, fine-grained data we analyze here. The need for this kind of detailed data is made even more acute by the fact that for many of these prehire mechanisms, no empirical evidence at all has ever been offered. The theoretical significance of this case is that it provides a window through which one can view the operations of a set of processes that are normally hidden from view. Thus, the insights gleaned from this case study can be used to guide broader-gauge research designed to represent wider populations of organizations.

ANALYSES

At the most general level, theoretical accounts of gender segregation of jobs can be grouped into two sets: theories emphasizing labor supply factors and theories stressing features of the demand side of the labor market.

Supply-Side Processes Choice and Constraint

Supply-side accounts of gender segregation argue that men and women have distinct preferences for different kinds of jobs because of gender differences in socialization (O'Leary 1974, Subich et al 1989), gender role stereotypes (Correll 2001, 2004, Cjeka and Eagly 1999), and differential constraints because of gender differences in family roles (Zellner 1975) From the perspective of our study, all of these theories share a common prediction prehire processes should result in a gender-biased application pool Indeed, the pool of applications over 1995–96 for the CSR job is not gender neutral 67 0% of the 4,286 applications for which we could code gender are from females While this certainly departs from the 50/50 population sex ratio, it is interesting to compare this percentage against several other baselines

A first baseline of comparison is the percentage of females employed at the call center just prior to the start of our study As of the day prior to the start of the hiring window (i e, December 31, 1994), 65 7% (69 of 105) of workers employed in the CSR position were women Whatever processes were at work prior to our study, the net result of these processes was to produce a female-dominated CSR job Thus, the gender distribution of job incumbents at the beginning of the study closely matches the gender distribution of the pool of applicants obtained for this job over the subsequent two-year period (65 7% vs 67 0% female)

There were, however, some interesting changes in the call center over the period of our study During 1995–96, the call center expanded its operations so that the number of CSRs would grow substantially (from 105 to 280) This expansion corresponded to an increase in the representation of women in the CSR job during this time the percentage of CSRs that were women increased from 65 7% female before the study to 72 5% female the day after the close of our hiring window (i e, as of January 1, 1997)³ Compared to this baseline, an application pool that is 67 0% female underrepresents the gender composition of the CSR job at time 2 This suggests that women are more likely than men to survive the screening process and be hired (see below)

³ As we describe below, the percentage of females hired into the CSR job during our study is even higher, with 77 7% of the people hired during our study being female Our data come from two sources that we cannot directly combine applicants to the job and a company database of job incumbents The incumbents' database is anonymous, and we cannot reconcile these data with our hiring data, which we constructed ourselves with full access to the information on hires The difference between 77 7% of CSR *hires* between time 1 and time 2 being women, and 72 5% of CSR *incumbents* at time 2 being women is because of turnover, which we cannot study for incumbents As a result of these limitations, we use the incumbents' database only to define the before-and-after baselines of comparison

It is interesting to consider that “customer service representative” appeared as an occupation for the first time in the 2000 census (code 524). We obtained the Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS) data for the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in which the call center was located. The percentage female among CSRs in these data was 74.2%, a figure that is quite close to the 72.5% figure reflecting CSR job holders at the end of our study. We have no way of eliminating the employees of our call center from the PUMS data. The local MSA does contain numerous call centers, however. This suggests that the gendered nature of the CSR job is a broader phenomenon in the labor market we are studying. We will use the PUMS data to further explore the gender distribution of the open labor market below.

It is important to consider that the 67.0% female figure combines applications from all sources. However, if there are gender-differentiated network processes (e.g., gender differences in job information, see Campbell 1988) that also serve to bias the pool of applicants, then external referral applications would be affected by *both* the prehire preferences/constraints of the candidates and the network processes. It is also likely that internal candidates would have better information about the nature of the job than external candidates. To the extent that the job has characteristics that are differentially attractive for men and women, the gender distribution of internal candidates might differ from that of external candidates.

Table 1 shows that there is a significant relationship between the gender distribution of applications and recruitment source ($P < .001$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 14.258$, $df = 2$). The percentage of women is highest for internal candidates (74.2%), intermediate for referrals (69.9%), and lowest for external nonreferrals (65.0%). Such a pattern is consistent with the idea that the CSR job becomes more attractive to women than to men as more information is made available about the job. We found a similar pattern for a small number (169) of former employees of the call center who are also likely to have good knowledge of the CSR job: the percentage female among previous employees is 72.2%. Although a similar process could be at work for referrals if referrers were to be passing on information about the CSR job, our previous work shows little support for the idea that referrals have “extra information” compared with external nonreferrals at this phone center (see Fernandez et al. [2000, pp. 1314–22] tests of hypothesis 3). The results do suggest, however, that other network-related processes serve to raise the proportion of women who apply to this job via referrals (see below).

The analyses up to this point have been aimed at understanding the gender composition of the application pool for the CSR job. We have yet to address possible gender differences in the *quality* of the applicants. We

TABLE 1
GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICATIONS BY RECRUITMENT SOURCE

	% Female	% Male	<i>N</i>
External nonreferral	65.0	35.0	2,578
External referral	69.9	30.1	1,534
Internal	74.2	25.8	151
All sources	67.1	32.9	4,263

interviewed the call center recruiters about the criteria they used when screening applicants. They said that they look for evidence of basic keyboarding and computer skills on the application form. In addition, they also place relatively high weight on an applicant's job history when screening applications. In light of the customer service aspects of the job, screeners also look for people with prior customer service experience. Recruiters said they are also quite concerned about work attitudes and tend to look for applicants who they think will be reliable employees. This leads them to prefer applicants who are currently employed, and who have had some previous work experience. Because they are quite concerned about the cost of turnover, recruiters tend to avoid people who have changed jobs a lot during their work histories. Recruiters are also concerned about applicants who are "overqualified" for this entry-level position, so that candidates who report significantly higher wages in their previous job than the starting wage at the phone center (\$8.25) are looked upon with some skepticism. Compared with work experience, the recruiters said that they place less weight on formal education for the entry-level CSR job. Recruiters are concerned, however, that highly educated people might be using these jobs as a platform to look for better employment and, consequently, that highly educated workers are more likely to turn over. The call center screeners thus consider very highly educated applicants as overqualified for the CSR job.⁴

From the original application forms, we coded each applicant's years of education, experience in the financial services industry, employment experience outside the banking industry, and customer service experience.

⁴ There is one criterion that absolutely disqualifies applicants, however. The application form asks whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a "breach of trust"; applicants responding "yes" are eliminated from further consideration, since regulatory agencies will not allow banks to hire such people into CSR positions. Breaches of trust include shoplifting, embezzlement, forgery, fraud, and writing checks with insufficient funds. All hires are required to undergo expensive fingerprinting and background checks. If these tests come back showing a conviction, the call center is required by law to let the new hire go. Only 0.6% (11 males and 14 females) of applications from all sources (external nonreferrals, external referrals, and internals) indicated a breach of trust.

We also coded a dummy variable for whether the person was employed at application, as well as the number of previous jobs listed on the application, years of tenure with the last firm, and wages of the last job. We looked for evidence of computer experience among the application materials and created a dummy variable for the presence of these skills (the applications had a line specifically asking for such information). Similarly, based on the information provided on the application form, we also created a dummy variable for evidence of foreign-language skills. In order to address recruiters' concerns about possible overqualification for the CSR job, we distinguished applications from people with more than a college degree (i.e., greater than 16 years of education) with a dummy variable. For similar reasons, we coded a dummy variable for whether the applicant reported a wage on their last job as being greater than or equal to the starting wage for CSRs at the call center, \$8.25 per hour.

Table 2 shows descriptive information on a number of background characteristics of the applicant pool by gender. In order to control for the network and information processes we address below, we focus here on the pool of nonreferral applicants. We begin with tests of gender differences in individual variables. Univariate *F*-tests show that male and female applications are not significantly different with respect to a number of background factors: computer and foreign-language skills, number of previous jobs, whether the applicant was employed, and tenure on the last job. Female applications show superior qualifications compared to males with respect to customer service and financial services experience. Applications from males list more experience in jobs outside financial services and contain higher proportions of overqualified applicants than do applications from females. Although the median years of education are identical for males and females (i.e., 14 years), the proportion of applicants with more than 16 years of education is significantly higher for males.

The percentage of applications overqualified by virtue of past wages that are greater than the starting wage for the CSR job (i.e., \$8.25 per hour) is also significantly higher for males than for females (37.0% vs. 21.7%, $P < .001$). Male applicants also earned higher wages on their last job than females when the difference is measured at the mean (\$8.15 vs. \$6.80, $P < .001$) or the median (\$7.25 vs. \$6.33). Indeed, with the exception of minimum-wage applicants (i.e., \$4.25), male applicants have higher past wages than female applicants at every percentile point in the distribution. This is seen clearly in figure 1, which plots the percentile distribution of wages on the applicants' last job for females against the percentile distribution of wages on the last job for males. The 45-degree line shows a baseline of what the plot would look like if females and males were to have identical wage distributions. With the exception of

TABLE 2
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF BACKGROUND VARIABLES BY GENDER FOR
EXTERNAL NONREFERRAL APPLICANTS

	FEMALE		MALE		UNIVARIATE
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	F-TESTS P-VALUES
Skills					
Computer (1 = yes)	786	410	786	412	NS
Language (1 = yes)	190	392	193	395	NS
Overeducated (> 16 years)	026	160	049	215	009
Experience					
Bank (in years)	216	1 338	101	781	040
Nonbank (in years)	5 053	4 438	6 162	5 707	001
Customer service (in years)	2 952	3 766	2 231	3 515	001
No of previous jobs	3 297	1 038	3 314	1 024	NS
Works at time of application	480	500	437	496	NS
Tenure on last job (in years)	1 848	2 709	1 865	3 030	NS
High wages last job (> \$8 25)	217	412	370	483	001
No of cases	1,262		678		
Multivariate test of gender difference in profiles					
Wilks's λ			935		
$F_{(10, 1929 df)}$			13 327		001

NOTE — 2.3% of applications report never having had a job. Tenure on last job and last wage are coded zero for those who have never had a previous job. The results do not change if we exclude those who have never had a job.

the fifth percentile and below, which consists of minimum-wage applicants, the line for the observed data is always above the 45-degree line, showing that males had higher wages than females over virtually the entire distribution.

We checked whether applications could be classified into distinct profiles. Table 2 reports the multivariate test of whether gender is statistically independent of the joint distribution of the 10 measures of applicant quality. We find strong evidence that gender distinguishes applicants' profiles ($P < .0001$, Wilks's $\lambda = .935$, F -test = 13.327, $df = [10, 1,929]$). In terms of the criteria that recruiters are seeking, on the whole, females are more qualified than males at application.

These latter findings suggest that the pool might be even *more* female if we were to adjust the pool of applicants by eliminating candidates who are not desirable according to the screeners. Human resource professionals refer to this as an "adjusted" application pool. Screeners often form adjusted pools as a way of judging how well they have targeted their recruitment effort. Screening from a pool that is composed of very few hireable people results in higher screening costs relative to a "richer pool."

of applicants (see Fernandez et al 2000) For example, eliminating from consideration “overeducated” and “overpaid” applicants—who tend to be male—increases the percentage of females in the remaining pool to 70.1% (1,177 of the surviving 1,668 candidates) Similarly, applying absolute cutoffs to eliminate candidates based on any of the criteria in table 2 on which women are superior to men (e.g., customer service experience) would serve to increase the proportion of women in the adjusted pool On the other hand, establishing a threshold for factors on which males dominate (e.g., months of nonbank experience) would decrease the percentage of women in the adjusted pool

We have good reasons to think that recruiters do not rigidly apply such single-variable thresholds, however In our interviews, recruiters described the screening criteria as “things to look for” and “things to avoid” Moreover, analyzing the outcomes of their actual screening decisions shows that, with the exception of the “breaches of trust” mentioned earlier, they clearly did not apply any of these criteria as absolute “must-haves” in their screening decisions, but rather allowed trade-offs among multiple factors For example, among interviewees, a person’s highest hourly wage in the last job was \$40.00, the same as it is in the original application pool Thus, a \$40.00 cutoff would exclude no one from the interview stage Indeed, even among hires, only 0.6% of applicants would be excluded by applying the criterion of the highest-paid person to be hired (\$22.49) as a cutoff By way of contrast, none of the 25 applications that cited a breach of trust were interviewed, offered the job, or hired

Pool adjustment focuses on eliminating from consideration people who are inappropriate from among those who actually applied However, this cannot address what the gender distribution of *potential* applicants to the CSR job might be One reason that the CSR job might attract a predominantly female application pool is that the CSR job is relatively low wage, and given that women earn less in the open labor market, a low-wage job is likely to be more attractive to women than to men Thus, the policy of having a fixed wage offer of \$8.25 per hour is likely to skew the applicant pool in favor of females We sought data on the external labor market in order to address this question The most appropriate data we could locate was the 1999 wages reported in the 2000 PUMS for the MSA in which the call center was located We then used the consumer price index (CPI) to adjust the wage data for inflation between January 1996 (the midpoint of our study) and 1999 (None of the substantive findings we describe below change if we use unadjusted wage data)

These data show that the female wage is 70.2% of the male wage in the open labor market The mean hourly wage for males in 1996 dollars is \$17.07 compared with \$11.98 for females (the comparable figures in 1999 dollars are \$18.36 and \$12.89) Moreover, the \$8.25 wage offer cuts

off a bigger slice of the female than male local wage distribution. The call center's offered wage for CSRs falls at the thirty-seventh percentile of the local female wage distribution, compared with the twenty-fifth percentile of the local male wage distribution. Thus, wage inequality in the open labor market alone would serve to make the CSR job more attractive to females than to males.

We used the inflation-adjusted wage data from the PUMS to get an idea of how much this factor might be contributing to the gendering of the application pool. Whereas females constitute 49% of those with positive earnings in the local labor market in 1999, they comprise 58.9% of those who earned \$8.25 per hour or less. We repeated this exercise, varying the wage cutoff for eliminating people from the pool of potential applicants. Figure 2 tracks the percentage female in the labor pool as wage cutoffs are varied from \$5 to \$25 (\$25 falls at the eighty-seventh percentile of the male wage distribution and at the ninety-fifth percentile of the female wage distribution). With the exception of the jump from 58.5% at \$5 to 60.5% at \$6, the percentage female in the population declines as successively higher wages are used to adjust the pool of potential applicants. In separate analyses, we found that this exception is because of the fact that the lowest-wage jobs are attracting male youths in greater proportion than female youths. The fact that males disappear from the pools as wages drop suggests that wage inequality in the open labor market is an important contributing factor to the gendered nature of the application pool for the CSR job. However, the highest percentage female occurs at \$6 per hour, 60.5%, and this figure is well short of the 67.0% figure observed for the call center. While certainly important, wages alone do not seem to account for females' greater attraction to the CSR job.

Supply-Side Processes: Networks

Another set of supply-side theories attempting to explain the gender segregation of jobs emphasizes the role played by gender differences in social networks. A number of scholars have argued that gender segregation of networks leads men and women into different jobs (Corcoran et al. 1980, Drentea 1998, Hanson and Pratt 1991, 1995, Mencken and Winfield 1999, Reskin and Padavic 1994). As noted above, all of this research is based on job incumbents, that is, people who have already found jobs. Thus, these studies cannot address the prehire network processes that are alleged to direct men and women to different jobs.⁵ Here, we specifically focus

⁵ We know of only one exception here. Petersen et al. (2000) provide an important study of the impact of employee referrals, gender, and race in the pool of applicants for employment at a high-tech firm over a 10-year period. They found no evidence of




FIG 2 —Percentage female in local labor pools, adjusted by hourly wage

on the prehire network factors that might differentially direct men and women to the CSR job

In the context of our study, such network factors would manifest themselves by employee referral applicants being even more gender biased than the pool of nonreferral applicants. As we showed in our discussion of table 1 above, the data show just this pattern: 69.9% of referral applications are from women, compared with 65.0% of nonreferrals. The gender difference between the referral and nonreferral application pools is statistically reliable ($P < .001$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 10.529$, $df = 1$). Thus, the net impact of the network processes that produce applications to this call center result in an applicant pool that is more female than the non-referral pool.⁶

As with nonreferrals, we explored whether there are gender differences in applicant quality among referrals (results available from the authors). Overall, the results for referrals are very similar to what we found for nonreferrals: women are better qualified than males are at application. The only difference is that for referrals, males and females do not differ with respect to years of experience in financial services, whereas females show significantly more financial services experience than males among nonreferrals. Among referrals, too, we find strong evidence that gender distinguishes applicants' profiles ($P < .001$, Wilks's $\lambda = .936$, F -test = 7.506, $df = [10, 1,104]$).

As was the case for nonreferrals, the male application pool also contains a higher proportion of overqualified applicants—both by virtue of education level and hourly wages on the last job—than the female application pool. Here, too, a plot of the percentile distribution of wages on the last job for referrals shows that males had higher wages than females over virtually the entire distribution (available on request). This suggests that the referral pool might be even *more* female if we were to adjust the pool of applicants by eliminating candidates who are overqualified with respect to past wages. Since this pattern emerges *within* the population of referrals

females being disadvantaged as applicants progressed through the hiring process. From the perspective of our goals here, their study has two limitations. First, the firm they studied did not distinguish jobs or occupations, but instead hired people into broad functional areas (Petersen et al. 2000, pp. 774–75). For this reason, their study cannot, as we do, address the gender composition of a specific job, but only the gender composition of the firm as a whole. Second, they do not have access to the originators of the referral tie, i.e., they cannot identify who referred the applicant. Thus, they cannot address questions related to gender differences in the referring or the gender homophily of the referral ties. We will examine both these issues below.

⁶ Note that we do not directly observe referrer's recruitment efforts in these data. Because we only observe recruitment attempts where the referral actually applies to the call center, we say "produce applications." We will explore the implications of this limitation of our data below.

as well, the policy of having a fixed wage offer of \$8.25 per hour and avoiding highly paid workers does not account for the observed referral/nonreferral difference in the percentage of women. Moreover, the gaps between the percentage female for referral applicants (69.9%) and the percentage female expected in the various adjusted pools calculated from the PUMS data on the local labor (the maximum is 60.5% female, see fig. 2) are even larger than gaps observed for nonreferrals. Among referrals as well, wages alone cannot account for females' greater attraction to the CSR job.

Who refers?—At the beginning of the chain of the network processes leading people to apply to the CSR job are the call center employees, who form the pool of *potential referrers*. We assembled a data set on all workers who were employed at the call center at any time during the two-year window of our study and, therefore, were at risk of referring CSR applicants. A total of 4,114 workers worked at the call center at some time during 1995–96, and virtually all of these workers were eligible to refer someone.⁷ Women were much more prevalent than men among employees of any job title of the call center: women constitute 69.7% of workers.⁸

We next examined whether there are significant gender differences in the propensity to produce referral candidates to the CSR job. A little less than a quarter of the workers (i.e., 1,005) produced at least one referral applicant for the CSR job. Of the women, 25.7% originated at least one referral, compared to 21.4% of men ($P < .003$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 8.753$, $df = 1$). Not only are women overrepresented among call center workers, but they are also more prevalent among referring workers than are men: 73.4% of the referrers are women compared with 68.5% of nonreferrers. Although there was no limit to the number of people that employees could

⁷ While the referral bonus program was widely available to employees working at the firm, a few (less than 10) of the 4,114 people employed at the phone center were barred from participating in the program. Managers who have hiring authority cannot claim a referral bonus for someone who winds up working for them (they could, however, refer people to other shifts or supervisors). Second, human resources personnel who screen applicants for the job cannot participate in the referral program. We could not identify these workers in order to exclude them from the set of people at risk for referring.

⁸ There are slight gender differences in turnover among employees that make the 69.7% number a slight underestimate of the percentage female at risk of referring. This is because 42.6% of the 4,114 workers were employed at the call center for less than the entire two-year period of the study. If we limit attention to the 57.4% of people who were employed the entire two years, the percentage female rises to 70.2%. If we weight the cases by the amount of time they are exposed to the risk of referring (this is equivalent to conceiving of the unit of analysis as person-days employed over the two-year hiring window), females account for 70.1% of the population of potential referrers. The predictive models we present below include corrections for heterogeneity in exposure (see table 4).

refer, the vast majority of referrers (79.7%) produced only one referral candidate. The gender difference in producing multiple referrals among the subset who referred at least one candidate is negligible (women, 1.44, and men, 1.43). There are gender differences in overall “out-degree,” however. Women produced an average of .371 referrals compared with an average of .308 referrals for men ($P < .012$, F -test = 6.32, $df = [1, 4, 112]$). Consequently, the gender difference in out-degree is driven by differences in the propensity to refer one candidate.

Who is referred?—Thus far we have shown that women are more prevalent than men at the call center, and that women are more likely to produce referral applications than men. Taken alone or in concert, these factors could account for the observed results where there are more females among referral than nonreferral applicants. However, the question of the *target* of referring remains. Specifically, we examine the data to see whether there is evidence of gender homophily for the referral applicants. As we noted above, a number of scholars assert that gender homophily is an important factor in job-finding networks (e.g., Berger 1995, Reskin and Padavic 1994). To our knowledge, with only the exception of Fernandez et al. (2000), the evidence for gender homophily has been based on the job incumbents and not on prehire data such as those we study here.

Table 3 tabulates the gender of the originator of the referral tie by the gender of the referral applicant. The correlation between the gender of the referrer and the gender of the referral is small ($r = .174$), but statistically significant. Three-quarters (75.1%) of the referral applications produced by female referrers are from women. What is interesting, however, is that the majority of referral applications produced by *male* referrers are also to women (56.3%).

We examined whether these results change after controlling for a number of facets of employee background. We include among the predictors two variables that measure knowledge of the job and referral practices at the company, that is, dummy variables for whether the person had ever worked as a CSR at the company (1 = yes) and whether the person was him- or herself hired as an employee referral (1 = yes). In addition, we control for worker's age (in years), tenure (in years) with the firm, and annual salary (in thousands of dollars) at the start of the study (January 1, 1995). If the worker was hired after the start of the study, tenure is coded zero, and the salary is their starting salary with the company. From the employment records, we also code separate dummy variables for having a bachelor's degree (1 = yes) and a master's degree (1 = yes).

Table 4 presents negative binomial regression analyses modeling the count of referrals made by each worker over the period of the study. We parameterized the count models to correct for differential exposure to the

TABLE 3
GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF REFERRAL APPLICANTS BY GENDER OF
THE REFERRER, COMPARED WITH GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF
NONREFERRAL APPLICANTS

	GENDER OF AP- PLICANTS (%)		<i>N</i>
	Male	Female	
Referral applicants			
Referrer male	43.7	56.3	375
Referrer female	24.9	75.1	1,056
External nonreferral applicants	35.0	65.0	2,578
All external applicants	33.2	66.8	4,112

risk of referring associated with time employed during the hiring window (see n. 7). For all three models presented in table 4, there is evidence of overdispersion, that is, that the variance of the dependent variable is greater than the mean. Thus, we opt for the negative binomial regression model, which corrects for overdispersion when modeling counts (Cameron and Trivedi 1998).

The first column shows the model predicting the number of referrals made by employees, irrespective of the gender of the target. As might be expected, controlling other factors, having been hired as an employee referral is strongly associated with producing referral applicants: the marginal effect shows that referrals have a conditional mean on referring that is .083 higher than nonreferrals. Similarly, employees who have previously (or currently) worked as a CSR at the company produce substantially more referrals than non-CSRs (the marginal effect of CSR background on the conditional mean of referring is .100). Employee's tenure is a significant negative predictor of referring: longer-term employees produce fewer referrals compared with people hired during the period of the study (i.e., those hired most recently). Controlling tenure, older workers are also less likely to participate in referring than are younger employees. The remaining control variables (salary, bachelor's degree, and master's degree) are also negatively associated with referring, although, with the exception of the dummy variable for having a bachelor's degree, these effects are only significant at the .10 level.

Most important for our purposes, while the zero-order data showed that women tend to produce more referral applicants than do men (the average number of referrals for females is .371 compared with .308 for males), this gender difference is explained by the other background factors. After controlling for other variables that are associated with referring, the gender difference is small and not statistically reliable. After controls,

TABLE 4

NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING THE COUNT
DIFFERENT-SEX REFERRALS MADE BY COMPANY E

	MODEL 1 COUNT OF REFERRALS	
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect ^a
Gender (1 = female)	093	027 (1 22)
Employee referral	238	083* (2 33)
Ever worked as a CSR	282	100*** (4 12)
Tenure (in years)	- 045	- 014*** (-4 03)
Annual salary (in \$1,000s)	- 007	- 002 (-1 74)
Bachelor's degree	- 242	- 066* (-2 38)
Master's degree	- 881	- 180* (-2 51)
Age	- 013	- 004*** (-3 38)
Constant	- 493***	
LR χ^2	160 93, df=8	
P-value	00001	

NOTE —No of cases = 4,051 Exposure is set to the length of time employed of
^a Change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable associated with a unit
of tenure, salary, age, days of exposure, and for the modal categories of the other
CSRs, no bachelor's degree, and no master's degree)

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

the marginal effect shows that the female-male difference in the conditional mean of referring is less than half of what it was without controls (.027 vs .063)

Gender differences remain strong and significant, however, once we distinguish the gender of the target of referring (see models 1 and 2 in table 4). Consistent with the zero-order results in table 3, females are more likely to produce same-sex (i.e., female) referrals than are males, even after controlling for the other background variables (model 2). The pattern of the other effects in model 2 are similar to that we found in model 1, that is, the model for the count of referrals, irrespective of gender. Nor do the control variables explain the pattern for different-sex referrals (model 3). As in table 3, female employees are less likely to produce male referrals than are male workers to produce female referral applicants.

Before concluding that men are gender unbiased in their referring patterns, and that only women referrers show a tendency toward gender homophily, it is important to remember that these data pertain to referrals that actually go to the trouble of applying, rather than to referral *attempts*. Even if males and females had no preference for one gender over the other when they contact people recommending that they apply to the CSR job (i.e., they show no tendency toward gender homophily in referral *attempts*), it is possible for gendered job preferences of the person contacted to lead more women than men to apply, ultimately. Indeed, referrers have an incentive to contact people who have a high chance of actually applying, getting hired, and succeeding at the CSR job, since referrers are paid bonuses for successful referrals.

Although we only observe the gender of referrals who end up applying, we can make an educated guess as to the size of the gender biasing effect of referring per se by comparing the referrer-referral gender homophily data in table 3 to what the gender distribution of applications would be in the absence of referring, that is, for the pool of external *nonreferral* applicants. Female referrers produce applications that are about 10% more female than the external nonreferral application pool (75.1% vs 65.0%). A nearly similar biasing effect is evident for male referrers: males produce a referral application pool that is 8.7% more male than do nonreferrals (43.7% vs 35.0%). When considered against the baseline of external nonreferrals, then, both male and female referrers do appear to produce referral applications from people of the same gender as themselves.⁹

⁹ Fernandez et al. (2000, pp. 1309–14) tested whether the gendered job preferences of the person contacted alone could account for the observed degree of referrer-referral gender homophily. If gendered attraction to the job alone is leading to a spurious correlation between the gender of referrers and referrals, then gender homophily should

Demand-Side Processes Screening

The net effect of the supply-side processes discussed above is to deliver an application pool that is two-thirds female into the hiring pipeline. Several theories of gender segregation focus on how it is that male and female candidates differentially progress through the hiring pipeline. In particular, some demand-side theories stress the gender-biasing effects of screeners' preferences (e.g., Reskin and Roos's [1990] queuing theory). Others argue specifically that conscious or unconscious discriminatory attitudes affect employer screening and, thus, the gender composition of candidates as they pass through the stages of the hiring pipeline (Glick et al. 1988, Heilman 1980, 1984). Virtually all extant studies of gender discrimination and prejudice in screening are done in simulated or laboratory settings (for a meta-analysis, see Ohian et al. 1988). In the field setting we analyze here, we cannot directly distinguish among the various attitudinal and psychological processes at work in screeners' minds that might affect the ways men and women are selected to move on through the hiring pipeline.¹⁰ We can, however, observe the impact of those decisions on the gender composition of candidates at each stage of hiring and isolate where it is in the process that gendering is taking place in the hiring pipeline.

Table 5 shows the gender composition of candidates as they move through the hiring process by recruitment source. Considering first the data for all recruitment sources combined (see the fourth row of table 5), we see that the percentage of women increases with each successive step in the process, that is, from 67.1% for applicants to 77.7% of hires. The biggest jump in the percentage female occurs at the step between interview and offer (69.2% vs. 77.0%). Although we have not controlled for any background factors on which men and women might differ, this suggests

also be observed when we randomly match referrers and referrals, and when referrers are randomly paired with *nonreferrals*. The simulated data never met or exceeded the observed levels of gender homophily in 1,000 random pairings of each type (i.e., referrer-referral and referrer-nonreferral). Gendered attraction to the job alone cannot account for this result: the link between specific referrers and referrals needs to be maintained in order to reproduce the observed level of gender homophily.

¹⁰ We only have data on who is interviewed by the hiring managers, who is offered the job (no one is ever offered a job without being interviewed by a hiring manager), and who accepts the job offer. Moreover, we have only limited information on the characteristics of the specific people involved in screening. We know that decisions on who should be brought in for an interview with hiring managers are based on a screen of the paper applications and a brief interview, either in person or by telephone. This stage of the process is handled by one woman. Applicants who survive this phase of the screening are then sent on for another interview with two hiring managers, who have the final say about extending the candidate a job offer. We cannot identify which particular managers performed these interviews, although we know that they are a mixed-gender group.

TABLE 5
 PERCENTAGE FEMALE BY HIRING STAGE FOR INTERNALS, EXTERNAL REFERRALS AND
 EXTERNAL NONREFERRALS (No. of Cases in Parentheses)

	Applications	Interviews	Offers	Hires
External nonreferral	65.0 (2,578)	67.6 (1,476)	72.7 (172)	72.9 (155)
External referral	69.9 (1,534)	71.2 (989)	80.3 (183)	81.4 (172)
Internal	74.2 (151)	73.7 (114)	79.6 (49)	79.6 (49)
All sources	67.1 (4,263)	69.2 (2,579)	77.0 (404)	77.7 (376)

that the screeners—and especially the hiring managers—are choosing women over men.

One possible explanation for this pattern of findings is that, for a variety of reasons, employers have a preference for hiring referrals (e.g., Mencken and Winfield 1999, Miller and Rosenbaum 1997, for a concise review, see Fernandez et al. 2000, pp. 1290–98) who, in this setting, are more likely to be females. Indeed, such an explanation is plausible: the percentage of referrals increases with each step in the process, from 36.0% of applications, to 38.3% of interviewees, to 45.3% of offers, to 45.7% of hires.

The differential gender composition of the referral and nonreferral pools, however, does not explain the tendency for females to progress in greater proportion through the screening steps. Table 5 shows that, except for the slight decline in female representation for internals (73.7% vs. 74.2%) at the interview step, the female composition of candidates increases at each stage even *within* categories of recruitment source. When moving from the application to interview stage, these increases in the percentage female are modest (i.e., 1%–3%). As we mentioned above (see n. 9), the screening decisions for granting an interview are controlled by one woman. However, irrespective of recruitment source, a larger boost in the percentage female (5%–9%) occurs at the next step of the process, where hiring managers extend job offers to interviewees. The vast majority of these offers are accepted, regardless of recruitment source (acceptance rates are 90% for referrals, 94% for nonreferrals, and 100% for internal candidates). The gendering effect is again small (between 0%–1%) at this last stage of the hiring process. This would seem to indicate that the men and women who have survived to this late phase of the recruitment process do not differ very much in their level of interest in the job or in the external options these job seekers might be considering. A suggestion of this latter point comes from the fact that the internal

candidates, who are most likely to be limiting their job search to within the firm, accept 100% of the offers, regardless of gender

A similar conclusion regarding gender differences in applicants' job alternatives or level of interest in the job is suggested by the limited data on applicant withdrawals at earlier stages in the hiring process.¹¹ The gender difference in the rate of application withdrawal prior to the offer stage is trivial (4.0% of females [116 cases] vs. 3.8% of males [45 cases]) and not statistically reliable ($P < .156$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 2.012$, $df = 1$). *None* of the internal candidates withdraw from the application process.

The analyses to this point, however, do not adjust for any background factors on which men and women might differ, and that could form the basis of screeners' judgments. In order to control for such background factors, we developed a set of predictive models of the interview and job-offer stages of the hiring process. Table 6 shows the means and standard deviations of the background variables for the interview and job-offer analyses. As we discussed above, we coded the background information from the original application forms, making sure to include the criteria that the call center screeners look for when reviewing applications. In addition, we included a squared term for nonbank experience in order to capture decay in the value of work experience over time (see Mincer 1974). In preliminary analyses, we examined a number of specifications of the experience variables and found no evidence of diminishing returns to months of banking or customer service experience. Because the unit of analysis is the application (see above), and some people applied multiple times, we also coded a dummy variable to distinguish repeat applicants from first-time applicants (one for repeat applicants and zero otherwise). We also control for the state of the market in these analyses by including

¹¹ In contrast to the situation with rejected job offers, there is some ambiguity about how to interpret withdrawn applications. Although we cannot be sure, we suspect that the majority of these withdrawals occurred when the screener called up the applicant to arrange an interview with the hiring manager. Screeners told us that it is very rare for applicants to call asking to have their names removed from consideration. The fact that *none* of the withdrawals were interviewed by hiring managers is also consistent with this scenario. If we are correct in our suspicion, then it is likely that there are many "undiscovered" withdrawals in the pool of people whom the screener did not call up to offer an interview. This suggests that the pool of withdrawals does not simply reflect applicants' self-selected choices, but is biased by the actions of the screeners. Removing the small group of withdrawals (161) does not change any of the substantive results in table 5: the corresponding percentages female are 64.8% for nonreferrals, 69.6% for referrals, 74.2% for internals, and 67.0% overall. Because we have no way of identifying the "undiscovered" withdrawals, and the "discovered" withdrawals might be endogenous with respect to the interview decision, we have chosen to combine withdrawals and nonwithdrawals in the analyses predicting interview (table 7, and the selection stage of the offer model in table 8). Here too, the results do not change if we exclude the withdrawals.

TABLE 6
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR VARIABLES IN THE INTERVIEW AND JOB-
OFFER MODELS

	INTERVIEW MODEL		JOB-OFFER MODEL	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Independent variables				
Gender (1 = female)	671	470	693	461
Repeat application (1 = yes)	101	302	099	299
Skills				
Computer	784	412	813	390
Language	201	401	188	391
Overeducated (> 16 years)	029	168	032	177
Experience				
Years of bank experience	195	1 259	239	1 391
Years of nonbank experience	5 474	5 190	5 851	5 121
Nonbank experience squared	56 895	216 776	60 448	131 975
Years of customer service	2 796	3 741	3 099	4 038
No. of previous jobs	3 277	1 054	3 292	1 068
Works at time of application	536	499	572	495
Tenure in last job (in years)	1 936	2 863	2 161	3 117
High wage on last job (> \$8.25)	247	431	250	433
Application behavior				
No. of applications	18 780	15 463	18 510	14 797
No. of job openings	19 164	10 986	21 125	11 851
Application source				
External referral	354	478	379	485
Internal	032	175	148	355
Dependent variables				
Interviewed	624	484		
Received job offer			148	355
No. of cases	3,134		1,955	

the number of job openings and the number of applications on the date the candidate applied. Finally, as we mentioned above (see n. 3), 25 cases indicated they had been convicted of a breach of trust. None of these cases were ever interviewed or offered a job. Since it is impossible for these people to get hired at the company, we have deleted them from the predictive models.

In table 7, we present predictive models of the interview stage of the hiring process. Model 1 shows that women are 6.2% more likely to be granted an interview than are men (see the marginal effect in model 1). Model 2 introduces the control variables into the model predicting interview. A number of these factors are significantly related to being granted an interview. Controlling the other factors, applicants with computer experience are more likely to be interviewed than applicants without such

experience, while foreign-language experience is negatively related to being interviewed. This latter effect could be because screeners avoid applicants with accents.

However, contrary to what we would expect in light of our interviews with screeners, overeducated applicants are *more* likely to be interviewed, although the effect is not statistically reliable. In preliminary analyses, we found that years of education is a positive and statistically significant predictor of being interviewed. Contrary to interviewers' stated concerns about overeducated candidates (see above), we could find no statistically reliable evidence of highly educated candidates being avoided by screeners. Nor does replacing the overeducation dummy variable with a continuous measure of education change the other substantive results. Applicants with more customer service experience and more nonbank experience are more likely to be interviewed than candidates without such experience. As predicted by human capital theory, the squared term on nonbank experience is negative, indicating that screeners place less value on very high levels of labor market experience when making decisions about whom to interview. Consistent with our expectations, applicants who are employed at the time of application and candidates who have longer tenures on their last job are significantly more likely to be interviewed than unemployed applicants or people with shorter tenure on their last job. Screeners are less likely, however, to grant interviews to candidates who had high wages on their last job. Entering the last-wage variable as a continuous variable measured in dollars shows a significant negative effect on the chances of being interviewed. Here, too, the substantive results do not change if we substitute the continuous measure of wage for the high-wage dummy variable. The state of the market also affects the propensity of the candidate to be interviewed. Although the number of applications received on the same day as the candidate applied is not a significant predictor of being interviewed, candidates applying when there are many openings are more likely to be interviewed.

For our purposes, the most important finding is that, even after controlling for this impressive array of background factors, the coefficient for gender is strong and statistically reliable in model 2. After controls, women are 4.7% more likely to be interviewed than are males. This 4.7% figure is 76% of the 6.2% advantage that females enjoy before controls are added. Thus, only a small part of the preference that recruiters demonstrate for females is explained by the background factors in model 2.

Nor does recruitment source account for the advantage that females have in being granted interviews. Model 3 adds dummy variables distinguishing external referrals and internals from external nonreferrals. Controlling other factors, referrals are 7% more likely to advance to the interview phase than are nonreferrals. While substantial, the apparent

TABLE 7
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE PROBIT REGRESSION PREDICTING JOB INTERVIEW FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE JOB ON SELECTED
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	MODEL 1			MODEL 2			MODEL 3		
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect ^a	Z-value	Coefficient	Marginal Effect ^a	Z-value	Coefficient	Marginal Effect ^a	Z-value
Constant	207***			- 893***			- 985***		
Gender (1 = female)	163	062***	3 36	135	047**	2 57	126	046*	2 41
Repeat application (1 = yes)				- 031	- 010	- 40	- 064	- 023	- 81
Skills									
Computer				292	104***	4 94	300	112***	5 09
Language				- 132	- 046*	- 2 20	- 137	- 050*	- 2 27
Overeducated (> 16 yrs)				165	052	1 21	185	062	1 35
Experience									
Bank experience				036	012	1 52	030	011	1 26
Nonbank experience				046	015***	3 55	047	017***	3 61
Nonbank experience squared				- 001	- 0005**	- 2 98	- 001	- 0005**	- 3 00

preference that recruiters give to internals is more than double the referral advantage: internal candidates are 17.8% more likely to be granted interviews than are external nonreferrals. Although women are overrepresented among applicants from both these recruitment sources (see table 6), the results of model 3 show that females are 4.6% more likely to advance to the interview stage even after controlling for recruitment source.¹²

Table 8 presents the models for the job-offer stage. Since no one was ever hired without an interview, it is possible that selection bias may affect our estimates of the job-offer-stage model. For this reason, we control for selection bias using a bivariate probit model with selection, which is the appropriate statistical procedure when both the ultimate dependent variable (job offer) and the selection criterion (interview) are dichotomous (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997).¹³

Model 1 presents the results of a bivariate probit model that includes all the regressors from the interview stage (table 7, model 3) in the interview-selection step and just the dummy variable for gender in the equation predicting job offer. As would be expected, the results of the interview-selection step are very similar to those in table 7. The ρ parameter—the correlation between the errors of the two stages—is statistically significant, indicating that there is evidence of selection bias. Even after controlling for the interview-selection factors, however, the marginal effect for gender in the offer stage shows that females are 4.9% more likely to be offered a job than are males.

Model 2 adds a number of regressors to the offer stage of the model. Comparing the log likelihoods (cf. models 1 and 2) shows that adding these factors significantly improves the fit of the model ($P < .01$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 26.686$, $df = 12$). Also, the ρ parameter is no longer significant.

¹² We examined whether there were interactions between gender and recruitment source. We found no such interactions with respect to referrals: gender and referral effects worked in an additive fashion. With respect to internals, the story is more complicated. Adding gender \times internal and gender \times referral interaction terms to model 3 shows no significant effect for gender \times referral, but a significant negative effect for gender \times internal. In analysis not presented here, we found that this effect is not substantive and is entirely accounted for by the changing of the case base as a result of listwise deletion of missing cases (results available from the author).

¹³ The hiring process at the phone center is organized in such a way as to make it very difficult to identify selection bias. To the extent that recruiters are successful in mimicking the behavior of the hiring managers, the recruiters' actions become indistinguishable from those of the hiring managers. In the limit, one can consider them *becoming* hiring managers. Indeed, recruiters were granted such hiring authority after our field period ended. Our main strategy for addressing the challenge of selection bias in this setting is to define instrumental variables for the analyses (see n. 14 below). The net result of these analyses, however, is that our central findings are robust to whether or not we control for selection bias.

Most important for our purposes, however, females appear to be preferred over males, even after controlling for other factors on which hiring managers are screening (marginal effect 5.9%)

Model 3 adds dummy variables for recruitment source to the offer stage of the equation.¹⁴ Here, too, ρ is not significantly different from zero, indicating little evidence of selection bias. The log likelihoods (cf. models 2 and 3) show that adding these dummy variables improves the fit of the model over and above the other background factors ($P < .0001$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 58.850$, $df=2$). The marginal effects for recruitment source show an interesting pattern. Hiring managers and human resources recruiters express roughly similar degrees of preference for referrals over nonreferrals. Recruiters show a 7.0% marginal effect for referrals at the interview stage, while the hiring managers' preference for referrals at the job-offer step is 7.7%. The contrast between the recruiters' and the hiring managers' behavior with respect to internal candidates is huge, however. Controlling other factors, internals are 17.6% more likely than external nonreferrals to be sent on for an interview with hiring managers. However, the marginal effect for internals at the job-offer stage is more than double this rate: hiring managers are 37.2% more likely to extend job offers to internals than to external nonreferrals. None of these factors, however, explains the tendency for more females than males to advance through the hiring stages. Consistent with the descriptive analyses in table 5, hiring managers' preference for females is over and above their bias in favor of referrals and internals: females are 4.2% more likely to be offered jobs than are males even after controlling applicant background factors and recruitment source. Here, too, we found no evidence of interactions between gender and recruitment source.

The final step of the hiring process is offer acceptance (see last column of table 5). In contrast to the interview and offer decisions, which are made by company personnel, the decision to accept or reject the offer is made by the candidate. The company has a policy of not negotiating wage offers for the CSR job. For all candidates, the wage being offered is a constant \$8.25 per hour. Therefore, gender differences at this final stage

¹⁴ Note that we have excluded the application behavior variables (no. of applications and no. of job openings) from the offer stage of models 2 and 3 in table 8. In so doing, we are treating these variables as instruments—variables that, by assumption, affect the selection stage, but not the substantive stage. Without instruments, the bivariate probit model with selection is only weakly identified off the nonlinearity of the selection effect. In this setting, this is tantamount to arguing that the recruiters worry about the state of the market when deciding whom to interview, but that line managers have delegated concerns about the state of the market to the human resources department when deciding job offers. Relaxing this assumption (analyses available from the author) does not change our central conclusions with respect to gender.

TABLE 8
COEFFICIENTS FOR THE BIVARIATE PROBIT REGRESSION MODEL WITH SELECTION PREDICTING JOB OFFER FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE
REPRESENTATIVE JOB ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	MODEL 1			MODEL 2			MODEL 3		
	Coefficient	Marginal Effect ^a	Z-value	Coefficient	Marginal Effect ^a	Z-value	Coefficient	Marginal Effect ^a	Z-value
Offer Model									
Constant	-623*** 142	049*	2 04	-1 242*** 202	059*	2 57	-2 176*** 261	042** 042**	3 27 -1 91
Gender (1 = female)				-103	-031	-88	-213	-035	
Repeat application (1 = yes)									
Skills									
Computer				033	010	34	231	038**	2 71
Language				-056	-017	-60	-106	-019	-1 20
Overeducated (> 16 yrs)				108	035	53	215	046	98
Experience									
Bank experience				-010	-003	-39	-020	-004	-73
Nonbank experience				039	012*	2 09	059	011**	3 19
Nonbank experience squared				-001	-0004	-1 92	-002	-0004**	-2 78
Customer service experience				016	005	1 61	020	004*	2 04
No of previous jobs				-060	-019	-170	-049	-009	-1 35
Works at time of application				320	090***	4 47	303	047***	3 77
Tenure on last job				013	004***	90	025	005	1 76
High wage on last job ^b				-053	-016	-59	-056	-010*	-66
Application source									
External referral applicant							336	077***	4 31
Internal applicant							1 181	372***	6 24

	Selection Model Interview					
Constant	- 871***		- 969***		- 993***	
Gender (1 = female)	121	044*	2 33		125	046*
Repeat application (1 = yes)	- 091	- 033	- 1 21		- 069	- 025
Skills						
Computer	291	109***	5 18		301	113***
Language	- 139	- 051*	- 2 44		- 137	- 050*
Overeducated (> 16 yrs)	214	072	1 68		191	065
Experience						
Bank experience	033	012	1 43		032	011
Nonbank experience	052	018***	4 34		048	017***
Nonbank experience squared	- 002	- 0006***	- 3 73		- 001	- 0005***
Customer service experience	026	009**	3 42		023	008**
No of previous jobs	- 004	- 001	- 16		010	003
Works at time of application	183	068***	4 01		137	050**
Tenure on last job	037	013**	3 42		037	013**
High wage on last job ^b	- 124	- 045*	- 2 12		- 135	- 049*
Application behavior						
No of applications	- 0003	- 0001	- 23		0005	0002
No of job openings	023	008***	8 34		027	010***
Application source						
External referral applicant	244	081***	5 14		226	076***
Internal applicant	831	221***	8 24		705	198***
ρ		- 700**				- 291
Log likelihood		- 2,711 642				- 2,598 299
Improvement LR χ^2 (df)						26 686** (12)
						58 850*** (2)

NOTE — No of cases for offer stage = 1,955; no of cases for interview stage = 3,134

* Change in the conditional probability of job offer associated with a unit change in the independent variable, evaluated at the means of bank experience, nonbank experience, nonbank experience squared, customer service experience, no of previous jobs, tenure, no of applications, no of openings, and for the modal categories of the other independent variables (i.e., females, not a repeat applicant, with computer skills, no language skills, not overeducated, working at application, not high wage, not employee referrals, and not an internal). For the selection equation, marginal effects refer to the probability of surviving selection

^b High wage on last job refers to wages greater than \$8.25

* $P < .05$, two-tailed test

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

are more likely to reflect candidates' feelings of fit for the job or other employment options than screeners' preferences for one gender over another

Unfortunately, because of the small number of cases that have survived to this stage, we lack sufficient statistical power to say anything about gender differences in offer acceptance rates reliably. Overall, females show a higher acceptance rate of offers: 93.6% for females versus 89.4% for males, but this difference is not statistically reliable ($P < .170$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 1.887$, $df = 1$). Looking within recruitment source, we find that regardless of gender, 100% of the offers to internals (10 males and 39 females) were accepted. For external nonreferrals, the gender difference in acceptance rates is only one percentage point (89.4% of males and 90.4% of females accept the job). The largest gender difference in the rate of offer acceptance is for the external referrals, where 95.2% of females and 88.9% of males accept offers. But this difference, too, is not statistically significant ($P < .182$, likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 1.780$, $df = 1$). The lack of significant gender differences also does not appear to be a result of suppressor effects of other control variables. We estimated a series of predictive models of offer acceptance using various combinations of the variables listed in table 6. Gender is never significant in any of these predictive models, for that matter, neither are any of the control variables. Thus, we are clearly at the limits of our data.

DISCUSSION

Although we can never be certain that we have controlled for all the relevant gender differences in background factors, the analyses in the previous section suggest that in this setting, recruiters' and hiring managers' preferences—perhaps unconscious—significantly contribute to the gendering of the CSR job. In this respect, the latter findings are consistent with statistical discrimination mechanisms (e.g., Phelps 1972, Aigner and Cain 1977). In the absence of cheaply available information about the quality of the person being screened, statistically discriminating employers treat each applicant like the average applicant from their gender group. While we think this process may well be going on, it is also possible that these screening decisions may reflect gender differences in CSR performance.

While exceptionally accurate and objective performance measures are kept for CSRs at the phone center,¹⁵ there is no evidence of significant

¹⁵ CSRs receive up to 5,000 customer inquiries from incoming phone calls per month, and a computer system randomly routes these phone calls to the next available CSR. This latter feature of the system means that the difficulty of the inquiries has been

male-female differences in the key performance measures used there (Castilla 2005). While the small number of cases ($N = 290$) for whom these various measures are available for study might be hindering this assessment, there is no reliable evidence of gender differences in the performance measures they collect in these analyses. Castilla (2005) reports analyses of both raw and quality-adjusted handle time and turnover. He presents numerous models predicting various aspects of performance, including initial performance after the two-month training period, initial performance controlling for selection, turnover during training, post-training turnover, performance growth, and performance growth, controlling for selection as the result of turnover. Gender is never significant in any of these models. The insignificant differences that do appear (e.g., 0.5 calls per hour against a mean of 20 calls per hour) virtually always favor males over females. At least by these relatively objective criteria, we cannot explain the preference that screeners in this setting show for females by a simple appeal to females' performance advantages in this job.

We explicitly asked human resources screeners and hiring managers whether men or women are better suited to the CSR job. Although their responses might be constrained by desirability bias, they all claimed that both men and women do equally good jobs as CSRs. These people would often provide anecdotal examples of good male and female CSRs. We pointed out that there were a lot of women employed as CSRs, the supervisor of the screeners responded that she had noticed that, and she hoped that we would be able to shed some light on why this is the case.

Although we can only speculate, our fieldwork in the call center has led us to think that the observed preference for females that we have documented might have its roots in subtle processes of the gender encoding of what screeners think of as good job performance for customer service interactions (for a review of the role of gender in service delivery, see Gutek et al. 1999). When we asked the call center managers whom they considered ideal performers on the job, they suggested that we monitor the phone calls of "two of their best CSRs," whom they described as "both

randomized across CSRs. Supervisors often monitor employees' phone conversations in order to ensure that courtesy and accuracy goals are being met. In addition, the computer system automatically records extensive information on each CSR's "handle time," i.e., how much time a CSR takes to complete each phone call. Conditional on a sufficient level of accuracy and courtesy, in this setting, employees who can get off the phone more quickly (i.e., have lower average handle times) are more productive than CSRs who dispatch customers more slowly. This is because the longer the handle time, the fewer calls the CSR is available to receive, the more staff is required to handle a given volume of phone calls, and the more time customers will be made to wait on hold. For more detail about the performance measurement system at the phone center, see Castilla (2005).

excellent, but for different reasons." With the workers' permission, we listened in on a number of calls handled by each of them.

These workers—one male and one female—had dramatically contrasting styles of interaction on the phone. While both workers spoke very clearly and succinctly, the male CSR spoke very quickly. Although he was polite in his interactions (e.g., not interrupting the customers as they spoke), his quick, focused responses left the impression that he was a very busy person and did not have time to waste. At least in our reading of these interactions, while this CSR did not go to the point of seeming impatient with customers, he was definitely leaning in that direction. Customers appeared to pick up on these cues and seemed to speak more quickly themselves over the course of their phone calls. The net result appeared to us to be a series of clear, efficient, but somewhat curt interactions.

In contrast, the female CSR spoke much more slowly, and we did not sense the customer speeding up as her calls progressed. She spoke distinctly and precisely, but was relatively leisurely in her style. Customers seemed to sense her as a warm person and would often open ancillary lines of discussion that were not immediately relevant to the topic at hand. In a particularly dramatic example of this, one female customer who had recently been widowed and was calling to clear up questions about her husband's financial affairs began confiding her feelings of despair and loneliness to the female CSR. Her reaction to this customer was to be kind and gentle in her tone of speaking. She went further to encourage the customer to place her faith in God, that he would help her through this trying time.

The call center managers were certainly aware of this dramatic contrast in styles and, indeed, were ambivalent about which was the superior style between them. They said that the ideal CSR was a combination of these two, but they recognized that they were probably impossible to combine. They described the male CSR as having an excellent handle time, while still meeting or exceeding the phone center's customer courtesy and accuracy goals. While the managers were concerned that the female CSR's handle time was not as fast as they would like, they praised her for being someone who could foster customer loyalty, even within the difficult limits of a fleeting call-center interaction. The managers saw that the emotional work that the female CSR was doing was a key part of customer courtesy, and that was likely to take time. In contrast, the "on-the-edge-of-impatient" style of the male CSR might run the risk of seeming officious to customers. We think that managers are correct in this interpretation: we do not imagine that the same widow, who felt so comfortable with the

female CSR, would even be tempted to open up to the male CSR in the same way¹⁶

As much research has shown (Hochschild 1983, Leidner 1991, 1993), the contrast in the emotional work between the two styles typified by these two CSRs evokes sex-role stereotypes that spill over from domains other than work. Another factor that would serve to invite such spillovers is that there is considerable uncertainty with respect to how to screen for these workers. Indeed, the screeners freely admitted to us that they found it quite difficult to discern who is likely to be a good CSR. Much research shows that in the face of uncertainty, stereotypes become more salient in decision making (e.g., Fiske and Taylor 1991, Hilton and von Hippel 1996). The screeners at the firm seem unlikely to be immune to the gender stereotype of the “nurturing” female (see Glick and Fiske [2001] on benevolent sexism). The fact that the interviewing process seems to produce the largest boost in the percentage of women is consistent with the idea that it is the interaction with the candidate that seems to activate the stereotypical conception of gender (Correll 2001, 2004, Ridgeway 1997). If we are correct in these speculations, then it is not simple coincidence that the employees we were directed to monitor as exemplars of the two ways of being excellent CSRs were of different genders. While they may feel genuinely ambivalent about choosing between the efficient (“male”) and supportive (“female”) styles, our findings suggest that, on the ground, they may in fact be shading their choices toward the more supportive definition of CSR performance. If this interpretation is right, then screeners would have to be deemphasizing the importance of handle-time “efficiency” at the margin as they screen candidates. Although the differences are never statistically significant, the fact that the handle-time performance measures were generally better for males is consistent with the idea that the handle-time constraint might be relaxed for females during screening. In so doing, they would be giving the benefit of a doubt to female candidates, whom they view as more likely to deliver on the more difficult-to-measure dimension of performance. With these actions, they have subtly, and probably unwittingly, contributed to the gendering of the CSR job in this setting.

¹⁶ In this setting, the entry-level CSRs we have studied are exclusively assigned to inbound calls and cannot dial phone calls out. Consequently, they have no way of reestablishing a contact with a specific client. Nor do customers have any way of asking to be served by a specific CSR. In Gutek et al.’s (2000) useful terms, these features of the technology make these customer service interactions much closer to “encounters” than “relationships.” Seen in this light, the male CSR’s style is much closer to an encounter, while the female CSR stretches toward the relationship end of the continuum (in Gutek et al. [2000] vocabulary, a “pseudo-relationship”) despite the strictures of the technology.

Screeners' behavior after application cannot account for why the application pool is two-thirds female at the beginning of the hiring pipeline, however. As we discussed above, the call center's policy of paying relatively low wages is likely to be part of the explanation. But it is also possible that screeners' gender stereotypes about job roles extends to the stage of initial contact with the company (see Fernandez and Mors 2005). The human resources screener says that she does steer people to apply to jobs for which she thinks they would be best suited and in which they would be most interested during preapplication inquiries. However, she denies using gender as the basis for such suggestions. To the extent that such steering is along gender-stereotypical lines, this would manifest itself in more women than men applying for CSR jobs. Although we are limited in our ability to address this issue in this setting (Fernandez and Mors 2005), we have been able to locate data that speak to this issue in another firm's call center, located in a different state.

Between April 1996 and December 1998, 8,323 applications were filed by job seekers at this second call center. In contrast to the call center that has been the focus of our study, this firm screens for fit with the company overall via an automated phone system, irrespective of the job in which the person might be interested. In addition to a battery of test items designed to measure fit with the company, all applicants to the call center are then presented with a short description of jobs "that might be of interest to you in the future," and asked to rate their level of interest in these jobs on a five-point Likert scale. The ratings range from a low of one, "really not interested," to five, "it is a job you really want and have the ability to do it at excellence." Because the wording of the five category confounds interest in the job with perceived ability to do the job, we will not calculate means on these items, but will focus instead on the gender distributions of those choosing one and those choosing five separately.

These data also allow us to measure the gender distribution of people who are choosing or avoiding jobs, even if they were looking to apply to some other job, prior to any opportunity to be steered by the human resources department personnel. Also important for our purposes is the fact that CSR was included among the job titles. The exact wording of the job description for the "customer service representative" was "Finding out what customers need and providing services that lead to a high level of satisfaction. Answering complaints when necessary." Since people in this setting are free to express interest in a number of gendered job titles—we will focus particularly on receptionist and computer programmer—these data can also be used to explore gender stereotypes operating among applicants on the supply side of the labor market.

Fifty-five percent of the applications to the company overall were from females. The representation of women among the pool of people very

interested in the receptionist job is 20 percentage points higher women comprise 75% of those saying “five” to the receptionist job. In contrast, females are underrepresented by 30 percentage points among those who are avoiding the receptionist job females constitute 25% of those who code the reception job a one. Considering the computer programmer job, while females are 55% of the applicants to the firm overall, women represent only 40% of those who choose a five for the computer programmer job. But women are found in overabundance among those avoiding the computer programmer job women are 65% of those giving the computer programmer job a one. The results for CSR are intermediate between these two extremes. Women are underrepresented by four percentage points among those choosing one while women are 55% of those applying to the company overall, females are 51% of those responding that they “really are not interested” in the CSR job. Women’s representation in the group of people who are choosing a five for CSR is 60%, a five-point boost over the female composition in the pool of applicants for the company overall.

The gender distributions of the choices being given by applicants to this call center align starkly for the two most clearly gendered job titles. At least in this setting, the CSR job title is not as stereotypically female in the minds of the applicants as is the receptionist job. Of course, in line with our analyses of the gender-biasing effects of the open labor market above, these patterns of choice and avoidance are probably affected by applicants’ expectations that computer programming is likely to pay more than are the other two jobs. Here, too, some part of the gender differences in these patterns reflect extant gender inequality in the local labor market.

However, preapplication steering by firm recruiters is not available as an explanation for these patterns in this setting. Even in the absence of steering, men and women show different levels of interest in the CSR job title. Although we cannot similarly remove the influence of preapplication steering in the focal call center, the findings from the alternative site suggest that steering is not required to produce gender biasing in the application pool. This implies that there is likely to be some gendering even at the preapplication inquiry phase of the hiring process. This further suggests that supply-side gender differences in preferences for jobs—affected at least in part by extant gender inequalities in the labor market—cannot be eliminated as a contributing factor to the gendering of the CSR job.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The patterns we have documented here have several important implications for our understanding of the gender segregation of jobs. This work is unusual in its ability to distinguish among various gender-segregating processes that are alleged to occur in the hiring pipeline. Starting with the preapplication phase, while we cannot rule out that gender differences in preferences may be playing some part in the skewed nature of the initial application pool, our analyses suggest that gender wage inequality in the open labor market is likely to be a contributing factor. The male distribution of applicants' past wages dominates the female distribution over virtually the entire range (fig. 1). The "adjusted pool" simulations (fig. 2) suggest that the firm's policy of offering a fixed wage of \$8.25 per hour likely has the effect of attracting proportionately more women than men to apply.

We also found stark evidence that clearly supports arguments that prehire network processes add to the gender skewing of jobs. In these data, the pool of employee referral applicants is even more female than the pool of nonreferrals. Examining the origins of these ties, we found that women are overrepresented among the potential initiators of referral ties (i.e., employees working at the call center), as well as among the population originating referral applications to the CSR job. Moreover, we found clear evidence of gender homophily in the referring process: referrers of both genders tend to produce same-sex referrals.

While these network factors certainly play a role in the gendering of the early phase of the recruitment process (specifically, the formation of the application pool), the network mechanisms cannot provide a complete explanation of the gendering of the CSR job. In order to complete the picture, we need to consider the behavior of the actors on the demand side of this market interface. We found that in making their screening decisions, screeners and hiring managers appeared to prefer internals and employee referrals, categories that were both composed of a higher proportion of women than external nonreferrals. Even within categories of recruitment source, females seem to have been given the benefit of a doubt in screening decisions, resulting in a further skewing of the population of candidates toward females. Apparently, being a referral did not *substitute* for whatever advantages screeners were attributing to females in this setting: on the contrary, referral background and the screens *combined* additively, such that among hires, the highest percentage of females is found among referrals (81.4%). As a final point, although we can only speculate, our interviews with screeners suggest to us that managers at the company might have been enacting gendered notions of what makes

for good customer service interactions when making these screening decisions

As we see it, our study has important methodological implications for studies of gender-based job segregation. While the literature on gender segregation of jobs often invokes gender-sorting mechanisms that operate *prehire*, the data that are used to examine these processes empirically are almost always collected on *posthire* populations. Consequently, it has been difficult to distinguish the various processes that may be at work in producing gender segregation. This lack of fit between theory and data makes it dangerous to conclude anything about the presence or absence of prehire gender-sorting mechanisms on the basis of posthire data, which reflect the net effects of various prehire processes.

As an illustration, we offer table 9, which is a cross-tabulation of the gender of referrers and referrals based solely on posthire data. In sharp contrast to table 3, where we saw ample evidence of one of the key network mechanisms that is cited as a source of gender segregation of jobs—gender homophily in the employee referral process—table 9 shows *no evidence whatsoever* in support of gender homophily. Although gender homophily in the referral process has clearly contributed to the early stages of the process by which this job has become gender segregated, a research strategy that starts with hires (e.g., Leicht and Marx 1997, Mencken and Winfield 2000), would miss this fact in this setting. Since it is quite common for researchers to invoke gender homophily of job-finding networks as an explanation for gender segregation, the comparison of tables 3 and 9 should strike a cautionary note for researchers in this area.

We see this article as contributing in significant ways to the conceptual grounding and clarification of the theoretical mechanisms at work in theories of job segregation by gender. The story we have told is necessarily multifaceted, and in this respect, bears some resemblance to the *dénouement* of the murder-mystery novel *Murder on the Orient Express*, where *all* the suspects did it. In this setting, we can say with assurance that all of the factors we examined—preapplication choices, preapplication gender homophily of networks, and screeners' actions—played a role in the gender segregation of the CSR job in this setting. Not only have we been able to isolate the processes, but close analyses of these very special data have also yielded important insights on how these factors work across the many links in the hiring process. Especially in light of the complicated and overlapping nature of the predictions of theories of job segregation by gender, our ability to distinguish among these mechanisms empirically constitutes an important step forward for this literature. If we are to attain a deep understanding of the social processes that sort men and women into distinct jobs, we suggest that future research in this area needs to

TABLE 9
GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF REFERRAL HIRES BY GENDER OF
THE REFERRER, COMPARED WITH GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF
NONREFERRAL HIRES

	GENDER OF HIRES (%)		<i>N</i>
	Male	Female	
Referral hires			
Referrer male	15.0	85.0	40
Referrer female	20.0	80.0	125
External nonreferral hires	27.1	72.9	155
All external hires	22.7	77.3	327

move beyond the posthire, “black box” treatment of the core prehire processes that produce gender segregation of jobs

Finally, the results of our analyses suggest an important new direction for research on gender segregation. While this article has identified and empirically documented the various separate mechanisms that contribute to the gender segregation of jobs, we have been careful not to apportion variation in gender segregation of this job with particular mechanisms. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, such a variance-partitioning exercise holds much theoretical appeal. It is important to note, however, that the structure of the hiring pipeline suggests that the various mechanisms we have documented here potentially feed back on one another, vastly complicating any attempts at a linear partitioning of effects. Developing such a decomposition is a high priority for our future research. In pursuing this goal, we have opted for an agent-based simulation framework in order to do justice to potential feedbacks and nonlinearities in the hiring pipeline (Rubineau and Fernandez 2005). In addition to identifying key leverage points in the system, agent-based models provide a way to decompose effects even in the presence of complex interdependencies. Moreover, the agent-based approach allows us to vary the empirical parameters of the processes that we observed in this setting. In this manner, we expect that the painstaking work of identifying the numerous gender-sorting mechanisms documented here will pay dividends in furthering our understanding of how the various mechanisms combine to produce job sex segregation in settings beyond the call center.

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Book Reviews

Streets of Glory Church and Community in a Black Urban Neighborhood
By Omar M. McRoberts Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003 Pp
x+178

Cheryl Townsend Gilkes
Colby College

Is the "black church" still the center of the "black community"? Omar McRoberts's pathbreaking volume cuts through the imagination of community, culture, and *ecclesia* to apprehend and interpret the complicated relationships between contemporary black churches and their neighborhoods. *Streets of Glory* is primarily an ethnographic study set in the Four Corners area of Dorchester (Boston), Massachusetts. Dorchester's racial transition was the force that shaped "the facts" that prompted Boston's 1974 federal desegregation order. According to McRoberts, Four Corners is a poor neighborhood whose "thriving religious presence" generates several questions: Why so many [churches]? What are the differences among them? What roles do they play in facing neighborhood problems?

In his rich review of the literature, McRoberts points out that black communities have been characterized as having too many churches. These excess churches were expected to disappear over time, not only have they remained, but their *relationship* with the neighborhood has become increasingly difficult. McRoberts provides not only a rich and nuanced understanding of the religious diversity of contemporary black Americans but also a focus on the downside of intensive religious presence.

First he places the "black religious district" of Dorchester in historical and ecological context, demonstrating that the religious diversity among urban black Americans is not new. From the early 20th century through the 1960s, he writes, "the social diversity introduced by migrants and immigrants from Virginia, Maryland, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and the West Indies had irreversibly complicated black identity along at least two major lines: point of origins and socioeconomic class."

McRoberts begins his research when these complexities have been deepened by the aftermath of the Civil Rights movement: economic changes depressing the situation of the poor and changes in immigration laws that multiply the ethnicities among Dorchester's black population. The dramatic impact of immigration brought the cultural tool kits of Haitians, Dominicans, and West Indians to this neighborhood. Their new churches along with the older ones shape a "religious environment" that is "dense and diverse, not unlike a contemporary shopping mall, where one finds twenty stores that sell pants." One consequence is the demise of a unitary

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“black public” and a religious environment that is unable to support the Four Corners area. In addressing migration, urban renewal, highway construction, blockbusting, and falling black incomes, Four Corners is a neighborhood that has lost out in the competition for resources and services.

The diverse churches that sprang up during this period of disruption and change are highly particularistic in their outreach. They are “niche churches” and “bouncing churches”—“a transgressive form of religious presence” where churches push out services necessary for the neighborhood population’s everyday life. Niche churches serve specialized commuter populations, and bouncing churches follow the instabilities of the rental market, moving in and out of storefronts and other locations as opportunity and church budgets allow. The churches reflect differences in religious consciousness such that their competing religious ideas and varying senses of “holiness” develop litanies of criticisms aimed at other churches in the area—a situation not conducive to effective community. For some churches, their prevailing idea is an “exilic” framework. This is especially true in immigrant and southern migrant churches, where “church participation becomes a way to ensure cultural continuity.” These churches are “in but not of” their immediate surroundings, and the immediate neighborhood identifies this as a problem.

Religious differences also lead to differences in the way churches help their members survive and in what they teach in terms of accommodation to the larger society, further eroding illusions of unity and community. For instance, McRoberts points to the struggle between the Four Corners churches and “the street.” In urban black communities, the struggle with the street is old and deep. McRoberts resists the temptation to wander off into the side trails of metaphors and tropes that this struggle invites. He illuminates this struggle with thick descriptions and critical analyses. One particularly poignant moment involves “a sonic battle” between a Sunday worship service and unchurched teenagers with a boombox. For the Four Corners churches, the street is a space to avoid, to convert, or to serve orientations that are confrontational and reinforce social distance and conflict.

While the churches want to be seen as “activist,” their variety confounds neat analysis. McRoberts wades into this thicket to provide perspectives that should guide future researchers. He juggles the priestly, pastoral, and prophetic at the same time as he implements a continuum that distinguishes among the more inward- or outward-focusing churches. His participant observation and intense interviewing permit him to identify what he calls “microsources of change” involving “drift” and “growth.” By asking questions about diversity, particularity, and ecology—“Who is my neighbor?”—McRoberts provides an analysis that should complicate all future research on “the black church” and should challenge churches in black neighborhoods to take seriously the presence and needs of their immediate neighbors. *Streets of Glory* is both disturbing and fascinating.

It is an excellent analysis that, in this era of “faith-based” initiatives, raises serious questions about the abilities of black churches to deliver direct services and to continue their historic role of uplift in inner-city neighborhoods

Every Time I Feel the Spirit Religious Experience and Ritual in an African American Church By Timothy J Nelson New York New York University Press Pp 222 \$19 00 (paper)

Carolyn Chen
Northwestern University

Timothy Nelson was only a week into his fieldwork at “Eastside Chapel,” a black church in the South, when a “strange and mysterious” man revealed to him a “word from the Lord.” Nelson’s book, the man said, “is going to touch a lot of people and reveal to the white community the depth of the relationship between black people and God” (p. 8). These prophetic words ring true as Nelson guides us through the colorful religious world of black, low-country southerners. *Every Time I Feel the Spirit* is based on Nelson’s year-long ethnographic research at Eastside Chapel, an AME (African Methodist Episcopal) church in a blighted neighborhood in Charleston, South Carolina. With an observant eye, he reveals an enchanted (vs. disenchanted) reality in which individuals experience God through dreams, visions, miracles, and spirit possession.

Nelson had set out to study the role of black churches in low-income neighborhoods. But he became so fascinated by the “emotional worship” he observed in black churches that he scrapped the original idea and instead wrote a book about religion. This choice of focus is more significant than it may seem, for Nelson does what few sociologists of black Christianity do these days—he writes about what makes religion “religious.” Rather than using religion to explain such outcomes as black political behavior and social movements, Nelson makes religion itself the thing to be explained. This is a refreshing and fruitful move.

To Nelson, there is nothing that inherently distinguishes religious experiences and rituals from ordinary experiences and activities. He therefore rejects traditional definitions of religious experience and ritual that depend on extraordinary qualities. Rather, Nelson maintains that some experiences are “religious” and certain actions are “rituals” because of the religious meanings that individuals attribute to them. Religious metaphors “provide ready-made templates that members can use to make sense of their experiences within a spiritual framework” (p. 55).

For example, Eastsiders practice a form of evangelical Christianity that constructs religious experience as a relationship between individuals and God. Mundane and everyday experiences are interpreted as encounters with this personal God. Dreams and visions become communications from

God, a rainbow becomes a sign of God's promise To Eastsiders, God intervenes in every aspect of ordinary life, even the simple action of waking up in the morning But spiritual experiences, Nelson reminds us, are not limited to only those encounters with the divine, but include negative spiritual entities as well Struggles that range from fighting drug addiction to being unfocused in church are attributed to the workings of the devil As much as God is present in the everyday lives of Eastsiders, so too is the devil

To Eastsiders, the Sunday worship service is a face-to-face encounter with God While all evangelical Christians want to experience the presence and transforming power of God in their worship services, the "emotional' black worship service" is unique, Nelson argues, because of its emphasis on certain emotional states and bodily movements as evidence of God's presence Behaviors such as clapping, hollering, running, and dancing during the worship service visibly show the participant's emotional involvement and spiritual commitment The involuntary display of ecstatic dancing or "shouting" is regarded as a sign of being filled with the Holy Ghost Or, as Nelson puts it, "genuine shouting gives evidence that God has responded and is moving among his people" (p 170)

But what does black religious experience have to do with the everyday reality of being black, poor, and Southern? I found myself asking this question repeatedly and was relieved that it is finally addressed in the book's last chapter Here Nelson argues that the social location of Eastside Chapel powerfully shapes their spiritual experiences For most Eastsiders, who do not have medical insurance and are suspicious of the all-white county medical clinic, "God is often a healer of first rather than last resort" (p 175) Poverty creates a sense of distrust among church members who, in turn, face struggles individualistically rather than communally Unlike other poor, minority churches, Nelson claims that Eastside Chapel is not a source of community and support for its members And yet people are transformed at Eastside Chapel—they leave the streets, they "clean up"—all through the power of God No doubt this pattern of individual spiritual struggle is true, but I sense that there is also a story here about how the community intervenes to enact and shape these kinds of encounters with God Nelson also notes that most of the congregants are women, but unfortunately does not discuss how gender influences black religious experiences

Nevertheless, Nelson has given us a wonderfully intimate glimpse into how rituals and belief animate the religious experiences of black southerners This is an important work that will challenge scholars of religion and race to rethink the nature of religious experience

Palestinians in the Diaspora Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland By Helena Lindholm Schulz with Juliane Hammer New York Routledge, 2003 Pp xii+276

Confronting the Occupation Work, Education, and Political Activism of Palestinian Families in a Refugee Camp By Maya Rosenfeld Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press, 2004 Pp xvi+376

Elia Zureik
Queen's University

Since the signing of the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993, the study of Palestinians has become a major industry that continues to occupy governments, think tanks of all shades, and academic researchers. The two books under review provide an interesting contrast in terms of focus and methodology. *Palestinians in the Diaspora* explores how Palestinians in their dispersal across the globe develop a sense of identity and community, while *Confronting the Occupation* deals with the Palestinians in their homeland, albeit as a displaced community living in a refugee camp near Bethlehem at a stone's throw from their original homes inside Israel. Maya Rosenfeld focuses on the reasons behind Palestinian educational attainment while living under adverse socioeconomic conditions and occupation by Israel. Helena Lindholm Schulz and Juliane Hammer's book draws upon the literature on transnationalism and globalization, while Rosenfeld's study is anchored in the political economy framework.

The literature on globalization and identity is suffused with discussion about diasporas. The term poses a problem for the authors. In its usual meaning, diaspora signifies a permanent separation from the homeland and, indeed, acceptance of the diasporic condition, something that most Palestinians reject. Yet, most but not all Palestinians exist as displaced people in varying degrees of severance from their original territory. To get around the association between territory and diaspora, Schulz and Hammer declare that diaspora refers to a state of alienation from the land, and that this state of alienation exists irrespective of the location of Palestinians. For this reason, all Palestinians, including those who live as a minority within Israel or as occupied people in the West Bank and Gaza, have their life shaped by "a diasporic condition." It is the memory of loss of land that defines what it is to be Palestinian.

Schulz and Hammer use material gathered in interviews with refugees in all walks of life and in several countries. What emerges clearly from their narrative is the complex texture of Palestinian identity in which liminality emerges as a defining feature of Palestinian experience in the diaspora. Attachment to the land, constant movement, and specific locality from which Palestinians originated bridge the local and the global. In a sense, according to the authors, the "land owns" the Palestinians, unlike

the relationship of the Jews to the land, which rests on claims of ownership of the land. Metaphorically, the refugee camp is described as "the only country" the Palestinians have. Regardless of their location, Palestinian refugees view the world around them with suspicion.

While the authors are aware of the problematic nature of the diaspora concept, with its tendency to bestow on its members homogeneity and similarity of experience, they do subscribe to a communal depiction of Palestinian life. Class divisions are mentioned but are not explored in any depth, so are generational differences. When addressed, it is to note the hybrid nature of Palestinian identity and to stress the fact that the refugee "right of return," emblematic of Palestinian experience, is unlikely to be realized, and the refugees know this. But at the same time the authors argue there is a need to acknowledge the principle of right of return in any final peace agreement with Israel. The paradox of deterritorialization and statelessness in a global world is that transnationalism, facilitated through the use of the Internet and contact among family members, has re-created Palestinian nationalism "from afar."

In seeking ways to account for the role of agency from below, anthropologist Rosenfeld rejects modernization theory, the dependency school, as well as Giddens's structuration theory and Bourdieu's relational framework built around the concept of habitus. In a modified political economy framework, she examines the role of agency and collective action in the context of three macrosocial spheres: wage labor, educational acquisition, and political organization. Each of these spheres is analyzed in separate chapters with special attention paid to the role of family and the kinship system. Contra modernization, Rosenfeld sets out to explain a known anomaly, namely, How is it that a community of dispossessed refugees that lives in poverty and under occupation has managed to transform itself from a mostly illiterate peasant society to one that has attained universal literacy and progressed through the educational system to send several of its sons and daughters to university?

The fieldwork for Rosenfeld's book draws upon the author's 1993 survey, which consisted of 120 married couples who were interviewed by means of structured questionnaires. These two-to-three-hour interviews of the core sample were supplemented in 1994 with another survey of 446 women.

Rosenfeld found out that political activism and politicization played an important role in crystallizing resistance, by both men and women, old and young, against Israeli occupation. However, the structured asymmetry of power that characterized the Palestinian national movement's weaker position vis-à-vis the Israeli military might have prevented this resistance from turning into effective oppositionary movement.

Education is viewed as a "family project," by which Rosenfeld refers to a sponsored form of educational mobility in the households of her refugee subjects. Brothers and sisters sponsor and educate their younger siblings, whereby largely illiterate parents of the first generation of ref-

ugees provide encouragement and appreciation of the education of their offspring. But education is also viewed as a generator of political consciousness, as her discussion of the experience of self-taught political prisoners in Israeli jails testifies. But this form of sponsorship is not without cost. In a sensitive account of one case study, Rosenfeld shows how one daughter from the camp sacrificed her personal goals, including having a family of her own, in order to support her parents and the education of her siblings. According to Rosenfeld, the family sacrificed the future of a female member, something not done in the case of male members, a proof according to Rosenfeld that the family "controls the buying power" of the unmarried female members of the household more so than that of males.

The emphasis on education does not necessarily mean that higher education translates into a commensurate place in the labor market. Teaching, particularly at United Nations schools, was the main occupation that educated Palestinians entered, since the employment sector outside the camp offered limited opportunities. The outcome of this labor market was emigration to neighboring Arab countries in search of employment. In a sense, universal education, high levels of educational attainment, limited work opportunities, and Israeli occupation contributed to the brain drain of Palestinians to neighboring countries.

Rosenfeld describes the politicization of Palestinian camp life in detail and notes that it was not uncommon for her to visit refugee homes where four or five sons were in jail simultaneously. For a large number of young Palestinians, spending time in jail became "rite of passage" into adulthood. The intersection between traditional family social structure, economic uncertainty, and the preponderance of Israeli military power and means of social control negated any possibility for effective mass movements.

In a self-disclosure note Rosenfeld talks about what it is like to be an Israeli researching Palestinian refugees. She shared with the Dheishan refugees their joys and sorrows and spent time with them when the camp was under curfew. She even picked up the local accent of the population. All this, however, according to her, does not change the fact that she is an Israeli who lives in affluent West Jerusalem, was raised on Western values, and is a product of a regime that oppresses the Palestinians.

Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and Its Legacy By Kenneth T. Andrews. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. Pp. 232. \$21.00 (paper), \$50.00 (cloth).

Michael P. Young
University of Texas, Austin

Not long ago sociologists claimed with good cause that we knew close to nothing about the impact of social movements. The social movement

literature was littered with studies of the origins of movements, but very little of this work addressed whether movements actually mattered. This criticism may no longer be fair, and Kenneth T. Andrews's innovative and compelling research on the Mississippi Civil Rights movement is a big reason why.

Andrews's *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle* is an impressive accomplishment on many fronts. It contributes theoretically to our general understanding of the consequences of movements. It is methodologically innovative, sophisticated, and yet accessible to a wide audience of social scientists with different backgrounds in methods and statistics. Andrews uses an effective mix of quantitative analyses of the state's 81 counties and in-depth qualitative analyses of three counties. With the quantitative analysis, he typically begins with simple but compelling presentations of summary statistics organized by counties with sustained, episodic, and no movement strength. When warranted, he explores deeper with ordinary least squares regressions and path models. Andrews has an excellent sense of using methods proportionate to the task. If the point can be made with a simple comparison of summary measures across counties, he begins there. This makes *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle* appropriate reading for a very wide audience.

The book is also substantively important. I cannot vouch for whether historians and sociologists who have researched the Civil Rights movement in Mississippi will find new insights in this book, but for social movement scholars like me who have explored this subject mostly through secondary sources, Andrews's book provides fresh insights into the mobilization of black resistance in the most hostile of Southern settings. His qualitative analysis of three counties with different movement histories draws on archival research and interviews to provide thick descriptions of the struggle to build community organizations. These accounts demonstrate the dynamic interaction of organizers with white repression, countermovements, and the white political power structure. They show in fine detail exactly how a movement infrastructure can and did have an impact.

The book is a tight 200 pages broken into nine chapters. Each chapter has a clear and concise purpose and some punch. The book begins with a brief introduction of the main issues. This is followed by an excellent theoretical chapter on what is involved in explaining the consequences of social movements. Andrews builds on the work of Edwin Amenta to call attention to the importance of studying the consequences of movements and clearly outlining how we should go about doing this. As he lucidly argues, a movement may matter even if it fails to accomplish its central goals. Andrews provides an excellent review of important debates about what movements must do to bring about change. His theoretical contribution synthesizes elements from received wisdom but moves beyond previous accounts. Andrews formulates a theory of the importance of what he calls a movement's *mobilization infrastructure*. Do not let the

label mislead you. This is not a simple endorsement of resource mobilization, but a synthesis that reconciles differences among previous theories that many readers might have thought incompatible. Protest disruption, persuasion of third parties, and negotiation with polity members all matter in certain contexts. To make an impact, movements must be able to engage in all of these lines of action, and this flexibility is only possible if they have constructed a mobilization infrastructure that can respond to changing political processes and the tactical responses of countermovements. Most important, a strong mobilization infrastructure can keep the pressure on for the long term.

Andrews follows this theoretical chapter with an overview of the movement in Mississippi and then with a chapter looking at local variations of movement dynamics before and after the 1964 Voting Rights Act and the War on Poverty. Chapters 5–8 provide a rigorous empirical investigation of the consequences of the movement in different arenas: electoral participation, welfare programs, school desegregation, and the acquisition of black political power at the local level. These empirical chapters are filled with insights. For example, white repression took many forms, some subtle and some brutal, and succeeded in crippling mobilization in parts of Mississippi. An influx of resources from the outside, like Freedom Summer recruits, had a positive impact, but it also created problems for the mobilization infrastructures already in place in many local communities. One of the more interesting conclusions from the book is that the consequences of the movement continue to shape the political, educational, and economic face of Mississippi. Unlike most studies, Andrews's analysis provides an extensive time horizon. He shows that much of the impact of mobilizations in the mid-1960s did not register until the late 1970s and the 1980s. This is an important cautionary tale for researchers who end their accounts of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s. To gauge if a movement had intended or unintended consequences may mean extending the period of time we study well beyond the peak moments of mobilization and disruption.

This book should be required reading for all social movement researchers. It should find a place on the syllabi of many graduate courses. Also, instructors should seriously consider using it as a supplement to Aldon Morris and Doug McAdam's works when they teach the Civil Rights movement in undergraduate courses. Finally, this book provides validation for the time and effort activists have put into community organizing. Activists will find in this book confirmation of the importance of organizing from the bottom up and new lessons on how to change society.

Workable Sisterhood: The Political Journey of Stigmatized Women with HIV/AIDS By Michele Tracy Berger Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 2004 Pp 248 \$32.50

Betsy L. Fife
Indiana University, Indianapolis

The concept of intersectional stigma that results from interlocking forms of oppression prompted by race, class, gender, and HIV/AIDS provides the framework for this ethnographic study of women who have multiple barriers to overcome in their effort to participate in the political system. This in-depth research includes 16 women—many of whom are women of color—who have lived as sex workers, drug users, and law breakers, and who have contracted the HIV virus. In addition, a number of them experienced domestic violence, childhood sexual abuse, assault, and poverty. Society had labeled these women deviant and had either given up on or directed particular punitive policies and agendas against them. They were victims of “intersectional stigma” that defined their social identity and determined the restriction of resources and opportunities available to them. Their narratives focus on the numerous difficulties they faced and on the remarkable reconstruction of their lives as they responded to HIV with a struggle to develop internal strengths that allowed them to pursue external resources and the personal goal of becoming politically effective.

An individual’s experience of stigma may either be accentuated or softened by her social location. Michele Berger addresses the relationship of marginality and stigma, clarifying how they interact to emphasize the status of outsider. While a marginal status results in loss of power, it is stigma that defines the mechanisms of social exclusion and the cultural factors behind that exclusion. Stigma provides the means by which a marginalized status may be defined and maintained. A major contribution of Berger’s work is the conceptualization of the impact of *intersectional stigma* on individuals’ participation in the social process. The negative effects of location in multiple marginalized social groups are compounded by the stigmatized identities associated with those groups, and the impact of each stigmatization on relationships of interaction and power is multiplied. The data presented in this study provide strong evidence that these intersectional factors have a multiplicative rather than a mere additive effect. Therefore, when these women contracted the HIV virus they experienced particularly devastating stigmatization that differs from those individuals who experience HIV-related stigma alone. This conceptualization provides a clear understanding of the ways stigma cuts across an individual’s identities and affects one’s access to social resources.

The women participating in this research embody the effects of “intersectional stigma” and the ways in which HIV/AIDS clarifies areas of structural inequality—specifically gender, race, and class, all but two of

the participants were women of color, all lived in poverty, and all were HIV positive. Through extensive interviews built upon deeply trusting relationships, Berger was able to obtain data indicating that along with HIV/AIDS, there were three central factors resulting in stigmatization for women in this sample: drug use (primarily cocaine), sex work, and sexual abuse, all of which magnified the HIV-related stigma. Through the narratives describing their experiences, it became apparent that the virus acted as a catalyst that enabled them to recognize and act on other dimensions of stigma they were experiencing. The context in which these women discovered their HIV status and the treatment they received are indicative of the social dynamics of intersectional stigma. The ways in which they were informed of their HIV status, and the manner in which treatment was or was not provided, was particularly degrading and devastating and led them to reflect on feelings of being slighted and mistreated. Why did they suffer this disrespect? Were they being blamed for their disease? Were they deserving of this injustice? They were left with a sense of betrayal and vulnerability, and they characterized these experiences as traumatic and life changing.

As a result of these reflections they began to transform their lives and to reach complex understandings of these experiences that resulted in a new level of self-awareness and a desire to work for justice on behalf of persons with HIV/AIDS. As one woman stated, "I never want another woman to go through the experience I went through, no matter what she did or who she is" (p. 97). The process of transformation/life reconstruction involved empowerment and participation at various levels in the political process, which concurrently included the cultivation of external resources to develop internal strength. Throughout a complex struggle, participants, to varying degrees, developed attitudes of acceptance concerning their HIV status along with a sense of self-respect and responsibility. Their political activities on behalf of others in similar social locations resulted in the development of a "sisterhood" that in turn provided an essential source of support that enabled them to maintain the changes they had made despite continued stigmatization.

While this work is situated primarily within the feminist literature, and particularly within the literature pertaining to women of color, it brought new emphasis to the significance of the relationship between social identity and stigma. In addition, it has implications for work on human resilience in general. The important variables brought out in the analysis of these narratives may also determine resilience in other populations facing seemingly insurmountable odds; they become evident within the discussion of life reconstruction. Finally, this research, which Berger found challenging throughout, points to a possibility for change that resides within many individuals society has written off as lost.

Accounts of Innocence Sexual Abuse, Trauma, and the Self By
Joseph E Davis Chicago University of Chicago Press, 2005 Pp 340
\$27 50 (paper)

Heather D'Cruz
Deakin University

Joseph E Davis's book, *Accounts of Innocence Sexual Abuse, Trauma and the Self*, examines how child sexual abuse is an example of the ideology of victimization (pp 3–4), a contemporary cultural phenomenon that has been the topic of more general critiques of “victim cultures” as well as sociological studies of discourses about social problems. He explores how the contemporary idea of child sexual abuse has emerged and how the claims-making processes by which the moral logic underpinning the discourse of victimization has influenced the construction of meanings and identities involved in adult-child sexual contact.

Davis traces the construction of the subject as self through the dynamic interplay between the personal and political, through the connections between the “upward” and “downward movements” (pp 18–19) of claims-making processes since the 1970s. Collective and personal narratives of the self have been key features of social activism, transforming theoretical explanations of the problem now called “child sexual abuse” and the therapeutic reconstruction of the self.

These interconnected social processes are set out in the first two parts of the book. Part 1, “Defining a New System of Meanings,” traces the “upward movement,” exploring “the origins of the new psychology of adult survivorship” (p 18), reminiscent of Michel Foucault’s “genealogical method,” for example, in *The History of Sexuality*, vol 1 (Random House, 1978). In four chapters, Davis explores the historical trajectories of the problem now known as “child sexual abuse,” first by “examining the older understandings from which the new understandings would depart” (p 29), namely, problem categories of “incest” and “sexual offenses” with related meanings, theories, and professional explanations before the 1970s. From the 1970s, a discursive change that was constituted within emergent political and social movements generated a different trajectory. Chapters 2 and 3 show in detail how child protection and antirape political movements and the growing influence of mental health and family therapy professionals intersected in reconstructing ideas of child sexual abuse. In particular, the upward movement was influenced for the first time by “victim activists,” thus connecting the personal with the political and generating a “collective story.” The emergence of victim activists in constructing a collective story from personal stories has generated more complicated knowledge/power relations that blur traditional boundaries between professionals and laypersons/victims in constructing knowledge and providing therapeutic help. Chapter 4 shows how a psychological trauma model offered a “unified theory” to support “accounts of innocence” (pp

18–19) that family therapy, child protection, and antirape movements did not provide and that also achieved the necessary legitimacy in the legal domain

In tracing the “downward movement,” part 2 of the book, “Defining Client Experience,” explores how the collective story that is given legitimacy through “therapeutic rationales” (p. 14) actively engages individuals in reconstructing their personal stories and thereby reconstructing themselves as normal subjects within the themes of the collective story. In chapters 5–7, Davis draws on professional and self-help treatment texts to deconstruct the therapeutic relationship as a process of reconstructing the self “from victim to survivor and beyond,” according to “therapeutic rationales and therapeutic persuasion” and “the victimization account.” Thus therapy operates as a normalizing process in two ways: in assisting the client to reconstruct a normalized identity as one of “innocence” and simultaneously operating as a regulatory device to generate identities that fit within collective accounts of innocence.

In part 3, “Victimization and the Self,” Davis discusses the implications of accounts of innocence in terms of consequences for identity and authenticity. In chapter 8 the “memory wars” represent struggles over the legitimacy of the meanings of past experiences and the authenticity of identity. In conclusion, Davis asks whether a discourse of victimization that constructs victim identities as innocent, relying on fixed versions of the self as a way of maintaining a moral position of innocence, is perhaps counterproductive for actual victims of sexual abuse. Actual victims of sexual abuse can only be positioned within a binary of “false (pathologized) selves” and “true (innocent) selves.” The “false self” is determined by trauma and displaces the “true self” (pp. 261–62) that can only be reconstructed through therapeutic narratives of innocence. Davis considers the possibilities of alternative ways of telling personal and collective stories that can account for the complexity of human experience and constructions of the self.

This is a provocative book. While it ought to be read by professionals who work in legal, psychosocial, and medical fields, because it challenges the implicit moral assumptions underpinning much professional practice in child sexual abuse, it is also likely to be controversial for the same reasons. Those who appreciate scholarly sociological critique will gain a well-argued alternative perspective on child sexual abuse. Of course, sociological analyses, however enlightening, always present the problem of how to reconnect the sociological to the social without seeming to dismiss moral concerns.

The Politics of Child Support in America By Jocelyn Elise Crowley
Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2003 Pp ix+217

Renee Monson
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Jocelyn Crowley analyzes shifts in U S child support policy to develop a generalizable theory of the process of policy innovation over time. She points out that most analyses of policy innovation seek to explain particular episodes of policy change and thus tend to emphasize the distinctive characteristics of the entrepreneurial individuals advocating for change. In contrast, Crowley seeks to explain the long-term trajectory of policy change. She borrows several concepts from economic theory to build her argument that *why* and *how* policy entrepreneurs innovate is central to understanding cycles of policy change. Crowley argues that policy entrepreneurs are “rent seekers,” motivated by the material or psychological benefits resulting from their (temporary) protection from competition in a policy realm once the state adopts their preferred policy. Policy entrepreneurs confront two main tasks in this rent-seeking process: minimizing the risks of entering a policy arena and gaining advantages over (or “shaking out”) incumbent policy entrepreneurs. Crowley argues that successful risk-reduction strategies (e.g., relying on professional or grassroots organizations rather than on the skills or vision of individuals) and engage in shakeout strategies that are perceived as legitimate rather than illegitimate by the general public. As social and political realities shift, new policy entrepreneurs appear, and the cycle of innovation begins again.

In six empirical chapters, Crowley traces how definitions of and policy solutions to the child support problem have changed. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, local charity organizations and law enforcement tracked down wayward husbands and compelled them to return to and to support their wives and children. As poverty rates for female-headed households increased after World War II, professionalizing social workers advocated a new approach to assuring mothers’ and children’s economic well-being: state provision of services as well as benefits to single mothers (thereby increasing the demand for social workers). Social workers used the resources developed in their professionalization projects—newly unified professional organizations and a stronger disciplinary identity—to solidify a partnership between their profession and an expanded welfare state in the 1962 Social Security Amendments. As welfare expenditures rose and the economy weakened, conservative legislators and activists built grassroots organizations that would become the base of the New Right. By 1975, conservatives engineered the establishment of a child support agency, federally funded and state operated, primarily for the purpose of pursuing fathers of children receiving welfare benefits and returning the child support collected to the states.

Once the basic framework of the federal-state child support enforcement (also known as welfare cost recovery) policy had been established, two new sets of policy entrepreneurs emerged. In the 1970s and 1980s, women leaders capitalized on the political muscle of the second-wave women's movements, emphasized the potential costs to taxpayers of ex-husbands' refusal to support their children and won increased child support awards and the expansion of state and federal child support enforcement for nonpoor mothers and children. By the 1990s, fathers' rights groups began to achieve some success in reducing child support awards (especially for low-income fathers) by redefining the father-child relationship in emotional rather than financial terms, a tactic that the women's groups could not effectively counter.

Crowley's detailed historical account is unsatisfying in some respects. The concept of "rent seeking" is useful as a description of policy entrepreneurs' behavior, but it assumes rather than explains their initial motivations and interests. Conceptualizing the child support policy arena as encompassing the social workers' advocacy of social service provision permits analysis of a longer trajectory of policy innovation, but it elides rather than illuminates the intersection of two different sets of policies: public assistance for poor women and their children, and state enforcement of private child support obligations. Nevertheless, this is a useful and timely contribution to studies of social policy change and should spark other fruitful research. For example, Crowley asserts that in the 1970s the early fathers' rights groups' castigation of single mothers' irresponsible sexual behavior was perceived as an illegitimate shakeout strategy because of the influence of second-wave women's movements (two decades would pass before the fathers' rights groups would craft a legitimate—and thus more effective—shakeout strategy to reduce child support awards). But this leaves unanswered the questions of why the women leaders of the 1970s did not characterize deadbeat dads' refusal to support their children as linked with an out-of-control male sexuality—Would that, too, have been perceived as an illegitimate strategy by the public?—or why the promiscuous "welfare queen" image became central to the welfare reform debates in the late 1980s at the same time that the fathers' rights groups dropped their critique of single mothers' sexual behavior. Other scholars might build on Crowley's theoretical model of policy innovation to investigate how and why particular discourses of sexuality become part of legitimate and illegitimate shakeout strategies in U.S. policy debates.

Freaks, Geeks, and Cool Kids American Teenagers, Schools, and the Culture of Consumption By Murray Milner, Jr New York Routledge, 2004
Pp ix+305

B Bradford Brown
University of Wisconsin—Madison

In his new book, *Freaks, Geeks, and Cool Kids*, Murray Milner attempts to bring a fresh perspective to a familiar yet still fascinating topic the organization and operation of high school peer groups among American adolescents Drawing principles from his highly acclaimed work on India's caste system, he argues that typical teenage behaviors that adults find so troublesome can be attributed not to the usual culprits—parents, peers, schools, or the society's social class structure—but to the status system that young people construct in most high schools This status system, he further argues, drives the rampant consumerism that is so characteristic of American teens, and adults do much to support and encourage teenage consumerism, even as they condemn it

In the first of the book's four sections Milner presents an overview of his theory and methods (with important details relegated to appendices) He asserts that status is the only real source of power that American teenagers can exercise, but because status is essentially inalienable and inexpansive (it cannot be bought or expropriated), one must convince others that one deserves it Adolescents strive for status by conforming to the norms of the elite group, cultivating associations with high-status peers (and avoiding associations with status inferiors), and involving themselves in high-status activities Meanwhile, the elites fend off this status striving by changing and complicating their group norms (e g, shifting clothing styles or language patterns) and belittling those who fall short of their exalted position Illustrations of these status games occupy the book's second section

Not until the third section does Milner confront the harsh reality of American adolescent peer culture in most high schools there is more ambiguity than consensus about the status of various crowds He depicts this ambiguity as a pluralistic status system and carefully illustrates its dynamics in one multiracial school in which his students conducted observations Then, he extends the analysis to other types of schools that impose a different status hierarchy on students (based on their grade level, "military" rank, or family background) In the book's final section Milner ties teenagers' status striving to consumerism, drifting far from his data and the focus on adolescent peer crowds in order to chastise adults for encouraging teenage spending habits

The book is full of intriguing ideas and is rooted in a strong theoretical framework Milner displays an impressive command of the research on adolescent peer groups, but he does not come to terms with the fact that these groups are as much cognitive abstractions as they are concrete re-

alties (for details, see my own "Adolescents' Relationships with Peers," in *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*, 2d ed [Wiley, 2004]) It is unusual to find broad consensus about a group's characteristics (including its status ranking) or membership A sizable portion of teenagers either fit into several crowds or no crowd at all Moreover, the types of groups and interrelationships among them, along with teenagers' allegiance to crowds, all change over the course of adolescence Individual status is also more fluid than Milner suggests As well attested in popular movies about teens (e g , *Can't Buy Me Love*, *Stand by Me*) it can rise and fall as easily as the beginning and ending of a romantic relationship These factors serve to discredit much of the information presented in the second section of the book and to undermine the value of Milner's theory of status striving More attention should have been devoted to themes articulated in his chapter on pluralistic status systems

To support his ideas Milner draws on retrospective accounts of high school experiences from term papers written by 300 college students and extensive observations in a single high school, conducted mostly by college freshmen in a course Milner taught The term papers are problematic not only because they involve retrospective data from a narrow sampling frame, but also because students may have been reticent to contradict the professor's ideas when their course grade was on the line Milner's cadre of observers had minimal training and could have been biased by routine discussions of the groups' observations in class meetings No details are given on data analysis strategies, leaving the impression that Milner's analytic approach lacked the rigor of most other work in the field

Milner frequently drifts into digressions and makes bold assertions without clear empirical support His final chapter focuses on practical rather than theoretical implications of his thesis and findings Some suggestions are appealing, but others are unfeasible (e g , random assignment of students to sports teams) or venture well beyond the book's primary topic (e g , lowering the voting age or creating a universal service requirement) Thus, although well intentioned, the book lacks the disciplined focus, rigorous data analyses, and awareness of the growing diversity in American high schools that are needed to generate new insights about teenage peer groups and peer culture It might inspire good discussion in college undergraduate courses, but I fear it will not be much appreciated by more seasoned scholars or by lay audiences

Working and Growing Up in America By Jeylan T Mortimer Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 2003 \$45 00

Julian Tanner
University of Toronto

Of very few sociological studies can it be said that the last word has been written on the topic But *Working and Growing Up in America* may be

an exception Part-time jobholding by full-time high school students has become a ubiquitous feature of young people's lifestyles in North America What effect does this economic activity have on transitions to adult life? Addressing this issue is the concern of a book that presents the main findings of a unique longitudinal study conducted in St Paul, Minnesota, by Jeylan Mortimer Beginning in 1987–88, when the subjects were in grade 9, the study recorded information on students' work histories between the ages of 14 and 18 and followed them for seven years beyond high school

I will cut to the chase Mortimer concludes that there are many more benefits than costs attached to part-time work I do not know if this is going to come as a blessed relief to those worried about the impact of jobholding or simply confirmation of what many suspected However, what is rather more certain is that much of the recent debate about the effects of part-time jobs assumes the opposite

Mortimer prefaces the empirical research with an accounting of changing perspectives on the relative value of school and work for adolescent development In the search for the appropriate balance between book learning and more applied skills, it was the absence of work experience that was once viewed problematically More recently though, the counterview has prevailed too much work has become the issue of concern

What is offered in this study is a demolition of this claim The case against part-time work in high school is that it takes away from other things that young people might be doing—things like studying, getting good grades, participating in sports, and spending time with family and friends None of these effects are confirmed In fact, Mortimer is able to show that for many outcomes—including and especially educational ones—teenage workers do better than their more abstentious peers How come?

The secret, according to Mortimer's findings, begins with the fact that most student workers are willing and able to balance job commitments with other obligations in their lives She is able to identify a work pattern that is most conducive to positive outcomes It is one in which part-time work is part of a regular low-intensive routine that is pursued alongside other activities that are conducted with a similar tempo moderation in everything, in other words The work that is bad for adolescents is work that is conducted outside these temporal parameters—work where excessive hours are required, work that is sporadic but intensive

Mortimer acknowledges that students who are able to put together balanced lives in which part-time jobs play their part are those from stable, middle-class backgrounds Indeed, some of her more interesting observations relate to class differences in the use of part-time employment Part-time work has a different meaning for middle-class and working-class students Students from working-class backgrounds invest more time in part-time jobs than their more middle-class peers and are more likely to hold adult-type jobs that pay well but are more stressful Whereas

middle-class students subordinate work to school, working-class kids and their parents look to the workplace as a means of enhancing—in terms of skill acquisition, practical knowledge, and networks—their human capital

While many part-time jobs may objectively be judged to be of poor quality, most respondents enjoyed doing them, felt reasonably fairly paid, and were able to identify, as were their parents, the advantages they accrued from work experience. They learned important lessons about time management, developed decision-making and human relations skills, and felt their levels of self-confidence increasing. Even negative experiences were interpreted positively: an early exposure to unpleasant or menial jobs taught them about types of work that they did not want to pursue after school. Likewise, working while in high school renders abstract ambition more concrete and focused, leading to better choices in postsecondary education.

And what of the costs of part-time working? They turn out to be of short-term duration that do not extend far into adulthood. Cross-sectional studies have repeatedly shown a linkage between part-time jobs and problematic drug and alcohol use. Mortimer's longitudinal data indicates that, over a longer time frame, those who worked through high school are no more likely than the nonworkers to report excessive use of alcohol.

This study is a model of sociological scholarship. It addresses an interesting and important topic, it clearly lays out the terms of the debate, formulates a research design that is able to test the competing ideas, and has produced findings that are likely to prove definitive. The book is exceptionally well written and accessible. Students as well as their professors will have little difficulty following the plot.

Imprisoning America: The Social Effects of Mass Incarceration. Edited by Mary Pattillo, David Weiman, and Bruce Western. New York: Russell Sage, 2004. Pp. 277. \$39.95.

Todd R. Clear
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

The incarceration rate in the United States has grown every year for a third of a century. This growth has been unaffected by the usual forces one would expect to be important. Prison populations have increased when crime goes up and when it goes down, in economic boom times and during the busts, during war and when we have been at peace, when the proportion of young men in the population is increasing and as it has been falling. The uniform, generation-long growth in imprisonment is a social factor that separates the United States in the world and throughout history. No other modern democracy comes close to the rate of incarceration that the United States now sustains, and never before in history has

a nation experienced a period of growing imprisonment that lasts for this long

The growth of incarceration has not been equally distributed across population groups. Imprisonment concentrates in five ways. Men are far more likely to be locked up than women, and among men, the prison disproportionately holds those aged in their late thirties to their early forties. Poor people are far more likely to be locked up than those who are not poor, and people of color, especially African-Americans, are locked up disproportionately, even after accounting for their tendency to be poor. Among African-American parent-aged males, 8% are behind bars on any given day, and the lifetime likelihood of going to prison for today's newborns approaches three in ten. Impoverished places contribute their residents to the prison system at stunningly high rates. In some urban neighborhoods, more than one in six males is locked up on any given day, and virtually every family has an adult male who has been behind bars.

With these kinds of facts serving as a background, Patillo and her colleagues have provided a set of original empirical papers exploring the social impact of mass incarceration, concentrated among men of color living in poor communities. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 explores mass incarceration and families, part 2 considers imprisonment and communities. Aside from the conclusion, each of the nine chapters provides original empirical work.

A strength of this book is the range of data sources used. The authors of the chapters analyze data from national databases such as the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, the U.S. Department of Justice Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities, and the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality. They also include investigator-initiated ethnographic data, interviews of low-wage men and of former felons, and a survey of paroled fathers. The heterogeneity of data makes the broad argument of this book—that mass incarceration has been problematic for poor families and communities—difficult to dismiss.

The section on families contains four chapters that investigate the way incarceration affects family life in poor families. Analyzing the Fragile Family data, Western, Lopoo, and McLanahan find “disruptive effects of incarceration on the life course, on the partners and children of former inmates, and on the public safety of communities absorbing large numbers of returning prison and jail inmates” (p. 41). As Edin, Nelson, and Paranal find in their interviews of low-income fathers, however, the disruptions are not simple. Their respondents reported that “the event of incarceration proved devastating to their ties with their children and their children’s mothers” (p. 56) and for many of the fathers in their sample, could “reinforce his criminal trajectory rather than reverse it” (p. 71). For other fathers, by contrast, “incarceration offers an opportunity to rebuild severed social ties . . . [and] may offer a powerful motivation to go straight” (pp. 71–72). Nurse’s interviews of paroled fathers and their female partners offer similar conclusions.

The section on communities has three chapters that consider a wider range of topics. Lynch and Sabol analyze data from Baltimore neighborhoods to determine how incarceration affects informal social control. They find “both positive influence on informal social control and, at the same time, negative effects on the social processes on which informal social controls depend” (p. 157). Uggen and Manza combine their analysis of the Youth Development Study with interviews of a sample of parolees and probationers to conclude that “felon disenfranchisement has become a growing impediment to the political participation of an expanding group of U.S. citizens” (p. 194), ultimately affecting electoral outcomes. Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll analyze the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality to explore the context of employers’ resistance to hiring someone with a previous criminal record.

The social impact of mass incarceration is a new area of concern to social scientists. This is the first collection of empirical examinations of this question. It offers consistently high-quality work that provokes the reader and moves the incarceration policy debate to a new level.

Only Hope: Coming of Age under China's One-Child Policy By
Vanessa L. Fong. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. Pp.
242.

Susan E. Short
Brown University

Despite the attention China’s controversial one-child policy has received, surprisingly little scholarship has examined how the policy has altered the lives of children. *Only Hope* fills this conspicuous omission by providing a wonderfully nuanced glimpse into the world of singletons in today’s PRC. With a focus on adolescents and their educational aspirations and achievements, Vanessa Fong, an anthropologist, details the lives of singleton teenagers growing up in urban Dalian, a coastal city in China’s northeast. Through the interweaving of individual stories and analysis, Fong describes how the state’s promotion of fewer “quality” offspring through fertility regulation has led to a generation of children growing up in challenging circumstances. Many experience unrealistically high expectations for social and financial success, significant parental involvement that leads to stress, and daily reminders to work hard and succeed in a highly competitive educational system. These circumstances lead to parents who indulge their children and, at the same time, criticize their children for their indulgences—and especially the modern (materialistic) lifestyles the children desire that little resemble the idealized socialist simplicity of the past.

Fong situates her work in anthropological and sociological literatures, emphasizing traditional discourse on modernization as it intersects chil-

dren's lives. She is attentive to history, and especially generational change, as she interprets the singleton experience. She argues that "what mattered most was not their singleton status per se, but rather the fact that they were singletons in a society used to large families" (p. 2), and, more generally, that her "study of Chinese singletons highlights how the cultural model of modernization associated with the fertility transition is both a cause and an effect of the unrealistically high expectations often said to characterize modern youth worldwide" (p. 3).

Three sources of data—participant observation, survey data, and statistical records published by governmental bureaus—are artfully combined in the analysis. The ethnography is based on visits to China by Fong, a native of Taiwan, who spent 27 months between 1997 and 2002 working in Dalian as an unpaid English conversation teacher. Fong taught at a vocational high school, a junior high school, and a nonkeypoint college preparatory high school. In exchange, the schools allowed her to observe students and conduct a survey.

The book relies heavily on case studies, particularly interactions that took place in students' homes and at family gatherings—with far less, indeed surprisingly little, material tied directly to the school settings. During the fieldwork, Fong visited the homes of 107 young people and developed ongoing friendships with 31 families. Often she was tutoring teenagers in the families and refusing monetary compensation to minimize commodifying the relationships.

The statistics presented from the government documents and the survey, which included 2,273 students in grades 8–12 in the schools where Fong worked, are largely secondary. Fong does, however, creatively use the survey data to observe a curious relationship between elite status and school performance. Among junior high students, as expected, those from elite families attain better test scores than those from nonelite families. However, at the college preparatory level, elite status is inversely related to scores. Fong explains the reversal by the ability of elite families to pay to enroll their children in schools where, by test scores alone, they would not have been admitted.

A minor drawback of the study is that it does not capture the full range of socioeconomic diversity in Dalian. Fong speculates that the most elite and most impoverished families are excluded from both the survey and ethnography. That said, the substantial variation in socioeconomic diversity that exists is skillfully used in analysis. A second drawback is that the analysis is based almost exclusively on data collected from children without siblings, presenting little opportunity to compare and contrast singleton experiences to those of children with siblings. This design limits Fong's ability to make inferences about the effects of singleton status per se. Understandably, this issue is not easily resolved. Fong reports that nearly all adolescents in urban Dalian are singletons.

Fong's detailed portrait of singleton life among the first cohort of children born under the one-child policy is a welcome addition to scholarship

on family in reform-era China. *Only Hope* moves beyond the simple portrayals of “spoiled” little emperors to create a more balanced depiction of the burdens and opportunities urban children experience. She adds texture to a terrain that until recently has emphasized the interpretations of scholars and especially those of Chinese psychologists concerned about the moral development of children. By focusing on children’s representations of their own lives, Fong turns the tables. Yet, she does so with meticulous attention to the social, historical, and family contexts that shape the everyday experiences of these children and their narratives. The result is solid scholarship that pushes the boundaries of our understandings of the consequences of extreme fertility control and a highly readable and enjoyable volume.

Japan’s Network Economy: Structure, Persistence, and Change By James R. Lincoln and Michael L. Gerlach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xx+410. \$80.00.

Brian Uzzi
Northwestern University

On April 4, 1993, the *New York Times* reported that Seymour Durst’s debt clock had broken. Over the clock’s face, which was the size of a baseball stadium’s scoreboard, was hung a white sign with big block lettering that read, DEBT CLOCK UNDER REPAIR, INCREASE WAS TOO RAPID. It had been erected over Times Square to monitor the swelling debt of the U.S. government when billions of dollars of debt seemed like a lot. For onlookers the pace of Manhattan crawled when compared to the blur of digits that recorded the \$11,034 per second rise in unpaid bills—a symbol of the failings of U.S. companies to compete, especially against the Japanese who had a new miracle weapon called the keiretsu. Ironically, while U.S. craftsmanship had much to do with the U.S. debt, it had nothing to do with the clock’s failure. Few knew the clock was made by Sony. Was the clock’s breakdown more telling of the future to come than the present?

James R. Lincoln and Michael L. Gerlach are world experts on Japan’s corporate networks, and *Japan’s Network Economy: Structure, Persistence, and Change* is an ambitious, original, and meticulously researched analysis of the rise and fall and future of the great Japanese keiretsu—a radically innovative network form of organization that balanced market forces with a social obligation to workers and suppliers even going as far as supporting the weaker members of the network at the expense of the strong. Lincoln and Gerlach’s view of keiretsu is not formulaic but subtle and exacting, showing that keiretsu are not, as stereotypes would have them, a tightly knit, master-planned conglomerate but a community network of ill-defined and permeable edges that revolve around a core of

firms with long-term relations of mutual support for each other and the lesser members of the network. Using structural analysis, as well as original fieldwork and institutional analysis, this book is an authoritative, essential account for anyone interested in economic or organizational sociology, networks, or Japan—the world's second-largest economy.

In the author's view, the keiretsu's monumental success, which propelled Japan's GDP to a phenomenal double-digit rate of growth for nearly 15 years, sowed the seeds of its own failure. Cash-flush firms began to eye speculative but lucrative real estate and financial investments that made large gains in the fraction of the time it took them to make similar gains from their tried and true investments in R&D. Moreover, because keiretsu had few institutional controls or independent, fiscally conservative bankers to answer to, tempting opportunities sparked a systemic carelessness (and some cronyism) that burdened the entire economic infrastructure with bad investments. Then, when chance had it, the real estate bubble burst at the same time that norms against putting work before everything else surfaced, creating problems with real estate, stocks, bad loans, and overcapacity that bulldozed the economy.

The core chapters offer detailed, multilayered statistical analyses of how the keiretsu networks of reciprocal, multiplex ties among firms, suppliers, and banks have evolved from their founding to the present. These analyses are data intensive and perceptive, and they engagingly show that the networks have significantly frayed on all key dimensions. There are less dense cross-holdings of company stock, less dependence on bank finance from a central bank and more on equity market borrowing, fewer long-term supplier ties, more competitive bidding, and more outsourcing of cheap offshore labor than in the past. Chapters 5 and 6 are standouts of analysis, showing how the keiretsu may have contributed to Japan's economic decline by having the strong prop up the weak to an excessive degree.

Supported by careful analysis, Lincoln and Gerlach get the story right and provide new insights into keiretsu behavior. Even so, I wonder about some details that they could not go into. I wonder what keiretsu behavior would have been like if it had not been for the bubble. Would suspected acts of inbreeding and cronyism have led to investment in fanciful endeavors at the expense of "rational" investments in high tech and R&D? Or would the overinvestment in a bubble have happened even if Japanese firms were organized like their American and European counterparts? It is also not clear to me why innovation in Japanese firms seemed to dry up so abruptly. It seems logical that past investments could have kept the innovation engine running strong (at their economic height, the Japanese issued more patents more than any other country) even if new investments were disproportionately plowed into real estate and finance. At the same time, it is unclear to what extent helping the weaker members of the community is to the community's long-term benefit and at what point it is better to let the weaker members die, a decision rule that is

critical to evaluating the comparative benefits of arm's-length markets and embedded economies

The last chapter aptly asks the big political economy question of whether the harsh assessment by many analysts against keiretsu is fair when compared to the economic problems of many other countries that have had worse troubles and many fewer economic feats to boast about. Compare, too, the keiretsu against the supposedly superior American style of arm's-length market ties, and it seems hard to call the Internet bubble and the swell of corporate scandals and misconduct a triumph for disembedded markets. Nevertheless, the authors reluctantly suggest that history may have already reached this conclusion given the sea change in the Japanese corporate network. Their last sentence reads, "We confess to considerable sympathy with Dore's positive portrayal of Japan's network economy, although we see much of it fading into history and perhaps inevitably so." While I praise them for their impartial reading of the data, I wonder if the biggest failing for Japan and other economies may be the possible loss of this remarkably important system of organizational governance.

Fraternal Capital: Peasant-Workers, Self-Made Men, and Globalization in Provincial India By Sharad Chari. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pp. xxv+379.

Sharit Bhowmik
University of Mumbai

This book is a study of Tiruppur, a small town in the state of Tamil Nadu in South India. Until the mid-1970s, Tiruppur was a small sleepy town that was struggling to achieve some recognition as a center of small-scale textile and knitwear units. By the end of the 1970s the textile industry showed signs of decline. There was an increase in outsourcing to small production units. Tiruppur's fortunes started to improve from this time. The town became a center for outsourcing. Large companies dealing in knitted goods, vests, T-shirts, and so on, in India and abroad got their supplies from the small industries in Tiruppur. The town flourished, and in 1994 a popular newsweekly wrote that it had more millionaires per square kilometer than any other part of the country.

Sharad Chari has taken a detailed look at the growth of Tiruppur and the factors that lead to its fortunes. He presents a fascinating account of the rags-to-riches stories. Tiruppur, he finds, is a town full of entrepreneurs who started out as workers in its knitting units. There are entrepreneurs from landowning classes as well, but his analysis shows that the most successful ones are of working-class origin. Chari's research explores "how peasant workers have become owners and transformed the knitwear industry into a powerhouse of small firm networks" (p. 29).

Tiruppur has a large number of small entrepreneurs who run small knitting and stitching factories. Securing capital, especially working capital, becomes a major problem for small entrepreneurs as banks are reluctant to give them loans. In Tiruppur the nonbanking sources of credit include financial companies and money lenders, both of whom charge high interest rates, and a system of rotating credit known as the *chit fund*. The small entrepreneurs try to overcome their credit problem by engaging in outsourcing with the large producers. The large manufacturers have access to institutional credit, and they are financially sounder. They get the small manufacturers to manufacture on their behalf by loaning them the yarn. The manufactured goods are bought by the large manufacturers at cheap rates.

The keen competition among the small or medium manufacturers cuts down their profit margins considerably. In order to survive, the entrepreneur has to be actively involved in the enterprise. This is how those of working-class origins are able to survive. Chari finds that those of non-working-class backgrounds (landowners or those from white-collar backgrounds) do not work in their factories or directly supervise the activities. They may appoint managers or supervisors for these jobs. This increases the costs, and their enterprises run at losses.

Chari's vivid description of the labor process, the control over social labor and the fortunes of the entrepreneurs, large and small, make interesting reading. He also delves into the past of the entrepreneurs and analyzes the agrarian relations prevalent in the district. The entrepreneurs and the workers in the early phase belonged to the same caste of Gounders. He finds that caste as a factor is not as strong as class. Gounders from the landed gentry (most of whom failed when they turned to industry or commerce) had few links with their tenants or laborers from the same caste. It is the latter who became successful entrepreneurs.

Chari has devoted a fairly large section of the book to women and work. Industry in Tiruppur is male dominated. Males are considered the breadwinners. Hence only those women work whose menfolk do not have work or who do not contribute to running the family. The younger, unmarried girls may work to accumulate gold for their dowry, and the older, married women may work to maintain their families. Even if the husband is a drunkard who does not contribute to family expenses, women rarely divorce their husbands though they may occupy separate households.

Women entrepreneurs in Tiruppur may appear to enjoy more freedom, but on closer examination they are as shackled as the working-class women. Chari gives the example of one such woman who runs a unit that makes collars and stitches them to the T-shirts. She uses home-based workers for the work. Most of these women are those whose husbands feel that decent women do not work outside the house. The women entrepreneurs are engaged in petty business. They too are subjected to male domination at home. However, like their working-class counterparts, having independent sources of income gives them a feeling that they have

freedom of consumption. The better-off entrepreneurs spend money on clothes and beauty salons, and the poorer ones adorn their hair with flowers.

The book is well researched and should be of interest not only to those interested in Indian industry and labor, but to those interested in other developing countries as well. It is written in a clear and lucid style that engages the reader. This study can pave the way for other similar studies in other parts of India and the developing world where the norms of capitalist development are not adhered to but are successful nonetheless.

Local Players in Global Games: The Strategic Constitution of a Multinational Corporation. By Peer Hull Kristensen and Jonathan Zeitlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 352. \$129.50 (cloth), \$39.50 (paper).

Frank Dobbin
Harvard University

What does globalization mean for the modern corporation? There is a lot of theory out there. Many have taken the intrepid step of speculating about the implications for the firm. Few have gone to the trouble to look into the matter. Looking at how a multinational actually operates is not for the faint of heart. In practice, the modern multinational involves thousands of different stories about a hydra-headed monstrosity. Taking on a task like this could make one yearn for the time when studying an organization meant copying the organization chart.

It is hard to imagine a better team to study the multinational than Peer Hull Kristensen and Jonathan Zeitlin. Even so, the task they set out is ambitious, perhaps pathologically so. They set out to understand a single multinational from the perspective of its British headquarters and work units in Denmark, the United States, and England. Their idea was to try to understand the history of each establishment, what it meant for each to come under the organizational umbrella, and how each operated at the site, in the local economy, and within the multinational. Their quest utilized the perspective of local workers, local managers, and company executives.

In the ongoing debate about the multinational, many describe a centrally controlled entity oriented to rational strategic decision making. In the firm Kristensen and Zeitlin studied, however, subsidiaries often follow their own traditions of rationality, often negotiate deals with headquarters to pursue the strategies they prefer, and often influence both headquarters' activities and the activities of other units. The conventional image conveyed in business school curricula—in which strategic decision makers pull the strings, and the subsidiaries hop and skip—is not only the incomplete story, but it is also often dead wrong.

Kristensen and Zeitlin find that behavior on the ground is a compromise among local practices, innovations found at horizontal plants, and directives coming from above. What they do not seem to find is that the business units benefit much from what headquarters does. This is a troubling realization in the midst of a global wave of consolidation. Many of the stories told here suggest that the independent units would have been better off left alone, or at least that central management, with its obsession with placating institutional investors and securities analysts ("the market"), may not be able to do much for individual enterprises. Early on, Kristensen and Zeitlin recount a downsizing order that came down from on high, to placate the market. The subsidiary was to cut 25% of its blue-collar workforce, but seniority rules determined that it would have to cut the workers who were most recently hired: these were the only workers trained in the new computer technologies that were the enterprise's best hope for future profitability. It often seems clear that top management is not always doing its homework or earning its keep.

The main lessons fit together well, even if they cannot be boiled down to a set of neat propositions. On the consolidation process, multinational acquisitions involve the strategies of a big fish, but also the strategies of the smaller fish who are looking to be devoured on the best terms possible. The buyers' stories make the *Financial Times*, but there is another side to each story, and the autonomy of subsidiary managers is partly a function of what they bring to the table in the acquisition. On innovation in subsidiaries, it is increasingly driven by an effort to position the subsidiary within the firm rather than the enterprise within the market. Competition among firms has been transformed into competition among subsidiaries. On what makes the multinational effective, success at the individual sites depends on whether managers collaborate well across units and at different levels (the site, the locality, the multinational).

This book challenges the first-wave view that globalization would lead to huge behemoths with central coordination and control extending around the globe. The new multinational, assembled by acquisition, is much more of a compromise. Yet it is less of a compromise than it perhaps ought to be, according to Kristensen and Zeitlin, because units could do much more with their specialized expertise and could learn more from one another than they are allowed to do by headquarters. Moreover, the system could work better if publicly held firms were not subject to the particular pathologies of today's stock market, which encourages firms to put managers who know nothing about product or operations, but know how to massage an earnings report, into positions of leadership.

The implications for organizational sociologists are clear but unsettling. We have long viewed the firm as a unified actor. Even the multidivisional firm seemed to be governed by a command and control system that could be diagrammed, that could be seen as operating under a single rationality, and that could be understood well from the outside. Work on comparative capitalism, such as the work of the national business systems school,

suggested that there were different network structures and rationalities in different countries but that once these were understood, conventional theories could be adapted. Kristensen and Zeitlin suggest, by contrast, that the multinational is characterized by diverse internal cultures, rivalry among subunits, and informal lines of command that seem to go in every which way. Prospects for a coherent set of propositions seem to be fading into the distance, and that tired old organization chart is looking awfully good.

Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and World Economy By Dale W. Tomich. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Pp. xv+226. \$22.95.

Giovanni Arrighi
Johns Hopkins University

The role of New World slavery in promoting the development of capitalism is a highly controversial issue. Following the tenets of neoclassical economics, so-called cliometric history avoids the issue by focusing on the technical evaluation of the profitability of investments in slaves, abstracting from the social and historical peculiarities of both slavery and capitalism. But those who do consider these peculiarities tend to reach very different conclusions depending on how they conceptualize capitalism. At one end of the spectrum, many Marxists (and Weberians) identify capitalism with the prevalence of wage labor. From this standpoint, most influentially represented by Eugene D. Genovese, slavery appears as a precapitalist social relation that retarded the development of capitalism in the U.S. South and other regions of the Americas. At the other end of the spectrum, world-systems analysts like Immanuel Wallerstein identify capitalism with the production and appropriation of surplus value in a world economy structured into core, peripheral, and semiperipheral zones. From this standpoint, slavery appears as one of the coercive social relations that characterize production in peripheral zones and, as such, a functional requirement of world capitalism.

In *Through the Prism of Slavery*, Dale Tomich points out how these approaches in different ways use conceptual abstractions to obscure the variability and complexity of historical processes. One approach uses the identification of capitalism with wage labor to eliminate from consideration the possibility that slavery might have contributed to the development of capitalism. The other approach uses the identification of slavery as an aspect of the core-periphery stratification of the capitalist world economy to eliminate from consideration the possibility that slavery might have been or might have become dysfunctional to capitalist development. Either way, the spatial and temporal variability of the relation between slavery and capitalism is eliminated from the research agenda.

Through the Prism of Slavery draws our attention to the pitfalls involved in such an elimination and investigates this variability by refusing to regard slave relations as capitalist simply because they entail production for the market, or as noncapitalist simply because they are not the waged form of labor. Throughout the book, slave relations are instead regarded as "a specific form of commodity production that is related to other such forms through the world market and international division of labor" (p. 30). From this perspective, what is capitalist and what is not is something that varies over time and in space depending on the ever-changing combination of social relations that undergirds the accumulation of capital as an end in itself. How capitalism and slavery have related to one another, in other words, is a question that must be settled not through definitions but through empirical investigation.

Tomich's approach proves very fruitful. He demonstrates that the crisis of slavery in the Americas was the result not of the expansion of industrial capitalism—which in fact engendered a "second slavery"—but of the expansion and differentiation of slave regimes in the course of the 19th century. Through a comparative analysis of the trajectories of slavery in Haiti, Martinique, Cuba, and Jamaica, he goes on to show how local responses to world-market pressures were rooted in specific historical geographies of accumulation and rule and resulted in a highly diversified relationship between local and global transformations. Equally important, by focusing on the crisis of slave labor in Martinique, Tomich demonstrates how slave struggles over the working day and subsistence cultivation played a crucial role in shaping the transformation of slave labor into both wage labor and self-employment in small-scale production and marketing. The overall result is a key contribution to our understanding of the complex relationship between New World slavery and world capitalism and, more generally, between local and global dynamics of social change. Historical and comparative sociologists of all specializations will do well to come to terms with the many methodological and theoretical insights that Tomich offers throughout the book.

A pioneering effort of this kind necessarily runs into occasional problems. At the methodological level, the identification of structural with conjunctural time leaves many questions unanswered concerning the nature and long-term evolution of historical capitalism. At the theoretical level, the identification of the circulation of commodities with trade ignores the little-noticed but crucial fact that all physical aspects of trade (such as transport and storage) belong to the production rather than circulation of commodities. At the empirical level, the focus on New World slavery results in a lack of appreciation for the crucial role that Asia, in general, and India, in particular, played in the establishment and reproduction of the 19th-century, United Kingdom-centered world-system. Given the purposes of Tomich's book, these are nonetheless secondary problems that detract nothing from its outstanding contributions to historical sociology.

Whole World on Fire Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation By Lynn Eden Ithaca, N Y Cornell University Press, 2004
Pp xiv+365 \$32 50

David Cunningham
Brandeis University

Midway through her superb book *Whole World on Fire*, Lynn Eden recounts the many nuclear weapons tests carried out by the U S government in the early 1950s. The scale of these explosions was tremendous, up to a thousand times more powerful than the blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The tests were designed in part to help scientists build models to predict resulting damage, but the methodology seemed curious. In each explosion's aftermath, observed MIT physicist Theodore Postol, "all these fucking things have burned down and these guys are worried about whether a nail came out of a wall or not" (p 148).

This is the puzzle that Eden sets out to solve: why the government has consistently supported and developed knowledge of *blast* damage caused by nuclear weapons but largely ignored the potentially more devastating effects of *fire* damage. The problem may seem narrow, but in Eden's capable hands, its sweep encompasses the work of hundreds of scientists and policy makers in dozens of agencies across many decades. It is also a problem still without an ending, as our continued failure to account for the impact of "mass fires" has enduring and significant defense-related policy implications.

Equally important, the case of damage prediction provides a vehicle for Eden to develop and employ an analytic framework centered on the social construction of organizational knowledge. Arguing that judgments presented as straightforward products of physical phenomena were in fact historically and socially constructed organizational outcomes, she views the government's problem-solving process as emerging through the enactment of "knowledge-laden organizational routines" shaped by organizationally constructed approaches to problem solving, or "organizational frames."

In so doing, Eden moves beyond conventional interest-based approaches to nicely integrate insights about the constructed nature of knowledge with an emphasis on endogenous negotiations typically stressed in organization theory. Significantly, this harmonization allows her to move from a conception of organizational frames as static products to a focus on the dynamic processes through which those frames emerge and develop over time. The tool kit here is large, Eden's analysis incorporates relational patterns and status structures both within and across agencies, as well as the varied resources allocated by these agencies, the state of knowledge in relevant scientific disciplines at key junctures, and the exogenous events that impact organizational landscapes.

The bulk of this book is devoted to developing the argument historically

Beginning with precision strategic bombing doctrines developed in the 1930s and moving through the Second World War, subsequent rounds of nuclear weapons tests, the evolution and end of the Cold War, and contemporary policy considerations, Eden is concerned with processes of continuity, change, and—most significantly—contingency. Much of this temporal exploration follows a path-dependent line, with earlier choices and allocations affecting later ones, contributing to an inertial or self-reinforcing dynamic. But she also complicates that straightforward story, challenging more deterministic path-dependent models to demonstrate how organizational discontinuities can result from “internal incubators of innovation” or the efforts of particular resourceful or well-situated individuals, rather than only through external “shocks” (p. 288).

Such conclusions are facilitated by the wide range of data utilized here, including published reports, intra-agency communications, and multiple in-depth interviews with many of the key players. Eden deftly makes use of this evidence, though at times readers might be inclined to wonder if she relies excessively on the accounts of particular central actors. Even this strategy has its benefits, however, as these individuals’ actions often illuminate the messier contingencies and change processes that make the analysis compelling. Such concerns are further allayed by Eden’s ability to skillfully embed these personal histories and perspectives within relevant social and historical contexts.

This rigorous attention to detail promises—and delivers—much to readers seeking insight into the construction of organizational knowledge and also to those primarily interested in the implications of nuclear weapons policy. This balancing act, however, at times results in a not-always-seamless effort to engage these varied audiences. Such tensions emerge within the book’s overall structure, which largely segregates broader theoretical considerations from the more descriptive narrative, blunting our ability to grasp how salient insights about path dependency and the like link to historical evidence. Another tension arises in the opening chapter, an extended description of the impact of a hypothetical nuclear attack on Washington, D.C. Alongside viscerally powerful accounts of collapsing buildings, airborne cars, and evaporating marble memorials, Eden incorporates detailed technical discussion of overpressure, thermal fluence, and VN values. These technical considerations populate most later chapters as well, and while they are unfailingly clear (not a small accomplishment), it is not always apparent how their inclusion contributes to our understanding of theoretically relevant historical and organizational processes.

These, however, are secondary quibbles and should not overshadow Eden’s considerable accomplishment here. *Whole World on Fire* is an engaging, comprehensive account of the counterintuitive evolution of an important policy dilemma. Its argument should hold influence in political circles, as well as provide indispensable reading for organizational and historical sociologists.

The Economics of Knowledge By Dominique Foray Cambridge, Mass
MIT Press, 2004 Pp 275 \$35 00

Alex Preda
University of Edinburgh

Can we conceive of knowledge as an economic good, subjected to private ownership, enclosed in a system of monetary exchanges, and regulated by profitability criteria? Can every single piece of knowledge be patented and protected from unauthorized replication? Can we produce thus more knowledge? Developed economies depend upon the production, diffusion, and use of highly specialized knowledge, as illustrated (among others) by the high-tech industries and the specialized services (e.g., financial) sectors, therefore, these questions are not mere rhetoric. Knowledge-based economies rely on the cross-sector growth and expansion of specialized knowledge. Over the last decades, this expansion has been accompanied by increasingly treating knowledge as a privately owned good, with often questioned effects.

Dominique Foray sets out to examine the economic characteristics of knowledge in this enlarged and revised translation of the French original published in 2000. To his credit, he takes an interdisciplinary approach and considers not only the economics and management literature, but also various sociological positions, mainly from the sociology of scientific knowledge and technology. While there is a theoretical tradition in economics (going back to Friedrich von Hayek and Fritz Machlup) dealing with the economic value of information, Foray is careful to stress the irreducibility of knowledge to the latter and, consequently, stresses the differences between the economics of knowledge, of research, and of information, respectively. In order to investigate the properties of knowledge as an economic good, the author transfers sociological insights and concepts into the conceptual frame of economics. He emphasizes the dual character of knowledge (explicit and tacit), its personalization, its inseparability from social relationships, and the importance of learning processes. These properties define not only common knowledge, but also scientific and expert knowledge, making it very difficult to measure and treat as a classic economic good. In the terminology of economics, knowledge is cumulative, local, weakly persistent, sticky, nonrival, partially nonexcludable, and nonconvex, to enumerate but some of its most important characteristics. This provides the starting point for examining issues like intellectual property rights and the storage and reproduction of knowledge, its development across economic sectors, and its management, all in a nonformalized, refreshing, and illuminating fashion.

Knowledge cannot be reduced to information stored by isolated individuals or artifacts. By its very nature, knowledge builds communities, spills over, and benefits the larger society. This means that any attempt to treat scientific knowledge entirely as private property and control its

exclusive diffusion via a patent system will either bring poor results or fail. And indeed, the author makes clear that, for basic scientific research, market regimes have very poor returns. Overall, Foray is skeptical about such regimes as a panacea for continued technological innovation and growth of scientific knowledge, favoring instead a situational approach that combines private with public initiatives or (as in the case of basic research) stresses these latter. Patenting regimes do not foster knowledge production as much as they foster exclusion from knowledge, with undesirable consequences. Exclusive rationing of knowledge by price has wasteful effects. The knowledge-based economy has made visible here the limits of an economics paradigm centered on self-interest.

In the knowledge-based economy, the scientific community stays at the forefront of knowledge production. Successful expansion of knowledge throughout economic sectors includes emulating at least some of its characteristics qua community. This should lead to a model of science-induced technological innovation, which in its turn changes the ways in which economic agents act. While this is a laudable vision, Foray does not discuss here issues like the links between social forces, risks, and technological innovation, thoroughly explored in the sociological literature and liable to alter this model of steady innovation cum expansion. He acknowledges, however, that the expansion of knowledge and innovation is uneven across socioeconomic sectors because of historically developed practices and institutions.

With economic processes depending to such a large extent on specialized knowledge, it becomes essential to examine its storage and reproduction, which are determined both by codification and standardization procedures and by the available technologies. Information and computer technologies (ICT) have greatly increased storage capacities, but this does not mean that social memory has become limitless. What has rather happened is that the obsolescence rate of storage procedures has soared, while their compatibility has diminished, leading to losses in some areas. This has direct consequences for knowledge management, a key issue confronting organizations in advanced economies. Efficient knowledge management requires open resources and access to learning, which in their turn require abandoning the notion that private property is a successful functional substitution for public ownership of knowledge. Knowledge is inherently public, a knowledge-based economy cannot go around this fact. This is the book's central message, supported by a remarkable integration of economic and sociological literature, which highlights the centrality of the sociological toolbox in any effort to conceptualize knowledge as an economic factor.

L'École Durkheimienne et l'Économie By Philippe Steiner Genève-Paris
Librairie Droz, 2005 Pp 369

Philip Smith
Yale University

The work of Durkheim and his students is being currently redescribed and rediscovered in surprising ways (for an overview see *The Cambridge Companion to Durkheim*, 2005) Philippe Steiner makes a significant contribution to this wider project His ambition is to show that the Durkheimians hold the trumps in a deal where it is widely suspected they have few strong cards to play—economic sociology

In this task Steiner very sensibly decides to look at the output of the Durkheimian school as a whole All too often efforts to rework Durkheimian sociology involve the collation of scattered items of text from the master's four major works, followed by oracular lucubrations upon these information-poor, runelike indicators Steiner correctly realizes that from the late 1890s through to the 1930s we should consider the output of both Durkheim and his students in toto as the evolving product of a collaborative intellectual exchange network Taking this path provides him with an embarrassment of nearly forgotten riches the numerous contributions to the fifth section of *L'Année sociologique* and series D of *Annales sociologiques*, Francois Simiand's neglected major volumes on money, wages, and economic cycles, Marcel Mauss's rather better-known *Essai sur le don*, Maurice Halbwachs's all but buried studies on working-class expenditures and the hierarchy of needs in daily life—to mention but a few Those unfamiliar with this scholarship will be surprised at its engagement with 20th-century economic activity and theory This was no retread of the *The Division of Labor in Society* and its specifically fin de siècle anxieties Mauss wrote not only about the *mana* of the primitive gift, but also on topics such as the economic implications of Bolshevik land reform and on the role of confidence and trust in global finance markets, Simiand and Halbwachs critiqued Keynes as his major tracts were published, debated the operations of the business cycle, and considered the mandate of the state for economic regulation

Steiner assists not only by bringing this corpus to wider attention but also by indicating its properties as a body of literature held together by distinctively Durkheimian attributes He identifies two such unifying paths The first track is a critique of orthodox political economy in terms of its methodology and has a parallel concern with the institutional preconditions for production and consumption under modernity This can be found mostly in the work of Halbwachs and Simiand and involves somewhat positivistic and deterministic advocacy for the primacy of social facts in economic life, alongside calls for empirical investigations of their laws of operation The second line of thinking emerged from Durkheim's religious sociology, was developed by Mauss, and pays closer attention to

the social and historical origins of economic categories Steiner argues these two programs eventually moved toward convergence thanks to methodological affinities and a shared foundation in the sociology of knowledge In his final chapters he shifts away from textual exegesis to suggest some ways in which such a Durkheimian sociology of economic knowledge and economic representations might be elaborated today, giving particular attention to the role of the education system in institutionalizing a utilitarian ethos, calculative reason, and individualized market subjectivities

This concluding salvo of neo-Weberian shot indicates a pervasive trait in Steiner's interpretation of the Durkheimian legacy, taking it to be largely a theory of a secularized and differentiated economic modernity such as we find in *The Division of Labor* It should also be noted that the referent of "l' école durkheimienne" is rather literal and restricted The result is a deeply scholarly book but not a radically challenging or ambitious one that makes the most of the opportunities it opens up An alternative reading to Steiner's might flag more vigorously the cultural Durkheim who wrote on emotions, classification, and the sacred as these intersect with the economic life of "primitive society" It would take Mauss's protestations about *hau* and *mana* more seriously and point emphatically to the role of moral forces in activities of production, consumption, and exchange, as well as underscoring the heavily symbolic qualities of the collective representations through which we imagine and regulate the economy It could further join recent scholarship in perceiving Durkheim as the ancestor of structuralism and poststructuralism Such a track could lead immediately to discussions of Bataille on destruction and consumptive excess (the Collège de Sociologie is curiously absent from this book) and indirectly to Lyotard and Deleuze on the libidinal economy or Baudrillard, Sahlins, and Douglas on the cultural codes that define value Seen in this light, the Durkheimian legacy for economic sociology is even more extensive and surprising than Steiner's otherwise useful book suggests

The Ethnological Imagination A Cross-Cultural Critique of Modernity
By Fuyuki Kurasawa Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 2004
Pp xiv+249 \$68 95 (cloth), \$22 95 (paper)

Neil Gross
Harvard University

In a 1997 *AJS* article, Robert Connell argued that the work of Comte, Durkheim, Spencer, and other founders was less concerned with processes of European modernization than with the "central idea" of "difference between the metropole and an Other whose main feature was its primitiveness" (102 1516–17) Fascinated by ethnographic accounts of the non-

Western world, many of the classical thinkers, Connell suggested, developed theories premised on evolutionist and racist assumptions, their contributions therefore belonged to a discourse of colonialism. Connell's reading of the textual evidence was selective, the conclusion he drew facile. In *The Ethnological Imagination*, by contrast, Fuyuki Kurasawa takes up a similar set of issues, but, on the basis of a more penetrating reading, comes to a radically different conclusion. Yes, the classical theorists, including Marx and Weber, often formulated their claims around a consideration of non-Western societies, and here Orientalist assumptions sometimes crept in. But they did so not to celebrate European geopolitical dominance, but to critique aspects of Western modernization. It was conceptions of non-Western otherness, though always interwoven with mythological elements, that allowed the classical theorists to call into question the naturalness and inevitability of such features of modern European life as anomic individualism, instrumental rationality, and capitalism. And here Kurasawa sees grounds for engaging with them anew because their mode of analysis looked outward across difference to formulate reflexive critique, they embodied ideals of dialogicity and intersubjective engagement urgently needed in a globalizing world wrenched by cultural conflict.

Kurasawa develops his argument across six tightly written substantive chapters that explore the ethnological underpinnings of the thought of Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and—moving into the contemporary period—Lévi-Strauss and Foucault. For Rousseau, conceptions of “civilized savagery” (p. 36), born of “travelers’ tales and missionaries’ reports” (p. 40), augmented by his “self-imposed exile [to] the countryside” (p. 39), provide the basis for an attack on the idea of private property. Marx, for his part, is said to have undergone an “ethnological turn” beginning with the *Grundrisse* but intensifying later in the *Ethnological Notebooks* of 1880–82. In these writings the notion of an Asiatic mode of production enters in as a counterfactual to support the claim that private property holding is a precondition for the unfolding of societal development according to the laws of historical materialism, while elsewhere Charles de Brosses’s account of “fetishism” in the religious practices of West Africa and Egypt is “transpose[d]” (p. 61) in service of a critique of commodification. Weber, Kurasawa insists, should be read as a comparativist for whom the essential features of the Protestant ethic and disenchantment came into view against a backdrop provided by consideration of Asian religions. Durkheim developed an “anthropological sociology” (p. 111) that relied heavily on ethnographic evidence from aboriginal societies, but also mobilized positively valenced notions of primitivism to draw out the distinctive and, in some of its forms, dangerous nature of modern individualism. Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology, premised on a cognitive universalism, was designed to counter social evolutionist claims, not least by serving as a basis for critical analysis of Western cultural conceptions. And Foucault’s contributions should be seen as constituting an ethnology of the West that treats rationalism and humanism as well-elaborated my-

thologies In light of the contemporary challenges of “postcolonialism, multiculturalism, and globalization” (p. 166), Kurasawa thinks the ethnological imagination should be deployed once again. Social theory, rather than retreating into traditionalist defenses of the canon, postmodern celebrations of radical alterity, or nascent universalism, should turn its attention to non-Western social practices to call into question the cultural forms and configurations that have become doxic in our time.

Despite its slightly florid writing style, this book is a pleasure to read. Kurasawa’s fluency with the language of theory is impressive, as is his capacity to produce an interpretive narrative at once nuanced and coherent. Among the authors Kurasawa cites in his preface as inspirational is Martin Jay, and in terms of both range and the type of theory on offer there is no one Kurasawa reminds me of more. But while Kurasawa is a strong poet in the Bloomian sense, his book also suffers from the problem inherent in misprision: one wonders whether, in the final analysis, it is a misreading. It is to Kurasawa’s credit to have shown how the classical theorists’ concern with the world outside the West contributed to their critical theories of modernity. But it is not as though Marx, Weber, and Durkheim looked to the wider world *solely* to question the naturalness and inevitability of European modernization. This is to treat them as never having gotten beyond the trope of social constructionism. Rather, regardless of the normative and epistemological differences among them (which Kurasawa tends to efface), they did so to gain access to empirical variation that could serve as the basis for constructing explanatory theories—theories which might (or might not) be harnessed in the service of social critique. Kurasawa sometimes acknowledges this, but because theory construction was a major goal of the classical theorists, readily available historical material on the West figured much more centrally in their intellectual projects than did engagement with non-European societies. Did Marx, Weber, and Durkheim deploy a distinctive ethnological imagination, then, or were they simply comparativists using any and all available data? A second criticism revolves around Kurasawa’s positioning of his own contribution. His attacks on postmodernism and universalism are on target, but there are few in sociology who would defend the classical canon on the traditionalist grounds he identifies. To cite, as he does, Charles Camic and Quentin Skinner as among those who “disregard the fact that . . . disciplinary canon[s] . . . are shifting sociohistorical constructs” (p. 5) is pretty much a nonstarter, given that Camic, in particular, uses the classical and postclassical theorists precisely to develop a sociology of ideas. The problem here is not simply one of miscitation. A richly developed sociology of ideas would result in a reflexive awareness of the social conditions for knowledge production that would represent an alternative pathway toward dialogicity and intersubjectivity. By ignoring the complementarities between such a project and the ethnological imagination, Kurasawa passes up an opportunity to flesh out his own

views more fully. These problems aside, *The Ethnological Imagination* heralds the arrival of a major new voice in social theory.

Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s. By Eric Bleich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xii+233.

Robin Stryker
University of Minnesota

In *Race Politics in Britain and France*, Eric Bleich demonstrates the importance of divergent race frames to divergent racial policies in two major European countries. In the process, he makes a compelling argument for the importance of framing in policy making more generally, explicating the role of frames within a more comprehensive comparative policy-making perspective that also draws from what he terms power-interest, problem-solving, and institutional approaches.

Whereas Britain uses civil law to punish employment and housing discrimination and other forms of access racism, France emphasizes criminal punishment. Whereas Britain created a state administrative enforcement agency, France permits societal antiracist groups to begin criminal proceedings, facilitating shared enforcement responsibility between state and societal actors. French law punishes Holocaust denial and allows the state to deny convicted racists the right to run for public office. British law does neither. British law punishes indirect discrimination (similar to the U.S. concept of disparate impact) and allows for "soft" forms of positive (affirmative) action, whereas France does neither. France collects no race or ethnic statistics. Britain, like the United States, engages in "ethnic monitoring" (p. 10).

Doing a process tracing of post-World War II Britain and France, Bleich shows how political bargaining, learning, and institutional constraints and opportunities all are applicable, yet limited, in accounting for divergent policy trajectories. Defining frames as "cognitive and moral maps that orient an actor within a policy sphere" (p. 26), Bleich argues that we cannot understand how and why racism came to the policy agenda, nor the different ways that enacted British and French policies combat racism without appreciating how frames constituted actors' policy goals in both countries.

British policymakers have largely accepted the categories of race and ethnicity; they have conceived of racism primarily in "color" terms and have devoted the majority of their energy to fighting access racism, and they have strongly identified their problems of racism with the North American context. By contrast, prevailing French frames have downplayed or denied the categories of race and ethnicity; they have focused more on expressive racism and on anti-Semitism, and they have rejected the North American

analogy because of its perceived irrelevance to understanding France's domestic context of racism. It has been the different political and public perceptions of race, racism and anti-racism that have had the most important impact on the precise nature of each country's concrete policies (P 14)

An impressive aspect of Bleich's book is his explicit delineation of what is expected in the cases, given that particular explanations of policy making are correct or incorrect. Equally impressive is his attempt to use his two-case comparison to ground more general hypotheses about when, how, and why framing plays a causal role in state policy making and how frames fit into a more comprehensive multifactor or multiperspective account. He suggests that whereas frames, like prior institutions, may constrain or enable particular kinds of policy making, frames are especially important to understanding actors' goals. Frames are likely to be less important for identifying key actors in policy making than are factors identified by the power-interest and problem-solving perspectives. When frames are shared by many actors, they probably will be very important, because they "attain a taken-for-granted quality that closes off potential challenges to them" (p. 186). Thus, Bleich especially emphasizes the constitutive aspect of framing, though his process tracing also finds evidence of strategic framing to score electoral points or to gain policy-making allies.

A downside of Bleich's book may be the inevitable consequence of his far-reaching theoretical aspirations. Because these require him to investigate events during a 30-to-40-year time period in two countries that both had multiple legislative debates embedded in a broader flow of policy change, Bleich elucidates frames by providing illustrative quotations from policy speeches, documents, and so on. The book lacks detailed attention to identifying the universe of actors or frames engaged in any particular policy-making event or to showing the (perhaps shifting) preponderance of one frame over another within and between policy events or countries. Readers who require the latter level of systematization for a convincing demonstration of the identity of frames mobilized by policy elites will be disappointed, as will those who hoped for systematic analyses of media frames or of mass opinion framing.

Overall, however, Bleich has written an important book that should be read by all students of comparative policy making or of ideas and institutions, whatever their disciplinary affiliation and whether or not they study race policies. Likewise, it should be read by all scholars of race and antidiscrimination, whatever their discipline and whether or not their explicit foci are comparative or not. Scholars of American antidiscrimination law and politics may find French race policies and frames especially illuminating precisely because they are so different from our own that knowledge of them prevents us from taking our own frames for granted.

Roots of Hate Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust By
William I Brustein Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2003 Pp
xv+384

Jeffrey K Olick
University of Virginia

In 1996, the American political scientist Daniel Goldhagen published a runaway bestseller called *Hitler's Willing Executioners Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*. There Goldhagen advanced the charge that the Holocaust happened because ordinary Germans shared a uniquely virulent ideology that Goldhagen called "eliminationist anti-Semitism." Rejecting extant versions of both "intentionalism" (in which the Holocaust was the responsibility of a clique of madmen) and "functionalism" (in which National Socialism and the Holocaust were products of Germany's delayed modernization and failed bourgeois revolution), Goldhagen accused the scholarly literature of neglecting anti-Semitic ideology as the source of the judeocide. The main point of Goldhagen's book, then, was that ordinary Germans were responsible for the Holocaust and that because this ideology was unique to Germany, the Holocaust simply could not have happened anywhere else.

In the last few years, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* has spawned a veritable industry of responses from scholars of virtually all stripes. At particular issue has been Goldhagen's unsubstantiated assertion that German anti-Semitism was somehow different from anti-Semitism elsewhere. Indeed, precisely this assertion is the impetus for William Brustein's new book *Roots of Hate Anti-Semitism before the Holocaust*, which seeks to examine systematically whether and how anti-Semitism varied in content and intensity across European societies and over time. In contrast to Goldhagen's assertion that Nazi anti-Semitism was but a more intensified version of a long-standing tradition unique to Germany, Brustein argues that "if Goldhagen were correct, we would find consistently higher levels of anti-Semitism in Germany than in other countries, as well as high levels of anti-Semitism in Germany prior to the Nazi period."

The conclusion of Brustein's analysis, however, is that the empirical evidence does not support Goldhagen's claim. Brustein analyzes rates of anti-Semitic acts and attitudes as reported both in the American Jewish Yearbook and in articles in leading newspapers in five countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Romania) between the years 1899 and 1939 (though the historical accounts address the period between 1870 and 1899 in detail). These data indeed demonstrate significant spatial and temporal variation in anti-Semitic acts and attitudes, as well as differences in the kinds of acts occurring in different places and different times.

The real message of this analysis, however, is the challenge it poses to extant theory. Indeed, Brustein reviews a number of major theoretical

frameworks for understanding anti-Semitism and, by extension, National Socialism and the Holocaust, and finds them all ultimately unable to account sufficiently for the spatial and temporal variability in anti-Semitism. First, modernization theory, according to Brustein, assigns causality to either effects of rising economic competition (in which social mobility for Jews generated fears among those threatened by it) or to growing anomic stresses resulting from modernization in general (in which nationalists charged Jews with diluting collective identity). For Brustein, while modernization theory provides a plausible account for why anti-Semitism increased dramatically after 1870, it does not account sufficiently for the spatial variations or its temporary decline after 1890. Second is "scapegoat" theory, which identifies the Jews as objects of irrational sociopsychological impulses. But such an account does not explain why the Jews rather than other minorities were the central focus of such impulses. Third is the "strong state" theory, in which anti-Semitism is a reaction against state-imposed emancipation of the Jews. While this theory does a better job, Brustein argues, of explaining spatial variations (anti-Semitism is strong where the state imposed emancipation, weak where emancipation came, if at all, through society), it fails to account for temporal variations. Finally, Brustein challenges political culture theory (of which Goldhagen is only one representative), which according to Brustein claims that distinct political cultures are responsible for national variations in anti-Semitism. Brustein's objection here is that political cultural accounts of anti-Semitism "assume a consistency in levels of anti-Semitism that runs counter to the evidence of temporal variations in German anti-Semitism. A theory that assumes invariability in political culture cannot explain variation in anti-Semitism." In contrast, Brustein argues that "rather than being a cause of anti-Semitism, political culture may be a manifestation of anti-Semitic attitudes and actions, and, like anti-Semitism, be produced by antecedent and independent factors." Hence, the Holocaust, he implies, was more "the consequence of Hitler's rise to power" rather than "the inevitable outcome of German history and culture."

Brustein's alternative theory distinguishes among four major "strands" or "roots" of anti-Semitism: religious, racial, economic, and political. Each of these has its own contours and trajectory, and Brustein organizes the body of the book as chapters surveying the history of each. Brustein argues that these four roots, each of which was deeply embedded throughout Europe and its history, "would periodically erupt at moments of large-scale Jewish immigration, severe economic crisis, or revolutionary challenge." At times and in places where the four forms converged with these historical factors, "anti-Semitism should have been more intense." Indeed it was.

As much as *Roots of Hate* is a reaction to Goldhagen, the alternative account Brustein offers is clearly continuous with his earlier controversial book, *The Logic of Evil*, in which Brustein argued that Germans were

pursuing their economic interests when they voted for Hitler *Roots of Hate* proceeds less explicitly from rational choice presuppositions, but the worldview is nevertheless strong here as well insofar as Brustein seeks to explain variations in anti-Semitism as motivated reactions to historical circumstances (e.g., racial anti-Semitism followed large-scale immigration of Eastern European Jews, who looked and acted very strange to Christian Western Europeans) *Roots of Hate* may thus face some of the challenges his previous book did. Does the rationalist's commitment to discovering motivation lead down a slippery slope from explanation to justification, failing to differentiate the historical efficacy of perception from that of misperception? Surely not, but one understands the concern. Can rationalism handle irrationality without denying it? This is, of course, an old question in sociology theory.

A further challenge—one not uncommon in the literature—is the difficulty in separating anti-Semitism, National Socialism, and the Holocaust. *Roots of Hate* argues convincingly that anti-Semitism contributes only a little to the explanation of National Socialism's triumph in Germany. Certainly, as Brustein emphasizes, there was plenty of anti-Semitism in Europe without National Socialism. However, there could also have been National Socialism without the Holocaust (though probably not a Holocaust without National Socialism). In this light, it seems that the causal role of anti-Semitism depends on how one specifies the dependent variable—National Socialism or extermination of the Jews. Anti-Semitism explains perhaps little of the former, but clearly a great deal of the latter (and the Holocaust, not National Socialism, was Goldhagen's dependent variable).

As a result of this conflation, and for other reasons as well, I found Brustein's presentation of extant theory simultaneously insufficiently specified and too stringent. Does modernization theory have to account for small variations and occasional backtracking of trends to be useful, or is it enough to identify overall trends? Does scapegoat theory not allow us to account for the particular power of some scapegoats over others (hence the seeming permanence of the Jews as objects of hatred, which Brustein rightly attributes to the multifaceted nature of anti-Semitism and multidimensionality of Jewish identity in European history)? Additionally, while the historical chapters do not add very much for those already immersed in the discourse, they are valuable summaries for students and nonexperts. By the same token, the quantitative analysis in the conclusion will be difficult for the general readers who have the most to gain from the substantive chapters.

Nevertheless, insofar as the book challenges us not to essentialize anti-Semitism, it is a valuable refinement, and the analytical separation of the four roots is quite salutary. Perhaps most important, *Roots of Hate* demonstrates that the Holocaust is an appropriate, indeed necessary, topic for rigorous mainstream comparative historical sociology (which has given it surprisingly short shrift) and that rigorous comparative historical soci-

ology has much to add to the discourse *Roots of Hate* is thus a major event for the field

The Cultural Realm of European Integration: Social Representations in France, Spain, and the United Kingdom By Antonio V Menéndez-Alarcón Westport, Conn Preager, 2004 Pp 186 \$79 95

Mathieu Deflem
University of South Carolina

The Cultural Realm of European Integration presents the culmination of Antonio Menéndez-Alarcón's long-standing research on the European unification process. The book addresses popular attitudes toward the integration of Europe in selected countries. Specifically analyzed are the perceptions about unified Europe among political leaders and laypeople in France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Menéndez-Alarcón situates his analyses in a brief historical overview of the integration process in Europe. Throughout that history emerged the multidimensional and frictional nature of European unification as a political, economic, and/or cultural entity. Early on in this process, integration took place at an institutional level with indifference of (and toward) the population. But since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 created a veritable European Union, the people of Europe have become much more aware of what Brussels can mean for them. Within this context, Menéndez-Alarcón's study of popular perceptions of the idea and reality of Europe takes on considerable relevance.

The author relies on a variety of sources to investigate how the process of European integration is perceived. The author specifically analyzes the opinions of members of the political elites, who are involved in steering the unification process top-down, as well as the attitudes of the general public. Methodologically, Menéndez-Alarcón relies on multiple techniques, including document analysis to investigate sources on European integration retrieved from various documentation centers across Europe, content analysis of important newspapers in Europe, and some 400 in-depth interviews that were conducted with political leaders and lay citizens during multiple research visits over the past eight years.

The author narrates the research results per country examined. Briefly reviewing the major findings, attitudes toward European unification in France are dominated by a strong sense of French national sovereignty. The French political elite is split among a mostly pro-European left and a very anti-European extreme right, with various opinions in between. Among the laypeople, a more positive trend toward Europe emerged during the 1990s. Still, most strong remains the notion among the French that the national state is a reflection of, and protection for, popular sovereignty.

Spain has traditionally been among the countries most positively inclined toward Europe's integration, yet support has become more conditional since the late 1990s. Spanish political leaders remain mostly positive about Europe, but there are concerns about Europe's social policies. The Spanish populace is generally positive about Europe in an abstract sense, but remains committed to the idea of the nation-state in more specific circumstances.

In the United Kingdom, sentiments about European unification have traditionally been less than favorable. While politicians from the leftist parties tend to be somewhat more pro-European, the conservatives are more strongly opposed to Britain's inclusion in a political union that is associated with the Continent. British laypeople similarly betray an "us-versus-them" mentality and remain skeptical.

Menéndez-Alarcón also probes into the attitudes toward Europe since the enlargement process that in most recent years has extended the European Union to include 15 member states. Most people in Europe tend to favor a slower, more gradual approach to enlargement. And while the creation of a bigger market is generally seen as favorable, a deepening of unification in various sectors of society is also considered necessary. In conclusion, Menéndez-Alarcón notes that across the examined nations there remains a strong identification with national symbols, traditions, and history. However, he also contends that this nationalism takes place within an increasingly international setting, a context where the nation-state has objectively lost some of its sovereignty.

Compared to the existing scholarship on European unification, this book primarily stands out because of its focus on popular perceptions and its methodological approach in relying on a wide variety of data collected over a lengthy period of time in the context of three national states. In particular, the many interviews Menéndez-Alarcón has conducted with a usefully broad range of respondents provide a rich complement to the relevant surveys that exist. Theoretically, this book is useful, if somewhat underdeveloped, in breaking with a hyperrationalist approach to European integration on the basis of a study of institutions in favor of adopting a cultural orientation that focuses on the nonrational and subjective factors that affect the political structure of Europe.

Menéndez-Alarcón's book provides not only a useful addition to the European studies literature, but also a fine contribution to the sociology of political cultures. Although the sociology of European unification is still not well developed, there have now suddenly appeared two books on this topic in the English language. Besides the book here under review, Juan Diez Medrano's *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom* (Princeton University Press, 2003) provides a similar cultural analysis of popular opinions about unified Europe. As most of the European studies literature is institutional in orientation and dominated by political scientists, it is much to the credit

of sociologists to have provided a useful antidote to such works by bringing out the relevance of Europe's cultural dimension

The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe By Daniele Caramani Cambridge University Press, 2004 Pp xviii+347 \$75.00 (cloth), \$27.99 (paper)

Jason Beckfield
University of Chicago

When, where, and why did the subnational regions and localities of Western Europe form national electorates and political party systems, where parties contest constituencies nationwide, citizens turn out to vote in similar proportions from region to region, and place diminishes as a determinant of party support? In Weberian terms, how did the functional dimension of political space, where politics is organized by social cleavages such as class, supersede the territorial dimension of political space, where politics is structured by place? Daniele Caramani addresses these questions with a noteworthy new data set that allows him to reconsider the existing explanations and develop a new argument that focuses on political parties and the class cleavage as forces for nationalization. Until Caramani's work, research on nationalization was limited in geographical and historical scope because of the extreme data demands, and explanations of nationalization included the extension of voting rights, the change of proportional representation, the development of electronic media, the consolidation of the welfare state, and other changes, many of them dated to the 20th century.

To examine nationalization, Caramani compiled data on the number of eligible voters, actual voters, valid votes, and votes cast—for every constituency, each party, every election, and each of 17 Western European nations—back to the democratic revolutions of the 1800s. Caramani's previous work, *Elections in Western Europe since 1815: Electoral Results by Constituencies* (Macmillan, 2000), part of the Mannheim Center for European Social Research *Societies of Europe* series, discusses this impressive data set. It also provides the data in multiple machine-readable formats on CD-ROM. In *Nationalization of Politics*, Caramani follows up his gift to social scientists with an original analysis of the data.

The analysis and the argument it supports make landmark contributions to our understanding of nationalization over time, across nations, and among party families. The longitudinal analysis, reaching back much further in time than previous work, shows that the nationalization of electorates and party systems was nearly complete by World War I. Getting the timing right matters because it rules out several otherwise plausible explanations: neither the intensification of electronic communication,

nor the economic crisis of the 1930s, nor secularization, nor the development of the welfare state, nor the transformation of parties into "catch-all parties" after World War II explains nationalization, because all these happened well *after* nationalization was essentially complete. Second, the comparative analysis identifies four types of party systems: nationalized (territorially homogeneous party support), segmented (one region represented by a strong regionalist party), territorialized (regionalized party support but no regionalist parties), and regionalized (regionalized party support and regionalist parties). Where parties show reduced territorial coverage, Caramani distinguishes among nations with "small regionalist parties" (Spain), "large regionalized parties" (Switzerland), "a two-party system" (Britain), and "two party systems" (Belgium). Third, the analysis of party families reveals that every European party family except the regionalists trended toward territorially homogeneous electoral support. But the liberals and conservatives nationalized first, before the extension of (male) universal suffrage. Getting the timing right matters once again, because it means that neither mass enfranchisement nor the entry of social democratic and agrarian parties fully accounts for nationalization.

Instead, Caramani explains the nationalization of politics as a function of competition, class, and culture. The key to nationalization is competition among liberal and conservative parties. Shortly after the beginning of competitive elections in the early to mid-1800s, the nation-building liberals drew tradition-defending conservatives into national competition. Dating the nationalization of this competition to the 1850s and 1860s implies that neither industrialization, nor mass enfranchisement, nor the change to proportional representation systems explains nationalization, because nationalizing party competition preceded all these factors. The development of the class cleavage then advanced the nationalization of politics because class cuts across territory. A key piece of evidence for the argument that the intensification of the class cleavage nationalizes politics is that the territorial heterogeneity of the vote declined as the size of the social democratic vote grew. "The stronger the social democrats, the more nationalized the whole party system" (p. 218). Caramani argues that while social democrats entered party systems that were already nationalized by liberals and conservatives, the combination of industrialization with the extension of voting rights to the (male) masses accelerated nationalization and led to its virtual completion by World War I. Conversely, Caramani argues that culture hindered nationalization because "ethnolinguistic and religious cleavages expressed in territorialized party families" are "dishomogenizing cleavages" (p. 197) that are strongly related to place.

This use of culture to explain the cases of nonnationalization or denationalization that remain after accounting for party competition and the predominance of the class cleavage is one of the book's few disappointments. Why do cultural cleavages prevent nationalization in some cases but not others? And might culture actually foster nationalization? While the book incorporates remarkably rich detail given its expansive

scope, more evidence on how liberals and conservatives extended their territorial coverage in the mid-19th century by capitalizing on "national" issues and setting "national" agendas might show how culture-as-meaning can enable nationalization as well as hobble it. A second shortcoming is that the recent rise of regionalism in Belgium, Britain, and Italy is not well explained. "Most of the so-called phenomena of new regionalism are in reality *legacies of the past*" (p. 292). Third, the book does not consider the alternative interpretation of growing territorial homogeneity in Europe as evidence of "supranationalization" or "Europeanization" of politics. For instance, the decreasing territorial heterogeneity among constituencies shown on pages 75 and 76 seems just as suggestive of Europeanization as of nationalization. Fourth, a stylistic complaint: too much of the evidence is presented in tables. In this book on politics and place that wants to "bring territory back in," I was surprised to find not a single map. But still, *Nationalization of Politics* deserves recognition as a leap forward in the literature on national political system formation. It sets the standard for future work.

Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World. By Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 226.

Terry Nichols Clark
University of Chicago

Two leading political scientists have given us a clear, systematic, and powerfully documented book on gender equality. *Rising Tide* outlines a general theory stressing transitions from agricultural to industrial and postindustrial societies, drawing especially on Daniel Bell and Ronald Inglehart's past work. Authors Inglehart and Pippa Norris formulate hypotheses about where and why gender equality rises, often invoking the rise of a postindustrial cultural agenda, including gender equality. They test hypotheses across nations, social sectors, genders, generations, and religious traditions. They analyze data from the World Values Surveys of national samples of citizens in 191 societies. The result is a clear, coherent statement and rich, detailed results. It stands as a baseline against which other interpretations may be compared. Most data are also publicly available, permitting reassessment of their results.

The rich data permit detailed tables that show, for instance, how much gender equality is supported by men versus by women, and by people of different educational levels, occupational types, marital status, and parental status, in agricultural, industrial, and postindustrial countries. Non-intuitive results include the finding that the young are far more egalitarian than their elders in postindustrial societies, but that within poor agricultural societies, the young differ minimally from their elders. Also, the gap

in the degree of gender egalitarianism between men and women is much smaller than the gaps across different types of nations

Religious (or civilizational) traditions remain important beyond income, education, and similar socioeconomic variables. Further, religious traditions hold strong in comparison to "religiosity," thus contradicting the pattern within the United States, for instance, where many interpreters suggest that religiosity better predicts social conservatism than does denomination. Moving beyond the (Western) Judeo-Christian tradition, Inglehart and Norris show that Hindus decidedly favor gender equality, while Muslims, and especially Buddhists, oppose equality, controlling for individual and societal development levels. This sort of multicausality analysis is virtually impossible for most studies that lack the sort of massive database from which the authors draw their data. This provides a clear, specific foundation for emerging work on civilizational analysis, such as that by S. N. Eisenstadt, Edward Tiryakian, Said Arjomand, and others (e.g., in recent issues of *International Sociology*).

Inglehart and Pippin present a political realignment theory that stresses how women have become distinctly politicized and have shifted away from men, increasing the political gender gap in postindustrial societies. In traditional agricultural societies, women favor more socially conservative issues and parties, but in postindustrial societies, women distinctly support more equality, left parties, and human-rights-related issues. Inglehart and Norris probe these shifts and sensitively test competing interpretations of their components. The authors also include a chapter on women as elected officials which shows that they are more numerous in countries where citizens favor women elected officials.

The authors review many theories and past studies from multiple subfields in the social sciences, they usefully join work on political mobilization, participation, voting, social movements, religion, gender, development, and more. While they repeatedly use work from these subfields to address hypotheses about women and gender, they also demonstrate that a wide range of theories can and do address gender issues. Similarly, they address feminist work but show through numerous examples that gender issues are too important for scholars of other subfields of social science to leave to the exclusive province of feminist studies.

I have a few caveats: other studies have shown how civic groups and political parties may shift the individual citizen effects, which Inglehart and Norris often stress. Their modeling works through culture and socioeconomic development, but it is ironic that two political scientists do not pay more attention to civic groups and parties as classic elements of political processes, especially since NGOs are key actors in spreading human rights globally, and parties are major actors in the decision to embrace or resist women's issues. For instance, the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, Italy, and France were major advocates for women's issues and slated women in far greater numbers than did other parties. By contrast, women's organizations often played a more active role in

mobilizing women, especially in the United States, Canada, and Australia, where parties are weak (see my own and Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot's *The New Political Culture* [Westview Press, 1998], chap. 4, for specifics by country). The global media also seem to be important drivers, but their effects are very hard to capture systematically. Nevertheless, for all such caveats about their theories, Inglehart and Norris have laid a foundation that others can criticize and extend. If one can judge from the amount of intellectual effort spent on studying the demographic transition, we are only at the beginning of interpreting the gender transitions, to which Inglehart and Norris have provided a detailed global map. This work could become a classic.

Coalitions across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order
Edited by Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. Pp. 280. \$75.00 (cloth), \$29.95 (paper).

Philip McMichael
Cornell University

Coalitions across Borders is a fruitful step toward the analytical integration achieved by Karl Polanyi in his account of the 19th-century countermovement as it projected the theme of market regulation into the making of the 20th-century citizen-state. In their conclusion, Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith speculate on the potential of a set of case studies to reveal a comparative frame that would unify the insights of, and from, particular movements to reconstruct civil society globally. In effect, they implicitly invoke the double movement as the analytic through which quite diverse, but materially related, protests might combine to force a historic compromise with the neoliberal project. To this end, the editors observe: "If efforts to make the global economy more democratic and equal are to succeed, they must overcome the antidemocratic and unequal forces that shape civil society itself" (p. 247). Herein lie the two related paradoxes shaping this collection.

First, the editors' expressed need for a method that simultaneously compares and combines quite distinct movements related in time/space terms reflects the transitional nature of this volume. Building on state-centered social movement theory, it nevertheless encounters a new world in the making that may not be adequately comprehended through a theoretical lens premised on organizational models rooted in the episteme of national sovereignty. And second, in observing the imprint of global capitalism on movement politics, the editors raise the possibility of a more complex analysis of how the neoliberal order works to accelerate, compress, deny, and conjoin history in different places across a diversifying world. There is, here, a glimpse of sociocultural relations that considerably complicate the world of states and markets, on which conventional social

theory depends. How to devise a method that incorporates into comparison these diverse yet related perspectives is the challenge. The editors rightly sense this, and they do so because this collection is strong and varied enough to raise these paradoxes.

The nine substantive case studies emerged from a workshop on contentious politics in 2000 and are grouped less by subject area within the field of transnational mobilization than by questions regarding the art of coalition building across national borders. The originating date is significant, since most individual chapters proceed from the resource mobilization perspective—a perspective concerned more with causal mechanisms among replicate movements than with divining new political subjects and possibilities in the expressed social contradictions of neoliberal globalization. And yet most authors reach beyond this foundation to raise important questions about its premises, drawing on social constructionism and the politics of identity.

In the opening section, “Movements and Challenges,” Laura Macdonald recasts the “transnational public sphere” as socially differentiated, especially by hierarchies of gender, and Daniel Faber reframes the import of the environmental justice movement on a world scale as a strategic fusion with other social justice causes, especially human rights. A section on models of coalition contrasts Pauline Cullin’s analysis of the Platform of European Social NGOs’ engagement in realizing organizational goals through a broad, regional coalition politics via the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, with Lesley Woods’s examination of the People’s Global Action network (“Our resistance is as transnational as capital”) and its attempt to transcend organizational politics by building its collective identity around evolving “living documents.” A following section, “Perspectives on Labor Solidarity,” includes three distinct treatments. Ethel Brooks’s deconstruction of “child labor” via a reconstruction of everyday relations surrounding child labor in situ, in order to stress the limits of this political campaign in revealing the local context of child labor and invisibilizing other forms of sweatshop and informal labor, Peter Waterman’s deconstruction of “globalization from below” by confronting the question of “talking across difference” and facilitating a politics of identity that would inflect and re-present the increasingly diverse membership of an international labor movement, and Gay Seidman’s critique of the self-serving implementation of corporate codes of conduct through the South African Sullivan Principles, as a pretext for labor activists’ taking the state seriously as a vehicle of global norms. The concluding section, “Transnational Campaigns,” juxtaposes Arunas Juska and Bob Edwards’s account of the successful, single-issue cross-national coalition between the U.S. Animal Welfare Institute and the Polish small-farmer organization, Samoobrona, in defeating Smithfield Foods’ attempt to introduce intensive hog farming in Poland, with John Foster’s account of the strategic, trinational alliance formed to resist NAFTA, whose legacy lies in spawn-

ing, among other organizations, a Hemispheric Social Alliance engaged in anti-FTAA politics

Editors Bandy and Smith have combined a lively and exemplary set of cases, which represent the outlines of a transnational civil society in the making and present a variety of organizational and strategic challenges. The most significant of these are the necessity of transnational mobilization against neoliberal globalization, in the context of the uncharted territory of coalition building across an unequal world imprinted with social and geopolitical hierarchies, not to mention questions of commensurability involving identity and cultural politics. The glimmer of hope and new understanding that underlies this engaging collection is that in addressing neoliberalism's many faces in the global counter-movement, this collection unearths a diversity of sovereignties. What are represented as organizational (and, therefore, analytical) challenges may well be expressions of the possibility of another world in the making.

The Next Los Angeles: The Struggle for a Livable City By Robert Gottlieb, Mark Vallianatos, Regina M. Freer, and Peter Dreier. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005. Pp. 279. \$21.95.

Daphne Spain
University of Virginia

In May 2005, when Antonio Villaraigosa was elected the first Latino mayor of Los Angeles in more than a century, the authors of *The Next Los Angeles* had reason to celebrate. They had already identified Villaraigosa as the next standard bearer in the city's long progressive legacy. The fact that the authors could even find such a history, in a city typically associated with police violence and racial tensions, is a testament to the optimism of their book.

L.A.'s past includes McCarthyism, race riots, and taxpayer revolts, yet the authors extract political moments during the 20th century at which progressive ideas prevailed. The dialectic between conservative and progressive forces constitutes the struggle to which the subtitle refers. The next L.A. has the potential to become more livable to the extent that political coalitions can implement policies favoring social and environmental justice.

Part 1 of the book offers a review of L.A.'s radical political movements since 1900. In 1911, socialist labor lawyer Job Harriman was almost elected mayor. He and colleagues in the city council and in the state assembly fought for a living wage and union contracts. Women were also active in the socialist movement. Charlotta Bass, editor and publisher of the African-American *California Eagle* from 1912 to 1951, used her newspaper and various campaigns for public office to promote a progressive agenda. The best-known figure in this legacy is Upton Sinclair. In 1933,

Sinclair published a utopian story about how he, if elected governor, would put people to work in the middle of the Depression. The book launched Sinclair's campaign for governor with the slogan "End poverty in California" (EPIC). Sinclair won the Democratic Party nomination, but was defeated at the polls.

Upton Sinclair was the muse for the Gottlieb et al. collaboration. The conference from which this book was derived was held in honor of the 75th anniversary of Sinclair's arrest for reading the Bill of Rights to striking dockworkers at Liberty Hill. Given Sinclair's status as a patron saint of progressivism in Los Angeles, the authors might well have come up with a different subtitle: "What would Upton Sinclair do?"

Part 2 addresses the role of progressive politics after the civil unrest of 1992. Here the authors document the polarization that emerged from demographic and economic changes and point out that trends transforming the United States are magnified in Los Angeles. Extensive immigration has made Los Angeles the first city without a racial or ethnic majority. Suburban sprawl has created such significant economic polarization in the city that San Fernando County, home of Proposition 13 advocates, tried to secede from the city in 2002. Los Angeles also has undergone extensive economic restructuring. Once a major manufacturing center, the number of manufacturing jobs in the region declined 23% between 1990 and 1994. Even in the midst of the recession, however, progressives scored a victory. The Living Wage Coalition, an alliance of religious groups, unions, and community organizations, successfully lobbied the city council to pass a law requiring private firms with municipal contracts to pay wages above the poverty level and to provide health benefits. Thus was the national living wage movement born.

Part 3 traces shifting political coalitions that reduced the power of L.A.'s corporate elite. The failure of Peter Ueberroth's "Rebuild L.A." campaign, which depended largely on the private sector, contributed to the erosion of business influence. In its wake, the L.A. 2000 committee was formed as a hybrid blue-ribbon commission and policy group to set an agenda for the 21st century. Rebuild L.A. and L.A. 2000 both faltered for lack of a grassroots base. In contrast, the newest group, Progressive Los Angeles Network (PLAN), includes grassroots activists, academics, politicians, and policy analysts (including the authors). The book's appendix contains PLAN's policy agenda for the next Los Angeles.

This book is an effective rallying cry for progressives, but it lacks the theoretical framework I would have expected. There is no reference to the L.A. school of urban theory, for example, nor to the literature on dual cities or social capital, all concepts that seem applicable. And despite their theme of regional coalition building, the authors neglect to draw comparisons with Myron Orfield's *Metropolitics*. They might also have given a nod to Clarence Stone, except that their policy solutions rest entirely with the public sector and ignore the private actors necessary for successful regimes.

This is a hopeful book. Gottlieb et al. wrote it "at a political moment that is ripe for either a grassroots progressive policy agenda or a form of protracted political, economic, and cultural balkanization" (p. 3). Villaragosa's election suggests that their optimism may be justified.

Public Dollars, Private Stadiums: The Battle over Building Sports Stadiums. By Kevin J. Delaney and Rick Eckstein. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. Pp. x+240. \$22.95 (paper), \$60.00 (cloth).

Kevin Gotham
Tulane University

The study of professional sports stadiums has been dominated more by economic "impact" studies and uncritical journalism than by nuanced sociological analysis. Kevin J. Delaney and Rick Eckstein help remedy this problem by producing an intriguing comparative study of battles over sports stadiums in nine U.S. cities. Their book, *Public Dollars, Private Stadiums*, provides an original contribution to our understanding of the structural and historical characteristics of cities building new publicly financed stadiums. One goal of the book is to explain why stadium supporters are able to leverage public resources even in the face of considerable opposition. A second goal is to identify the strategies and tactics used by proponents to contest countervailing claims and evidence that show clearly the antidemocratic nature and inequities of stadium building. Stadium supporters have adopted several strategies to neutralize academic studies: ignore them, ridicule the methods or findings, try to counter them with their own "advocacy studies," change the subject, or make the argument that stadiums provide "intangible social benefits" such as publicity and notoriety for the city. Delaney and Eckstein borrow Émile Durkheim's concept of the "collective conscience" to explain how sports teams now regularly argue for and justify huge public subsidies for stadiums on the grounds that a winning sports team will solve social problems by building community solidarity.

Public Dollars, Private Stadiums is situated in a rich tradition of local community studies that probe urban power relations and organization of local growth coalitions, a concept that is an extension of Harvey Molotch and John Logan's notion of the "growth machine." Each chapter is organized to identify the strength and cohesiveness of the growth coalitions and the strategies they employ to obtain a new stadium. Indeed, a unified and powerful local growth coalition is the single most important factor responsible for securing public dollars for a new stadium, even in the face of vehement and organized opposition. Thus, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh have had easier times building stadiums, while Philadelphia, with its weak growth coalition, has had considerable problems. Other factors are important also. Cities with compliant media, a strong mayoral

form of government, and a business friendly mayor provide fertile ground for building stadiums. Cities with a variety of downtown residences and business are better able to mobilize opposition to stadiums than are cities with downtowns that close when commuters depart.

Among the strengths of this book is its clear explication of the key actors and organized interests supporting stadiums, the ideologies buttressing the claims of stadium proponents, and the constraints and opportunities local opposition groups face in challenging stadiums. The book notes that local opposition to stadiums reflects local idiosyncracies, demographics, and structural arrangements. Denver, Phoenix, and San Diego, for example, were successful in building stadiums despite the “power vacuum” created by the absence of a powerful local growth coalition (p. 152). Economic prosperity and increasing population in these cities means that stadium proponents could craft an argument that public financing for stadiums would help boost an already prosperous metropolitan economy. The book offers several lessons for opponents interested in fighting back. Locally, opponents must publicize the finances of the team and of its owners, organize boycotts, and target local businesses and nonsports organizations to raise critical awareness. Nationally, opponents must press for legislation that restricts the amount a city can spend on a sports stadium, laws mandating that teams pay a share of the stadium costs, and limits on team mobility. Finally, countering huge public subsidies for private stadiums requires not only that activists critique economic impact studies, but also that they counter arguments that new stadiums will enhance community self-esteem.

In the conclusion to the book, Delaney and Eckstein tell us the process of building stadiums is more akin to “plutocracy and oligarchy than democracy” (p. 183). Indeed, the increased ability of powerful stadium advocates to dismiss and ignore referenda against new stadiums and leverage huge subsidies skews the civic agenda to the detriment of fundamental municipal services, especially schools, parks, and libraries. Despite the important focus on inequality and democracy, the book does not show an impressive grasp of theoretical issues linking race, class, and local growth coalitions. Nor does it seriously engage with or challenge scholarly accounts that document the central importance race has played in structuring social relations, inequalities, and progrowth coalitions in U.S. metropolitan areas. In the end, *Public Dollars, Private Stadiums* provides an important perspective on the links between social inequalities and growth coalitions, but it does not offer a completely satisfying answer. Nevertheless, it is an outstanding piece of research that is probably one of the best books yet written on the conflicts and controversy of building sports stadiums. It combines a theoretically driven comparative analysis with a critical and debunking style that is truly impressive. General readers, undergraduate and graduate students, journalists, and academic specialists in urban studies will benefit from reading this book. I plan to use this book the next time I teach my urban policy course.

Home Ownership and Social Inequality in Comparative Perspective Edited by Karin Kurz and Hans-Peter Blossfeld Stanford, Calif Stanford University Press, 2004 Pp xvii+385 \$70 00

Florencia Torche
Queens College, CUNY

Stratification research has come a long way in understanding labor market-rooted inequality. Much less is known about the role of wealth and family transfers. This is unfortunate because wealth can significantly alter—either enhancing or reducing—labor market-based inequalities. Given this fact, Karin Kurz and Hans-Peter Blossfeld, in *Home Ownership and Social Inequality in Comparative Perspective*, offer a study of the relationship between home ownership and social inequality. Following what has become a tradition in stratification research, the editors use a comparative format in this edited volume covering 12 industrialized countries. The presentation of the chapters follows Esping-Andersen's typology of "welfare capitalism" and includes three conservative regimes (West Germany, France, and Belgium), three social-democratic nations (the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway), and three liberal countries (Britain, Ireland, and the United States). To this, the editors add both a Southern European group, represented by Italy and Spain, as well as Israel.

Each chapter is written by one or more national experts and provides an excellent historical account of the economic and institutional factors shaping national housing markets. Chapters describe the prevalence and costs of different tenure types—home ownership and renting, public and private—as determined by macroeconomic factors and government action in the form of housing policies, subsidies, taxes, and regulations.

The volume addresses two assertions: first, that social class influences access to home ownership, and second, that welfare regimes determine the ways in which class matters. The editors predict the link between class and home ownership to be greatest in the liberal and Southern European "weaker states," moderate in conservative regimes, and lowest in social democratic nations. In order to address these assertions, each chapter is asked to explore the relationship between home ownership and three factors: class and income, intergenerational transfers, and birth cohort (p. 15).

As emphasized in the concluding chapter, a main way in which government matters is by affecting the "relative costs of owning versus renting" (p. 366). Country analyses make clear that home ownership rates as low as 43% in West Germany and as high as around 80% in Spain, Norway, Israel, and Ireland are consistently explained by government influences on such costs. However, beyond the higher home ownership rates in liberal countries and the prevalence of self-building in conservative nations, there is not a univocal association between welfare regime and dominant tenure status. Two factors help explain this lack of asso-

ciation First, ideological goals of welfare regimes can be attained through alternative routes In the case of social democratic regimes, for instance, decommmodification of housing was achieved through affordable home ownership (Norway) or through a nonprofit rental sector (Denmark) Second, housing policy has unintended consequences For example, in the United Kingdom, Israel, Spain, and Italy the government's attempt to afford access to rental housing through regulation actually boosted home ownership by discouraging landlords These findings are an important caveat against easy generalizations and highlight the value of a comparative analysis of the institutional determinants of home ownership

The analysis of the association between class and home ownership is, in my view, weaker, and it highlights the major challenge of comparative projects ensuring comparability If inferences are to be made about international variation, comparability is crucial in the operationalization of the key predictor and methods Unfortunately, the chapters in this volume use diverse and sometimes highly aggregated measures of social class The methods are even more heterogeneous some chapters use only bivariate analyses, and when multivariate models are presented, they include logistic regression, piecewise exponential, and Cox proportional hazard models, with a widely diverse set of controls Naturally, some heterogeneity is driven by data constraints, but some could have been prevented

In spite of heterogeneity in the case studies, findings consistently suggest that socioeconomic resources do influence access to home ownership In almost all countries professional groups have a very high home ownership rate, unskilled manual workers have the lowest one At the same time, there seem to be two overlapping hierarchies one manual and one non-manual, with home ownership among the skilled working class usually surpassing that of the lower nonmanual classes As expected, farmers and self-employed groups tend to have high home ownership rates We also learn that other factors, such as life-cycle stage, family structure, and rural-urban residence, matter tremendously and sometimes interact with class Furthermore, most of the seven country studies that investigate differences across cohorts or periods (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Israel) suggest that access to home ownership for lower-class groups has worsened over time Findings about intergenerational assistance are less conclusive Based on four countries (Denmark, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Israel), the role of family transfers appears to be mediated by the characteristics of the spouses

Insofar as "real" differences between countries are potentially confounded with diversity in measures and methods, these findings do not provide a conclusive answer to the question of international variation in the inequality-home ownership association However, they offer a pioneering, important breakthrough in an area where much research is needed Some researchers will find the focus on home ownership as the volume's outcome of interest limited As the chapter on Israel indicates, given the near universality of home ownership in many countries, in-

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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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